(a) The initial date in calculating the retirement benefits thereafter, in cases where a worker retires from office at his/her free will and option, and enters the same time within the short time after receiving the retirement benefits (=the date when he/she enters the different time);

B. Whether the consent of each worker should be obtained in addition to the consent or agreement of the workers in a collective decision-making manner if the amendment to the rules of employment unfavorablely changes the existing working conditions or the rights of workers (negative)

C. Whether the consent or agreement under the above "B" affects the employee who retired before that time (negative)

A. If an employee submitted a written resignation by free will and choice, and the employer accepted it and received the prescribed retirement allowance without objection, it is reasonable to deem that the labor relationship between the employee and the employer with respect to the labor relationship which is the basis of the calculation of the retirement allowance has been terminated at least once. Therefore, even if the employee was employed again within the short time, it is reasonable to calculate the retirement allowance thereafter by counting from the date of re-employment.

B. If the employer intends to revise the existing terms and conditions of employment to disadvantage workers due to the amendment of the rules of employment, it is necessary to obtain consent from a collective decision-making method of a group of workers under the previous rules of employment. If there is an organized labor union, the union should obtain consent from a majority of the workers who hold meetings if there is no such union, and if there is no such union, the amendment of the rules of employment shall not take effect unless the consent is given in the above manner. However, the amendment of the rules of employment shall take effect without obtaining the consent of the individual workers as agreed upon, and the same shall also apply to the case where the amendment of the rules of employment takes effect against

(c) The consent or agreement in paragraph (b) above shall be effective only to the workers who are engaged in the business and who shall be subject to the application at the time of the consent or agreement, and shall not be extended to the workers already retired prior to that time.

A. Article 28(b) of the Labor Standards Act; Article 95(c) of the same Act

A. Supreme Court Decision 90Da20398 delivered on May 28, 1991 (Gong1991, 1747), 92Da17754 delivered on September 14, 1992 (Gong1992, 2874). Supreme Court Decision 91Da3031 delivered on March 27, 1991 (Gong1991, 2602 delivered on September 24, 1991), 92Da30566 delivered on November 10, 1992 (Gong193,87)

Plaintiff 1, Attorney Park Tae-young, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant

Plaintiff 2

Leecheon Electric Industries Co., Ltd., Counsel for the defendant-appellant

Seoul High Court Decision 90Na42420 delivered on July 19, 1991

The part of the lower judgment against the Defendant regarding Plaintiff 2 shall be reversed, and that part of the case shall be remanded to the Seoul High Court.

The appeal by Plaintiff 1 is dismissed, and all costs of appeal are assessed against the same Plaintiff.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

1. As to Plaintiff 1’s ground of appeal

Upon examining the record, the court below recognized that the plaintiff 1 was employed by the defendant company on March 23, 1966 and continued to work until his retirement on July 31, 198, but rather, the plaintiff was resigned on January 16, 1979 while he was employed on March 23, 1966 and went back on February 16 of the same year while he was employed on March 23, 196, and the plaintiff was able to receive retirement allowances for his continuous service from March 16 of the same year to January 16, 1979. The court below recognized that the plaintiff was receiving retirement allowances for his continuous service from March 16 of the same year to January 16, 1979, and there is no error of law by violating the rules of evidence, such as the theory of lawsuit.

The issue is that the plaintiff submitted a written resignation on January 16, 1979 for the purpose of receiving a part of the retirement allowance in advance due to the need of money, and there was no intention to retire, and that the defendant did not intend to retire. However, if the plaintiff submitted a resignation by his own free will and choice and accepted it, and the plaintiff received the prescribed retirement allowance without objection, it is reasonable to deem that the labor relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant as to the same labor relationship which is the basis of the calculation of the retirement allowance has been terminated at least. Therefore, even if the plaintiff was employed again during the short period, it is reasonable to calculate the retirement allowance thereafter from the date of re-employment (see Supreme Court Decision 90Da20398, May 28, 1991; Supreme Court Decision 92Da17754, September 14, 1992). This is without merit.

2. The defendant's grounds of appeal are examined.

On the first ground for appeal

Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the records, the court below accepted the measures that the defendant company did not recognize that the labor union of the defendant company consented to the application of the non-influence system concerning retirement allowances since April 25, 1984 when it revised the rules of employment on October 28, 1981, and it cannot be said that there was an error in the rules of evidence or in the incomplete hearing, and the court below did not err in the misapprehension of the validity of the disposal document.

The issue is that the labor union attached a written opinion by the president of the labor union to the effect that the labor union should apply the progressive progressive system at least until April 25, 1984, which is the effective period of the collective agreement, when the defendant company revised the rules of employment which provides for the progressive system of retirement allowances to the progressive system, it should be deemed that the labor union consented to the amendment of the rules of employment after April 26, 1984. However, it cannot be interpreted that the labor union of the defendant company consented to the amendment of the rules of employment after the expiration of April 26, 1984. Therefore, there is no reason to discuss.

On the second ground for appeal

A. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, with respect to the application of the progressive retirement allowance on February 17, 1989 between the defendant company and the trade union, the amount of retirement allowance for the person who was employed on or before July 31, 197 shall be calculated as ordinary wages for the remaining portion until March 31, 1981, and the amount of retirement allowance for the continuous service from that date to the end of June 1985 shall be calculated as average wages for the remaining portion, and the calculation standard shall be preferentially paid for the remaining portion, and the amount of calculation shall be calculated as average wages for the continuous service from that date, but the plaintiff 2 shall recognize the fact that he retired after December 31, 198, and even though the above agreement violates retroactively the vested rights of the worker who was subject to the "voluntary retirement" from that date, the above agreement shall not be effective against the plaintiff on the ground that the agreement between the defendant company and the trade union alone cannot infringe upon the specific right to acquire wages of the employee.

B. In light of the above, working conditions should be determined by free will with the original employee’s equal status (Article 3 of the Labor Standards Act), and it is not permissible for the employer to unilaterally change the existing working conditions to the employee’s disadvantage, but it should be allowed to change them with the employee’s consent. This also applies to the case where it is retroactively applied.

In addition, the employer needs to obtain consent from a collective decision-making method of a group of workers under the previous rules of employment in order to amend the existing rules of employment to disadvantage workers, and the method of consent must be the union if there is a labor union consisting of more than half of workers, and if there is no such union, the union must obtain consent from a majority of the workers, and the modification of the rules of employment shall not be effective unless there is consent by the above method. However, the modification of the rules of employment is valid if there is no consent or agreement by the above method, and the same shall apply to the case where the amendment of the rules of employment makes unfavorable changes to the existing conditions of employment or the rights of workers retroactively due to the amendment to the rules of employment.

However, as above, the validity of the consent or agreement can only be applied to the employees who are engaged in the business at the time of the consent or agreement and who will be subject to it, and shall not be extended to the employees who were already retired before that time (see Supreme Court Decision 91Da34073, Jul. 24, 1992). However, according to the facts acknowledged by the court below, Plaintiff 2 retired after that agreement was reached, barring any other special circumstances, it shall also be effective to the same Plaintiff.

C. Thus, the court below's decision that the agreement between the defendant company and the defendant company's trade union to which the defendant company and the plaintiff 2 joined pursuant to the above letter of agreement (No. 6) is invalid even though it did not retire at the time of the agreement, it is erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the scope of the consent of the workers' group as to the amendment of the rules of employment, and there is a ground to point out

Therefore, among the judgment below, the part against the defendant as to the plaintiff 2 is reversed and remanded without any need to decide on the remaining grounds of appeal. The appeal by the plaintiff 1 is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the same plaintiff. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.