In the terms and conditions of the business car insurance, the insurer’s liability for compensation under Section II provides that “if there is no amount which can be paid or payable to the victim as the personal compensation I” as to the insurer’s liability for compensation under the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act, whether the insured may be compensated as the personal compensation II (affirmative in principle)

Article 726-2 of the Commercial Act, Article 105 of the Civil Act, Articles 3 and 5 of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act

Supreme Court Decision 2000Da32840 Decided October 6, 200 (Gong2000Ha, 2293) Supreme Court Decision 2012Da57385 Decided November 15, 2012

Korea Labor Welfare Corporation

Samsung Fire and Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (Law Firm Gyeongpyeong, Attorney Lee Sung-jin, Counsel for defendant-appellant)

Seoul Southern District Court Decision 2013Na51754 decided September 26, 2013

The part of the judgment below against the defendant is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the Panel Division of the Seoul Southern District Court.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. According to the reasoning of the judgment below and the records, NaNC Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as NaNC) entered into an automobile insurance contract with the defendant with respect to the soft machine of this case, NaNC Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as NaNC) entered into the insurance policy on the type of the automobile into NaNC as 'the softener type', i.e. 'the amount of personal damage I', ii) the coverage of the insurance contract of this case consists of NaN I, al.e., al. the personal damage I, al. the personal damage II, and NaNC paid the insurance premium calculated by each of the above collateral contents to the defendant. Article 10 of the insurance clause of this case provides that NaNC provides that "The personal damage II shall be limited to the automobile damage liability under its own law, i.e., the personal damage II. the amount of the insurance accident caused by the insured's possession or management is not known as being legally paid as al damage.

2. Article 10 of the insurance clauses of this case provides for the insurer's liability for compensation as stipulated in Section Ⅱ of the Insurance Contract provides that "if the insured has caused death or injury of an insured motor vehicle caused by an accident of an insured motor vehicle which occurred during the possession, use, or management of the insured motor vehicle, or if the insured motor vehicle is not subscribed to Class I, the amount of personal compensation which can be paid as Class I shall be deducted." The purport of Article 10 of the Insurance Clause is not to ask whether the insured motor vehicle has been paid or can be paid as Class I as the personal compensation, but to compensate only the remainder after deducting the insured motor vehicle from the amount of the personal compensation, and if the insured motor vehicle has been subscribed to Class I as the personal compensation, the insured motor vehicle shall not be covered by Section 10 of the Automobile Accident Compensation Security Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Personal Compensation Act") and there is no room for application of Section 20 of the Insurance Contract to the victim, the insured motor vehicle compensation shall not be applied to Section 200 of the Insurance Contract.

In light of the above legal principles, since the excavation machine of this case is an intangible track type, it does not constitute construction machinery subject to the law of distribution. As such, even if there is no room to apply the large-scale compensation I as such, and there is no room to apply the large-scale compensation, and even if there is no amount that can be paid as the large-scale compensation I, Nasan is entitled to receive the full compensation as a large-scale compensation II, barring special circumstances. Thus, NaNC has sufficient grounds to regard it as having subscribed to the large-scale compensation I under the premise that NaNC subscribed to the large-scale compensation II in consideration of the large-scale compensation II. In addition, when entering into the insurance contract of this case, it can be deemed that the "automobile" column of the automobile insurance policy is written as a "unclaimed tramway type cater."

In full view of these circumstances, even though considering the fact that the insurance contract of this case is subject to industrial accident exemption clause and the defendant is exempted from liability for personal compensation Class II, it is difficult to view that, at the time of entering into the insurance contract of this case, the provisions of the insurance contract of this case concerning the scope of personal compensation I were excluded from liability for damages other than liability for damages due to the accident at the time of the search period of this case between Nasan and the defendant, and that there was an agreement between Nasan and the defendant that the defendant would compensate for the personal compensation I (see Supreme Court Decision 2012Da57385, Nov. 15, 2012).

Nevertheless, solely for the reasons indicated in its reasoning, the lower court determined that Nasan had concluded the instant insurance contract with the intent to compensate for the same content as the construction machinery subject to the self-defense law, not the construction machinery subject to the self-defense law, and that the Defendant also had concluded the instant insurance contract with the intent to compensate for the same content as that of the construction machinery subject to the self-defense law even though it was not the construction machinery subject to the self-defense law. In so doing, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the interpretation of the insurance contract and the insurance terms, thereby adversely affecting the conclusion

3. Therefore, without further proceeding to decide on the remaining grounds of appeal, the part against the defendant among the judgment below is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the court below for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Kim So-young (Presiding Justice)