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(영문) 대법원 1996. 1. 26. 선고 94다54481 판결
[소유권이전등기][공1996.3.15.(6),726]
Main Issues

The meaning of a contract for a third party and the criteria for its identification;

Summary of Judgment

Unlike the fact that a general contract for a third party is concluded with an intention to take effect only between the parties, it is a contract with the intention to have a third party acquire rights directly to one of the parties to the contract. Whether a contract constitutes a contract for a third party is an issue of interpreting the intent of the parties to the contract to obtain rights directly to a third party by the contract. This is a matter of interpreting the intent of the parties to the contract, which is the purpose of the conclusion of the contract, the nature of the acts of the parties to the contract, the profits and losses arising between the parties or between the parties to the contract, transaction practices, and the social functions of the contract system for the third party, and can be determined by interpreting the reasonable intent of the parties to the contract.

[Reference Provisions]

Articles 105 and 539 of the Civil Act

Reference Cases

Supreme Court Decision 85Meu239 Decided July 24, 1986 (Gong1986, 1090), Supreme Court Decision 87Meu2009 Decided December 8, 1987 (Gong1988, 277), Supreme Court Decision 92Da41559 Decided August 12, 1994 (Gong194Ha, 2280)

Plaintiff, Appellant

Plaintiff 1 and one other (Attorneys Kim Young-sub et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Defendant, Appellee

Defendant 1 and one other (Defendant Law Firm Solomon General Law Office, Attorneys Kim Yong-han, Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Judgment of the lower court

Seoul Private District Court Decision 94Na17597 delivered on October 14, 1994

Text

All appeals are dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiffs.

Reasons

We examine the Plaintiffs’ grounds of appeal.

1. We examine the grounds of appeal concerning the plaintiffs' primary claim.

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below determined that the protocol of settlement was prepared as of September 13, 191 (if the original court decided as of September 18, 1991) between the deceased non-party 1, non-party 2 and the deceased non-party 2 and the plaintiff 1, and that the effect of the above protocol of settlement was reached between the plaintiffs and the defendant 2, recognizing that the plaintiff 2 was the sole heir of the above non-party 2, and the defendant 2 became the sole heir of the above non-party 1, and that the effect of the above protocol of settlement would also extend to the plaintiff and the defendant 2. The plaintiffs' lawsuit against the defendant 2 seeking the performance of the transfer registration of ownership share to the same effect as the above protocol of settlement, as there is no interest in the lawsuit, and as long as the defendant 1 is not the party of the above settlement or the deceased non-party 1's property, the defendant is not obligated to perform the transfer registration procedure due to the above settlement. The above fact-finding and the above judgment below is justified and there are no errors in misapprehension of legal principles.

2. We examine the grounds of appeal related to the plaintiffs' preliminary claim.

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below held that the above settlement agreement includes a settlement contract for a third party with the plaintiff 1 and the defendant 1 who is the party to the settlement contract for the above third party, since it is reasonable to view that the above settlement agreement was concluded between the above non-party 1 and the defendant 1 in April 17, 192, but that the contents thereof completed the registration of ownership transfer with respect to one half of the forest of this case to the above non-party 1, and that the above non-party 1 transferred one half of them to the plaintiff 1 and his heir to the above non-party 2. The above settlement agreement includes a settlement contract for the third party with the plaintiff 1 and the above non-party 1, who is the party to the settlement contract for the above third party, was cancelled by recognizing that the plaintiff 1 was the sole ownership of the forest of this case before the plaintiffs expressed their intent of profits. Thus, the conjunctive claim against the defendant 2 based on the above settlement agreement of this case against the plaintiff 1 is not justified, and there is no right to preserve.

Therefore, unlike the fact that a contract for a third party is ordinarily concluded between the parties, the contract for a third party is for the purpose of having a third party acquire rights directly to one of the parties to the contract under the name of the party to the contract. Whether a contract constitutes a contract for a third party is a matter of interpreting the intent of the party to the contract to directly acquire rights directly to the third party under the contract. This is a matter of interpreting the intention of the party to the contract. This is a matter of interpreting the intention of the party to the contract, such as the purpose of the conclusion of the contract, the nature of the act of the party to the contract, and the social function of the contract system for the third party, such as the gain and loss of understanding between the parties or the third party due to the contract, transaction practices, and social function of the contract system for the third party.

However, even if examining the contents and the process of the above judicial compromise in accordance with the records, there is no circumstance that the plaintiff 1 and the above deceased non-party 2, the heir of the above deceased non-party 2, paid the price for the transfer of ownership in the forest of this case by the non-party 1, or that the above non-party 1, who received the transfer registration of ownership in the forest of this case from the defendant 1, decided to invalidate the above compromise if he did not follow the procedure for the transfer registration of ownership in the above shares to the plaintiffs. The part that the court below held that the above non-party 1 is a contract for the third party among the above contents of the judicial compromise is a contract for the above non-party 1 and the non-party 2, and the plaintiff 1, the above non-party 1, who is the heir of the above deceased non-party 2, cannot be deemed to have obtained new rights and obligations from the above provisions. Thus, the above settlement cannot be deemed to have been included in the contract for the third party.

If the contract for the third party as alleged by the plaintiff is not included in the judicial compromise made between the non-party 1 and the defendant 1 on April 17, 1992, the above judicial compromise does not affect the plaintiffs, and there is no right to claim for transfer registration of forest land ownership against the defendant 2. Thus, the plaintiffs' claim against the defendant 2 against the defendant 2 is dismissed as there is no reason. In order to preserve the plaintiffs' right to claim transfer registration of forest land ownership against the defendant 2, the plaintiff 1's claim against the defendant 2 by subrogation against the defendant 2 against the defendant 2 cannot be dismissed as it is illegal as it is not recognized as the plaintiff's right to claim for transfer registration of ownership against the defendant 2.

Ultimately, while the court below erred in its reasoning that the above contract for a third party is included in the above judicial compromise, it is correct to dismiss or dismiss the plaintiffs' claim for the conjunctive claim in this case as above, and the appeal for the conjunctive claim in this case is based on the premise that the contract for a third party is included in the above judicial compromise, and therefore, it is no longer reasonable to review further.

3. Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Cho Chang-tae (Presiding Justice)

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심급 사건
-서울민사지방법원 1994.10.14.선고 94나17597
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