(a) The sex of confinement by psychological or intangible disorder;

B. Whether an application for adjudication is dismissed where it is deemed that a disposition to suspend indictment is illegal even if such disposition is illegal

A. The act of confinement in the crime of confinement refers to an act of restricting physical freedom by preventing a person from leaving a certain place, and its method includes not only physical and tangible obstacles but also psychological and intangible obstacles. If there is a tangible or intangible suppression that restricts the victim's physical freedom so that the victim might not leave the police station even if he/she acted freely, it may constitute the act of confinement immediately.

B. Even if the prosecutor’s intangible non-prosecution disposition on the propriety of a disposition that does not institute a public prosecution is illegal, the court may dismiss an application for a ruling where it recognizes that the prosecutor’s refusal of indictment can be subject to a non-prosecution disposition based on the circumstances indicated in the record.

A. Article 276 of the Criminal Procedure Act

A. Supreme Court Order 84Do2083 Decided June 25, 1985 (Gong1985,1081) 85Mo16 dated July 29, 1985 (Gong1985,1224) (Gong1992,818) 91Mo5 dated December 30, 1991 (Gong1992,818). Supreme Court Order 85Mo37 dated September 16, 1986 (Gong1986,1425) 93Mo9 dated August 12, 1993 (Gong193Ha,2483)

Re-appellant

Supreme Court Order 91Mo5 Dated December 30, 1991

Seoul High Court Order 92 seconds21 Dated December 13, 1993

The reappeal is dismissed.

The ground of reappeal No. 1 is examined.

In comparison with the reasoning of the judgment of the court below, the judgment of the court below as to the process that the suspect conducted the re-appellant as an inspector of the Yongsan Police Station and detained by the warrant of detention is just, and there is no error of law such as the theory of litigation.

Furthermore, the court below affirmed the judgment of the court below to the purport that the suspect's investigation was conducted on July 21, 1989: 00 to July 24, 1989; 82 hours from the time of the re-appellant's acceptance of the suspect's disease to July 24, 1989; the suspect's investigation was conducted on the part of the above police station investigation office and the waiting room for the criminal suspect for about 82 hours prior to the execution of the defendant's detention warrant; such measures were minimum necessary for the investigation; thus, the suspect did not unfairly prolonged the investigation period or intentionally detained the re-appellant; the suspect did not comply with the demand of voluntary withdrawal to undergo the investigation; the suspect's voluntary withdrawal; the suspect's refusal to undergo the investigation; and the suspect's escape was likely to escape if the suspect presented to the defendant; and the defendant's thorough request for the investigation was no longer free from the inquiry or waiting room; and the prosecutor's ex officio abuse of the suspect's order to prosecute the suspect (the defendant's act of this case).

However, the act of confinement in the crime of confinement refers to an act of restricting physical freedom by preventing a person from leaving a certain place, and its method includes not only physical and tangible obstacles but also psychological and intangible obstacles. Even if the Re-Appellant acted freely in the police station as stated in its reasoning, there is a tangible or intangible suppression that restricts the Re-Appellant's physical freedom so that he/she does not leave the police station, it may be the act of confinement immediately if there is a tangible or intangible suppression that prevents the Re-Appellant from leaving the police station.

The court below cited the circumstance that the re-appellant requested a thorough and fair investigation to the suspect that he did not have the intention of confinement, and the situation that the part in the police station is better than the complainants. In light of the records, it is hard to believe each of the above statements in the prosecutor's office of the suspect 1, and each of the above statements in the prosecutor's office of the suspect 1, and the witness and the witness in the court of original trial, and even if the Re-Appellant made such remarks, it is hard to say that the Re-Appellant's own statement was conducted in a voluntary and voluntary manner, not in the Re-Appellant's own police station, but in the fact that the Re-Appellant took the place in the police station. In light of the fact that the Re-Appellant's statement was carried out by himself, it cannot be accepted to the purport that it was emphasized that it was carried out through a thorough and fair investigation and it was within the police station, and it cannot be concluded that there was no intention of confinement for the suspect.

Nevertheless, the lower court’s determination that the prosecutor’s non-prosecution disposition is justifiable on the grounds that it is not acceptable as stated in its holding does not constitute an error of law by misunderstanding the legal interpretation of illegal confinement or by failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations.

The second ground for reappeal is examined.

Even if a court which is subject to an application for a ruling on the propriety of a disposition not to institute a public prosecution is illegal, it may dismiss an application for a ruling where the court recognizes that a disposition not to institute a public prosecution is illegal, taking into account all the circumstances indicated in the records, in light of all the circumstances indicated in the records (see Supreme Court Order 85Mo37, Sept. 16, 1986).

In addition to the court below's decision that the prosecutor's non-prosecution disposition is justifiable, the court below judged that the suspect's act constitutes illegal confinement, such as the opinion of the court below, can be taken into account as the circumstances leading to the case, and the suspect has been physically involved in the police for a long time without the previous conviction, and it is reasonable to postpone prosecution only once after he sufficiently admonishs the future in light of the personal appraisal or interest. In light of the records, the reasoning for the decision of the court below as to this point is reasonable, and it cannot be said that there is any error such as the theory of lawsuit, and therefore, the court below's decision is just and acceptable despite the above illegality.

Therefore, the reappeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Park Jong-chul (Presiding Justice)