[1] Whether the contents of the insurance contract are limited to the provisions of the insurance contract (negative), and the grounds for binding the insurance contract between the parties to the contract

[2] The principle of objective interpretation and the principle of priority of individual agreements in interpreting the insurance clauses

[3] The method of interpreting a contract where there is a conflict of opinion between the parties on the interpretation of the contract and the interpretation of the parties' intent is at issue

[4] The case holding that Gap company is obligated to pay insurance money according to the insurance contract, and it cannot refuse to pay insurance money on the ground that the above house owner is not a construction machine to which the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act applies, in case where Gap insurance company's insurance contract entered into with Eul, compensates the insured for damages caused by the accident of Eul's possession of Eul, and the security contents were stipulated as "Large Compensation I (liability Insurance)", and Byung's accident occurred while driving a house with Eul's consent.

[1] An insurance contract is an infinite contract that takes effect when one of the parties pays the agreed insurance premium and the other party agrees to pay a certain amount of insurance money and other benefits in the event of an infinite accident with respect to property, life, or body, and the content of the contract is not limited to the provisions of the insurance contract. Furthermore, the insurance contract is not because it itself is a legal norm or has the legal nature, but it is not because the other party agrees to include the provisions of the contract in the contents of the contract.

[2] The latter part of Article 5(1) of the Act on the Regulation of Terms and Conditions (hereinafter “Terms and Conditions Act”) provides for the principle of objective interpretation by stating that “The terms and conditions shall not be differently interpreted by the customer.” The interpretation of the insurance terms and conditions shall be uniformly interpreted on the basis of the average customer who is not the other party to the contract. However, if an insurer and the customer agree differently from the terms and conditions, the terms and conditions should take precedence over the terms and conditions prescribed by the individual agreement (Article 4 of the Terms and Conditions Act).

[3] In a case where there is a conflict of opinion on the interpretation of a contract between the parties, the parties’ interpretation should be reasonably interpreted in accordance with logical and empirical rules by comprehensively taking into account the contents of the contract, the motive and background of the contract concluded, the purpose to be achieved by the contract

[4] The case holding that Gap company's automobile insurance contract can be concluded to cover liability for personal damage by treating the insurance money as construction machinery to which the Automobile Loss Guarantee Act applies even if Gap company did not fall under "automobile" in the Automobile Loss Guarantee Act, and the automobile insurance contract is not subject to restriction on subscription to general construction machinery as stipulated in the provisions of the insurance clauses of Gap company's insurance contract, and where Byung suffered emotional injury due to an accident attributable to Eul's agreement while driving cars with Eul's consent, Eul's insurance contract was concluded, and Byung's insurance contract did not completely deny the validity of the automobile insurance contract if it violated the provisions of the insurance clauses of Eul's insurance contract, and Gap's insurance contract cannot be viewed as being subject to restriction on liability for personal damage because Gap's automobile loss cannot be viewed as being applied to the above automobile accident since Gap company's insurance contract's agreement was concluded with the construction machinery accident.

[1] Article 638 of the Commercial Act / [2] Article 638 of the Commercial Act, Articles 4 and 5(1) of the Regulation of Standardized Contracts Act / [3] Article 105 of the Civil Act / [4] Articles 638, 719, and 726-2 of the Commercial Act, Articles 4 and 5(1) of the Regulation of Standardized Contracts Act, Article 105 of the Civil Act, Article 2 subparag. 1, Article 3, and Article 5 of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act

[2] Supreme Court Decision 94Da1142 Decided April 29, 1994 (Gong1994Sang, 1614) Supreme Court Decision 201Da5134 Decided December 27, 201

Korea Labor Welfare Corporation

Hyundai Marine Fire Insurance Co., Ltd. (Attorney Jae-young et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Daejeon High Court Decision 2015Na10026 decided October 14, 2015

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Ground of appeal No. 1

A. Since an insurance contract is an infinite contract that takes effect when one of the parties pays the agreed premium and the other party agrees to pay a certain amount of insurance money and other benefits in the event of an uncertain accident with respect to property, life, or body, the content of the contract is not limited to the provisions of the insurance contract. In addition, the insurance contract has binding force between the parties, not because it itself is a legal norm or has the legal nature, but it was agreed that the provisions of the contract be included in the contents of the contract.

The latter part of Article 5(1) of the Act on the Regulation of Terms and Conditions (hereinafter “Terms and Conditions Act”) provides for the principle of objective interpretation by stating that “The terms and conditions shall not be differently interpreted by the customer.” The interpretation of the insurance terms and conditions shall be uniformly interpreted on the basis of the average customer who is not the other party to the contract. However, if the insurer and the customer have agreed on the matters stipulated in the terms and conditions differently, the terms and conditions shall prevail over the terms and conditions (Article 4 of the Terms and Conditions Act).

Furthermore, in a case where there is a difference between the parties regarding the interpretation of a contract, the parties’ interpretation should be reasonably interpreted in accordance with logical and empirical rules by comprehensively taking into account the content of the contract, the motive and background of the contract, the purpose to be achieved by the contract, the parties’ genuine intent, etc. (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 94Da1142, Apr. 29, 1994; 201Da5134, Dec. 27, 2011).

B. Review of the lower judgment and the evidence duly admitted by the lower court reveals the following facts.

(1) Around June 2010, the Defendant concluded the instant insurance contract with Nonparty 1. The content of the instant insurance contract is to compensate the insured for damages caused by the instant accident owned by Nonparty 1.

(2) The security content of the instant insurance contract is “Large Compensation I (Liability Insurance),” and the subscription amount is the amount prescribed by the Enforcement Decree of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act (hereinafter “Automobile Compensation Act”). Nonparty 1 paid the insurance premium calculated according to the aforementioned security to the Defendant.

(3) The KNN Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “NN”) is the prime contractor of the Han Steel Co., Ltd. operated by Nonparty 2, and entered into a temporary employment agreement with Nonparty 1 along with the mid-term lease agreement with respect to the instant stock owner, and had Nonparty 2 use it for work. Nonparty 3 and Nonparty 4 are the workers of Han Steel Co., Ltd.

(4) Around 14:00 on October 19, 2010, Nonparty 3 driven the instant vehicle at the main steel plant located in Jinjin-si, Hanjin-si, without a license, in order to take out ice (column and H beam steel) out of the country without a license. Nonparty 3, while driving the instant vehicle at the main steel plant in Hanjin-si, Nonparty 3, who neglected Nonparty 4’s stop signal and slicked Nonparty 4’s left bridge while driving the instant accident (hereinafter “instant accident”). Nonparty 1, at the time, consented Nonparty 3, who did not obtain a license, to drive the instant vehicle with the instant vehicle without a license, by neglecting Nonparty 4’s stop signal.

(5) The Plaintiff recognized the instant accident as an occupational accident, paid 52,586,380 won of temporary layoff benefits and 88,124,880 won of medical care benefits, and paid disability lump sum 113,043,436 won of disability benefits.

C. In light of the following circumstances along with the process of concluding the instant insurance contract, the details of the instant insurance contract’s security, and the process of implementing the insurance contract, the Defendant may be deemed to have agreed to treat the instant car under the instant insurance contract as construction machinery to which the Automobile Loss Compensation Act applies, and compensate for the accidents arising in relation to its operation with the same content as the Automobile Loss Compensation Act.

(1) The Defendant appears to have known that the instant car did not constitute construction machinery subject to the Automobile Loss Act, and agreed to the instant insurance contract upon its own determination.

(2) Even if a vehicle is not a “automobile” under the Automobile Liability Act, it can enter into an automobile insurance contract with the content that it treats it as a construction machine to which the Automobile Liability Act applies and guarantees the liability of compensation I for personal injury. The provisions of the insurance contract of this case do not impose restrictions on the subscription of the general construction machine in the provisions of the insurance clauses

(3) If the instant insurance contract denies personal compensation under Article 15(1) of the Personal Compensation Insurance Act, the effect of the instant insurance contract is entirely denied, and the insurance purpose of the instant insurance contract cannot be entirely achieved.

D. Therefore, the Defendant is liable to pay insurance proceeds from the instant accident in accordance with the instant insurance contract, and the instant car owner does not constitute construction machinery to which the Automobile Loss Compensation Act applies, and thus, cannot refuse to pay the insurance proceeds. Accordingly, the Defendant’s ground of appeal on this part is rejected.

2. Ground of appeal Nos. 2 and 3

A. On the following grounds, the lower court determined that the Defendant could not exercise the insurer subrogation right or the right of indemnity against the insurer against the liability insurer of the instant insurance contract, the case, Nonparty 2, and Nonparty 3.

(1) In accordance with the standard terms and conditions of automobile insurance applicable to the instant insurance contract, not only the registered insured as indicated in the insurance policy, but also the person who uses the insured automobile with the consent of the registered insured is the approved insured.

(2) The case, Nonparty 2, and Nonparty 3, who used or managed the instant vehicle from Nonparty 1, the registered insured, on the ground that they constitute the insured under the instant insurance contract with Nonparty 1, and thus, cannot be deemed as a third party under Article 682 of the Commercial Act.

(3) As alleged by the Defendant, the accident in this case occurred not by a third party but by the insured’s act, even though the case and Nonparty 2 failed to perform their duty of care for the supervision of work, as argued by the Defendant, and thus, the insurer cannot exercise the insurer’s subrogation right against the accident.

B. Examining the relevant legal principles and records, the lower court’s determination is justifiable. In so determining, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules, or by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding the limitation of the right to indemnity, and the consent insured of an

C. The defendant asserted that the accident of this case conflicts between the non-party 4's employer cases and the non-party 2's negligence in supervising the work of the non-party 4, and that if these employers concurrently hold the status as the insured under the Occupational Safety and Health Act and the status as the insured under the insurance contract, it is reasonable to assume the responsibility for anti-demoring the negligence of the plaintiff and the defendant, but there is no ground

3. Conclusion

The Defendant’s appeal is dismissed as it is without merit. The costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Kim Chang-suk (Presiding Justice)