2017Da224494 Compensation (as stated)

A Organization A

A person shall be appointed.

Seoul Central District Court Decision 2016Na29882 Decided April 7, 2017

December 13, 2019

The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Seoul Central District Court Panel Division.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. The lower court recognized that the Defendant’s term “D attorney-at-law belongs to A, and head, which belongs to A, is not a democratic defense, but a r. S. r. S. S. P. S. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P., the Plaintiff’s., the Defendant’s., the Plaintiff’s.P.P.P. of its defense.

2. The lower court’s determination is difficult to accept on the following grounds. (1) Defamation that constitutes a tort under the Civil Act refers to an act of openly expressing a fact to infringe on a social objective evaluation of personal value, such as a person’s character, morals, reputation, and credit. In addition, an expressive act explicitly indicating a fact to the extent likely to infringe on another person’s social evaluation may constitute defamation. However, an expressive act that expresses an opinion or comment may constitute defamation if the assertion of a hidden basic fact, which serves as the basis for the opinion, is implicitly included in light of the overall purport of the expressive act, and if the fact may infringe on another person’s social evaluation, such an expressive act may constitute defamation. An expressive act that separately expresses a fact that serves as the basis for the opinion, can constitute defamation if it infringes on another person’s social evaluation solely on the basis of a publicly stated basic fact (see Supreme Court Decision 2013Da26432, Sept. 10, 2015).

However, purely expressing opinion alone does not lead to defamation. However, if the form, content, etc. of an expressive act falls under an insulting and dissipious personal attack or infringes on personal rights by publicly announcing a fact going beyond a certain degree of exaggeration about another’s personal affairs, such act may constitute a tort separate from defamation (see Supreme Court Decision 2012Da19734, Aug. 20, 2014).

As can be seen, since the requirement for establishing tort under the Civil Act differs from the case where a fact is indicated and the case where an opinion is expressed, it is necessary to distinguish between the cases where an expression is a statement of fact. In order to determine whether an expression among articles is a statement of fact, the meaning of an expression should be examined together with the language of expression, the purport of the entire article, and in relation to the background and social flow, and whether it is possible to determine the authenticity of an expression (see Supreme Court Decision 200Da14613, Dec. 24, 2002). (2) Examining the facts indicated in the reasoning of the lower judgment in accordance with the above legal principles, it is not clear whether the term “North Korea” in this case is used as meaning “pro-North Korea attorney,” which has the meaning of the lower court, and the meaning of “pro-North Korea” in this case is currently used, and it is difficult to determine the meaning of the expression in this case before and after 200Da163164, May 16, 2018.

(3) Nevertheless, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding the establishment of tort caused by defamation, which is premised on the premise that the expression of this case is not a statement of opinion but a statement of fact, thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, without further proceeding to decide on the remaining grounds of appeal, the lower judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Min You-sook

Justices Jo Hee-de

Justices Kim Jae-hyung

Justices Lee Dong-won