(영문) 부산지방법원 2017.4.13. 선고 2015구합22906 판결

(a) cancellation of recognition of "construction machinery (midstanding season + operation practices) deepening driving practices," and restrictions on recognition of entrustment for two years (from July 7, 2015 to July 6, 2017) ;

B. A disposition of restriction on recognition of entrustment for one year (from July 7, 2015 to July 6, 2016) for the entire process, is revoked. A disposition of return of KRW 15,119,870 for illegally received amount and additional collection of KRW 15,119,870 for 15,00 shall be revoked.

2. The Defendant’s disposition suspending qualification for two years (from July 7, 2015 to July 6, 2017) against Plaintiff B and C on July 7, 2015 is revoked, respectively.

Reasons

1. Details of the disposition;

A. The Plaintiff Incorporated Foundation A (hereinafter referred to as the “Plaintiff Incorporated”) is operating vocational ability development training facilities under the former Act on the Development of Workplace Skills of Workers (amended by Act No. 13902, Jan. 27, 2016; hereinafter referred to as “Vocational Skills Development Act”), and Plaintiff B and C are training teachers belonging to the Plaintiff Incorporated.

B. The Plaintiff’s foundation recognized the instant training course, including the 130 driver’s room and the 1,900 driver’s room and the 1,00,000 driver’s hall and the 1,000 driver’s hall and the 1,000 driver’s hall and the 1,000 driver’s hall and the 1,000 driver’s hall and the 1,000 driver’s hall and the 1,000 driver’s hall and the 1,000 driver’s hall and the 1,000 driver’s hall and the 2015 hall and received training expenses. The Defendant reported that the Plaintiff’s company conducted other training courses than the instant training course, which was recognized by the Plaintiff foundation, conducted the instant training course. On July 7, 2015, the Plaintiffs were subject to the following dispositions (hereinafter referred to as “each disposition”).

A person shall be appointed.

D. The Defendant accused E, the representative of the Plaintiff corporation, on suspicion of fraud, and the Busan District Prosecutor’s Office filed a request for a summary order against E with this Court. E filed an application for formal trial with this Court 2015Da4250, Jan. 20, 2016, which was sentenced to a fine of KRW 5 million from the above court. E appealed appealed from this court 2016No483, Sept. 23, 2016, and the above court rendered a judgment not guilty on the grounds that “E, despite being aware of the voluntary change of the training course, applied for training expenses to the Ministry of Employment and Labor according to the previous training course,” and the judgment became final and conclusive around that time. On December 24, 2016, the Defendant filed an application for a summary order with this Court for a summary order for the above amount of KRW 15,19,170 [15,70,700 for training expenses per 70 hours for correction of KRW 75 hours per Government Product Training, -175 hours per 70 hours per 5 hours per Government Product.

[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence Nos. 1 through 6, Eul evidence Nos. 1 through 13, 15, 16, 18 through 21 (including provisional number), the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Whether each of the dispositions of this case is legitimate

A. The plaintiffs' assertion

(1) As to the cancellation of recognition of the pertinent process for the Plaintiff corporation (A) and the two-year consignment and restriction on recognition

1) The main purpose of the instant training course is to improve the vocational ability of the unemployed through the driving training of construction machinery. Thus, even if a part of the trainees received training instead of a mid-term training, this is to achieve the original training purpose, such as acquisition of qualification certificates, employment, etc., and thus, it cannot be deemed as violating the contents recognized to the extent that it violates the purpose of training. This constitutes “where vocational ability development training is conducted in violation of the recognized contents as prescribed in Article 6-3 [Attachment 1-2] 2-5] of the Enforcement Rule of the Vocational Training Act, and is merely an object of the corrective order.”

2) The Defendant, based on the foregoing attached Table 1.5(d) of the same attached Table 1.2(d) of the same Table, imposed a restriction on consignment and recognition of the relevant course for two years by aggregating the limitation period of one-year entrustment of one-year course according to the foregoing attached Table 2.2(d) (illegal supply and demand) and the limitation period of one-year entrustment of one-year course pursuant to Article 2.5(5)(a) of the same attached Table of the same attached Table. However, the foregoing limitation period can be added up only when the grounds for each disposition on the relevant process or the entire process exist at the same time. As such, it is unreasonable that the nature of

(B) As to the restriction of recognition of one-year entrustment and the additional collection of return orders for the entire process

1) Although the Plaintiff corporation intended to implement the initial training programs recognized, it had to conduct training programs to meet the demand of trainees, so the Plaintiff corporation did not have any intent to receive training costs by unlawful means.

2) Although the Defendant considered the difference between training costs and training costs for the instant training course as an unfair payment amount, the occurrence of the difference between training costs due to the change in the training content was attributable to the unexpected circumstance that the government voluntarily determined training costs, and thus, the Plaintiff corporation cannot be deemed to have received financial benefits due to the change in the training content, and there was no economic benefits due to the change in the training content.

3) Some training courses, such as common theoretical classes for all trainees, cannot cause the difference between training costs. Considering the fact that the training content is changed to the middle of the training course, the difference between training costs cannot be deemed to be an unfair payment amount, given that all trainees choose to substitute for the end of the training period from the date of the first training.

Even if the plaintiff corporation conducted training in violation of the recognized contents, the degree of violation is minor, the result of the training of the plaintiff corporation was excellent, and no disposition was made in violation of the training standards, and in particular, the restriction on entrustment and recognition of the whole process is a disposition that actually closes the plaintiff corporation, it constitutes a deviation or abuse of discretionary authority under the proviso to Article 6-3 [Attachment 1-2] 1.1 of the Enforcement Rule of the Vocational Skills Development Act.

(2) As long as the restriction on consignment to Plaintiff B and C is unlawful, the suspension of qualification against Plaintiff B and C, who is a training teacher of Plaintiff corporation, is unlawful on the premise that the restriction is unlawful.

B. Relevant statutes

The entries in the attached Table-related statutes are as follows.

C. Determination on the disposition against the plaintiff corporation

(A) As to the cancellation of recognition for the relevant process and a disposition to restrict recognition for two years;

1) Comprehensively taking account of the overall purport of the statements and arguments in the evidence Nos. 1 through 10, 15, 16, 18, and 19 as to the existence of the grounds for disposition, the Plaintiff’s purpose of the above training course at the time of obtaining the recognition of the training course of this case from the Defendant is to obtain a national technical qualification witness’s license, driving technician, and skill manpower who can be in charge of driving of cateral skills, and to train expert manpower who can be in charge of operating of cateral skills. The Plaintiff’s training methods, training methods, training instructors and instructors, training places, training facilities and equipment also correspond to the training practice of cirral skills + operation of ciral skills. The Plaintiff’s training instructors, including the Plaintiff B and C, knowing the contents of the training course of this case, are recognized as denying the Plaintiff’s 66 training personnel from conducting ciralizing cirral skills with other training contents, training methods, training facilities, equipment, etc.

In this context, the recognition of workplace skill development training courses and the subsidization of training expenses therefor are divided by each training course, so the execution of the training course deviating from the contents of the training course of this case is deemed to be in violation of the original recognized training purpose. In light of the fact that the act of improper training by the plaintiff corporation in this case violates the purpose of training, it constitutes "where workplace skill development training (including account combined training courses) is conducted in violation of the recognized contents under Article 19 (2) 5 of the Vocational Skills Development Act," which constitutes "where the act of this case violates the contents of training, training methods, training instructors and instructors, training places, training facilities and equipment, etc." under Article 6-3 [Attachment Table 1-2] 5] (a) of the Enforcement Rule of the same Act. Therefore, there are grounds for disposition in this part.

2) Whether the restriction period is appropriate

The instant unfair training act constitutes a ground for restriction on recognition of commission for the relevant process pursuant to Article 2.5(a) of the aforementioned attached Table 2.5(a) and at the same time constitutes grounds for restriction on commission and recognition for the entire process as seen below. The foregoing attached Table 1.5(5) provides that “where at least two grounds for restriction on commission and recognition occur simultaneously, the period of restriction on commission and recognition shall be the period calculated by adding up the period of each restriction within three years.” Since the entire course of vocational development training includes each individual training course, the grounds for restriction on recognition of commission for the entire process constitutes grounds for restriction on recognition of commission for the relevant process.

Therefore, pursuant to attached Table 1.5(e) above, the Defendant may impose a total of two years of restriction period calculated by aggregating one year of each restriction period as to the relevant process pursuant to the foregoing attached Table 1.5, and as such, the restriction on recognition of entrustment to the relevant process for two years (from July 7, 2015 to July 6, 2017) was imposed within the period of restriction on entrustment to the entire process (from July 7, 2015 to July 6, 2016), it cannot be deemed that the sum of restriction periods is otherwise unfair.

(B) As to the restriction of recognition of one-year entrustment and the additional collection of return orders for the entire process

(i) the existence of the reasons for the measure

"False or other fraudulent means" under Article 19 (2) 2 and Article 56 (2) of the Vocational Skills Development Act means the affirmative and passive act that may have an impact on decision-making with respect to subsidization of expenses, in general, all acts that are not correct by social norms to see that a person who is not eligible to receive subsidization of training expenses has a qualification or to conceal the fact that he/she is not eligible.

With respect to this case, the health team and the Plaintiff corporation will meet the demand of trainees.

Even if the Plaintiff Company conducted the instant training activity different from that of the instant training course, the Plaintiff Company’s training costs related thereto cannot be subsidized through due process. Therefore, as if the Plaintiff Company conducted the instant training course, the Defendant’s claim for subsidies for training costs constitutes false or other unlawful means under Articles 19(2)2 and 56(2) of the Vocational Skills Development Act, and this does not inquire whether the Plaintiff Company actually suffered economic benefits.

As such, inasmuch as the Plaintiff corporation received subsidies for training expenses by fraud or other improper means, it constitutes grounds for restricting the recognition of entrustment for one year for the entire process and for additionally collecting an amount equivalent to the amount of unfair payment, pursuant to Articles 19(2)2 and 56(2) of the same Act, Article 50 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, and Article 6-3 [Attachment Table 1-2] 2) (d) of the Enforcement Rule of the same Act.

2) Whether the amount of unlawful receipt and the amount of additional collection are calculated

The Plaintiff asserts to the purport that the total amount of the training fees cannot be deemed as the amount unlawfully received or additionally collected, as the trainees subject to the instant unlawful training had completed a part of the training course. However, even if a part of the training consistent with the instant training course, such as a common theoretical education, was conducted, other contents different from the instant training course when comprehensively evaluating the training course conducted for the trainees subject to the instant unlawful training. As such, KRW 15,119,870, which is the amount equivalent to the difference between the training expenses calculated by the Defendant, can be deemed as the amount wrongfully received, and the amount equivalent to the above amount may be additionally collected (no materials exist to clearly know the details, time, etc. of the training that can be deemed to have been conducted).

In light of the fact that the instant unlawful training act was conducted with about 130 trainees for about 1 year and 130 trainees, the degree of violation cannot be deemed minor, and the amount of illegal receipt is deemed to be significantly lacking in the attention on the management and supervision of training instructors, and thus, it does not constitute subject to mitigation under the proviso of attached Table 1.1). Furthermore, workplace skill development training is conducted with limited financial resources, such as the Employment Insurance Fund under the Budget and Employment Insurance Act, and it is conducted by the above disposition, and public interest is highly high, and it is necessary to manage whether the training is conducted in accordance with the recognized training course in order to achieve the purpose of workplace skill development training and prevent the unfair claim for training fees. In addition, taking into account various circumstances revealed in the argument process of this case, each of the above dispositions is deemed to have exceeded and abused the Defendant’s discretionary power.

The fact that Plaintiff B and C, a training teacher belonging to the Plaintiff corporation, conducted the instant training activity with knowledge that it is different from the instant training course, and the fact that the Plaintiff corporation received a disposition of restriction on recognition, as seen earlier, is deemed to have violated the contents recognized to the extent that it would violate the purpose of training, and thus significantly impeded vocational ability development training.

Therefore, the above plaintiffs' act constitutes "a case where a serious obstacle to workplace skill development training is caused by intention or gross negligence as stipulated in Article 35 (1) 3 of the Workplace Skill Development Act, and the training institution has received a disposition of recognition restriction under Article 19 (3) of the Enforcement Rule of the same Act (two years of suspension of qualification) by intention or gross negligence under Article 17 [Attachment 4] 3. b. of the same Act. Thus, there is no circumstance that this part of the grounds for the disposition exists and that this part of the disposition is unlawful.

E. Sub-committee

Therefore, since each disposition of this case is legitimate, the plaintiffs' assertion is not accepted.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, all of the plaintiffs' claims are dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition.

Judges

The presiding judge, senior judge and senior judge

Judges 00 Efficacy

Judge Choi Jin-hun

Note tin

1) The Defendant’s unjust payment of the difference between the initial training costs and the training portion illegally conducted.

was calculated by the court. Accordingly, for the first time + for the first time, training between the cater and the forknive vehicles.

The difference in expenses shall be the amount of illegal receipt, and the amount of illegal receipt shall be calculated as zero won because there is no difference between training expenses.

was determined.

2) The written disposition described in Paragraph 2, but appears to be a clerical error.

3) The calculation method is as listed in Section 1. of each week, provided, however, that the error in the calculation of training costs that included one’s own contributions was corrected.