[1] The legal nature of an insurance contract (i.e., an ambiguous contract) and whether the content of an insurance contract is limited to the provisions of the insurance contract (negative)

[2] The method of interpreting a juristic act in a case where there is a conflict of opinion on the interpretation of a juristic act between the parties and the parties concerned are at issue

[3] In a case where the insurance company Gap et al. entered into an insurance contract with Eul corporation et al. which does not fall under the "automobile" under the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act with the content of collateral "Large Compensation I (liability insurance) and the provisions of the insurance clause that "Large Compensation I shall be limited to the liability under the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act", the case holding that the above for the above for the above for the holding company can also enter into an automobile insurance contract with the same treatment as the construction machinery to which the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act applies, and it can be deemed that there exists a mutual recognition or intent different from the provisions of the insurance clause related to the content of the insurance contract, and thus, the company Gap is liable to pay the insurance money under the Guarantee of Personal Compensation I for the damage caused by the fore-board accident

[4] In a case where the insurance company Gap et al. entered into an insurance contract with Eul corporation et al. which provides that "personal compensation I, II, and property compensation, etc." with the coverage of "personal compensation II", "personal compensation I may subscribe only to personal compensation I", "personal compensation I shall be limited to personal compensation under the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act", "personal compensation II shall be limited to personal compensation under the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act", "personal compensation II shall be limited to personal compensation if the personal compensation is paid as Class I or the insured automobile is not subscribed to personal compensation I", the case holding that the above insurance contract can be entered into an automobile insurance contract with the same treatment as the construction machinery to which the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act applies to the above remaining vehicles as the personal compensation liability of Class I and II, provided that considering the personal compensation and personal compensation as stipulated in the insurance policy, Gap corporation et al. shall be liable for damages as a result of an accident other than the insurer's liability for damages under the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act.

[1] Article 105 of the Civil Act, Articles 638 and 638-3 of the Commercial Act / [2] Article 105 of the Civil Act / [3] Article 105 of the Civil Act, Article 726-2 of the Commercial Act, Articles 2(1) and 5(1) of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act, Article 2 of the Enforcement Decree of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act / [4] Article 105 of the Civil Act, Article 726-2 of the Commercial Act, Articles 2(1) and 5(1) of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act, Article 2 of the Enforcement Decree of

[1] Supreme Court Decision 88Da4645 Decided March 28, 1989, Supreme Court Decision 95Da47398 Decided September 5, 1997 (Gong1997Ha, 302), Supreme Court Decision 97Da3163 Decided October 13, 1998 (Gong198Ha, 2651) / [2] Supreme Court Decision 94Da1142 Decided April 29, 1994 (Gong194Sang, 1614), Supreme Court Decision 201Da5134 Decided December 27, 2011

Samsung Fire and Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (Law Firm Gyeongpyeong, Attorneys Jeon Sung-jin et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Korea Labor Welfare Corporation

Seoul Southern District Court Decision 2013Na51877 decided October 10, 2013

Of the judgment of the court below, the part concerning (vehicle No. 1 omitted) and (vehicle No. 2 omitted) typists is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the Panel Division of the Seoul Southern District Court. The remaining appeals are dismissed.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. (3 omitted of Vehicle Number 4 omitted) and (4 omitted) as to the ground of appeal on the other hand-on vehicle

A. An insurance contract is an infinite contract that takes effect when one of the parties pays the insurance premium agreed upon and the other party agrees to pay a certain amount of insurance money or other benefits in the event of an uncertain accident with respect to property, life, or body, and the content of the contract is not limited to the provisions of the insurance contract. Furthermore, the insurance contract has binding force between the parties, not because it itself is a legal norm or has the legal nature, but it is because the parties agreed to include the provisions of the contract in the contents of the contract. In general, where an insurance contract which includes the insurance contract in the contents of the contract has been made between the parties, the binding force of the contract cannot be ruled out even if the contract party is unaware of the contents of the insurance contract. However, if the contract is expressly agreed differently from the contents of the contract, the binding force of the contract is excluded (see Supreme Court Decisions 88Da4645, Mar. 28, 198; 95Da4798, Sept. 5, 197; 193Da3637, Oct. 136, 1998).

Furthermore, the interpretation of a juristic act is clearly confirming the objective meaning which the parties gave to the act of representation. In the event of a conflict of opinion on the interpretation of a juristic act between the parties, where the interpretation of the parties is at issue, it shall be reasonably interpreted in accordance with logical and empirical rules by comprehensively taking into account the contents of the juristic act, the motive and background of such juristic act, the purpose to be achieved by the juristic act, the parties’ genuine intent (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 94Da1142, Apr. 29, 1994; 201Da5134, Dec. 27, 2011).

B. Based on the reasons stated in the judgment of the court of first instance, the court below held that ① the Plaintiff entered into each insurance contract with the revised resources corporation and Hyundai Timber Co., Ltd. with the effect that the insured shall be liable for damages caused by the accident of the said car owner (hereinafter referred to as “the automobile owner”) and ② the collateral contents of each insurance contract are as follows: the amount stipulated in the Enforcement Decree of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act (hereinafter referred to as “The Automobile Accident Compensation Act”) is as follows: (i) the insured shall be liable for damages; (ii) the insured shall be liable for damages caused by the accident of the automobile owner; (iii) the Plaintiff shall be liable for damages under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act, which is the victim of the accident; and (iv) the Plaintiff shall be exempted from the liability insurance contract as stated in the judgment of the court below as follows: (iii) the Plaintiff shall be liable for damages to the Plaintiff under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act; and (iv) the Plaintiff shall be exempted from the liability insurance contract as stated in the judgment of the court below with regard to each accident of first instance.

C. As shown in the reasoning of the judgment below, the automobile insurance contract can be concluded with the same treatment as construction machinery to which the Automobile Loss Compensation Act applies, which covers the liability of compensation Ⅰ. In addition, if the insurance contract of this case denies compensation Ⅰ in accordance with the insurance contract of this case, each of the above insurance contracts would result in completely denying the validity of each of the above insurance contracts, and the purpose of each of the above insurance contracts cannot be achieved entirely. Considering this point, the plaintiff seems to agree with the fact that it can be effective as an insurance contract in the process of the lawsuit of this case or the appellate brief of this case, in agreement with the parties concerned about the contents of compensation of the insurance contract of this case, as it is different from the provisions on the contents of compensation of each of the insurance contracts of this case at the time of the conclusion of each of the above insurance contracts. In addition, it is not different from the Automobile Loss Compensation Act of this case in that the automobile accident may occur in the course of operation at the site of construction work as well as operation at the site of construction work.

D. Examining these circumstances and the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the foregoing legal doctrine, the lower court’s conclusion is acceptable. In so doing, contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal, there were no errors by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding the interpretation of terms and conditions, the liability for damages as prescribed by the Automobile Loss Compensation Act, the exercise of the right to claim damages

In addition, insofar as the lower court did not err in its judgment, the legitimacy of the reasoning of the lower judgment that the Plaintiff was unable to be exempted from liability because it did not explain the proviso to the insurance clause of this case. Therefore, the allegation in the grounds of appeal that the lower judgment erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the insurer’s duty to explain, etc. is not acceptable, thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment.

2. (Motor Vehicle Number 1 omitted) and (Motor Vehicle Number 2 omitted) as to the ground of appeal on other types of motor vehicles

A. The reasoning of the lower judgment and the evidence duly admitted reveal the following.

(1) The Plaintiff concluded each insurance contract between ○○ concrete and Han-dong Co., Ltd. with the content that the insured is liable for damages caused by the accident of the above type of typists (hereinafter “the instant large-scale damages I and II”).

(2) The security contents of each of the above insurance contracts are “personal injury I, II, and property injury, etc.” The amount of personal injury I shall be the amount prescribed by the Enforcement Decree of the Automobile Loss Compensation Act, and the amount of personal injury II shall not be limited, and the amount of personal injury II shall be KRW 100 million, and the relevant insured paid the premiums calculated in accordance with the respective security contents to the Plaintiff.

(3) Since each accident occurred as indicated in the judgment on the two lanes I and II, the Defendant paid insurance benefits to the victims pursuant to the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act, in subrogation of the victims, claimed the Plaintiff to pay the insurance benefits under each insurance contract of this case, and the Plaintiff paid the amount of money determined as the subject of liability to the Defendant in response thereto.

(4) The instant insurance clause is a business automobile insurance clause, and is subject to two-wheeled automobiles and all non-business cars with 10 or less passengers on statutory passenger capacity except for automobiles (Article 2). The content of the instant insurance contract for personal compensation I is “compensation within the limit set by the Automobile Liability Act in the event that a person killed or injured another person due to an automobile accident”. Meanwhile, the content of the instant insurance contract for personal compensation II is “compensation in the event that a person killed or injured another person due to an automobile accident exceeds the amount paid by the personal compensation I” (Article 3(1)).

(5) In addition, Article 10 of the insurance clause of this case provides for the liability for damages, "The personal damage I (liability insurance) and the personal damage compensation mean mandatory insurance pursuant to the Automobile Loss Act, and anyone who owns an automobile will subscribe to it. In addition, the personal damage II may subscribe only to the personal damage I. Furthermore, with respect to the detailed compensation, "The insurer will compensate the insured for the damages suffered by the insured's death or injury due to the insured's accident that occurred during the possession, use, and management of the insured automobile, and as "I will compensate for the damages sustained by the insured's legal liability due to the death or injury of the insured automobile caused by the insured's accident", while the proviso of the insurance clause of this case stating "I will make the personal damage liability according to the Automobile Loss Compensation Act," and the compensation clause II of the personal damage compensation provides for "I will indemnify the amount calculated by deducting the amount that can be paid as the personal damage first if the insured automobile or the insured automobile does not subscribe to the personal damage compensation I."

(6) However, the instant insurance clause provides for the exemption from liability for personal injury II as follows: “If the insured uses an insured automobile for his/her business, any other employee engaged in his/her business who is entitled to the accident compensation under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act is dead or injured, as a person who is entitled to the accident compensation under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act.” Meanwhile, the instant insurance clause provides for the exemption from liability for personal injury II, stating that “I would compensate for the excess damage if the loss sustained by the person exceeds the scope of compensation under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act” (hereinafter

(7) Article 2 of the Enforcement Decree of the Automobile Loss Compensation Act provides for construction machinery to which the Automobile Loss Compensation Act applies, and it does not correspond to other types of vehicles, such as the Car Accident Compensation I and II.

B. (1) As shown in the reasoning of the judgment below, the automobile insurance contract can be concluded with the same treatment as the construction machinery to which the Automobile Loss Compensation Act applies, and as it does not have any restrictions on the subscription of general construction machinery to the insurance clauses of this case, each of the above insurance contracts is valid as the insurance contracts agreed to compensate for the accidents that occurred on the part of the large-person Compensation I and II. However, unlike the foregoing large-person Compensation I, in the case of the instant large-person Compensation I and II, the large-person Compensation I and II insurance under the insurance clauses of this case are entirely subscribed to the insurance of this case, and the industrial accident exemption provisions are also applied, so the large-person Compensation I and the large-person Compensation II, which are stipulated in the insurance clauses of this case, should be interpreted in consideration of the contents and scope of the compensation.

(2) (A) However, the accident caused by the operation of a car on the other hand does not constitute an accident caused by the operation of a car as prescribed by the Automobile Loss Act, and according to the text of the instant proviso limiting the subject of compensation I as liability for damages by the Automobile Loss Act, the liability for damages caused by the accident caused by the operation of a car on the other hand does not constitute the content of compensation I for the personal injury.

(B) Meanwhile, the content of the Personal Compensation Insurance Contract II provides that “In the event that the damage exceeds the amount payable under the Personal Compensation I if the damage was caused by the death or injury of another person due to a motor vehicle accident, the excess amount of damage shall be compensated.”

This purport is that if the insured is legally liable to compensate for the loss, the insurer shall deduct the amount to be paid or payable as the personal compensation I from the amount to be paid by the insurer, and only the remainder shall be compensated. If there is no room for application of the personal compensation I to the injured party due to the relationship in which the insured is not liable to compensate as prescribed by the Automobile Loss Act, it does not purport to compensate more than the amount calculated by applying the personal compensation I to the case where the personal compensation I is not applicable even if there is no amount to be paid or payable to the injured party. In such a case, unless there are other special circumstances, all the damage suffered by the insured who is legally liable to compensate for the loss can be compensated as the personal compensation II.

Since the insurance policy of this case limits the personal compensation to be subscribed to the personal compensation Class II only in the case of subscribing to the personal compensation Class, there is sufficient room to view that the insured subscribed to the personal compensation Class I on the premise that he/she subscribed to the personal compensation Class II with the mind that he/she would receive the personal compensation of accidents caused by the lanes I and II of this case.

(C) Therefore, at the time of concluding the instant insurance contract for the personal compensation I and II, where the Plaintiff and the insured are liable for damages other than the liability for damages under the Automobile Loss Compensation Act due to the accidents on the part of the Plaintiff and the insured, all of them shall be included in the personal compensation II, and it shall be interpreted that the exemption from liability, such as the provisions on the exemption from industrial accidents, is agreed to apply. On the other hand, it is difficult to view that there is a special agreement that excludes the instant proviso on the scope of compensation I and that the Plaintiff compensates part of the damage as personal compensation I (see Supreme Court Decision 2012Da57385, Nov. 15, 2012, etc.).

C. Nevertheless, on the grounds as indicated in its reasoning, the lower court determined otherwise by: (a) on the instant large-scale compensation I and II, the Plaintiff and the insured treated the same as construction machinery to which the Automobile Loss Compensation Act applies; and (b) paid compensation to the same content as mandatory insurance under the Automobile Loss Compensation Act, not as the large-scale compensation II; and (c) in so doing, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the principle of priority of individual agreements or the basic principles on the interpretation of the terms and conditions, thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment. The allegation in the grounds of appeal

3. Conclusion

Therefore, without further proceeding to decide on the remaining grounds of appeal as to the Grand Compensation I and II, the part concerning the Grand Compensation I and II among the judgment of the court below concerning the Grand Compensation I and II shall be reversed, and this part of the case shall be remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination, and the remaining appeal shall be dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Kim So-young (Presiding Justice)