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(영문) 대법원 1997. 2. 14. 선고 96도1241 판결
[강도상해·폭력행위등처벌에관한법률위반][공1997.3.15.(30),828]
Main Issues

Whether a juvenile is eligible for mitigation under the Juvenile Act shall be determined based on the standard of the adjudication of fact-finding court (affirmative)

Summary of Judgment

In Article 60 (2) of the Juvenile Act, the term "juvenile" means a juvenile under Article 2 of the Juvenile Act, unless otherwise specified, and the term "juvenile under Article 2 of the Juvenile Act" means a person under 20 years of age, who is under the condition of a trial, and must continue not only in the course of committing a crime but also until the time of trial. This is obvious in light of the provisions of Articles 38 (1), 7 (2), and 51 of the Juvenile Act, and since the character of a juvenile is highly likely to improve and is placed in a special mental condition with mental and physical development, it is obvious that the character of the juvenile is formed, and therefore, it is also obvious that Article 60 (2) of the Juvenile Act is to promote the sound fostering of the juvenile and Article 60 (2) of the Juvenile Act should also be understood as a matter of criminal liability under Article 59 of the Juvenile Act and Article 9 of the Criminal Act. Therefore, the judgment of the fact-finding court at the time of trial is based on the judgment of Article 60 (2) of the Juvenile Act.

[Reference Provisions]

Articles 2 and 60(2) of the Juvenile Act

Reference Cases

[Plaintiff-Appellant] Plaintiff 1 and 1 other (Law Firm Doz., Counsel for plaintiff-appellant)

Defendant

Defendant

Appellant

Prosecutor

Defense Counsel

Attorney above-at-Law

Judgment of the lower court

Daejeon High Court Decision 95No540 delivered on April 26, 1996

Text

The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to Daejeon High Court.

Reasons

The grounds of appeal are examined.

According to the records and reasoning of the judgment of the court below, the first instance court found the defendant who was prosecuted for violating the Punishment of Violences, etc. due to robbery, bodily injury, and intrusion by carrying a deadly weapon on August 25, 1995 guilty of all the above criminal facts, and subsequently, sentenced a statutory mitigation pursuant to Articles 2 and 60 (2) of the Juvenile Act, and then sentenced the defendant to a discretionary mitigation pursuant to Article 53 of the Criminal Act within the scope of the term of punishment, and then the prosecutor filed an appeal on the ground of unfair sentencing. The court below dismissed the judgment of the court below on November 30, 1975, which affirmed the first instance court's sentencing on the ground that the defendant was sentenced to an unfair sentencing, and the reduction under Article 60 (2) of the Juvenile Act was made only by the juvenile at the time of committing the crime on April 26, 1996, and the prosecutor maintained the judgment of the court of first instance on the ground that the reduction under Article 60 (2) of the Juvenile Act was made proper.

In other words, Article 59 of the Juvenile Act provides that a person who is under 18 years of age shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a limited term of 15 years instead of punishment for death or imprisonment for life when committing the crime. In the same context, Article 9 of the Criminal Act provides that a person who is under 14 years of age shall not be punished for the act of a person who is not under 14 years of age shall not be punished, but shall not be for treatment in future against a juvenile, i.e., the past of a juvenile, but for a juvenile who has not yet been fully

The purpose of Article 60 (2) of the Juvenile Act is to provide for voluntary mitigation for the juvenile of this case, as in Article 59 of the Juvenile Act, is not due to the fact that the juvenile of this case was at the time of trial, but due to the fact that the juvenile of this case was not yet fully equipped with criminal responsibility at the time of

Our law is generally complete according to the age of criminal liability, and it is judged that the age at the time of the act of the offender is divided into 14, 18, and 20, and the existence and degree of criminal liability is determined.

This interpretation also accords with the purport of Article 60 (2) of the Juvenile Act, separate from Article 51 of the Criminal Act, which provides the age of the offender as a condition for sentencing.

In addition, in the case of this case, the record of trial was sent to this court on September 20, 1995, and if this court had started a trial as soon as possible, it would have been able to pronounce a judgment before the defendant reaches the majority, but as a result of the court's hearing delayed due to the circumstances of the court, the defendant would have come to the majority, and as such, if the trial cannot be reduced under the Juvenile Act for the reason that the defendant became adult as a result of the late commencement of the trial due to the reasons not attributable to the defendant, it would be unreasonable because the trial could not be conducted for the reason that the defendant became adult, this would be harsh to the defendant, and it would be unreasonable to apply the law

Therefore, even if the defendant was a juvenile at the time of the act even if he/she became an adult when the court rendered a fact-finding judgment, the punishment can be mitigated by applying Article 60 (2) of the Juvenile Act.

However, under Article 60 (2) of the Juvenile Act, the term "juvenile" means a juvenile under Article 2 of the Juvenile Act unless there is a special provision, and the term "juvenile under Article 2 of the Juvenile Act" means a person under 20 years of age, who is under the condition of the trial, and it is a condition of the trial, so it should continue not only when the crime is committed but also until the trial is

This is obvious in light of the provisions of Articles 38(1), 7(2), and 51 of the Juvenile Act, and since the character of a juvenile is highly likely to be improved in the process of formation, and is in a special mental condition with mental and physical development, due to the characteristics of the juvenile, it is intended to nurture the juvenile in a sound condition, and Article 60(2) of the Juvenile Act also has taken this purport. It is not that it should be understood as a matter of criminal liability like Article 59 of the Juvenile Act and Article 9 of the Criminal Act as the judgment of the court below. Therefore, it is reasonable to judge whether a juvenile is a juvenile under Article 60(2) of the Juvenile Act as a matter of criminal liability, such as Article 60(2) of the Juvenile Act and Article 9 of the Criminal Act, in principle, at the time of adjudication of whether it is a juvenile (see Supreme Court Decision 91Do2393, Dec. 10, 191).

Therefore, the court below's decision that maintained the first instance court's decision that had been rendered legal mitigation under Article 60 (2) of the Juvenile Act on the ground that the defendant who had already attained majority was a juvenile at the time of the crime was a juvenile at the time of the court's decision was erroneous in the misapprehension of Article 60 (2) of the Juvenile Act and affected the conclusion of the judgment. Thus, the ground for appeal pointing this out has merit.

Therefore, the judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Kim Jong-sik (Presiding Justice)

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심급 사건
-대전고등법원 1996.4.26.선고 95노540
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