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(영문) 대법원 2000. 8. 18. 선고 2000도2704 판결
[강도상해·특수절도·특수절도미수·도로교통법위반][공2000.10.15.(116),2040]
Main Issues

Whether a “juvenile” under Article 60(2) of the Juvenile Act should be determined at the time of adjudication of fact-finding court (affirmative)

Summary of Judgment

Article 60 (2) of the Juvenile Act refers to a juvenile under Article 2 of the Juvenile Act, unless otherwise specified, and Article 2 of the Juvenile Act refers to a juvenile under the age of 20 who is under the age of 20, and as a condition for a trial, it should be viewed that not only the time of crime but also the time of trial. Therefore, determination of whether a juvenile is a juvenile under Article 60 (2) of the Juvenile Act should be based on the time of adjudication of fact-finding court,

[Reference Provisions]

Articles 2 and 60(2) of the Juvenile Act

Reference Cases

Supreme Court Decision 91Do2393 delivered on December 10, 1991 (Gong1992, 556) Supreme Court Decision 96Do1241 delivered on February 14, 1997 (Gong1997Sang, 828)

Defendant

Defendant

Appellant

Prosecutor

Defense Counsel

Attorney Mayang-yang

Judgment of the lower court

Seoul High Court Decision 2000No202 delivered on May 30, 2000

Text

The judgment below is reversed and the case is remanded to Seoul High Court.

Reasons

The grounds of appeal are examined.

The first instance court convicted the defendant who was prosecuted for injury by robbery, special larceny, special larceny, special larceny, and violation of the Road Traffic Act (free license) and sentenced the defendant to imprisonment with prison labor for not more than three years and six months and a fine of not more than 150,000 won within the scope of the term of punishment by discretionary mitigation under Article 53 of the Criminal Act.

Accordingly, when the defendant filed an appeal on the grounds of mental illness and unreasonable sentencing, the court below reversed the judgment of the first instance on the ground that each of the instant offenses was in the concurrent crimes between the robbery injury crime for which judgment became final and conclusive and the crime of unfair sentencing under the latter part of Article 37 of the Criminal Act, and that the punishment was imposed separately under Article 39(1) of the Criminal Act, and further, the defendant was born on September 27, 1979, and the mitigation under Article 60(2) of the Juvenile Act had already been completed as of May 30, 200, which was the time when the judgment of the court below was rendered, but the defendant was a juvenile at the time of each of the instant offenses, on the ground that the mitigation under Articles 2 and 60(2) of the Juvenile Act was to be mitigated under Article 2 of the Juvenile Act, and again mitigated under Article 53 of the Criminal Act, and sentenced the defendant to a punishment of imprisonment for two years and six months, fine 75,00

In other words, when examining the language and text of Article 2 of the Juvenile Act, the court below held that it is not reasonable to define only the significance of the juvenile under the Juvenile Act using the most simple phrase as possible, and there is no other legal effect or meaning, and it cannot be interpreted that Article 2 of the Juvenile Act provides the conditions of the trial. On the other hand, it cannot be interpreted that the above provision provides the conditions of the trial, and it is not an inevitable relation between the mitigation of the Juvenile Act and the system of the irregular sentence, and therefore, it is not reasonable to argue that the standard market price of the non-scheduled sentence is determined at the time of sentencing, so it should be presented as the standard market price of the judgment on the reduction of the punishment under the Juvenile Act. In other words, even if the defendant was a juvenile and the court of first instance rendered a sentence, even if the defendant became an adult at the time of sentencing, it cannot be viewed that the reduction of the punishment under the Juvenile Act cannot be made in accordance with the "Criteria for Public Notice of Facts" theory, and even if the defendant's efforts for the restriction of the treatment of this case or prompt trial cannot be ruled.

However, the term "juvenile" under Article 60 (2) of the Juvenile Act refers to a juvenile under Article 2 of the Juvenile Act, and the juvenile under Article 2 of the Juvenile Act refers to a person under the age of 20, who is under the condition of a trial, and as such, it should continue not only the time of crime but also the time of trial. Therefore, it is the opinion of the Supreme Court that determination of whether a juvenile is a juvenile under Article 60 (2) of the Juvenile Act should be based on the time of adjudication, i.e., the time of adjudication of fact-finding decision (see, e., Supreme Court Decisions 96Do1241, Feb. 14, 1997; 91Do2393, Dec. 10, 199).

Nevertheless, the court below erred in the misapprehension of the interpretation of Article 60 (2) of the Juvenile Act and affected the judgment, and the ground of appeal pointing this out is justified. The ground of appeal pointing this out is justified.

Therefore, the judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Shin Shin-chul (Presiding Justice)

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