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(영문) 대법원 2017. 7. 18. 선고 2016다216953 판결
[손해배상(자)]〈자동차 운행 중 동승자가 뛰어내려 사망한 사고가 ‘승객이 고의나 자살행위로 사망한 경우’에 해당하여 보험자가 면책되는지 문제 된 사건〉[공2017하,1711]
Main Issues

[1] The legal nature of the self-physical accident insurance (=personal insurance), and the intent of the insured as stipulated by the insurer’s exemption from liability in the life insurance covering death or bodily injury as an insured event should be caused by the act deliberately assessed in light of the whole of the insured event (affirmative)

[2] Purport of the provision of Article 3 of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act and whether “the act of passengers’ intentional act or suicide” under Article 3 subparag. 2 of the same Act is limited to the act done with awareness in accordance with the free decision-making of passengers (affirmative)

Summary of Judgment

[1] A self-physical accident insurance policy is a kind of personal insurance policy in which an insurer is liable to pay insurance proceeds when an insured incident occurs with respect to the life or body of the insured, and its nature is equal to that of personal insurance. In a case where the terms and conditions of an insurance contract stipulate that the insurer shall be exempted from liability in the event of the insured’s intentional loss with respect to one’s own physical accident, the insured’s intentional act in personal insurance which covers death or bodily injury should be caused by intentional evaluation of the insurance accident as a whole.

[2] Article 3 of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act (hereinafter “automobile Accident Compensation Act”) provides that “When a person who operates an automobile for his own sake causes the death or injury of another person due to the operation thereof, he shall be liable to compensate for the damage therefrom: Provided, That this shall not apply to the case where a passenger is killed or injured due to his intentional act or suicide.” The above provision further protects the passenger by distinguishing the cases of death or injury from those other than the passenger. The passenger is integrated with the risks of an automobile by boarding the automobile, and is more dangerous than those of the non-passenger. Therefore, in the event the passenger dies of the automobile accident, the operator is liable to compensate for the damage resulting from the death of the passenger without asserting and proving that the death of the passenger was caused by his intentional act or suicide.

In light of the purpose of the Automobile Liability Act, where a person dies or is injured due to the operation of a motor vehicle, the purpose of the Act is to protect the victims and promote the sound development of the transportation of motor vehicles by establishing a system for guaranteeing compensation for damages (Article 1), “the act of passengers’ intentional act or suicide” is limited to the act done on the basis of free decision-

[Reference Provisions]

[1] Articles 659(1), 663, 732-2, and 739 of the Commercial Act / [2] Articles 1 and 3 of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act

Reference Cases

[1] Supreme Court Decision 98Da35730 Decided December 22, 1998 (Gong1999Sang, 190), Supreme Court Decision 2009Da38438 Decided March 25, 2010 / [2] Supreme Court Decision 93Da6560 Decided May 27, 1993 (Gong193Ha, 1879), Supreme Court Decision 95Da2215 Decided November 11, 1997 (Gong197Ha, 3743), Constitutional Court en banc Decision 96Hun-Ga4, 97Hun-Ga6, 7, 96Hun-Ba58 Decided May 28, 198 (Gong28, 438)

Plaintiff-Appellee

Plaintiff 1 and one other

Defendant-Appellant

Heung Fire and Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (Law Firm just Law, Attorneys Kim Jin-hee et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Judgment of the lower court

Seoul Central District Court Decision 2015Na11341 Decided March 17, 2016

Text

All appeals are dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

Reasons

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. The lower court rejected the Defendant’s assertion that the instant accident was caused intentionally by the deceased Nonparty (hereinafter “the deceased”) without distinguishing the reasons for exemption from the insurer’s liability under the proviso of Article 3 subparag. 2 of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act (hereinafter “The Automobile Accident Compensation Act”) and the reasons for exemption from the insurer’s personal body accident under Article 14 of the terms of the instant insurance contract. In other words, in view of the circumstances where the deceased was not completely cured at the time of the instant accident and there was considerable psychological anxiety, etc., it is recognized and used to recognize that the instant vehicle, which was driven at a speed of 40-50 km each hour, would inflict a significant injury on the part of the deceased, but it cannot be deemed that it was aware and used as a significant result, such as death.

2. Of the instant insurance contract, the automobile insurance is liable for the insurer to pay the insurance money stipulated by the insurance contract in the event an insured incident occurs with respect to the life or body of the insured (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 98Da35730, Dec. 22, 1998). Article 14 of the instant insurance contract provides that the insurer shall be exempted from liability in the event of the insured’s intentional loss with respect to one’s own physical accident (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 98Da35730, Dec. 22, 1998). The insured’s intentional act in the personal insurance that covers death or bodily injury must be caused by the act of deliberately assessing the insurance accident as a whole (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2009Da38438, Mar.

Meanwhile, Article 3 of the Automobile Loss Act provides, “When a person who operates an automobile for his own sake has killed or injured another person due to the operation thereof, he shall be liable to compensate for the damage thereof: Provided, That this shall not apply to the case where a passenger has killed or injured a passenger due to his intentional act or suicide.” The above provision protects the passenger separately from a person who is not a passenger in the case of his death or injury. This is more dangerous than a person who is not a passenger because the passenger is integrated with the risks of an automobile by boarding the automobile. As such, in the event of the death of a passenger due to an automobile accident, the operator is liable to compensate for the damage resulting from the death of the passenger without any negligence unless the passenger asserts and proves that the death of the passenger was caused by his intentional act or suicide (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 93Da6560, May 27, 1993; 96Hun-Ga4, 97Hun-Ga6, 7, 96Hun-Ba58, May 28, 1998).

In light of the purpose of the Automobile Loss Compensation Act, where a person dies or is injured due to the operation of a motor vehicle, the purpose of the said Act is to protect the victims and promote the sound development of the transportation of motor vehicles (Article 1), “the act of passengers’ intentional act or suicide” is limited to the act done scruptly based on the free decision-making of passengers (see Supreme Court Decision 95Da22115, Nov. 11, 1997, etc.).

3. We examine the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the above legal principles and records.

The court below determined that the death of the deceased was not caused by an intentional act on the premise that even “the intent of the passengers” stipulated in Article 3 subparag. 2 of the proviso of Article 3 of the Automobile Loss Compensation Act may be invoked as it is, on the premise that the concept of “the intent of the insured” stipulated in the terms and conditions of life insurance exemption is not attributable to the intentional act. However, as otherwise asserted in the ground of appeal by the defendant, it is difficult to readily conclude that the deceased completely recovered from the existing mental illness and went against the consciousness of the deceased depending on free decision-making, and it does not seem to have been proven otherwise.

Therefore, the judgment of the court below that the defendant cannot claim the exemption of the operator under Article 3 (2) 2 of the Automobile Loss Compensation Act is justified as a result, and the judgment below's error did not affect the conclusion of the judgment. The ground of appeal cannot be accepted.

4. Conclusion

The appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Kwon Soon-il (Presiding Justice)

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