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(영문) 대법원 2015.2.12. 선고 2014두8711 판결
행정처분취소
Cases

2014Du8711 Revocation of an administrative disposition

Appellant and Appellee

A

Defendant Appellee et al.

person

The Deputy Director General of the Central Regional Employment and Labor Office;

Judgment of remand

Supreme Court Decision 2012Du2115 Decided September 26, 2013

The judgment below

Seoul High Court Decision 2013Nu28703 Decided May 16, 2014

Imposition of Judgment

February 12, 2015

Text

The part of the lower judgment against the Defendant is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court. The Plaintiff’s appeal is dismissed.

Reasons

1. The plaintiff's grounds of appeal are examined.

A. As to the first ground for appeal

On the grounds indicated in its reasoning, the lower court determined that the part of training expenses paid by the Plaintiff in excess of KRW 58,290, out of KRW 1,730,420, which was paid by the Defendant for three days of absence from training, is also included in training expenses paid by “any false or other unlawful means.” In light of the relevant legal principles and records, the lower court’s aforementioned determination is acceptable, and contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the wrongful receipt of training expenses, thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment.

B. As to the ground of appeal No. 2, the lower court’s determination that the restriction on entrustment and recognition of the entire process of maintaining a motor vehicle, which is a minor disposition, is unlawful, is logical contradictory to the purport that the court below’s determination that the restriction on entrustment and recognition of the entire process of maintaining a motor vehicle is lawful. However, as seen below, the lower court’s determination that the restriction on entrustment and recognition of the process of maintaining a motor vehicle was unlawful is erroneous. Thus, the first ground of appeal on a different premise

2. We examine the defendant's grounds of appeal ex officio before determining them.

A. In a case where the Plaintiff’s claim was partially accepted and the final appeal accepted this appeal and reversed and remanded the part against the Defendant, the subject matter of review in the final appeal is limited to this part. The scope of the case to be remanded, that is, the scope of the case to be remanded, that is, the lower court’s judgment is limited to the part against the Defendant prior to remand, and the part against the Plaintiff among the lower judgment prior to remand becomes final and conclusive, the lower court cannot review it after remand (see Supreme Court Decision 2011Da31706, Feb. 28, 2013).

B. According to the records, the court below, prior to the remanding of the case, appealed only to the judgment that held that the part exceeding one year out of the 1.5-year consignment and restriction of qualification for the automobile maintenance process was unlawful, and the appellate court accepted the defendant's appeal and reversed and remanded the part against the defendant among the judgment below. Thus, in accordance with the legal principles as seen earlier, one year of the above restriction of consignment and restriction of recognition, which is the part against the plaintiff before remanding of the judgment below, became final and conclusive, the court below cannot review it

C. Nevertheless, the lower court deemed all of the foregoing restrictions on consignment and recognition as the same subject matter of lawsuit and also deemed the same part for one year, which became final and conclusive, as the subject matter of adjudication. In so doing, it erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the scope of adjudication by the lower court after the reversal and return, thereby adversely affecting

3. The defendant's grounds of appeal are examined as to the part exceeding one year among the restrictions on entrustment and recognition of the automobile maintenance process.

A. The lower court, in light of the relevant laws and the Enforcement Rule, provides that the restriction on the entrustment and recognition of the relevant training courses may be imposed for one year upon termination of the contract and the relevant training courses where the training personnel has been fabricated or managed by fraudulent or other illegal means in connection with the management of trainees, and that there is no provision that the restriction on the entrustment and recognition of the relevant training courses may be imposed on the grounds that training expenses were illegally received, and that with respect to the Plaintiff’s act of receiving training expenses by fraudulent or other illegal means, the entrustment and recognition of all the relevant training courses are limited, and that the part exceeding one year out of the restriction on the entrustment and recognition of the automobile maintenance process is illegal.

B. However, the lower court’s determination is difficult to accept for the following reasons.

1) Attached Table 1 of the former Enforcement Rule of the Act on the Development of Workplace Skills of Workers (amended by Ordinance of the Ministry of Employment and Labor No. 5 of Aug. 30, 2010, and amended by Ordinance of the Ministry of Employment and Labor No. 20 of Mar. 11, 2011; hereinafter “Enforcement Rule”) that applies to the instant disposition, separates two kinds of restrictions on entrustment and recognition of the entire course to all training courses conducted by the relevant training institution and relevant restrictions on entrustment and recognition of the relevant course. In addition, in cases of the unlawful receipt of training costs equivalent to one million won to five million won, the imposition of restrictions on entrustment and recognition of the entire course for three months in addition to termination of the contract due to improper removal and management, the imposition of restrictions on entrustment and recognition of the relevant process may be deemed legitimate, in addition, in cases of a specific case, the imposition of restrictions on entrustment and recognition may be deemed to have been made within one year prior to the completion of the contract, and thus, the relevant reduction and restriction period may be deemed to have more than the foregoing imposition period.

2) According to the reasoning of the lower judgment and the record, the Defendant deemed that the Plaintiff’s violation constituted both the Plaintiff’s act of unlawfully receiving training costs of KRW 1,730,420 and the act of violating an entrustment contract due to illegal outflow management. The Defendant’s disposition on the entire process constitutes a legitimate disposition of restricting commission and recognition for 1.5 months from October 16, 2010 to November 30, 201, and at the same time, a disposition of restricting commission and recognition for the automobile maintenance process, which is the pertinent process, for 1.5 months from November 30, 209 to January 13, 201. As seen earlier, the Defendant’s disposition of restricting commission and recognition for 15 months from the initial process of consignment and recognition for 3 months, and the pertinent disposition of restricting commission and recognition for 15 months from the initial process of restricting commission and recognition for 15 months can only be deemed unlawful. As such, the Defendant’s disposition can only be deemed unlawful for the pertinent period of one year prior to the entrustment process.

C. Nevertheless, solely based on its reasoning, the lower court determined that the part exceeding one year among the restrictions on consignment and recognition of the automobile maintenance process was unlawful. In so doing, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the restrictions on consignment and recognition of workplace skill development training under the Act on the Development of Workplace Skills of Workers, thereby affecting

4. Therefore, without examining the Defendant’s remaining grounds of appeal, the part against the Defendant is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. The Plaintiff’s appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Judges

Justices Min Il-young

Justices Park Young-young

Justices Kim In-bok, Counsel for defendant

Justices Kim Jong-il

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