A. Requirements for a disposition by an administrative agency to be unlawful against the principle of trust protection

(b) The case holding that the requirements for protection of trust cannot be deemed to have been satisfied on the ground that the administrative agency granted a building permit for the previous land before the replotting becomes final and conclusive, but this cannot be deemed to have given a public opinion mark on the building permit for the land for which replotting is finalized, and that there cannot be no reason attributable to the plaintiff who trusted that the building permit can be newly granted.

A. In order to apply the principle of the protection of trust to the act of an administrative agency in administrative legal relations, first, the administrative agency should name the public opinion that is the object of trust to the individual; second, the administrative agency's opinion that is justified and trusted to the trust of the individual should not be attributable to the individual; third, the individual should have trusted and trusted the opinion name; fourth, the administrative agency's disposition against the above opinion name should result in infringing the individual's interest in trust; fourth, when meeting these requirements, the administrative agency's disposition shall be deemed to be unlawful against the principle of the protection of trust.

B. The case holding that although an administrative agency granted a building permit for the previous land before the land substitution becomes final and conclusive, it cannot be deemed that the plaintiff's previous land was subject to the land before the land ownership is acquired, this cannot be deemed to have given the plaintiff the public opinion opinion about the building permit for the land for which replotting is determined, and where an administrative agency had lawfully granted a building permit since it was abutting on the road at least 2 meters at the time of the initial disposition of the building permit, but where an extension or substantial repair is conducted on the premise of the existence of the existing house, it cannot be said that the plaintiff trusted that a new building permit can be obtained, or that there was no reason attributable to the plaintiff who trusted that the plaintiff would be able to obtain the building permit on the building site adjacent to the road when the land substitution becomes final and conclusive, and that the plaintiff did not own the above house for at least 10

(b) Article 1 of the Administrative Litigation Act / [General] Article 27(1) of the former Building Act (amended by Act No. 4381 of May 31, 191)

A. Supreme Court Decision 84Nu593 decided Apr. 23, 1985 (Gong1985,800) 86Nu92 decided May 26, 1987 (Gong1987,1079) 86Nu101 decided Sep. 13, 1988 (Gong1988,1282)

[Judgment of the court below]

The head of Dobong-gu Seoul Metropolitan Government

Seoul High Court Decision 91Gu829 delivered on August 28, 1991

The judgment below is reversed and the case is remanded to Seoul High Court.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

The additional appellate brief not timely filed is considered to the extent of supplement in case of supplemental appellate brief not timely filed.

1. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below

A. The Plaintiff filed an application for a building permit with the Defendant to construct housing on the instant land (Seoul Dobong-gu (hereinafter address omitted), which is his own ownership, on the ground that it violates the main sentence of Article 27(1) of the Building Act (wholly amended by Act No. 4381, May 31, 1991) prior to the amendment that the instant land does not adjoin the road only 1.8 meters, and thus, the Defendant returned it on the ground that it violates the main sentence of Article 27(1) of the Building Act (wholly amended by Act No. 4381, May 31, 191).

B. A land readjustment project was implemented on March 8, 1967 with respect to the previous land and the surrounding land of the site of this case. In the latter part of 1969, the housing was constructed by the defendant's permission in the latter part of 1969, and the above previous land was replaced by the current form after the completion of the construction on the site of this case. On the neighboring land surrounding the site of this case, there was no part of the road or the vacant land except for the part above 1.8 meters since all buildings are included in the building on the neighboring land of this case, and the plaintiff acquired and owned the site of this case and the ground building of this case so far around May 1980, and it was recognized that the building was removed the existing building to newly build the new house and applied for the building permit of this case.

C. In light of the current state of the instant site, it is difficult to deem that the construction on the instant site constituted a case where there is no security hindrance to the construction on the instant site;

D. At the time of the execution of a land readjustment project at the time of 1969, the Defendant issued a building permit on the instant site, and thereafter, the said permission was completed, and the land category was in violation of the Building Act, and the Plaintiff owned the instant land and its ground buildings, and removed the previous house to believe that it would become a building permit on the instant site and to build the new house without any problems for more than 10 years. As such, the Defendant did not newly construct the house due to the instant disposition, and thus, the instant disposition was deemed unlawful in violation of the principle of trust protection.

2. In general in administrative legal relations, in order to apply the principle of the protection of trust to an act of an administrative agency, first, the administrative agency should name the public opinion that is the object of trust to an individual; second, with respect to the trust of the administrative agency's statement of opinion that is justifiable, there should be no cause attributable to the individual; third, the administrative agency should have conducted any act that is contrary to the above statement of opinion; fourth, the administrative agency's disposition against the above statement of opinion that violates the interests of the individual who trusted the statement of opinion should result in an infringement of the individual's interest; fourth, the administrative agency's disposition is illegal as against the principle of the protection of trust (see Supreme Court Decisions 84Nu593, Apr. 23, 1985; 86Nu92, May 26, 1987; 86Nu101, Sept. 13, 1988).

3. However, since the Defendant’s construction permission granted to the previous land was subject to the land before the land substitution becomes final and conclusive prior to the Plaintiff’s acquisition of ownership, it cannot be deemed that the Plaintiff issued a public opinion statement on the construction permit of this case to the Plaintiff. At the time the Defendant initially issued the construction permit, the construction permit was lawfully granted on the road more than 2 meters since it was abutting on the road at the time of the initial disposition of the building permit. In the event of extension or large-scale repair on the premise of the existence of the existing house, it cannot be said that the Plaintiff trusted that the Plaintiff could obtain a new construction permit on the instant land abutting on the road that is 1.8 meters or less due to the confirmation of the replotting, or that there was no cause attributable to the Plaintiff who trusted that the Plaintiff would have owned the said house for more than 10 years, and the requirements for

4. Thus, the judgment of the court below is erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the principle of protection of trust, and there is a ground for appeal assigning this error.

Therefore, without further proceeding to decide on different points of appeal, the judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Kim Jong-soo (Presiding Justice)