(영문) 대구지방법원 2011.6.29. 선고 2010구합3420 판결

All corrective orders issued by the Defendant on September 8, 2010 with respect to each of the provisions in the collective agreement between the Plaintiff and each of the companies listed in the separate sheet of "List of Use Subsidiaries" (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "company of this case") in the separate sheet of the collective agreement between the Plaintiff and the Defendant and each of the companies listed in the separate sheet of Use Subsidiaries (hereinafter referred to as the "company of this case") are revoked.

Reasons

1. Details of the disposition;

A. The Plaintiff is an industrial unit trade union established on February 8, 2001 with workers, etc. in the metal industry and metal-related industries as its subject.

B. During the period from June 1, 2010 to June 30, 2010, the Plaintiff Union entered into a collective agreement with the companies listed in the separate sheet Nos. 1 to 11, 14, and 15, between the company listed in the separate sheet No. 1 to 200, July 5, 2010 and the KONEX Co., Ltd., on July 13, 2010, respectively (hereinafter collectively referred to as “instant collective agreement”). The Defendant requested the North Regional Labor Relations Commission to make a correction order on the grounds that the instant issues violate the relevant provisions of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (hereinafter referred to as the “Labor Relations Adjustment Act”). The Defendant made a resolution on the grounds that the instant provision violates the Act on July 23, 2010 and August 4, 2010.

D. On September 8, 2010, the Defendant issued a corrective order by applying Article 31(3) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act to the Plaintiff on the ground that the instant provision violated each provision of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, among the details of correction order of illegal matters in the attached Table of the Organization Agreement (hereinafter “instant disposition”). [The grounds for recognition] of absence of dispute, entry of No. 1 through 3 and No. 8 (including the virtual number), and the purport of the entire pleadings.

2. The key issue clause of this case is as follows (the fact that there is no dispute).

A. Article 1(1) of the collective agreement between the Plaintiff and SIGP Mexico Co., Ltd. provides that “The Company recognizes that it is the sole labor organization that negotiates wages, conditions of labor, rights to association activities and other matters on behalf of all its members, including all its members, and does not recognize any other two labor organizations.” The remaining collective agreements of this case have the same provision (hereinafter referred to as “daily provisions”).

B. Article 1(2) and (3) of the collective agreement between the Plaintiff and SIG Poto Co., Ltd. and Article 1 subparag. 1 and subparag. 2 of the collective agreement between the Plaintiff and LIGPM Co., Ltd. provide that “A company shall guarantee the unity of metal labor unions (including branches and sub-branches) without any additional quality after July 1, 201, and shall not be included in the subject of the simplification of bargaining windows. This agreement will be deemed to have consented to autonomous bargaining under the Trade Union Act” (hereinafter referred to as “the exclusion provision of procedures for the simplification of bargaining windows”).

C. Article 4(2) of the collective agreement between the Plaintiff and SIGP Mexico Co., Ltd. provides that “A company shall not interpret a person disputing the validity of dismissal as a non-member until the Supreme Court rendered a final judgment, and shall not restrict entry and activities in the company,” and most of the remaining collective agreements of this case provide the same provision (hereinafter referred to as “the provision of qualification as a member”).

D. Article 14(5) of the collective agreement between the Plaintiff and SIGP Mexico Co., Ltd. provides that "the company shall pay the full-time officer's wages + office allowance for three months prior to an election of executives"; Article 14(6) provides that "if the full-time officer was affected by an accident in the course of his/her union activities but does not obtain industrial accident recognition, the company shall compensate for the same amount as occupational accident security"; the remaining collective agreement of this case provides that the full-time officer's wages shall be paid to the majority of the union (hereinafter referred to as "full-time officer's wages") (hereinafter referred to as "full-time officer's treatment clause"). Article 131(Temporary Retirement clause) of the collective agreement between the Plaintiff and SIGP Mexico provides that "the company shall grant the full-time officer's wages to be paid to the full-time officer's full-time officer's full-time member's full-time member's full-time member's full-time member's full-time member's full-time member's full-time member's work."

F. Article 16 (1) of the collective agreement between the Plaintiff and SIGP Orex Co., Ltd. provides that "the company shall provide exclusive office equipment required by the union, office equipment, communication equipment, office supplies, and gasoline-related office maintenance expenses," and Article 56 (1) of the said collective agreement provides that "the company shall bear 170,000 won per month for the union's office maintenance expenses," and Article 56 (1) of the said collective agreement provides that "the office-related office expenses: 170,000 won per branch officer, 130,000 won for the office-related office and representative, 60,000 won for the office-related office and representative, 80,000,000 won for the head of the Ban, 10,000,000 won for each week, and most of the other collective agreements of this case provide the employer with the expenses for the management and maintenance of office-related office in addition to the provision of labor union office and equipment, the employer shall not provide the expenses for convenience (hereinafter referred to the above provision.

G. Article 140(3) of the collective agreement between the Plaintiff and SIGP Mexico Co., Ltd. provides that "a provision of the Convention on Guarantee of Trade Union Activities shall have effect until the conclusion of a new collective agreement, even if the collective agreement has ceased to have effect by one of the six months prior to the expiration of its validity period," and Article 121(2) of the collective agreement between the Plaintiff and SIGP Mexico Co., Ltd. provides that "the company shall not unilaterally terminate the collective agreement without the labor-management agreement, and shall continue to have the effect of this agreement until the renewal of the agreement after the expiration of its validity" (hereinafter referred to as "collective agreement limitation provision"), and some of the remaining collective agreements of this case provide that restricting the right to terminate the collective agreement as mentioned above (hereinafter referred to as "collective

3. The plaintiff's assertion

The Plaintiff asserts that the instant provision is legitimate for the following reasons, and thus, the instant disposition should be revoked in an unlawful manner.

(a) Articles of the negotiating party;

(1) According to the provisions of Article 7 of the Addenda to the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (Act No. 9930), since multiple labor unions are prohibited until June 30, 201, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 5 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, the establishment of multiple labor unions is not prohibited until June 30, 201. Thus, even if

(2) The collective agreement of this case provides a so-called union shop shop provision to the effect that a person eligible to join the association at the same time as a member is admitted to the association, and that if a trade union voluntarily withdraws from the association or refuses to join the association, he/she shall lose his/her employee's qualification. This is valid pursuant to Article 81 subparagraph 2 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act. As such, as a result, it is prohibited from organizing a new trade union or joining a new trade union by the Plaintiff's member to withdraw from the Plaintiff association, it shall not be deemed unlawful even if the Plaintiff

(3) The point of time of determining the illegality of the instant disposition is September 8, 2010, which is the time of disposition, and the establishment of multiple labor unions is prohibited until June 30, 201. As such, the negotiation body clause of the instant case cannot be deemed unlawful based on the time of disposition.

B. According to the proviso of Article 29-2(1) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act excluding the procedures for the simplification of bargaining windows, labor and management may agree to exclude the procedures for the simplification of bargaining windows through autonomous bargaining, and the meaning of "period" stipulated in the above proviso refers to the termination period during which an employer can agree, and thus it is possible to agree in advance to exclude the procedures for the simplification of bargaining windows from the collective agreement because it does not necessarily require an agreement within a specified period. Even if interpreting that the consent should be given within a specified period for domestic affairs, the exclusion clause of the procedures for the simplification of bargaining windows may stabilize the validity of this contract

C. The proviso of Article 2 subparag. 4 (d) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act provides that the relationship subordinate to a certain employer shall apply to a company-level trade union meeting the qualification requirements for union members, and the Plaintiff Union, a primary industrial trade union, shall not apply to the Plaintiff Union, which is a primary industrial trade union. Thus, the provision on qualification for union members cannot be deemed as violating

(d) Provisions concerning full-time officer treatment.

(1) Article 24(2) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act and Article 81 subparag. 4 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, which prohibit the payment of wages to a full-time employee, violate the fundamental contents of the three labor rights guaranteed by Article 33 of the Constitution, violates the fundamental contents of the three labor rights guaranteed by Articles 33 and 10 and 37(1) of the Constitution, violates the fundamental contents of the labor-management autonomy principle derived from Article 32 of the Constitution, violates the fundamental contents of the labor rights guaranteed by Article 32 of the Constitution, violates the over-breadth principle under Article 37(2) of the Constitution, violates the ILO Convention (ILO) and Article 143 of the Constitution, and violates the ILO (ILO)’s 135 Convention, and Article 6 of the Constitution, and fails to pay wages on the ground that he is a full-time employee. Thus, there is no reasonable reason to believe that it violates the principle of equality under Article 11 of the Constitution, and thus is unconstitutional.

(2) According to the provisions of Articles 1 and 8 of the Addenda to the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (Act No. 930), the amended provisions of Article 24(3), 4, and 5 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act shall enter into force from July 1, 2010, and Article 24(2) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act shall not apply from June 30, 2010. Thus, Article 3 of the Addenda to the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act shall be construed as July 1, 2010 with respect to Article 24 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act. Accordingly, the term "the enforcement date of the Act" shall be construed as July 1, 2010. Therefore, the provision on full-time treatment included in the collective agreement concluded before July 1, 2010 among the collective agreement of

E. The limit of time-off under Article 24(4) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act is a provision that applies only to the union chief executive officer, and it cannot be applied to the payment of wages to the union chief executive officer, negotiating members, etc. Therefore, the provision on the treatment of non-exclusive executive officer cannot be said to violate Article 24(4) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act.

F. The provision of facilities, convenience provision, and convenience provision are about basic management and maintenance expenses incidental to the provision of trade union offices, and there is no local risk of infringing on the autonomy of trade unions, and thus, it cannot be deemed to constitute unfair labor practices under Article 81 subparagraph 4 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act.

G. The agreement that limits the right to terminate a collective agreement under the proviso of Article 32(3) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act is an autonomous self-detention, and naturally permitted under the principle of labor-management autonomy, and there is a realistic need to limit the abuse of employer's right to terminate the collective agreement. Thus, it cannot be deemed unlawful, unlike the proviso of Article 3

4. Related Acts;

Attachment 'Related Acts and subordinate statutes' shall be as shown.

5. Determination

(a) Articles of the negotiating party;

(1) Determination as to the Plaintiff’s allegation No. 3. A. (1)

(A) According to Article 7(1) of the Addenda to the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (Act No. 9930), where a trade union is organized in a single business or workplace, a new trade union that shares the object of organization with the trade union until June 30, 201 shall not be established until June 30, 2011. The purport of the foregoing provision is to prohibit temporary prohibition in order to prevent confusion in collective bargaining that may arise due to the transfer of the bargaining counter if the establishment of multiple labor unions with a separate bargaining right is immediately permitted, among the absence of the methods and procedures for the simplification of bargaining windows.

A multiple labor union, the establishment of which is prohibited pursuant to the above provision, is limited to the unit trade union for each company newly established in the same business or workplace or to the branch or sub-branch of a unit trade union for each industry, occupation, or region that can be seen as equivalent thereto even though the branch or sub-branch of a unit labor union for each company or an industrial, occupational, and regional unit labor union that can be seen as a unit trade union, and if the existing trade union is the primary business unit trade union and its branch or sub-branch is a unit trade union for each company, it may establish a unit trade union for each company without any restriction under the above provision. On the contrary, if the existing trade union is a unit trade union for each company, the unit trade union for each industry, occupation, and region newly established is a unit trade union for each company, and its branch or sub-branch is deemed as a unit labor union for each company (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 201Du5361, Jul. 26, 2002; 2002Du456, Dec. 26, 2004

(B) In the instant case, the collective agreement of this case was not concluded by each company of the Plaintiff Union as a party to the agreement, but concluded by the Plaintiff Union as an industrial unit trade union as a party to the direct agreement. Thus, even before July 1, 2011, the establishment of a unit trade union or a unit trade union for each company of the instant company, which is organized by the Plaintiff Union and the employees of the instant company, can be established to the extent that it does not coincide with the organization of the Plaintiff Union even before July 1, 2011, the Plaintiff’s assertion on the premise that such establishment is denied is without merit.

(2) Determination as to the Plaintiff’s allegation No. 3. A. (2)

According to Article 33(1) of the Constitution, Articles 5 and 29 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, workers shall have the right to independent association, collective bargaining, and collective action to improve the working conditions, and workers may freely organize or join a trade union, and the representative of a trade union shall have the right to negotiate with an employer or employers' association and to conclude a collective agreement on behalf of the trade union or its members.

If the union shop agreement is concluded, if a union member permits another trade union with independent collective bargaining rights while withdrawing from a trade union and joining another trade union with independent collective bargaining rights as an object of organization, the company actually exists multiple trade unions with collective bargaining rights within the company, and the union shop agreement should be abolished, and therefore, the union union agreement shall also apply to the withdrawing union member (Supreme Court Decision 2000Da23815 Decided 10, 25, 2002). However, the above legal principle applies only to determine whether it is legitimate to determine which union member withdraws from a trade union and join another trade union, and it does not apply to the effect of a union member's joining another trade union or to determine the existence of other trade union's collective bargaining rights.

In the instant case, there is no dispute between the parties to the instant collective agreement, and there is no evidence to prove whether the Plaintiff’s union represents more than 2/3 of the employees belonging to the instant company at the time of concluding the instant collective agreement or thereafter, and even if the union shop provisions included in the instant collective agreement are valid, as seen in 5. A. (1) above, the instant company may establish another trade union affiliated with the Plaintiff union, and thus, it cannot be permitted pursuant to Article 81.3 of the Trade Union Act to refuse or neglect the Plaintiff’s demand for collective bargaining by the surviving trade union separate from the Plaintiff union on the ground that the instant company has a union shop provisions.

Therefore, recognizing only the plaintiff union as the only negotiating body is illegal because it infringes the workers' right to organize and the labor union's right to collective bargaining guaranteed by Article 33(1) of the Constitution and Articles 5 and 29(1) of the Trade Union Act. Thus, the plaintiff's assertion is without

(3) Determination as to the Plaintiff’s above 3. A. (3) argument

In full view of the purport of the entire pleadings, the validity term of the instant collective agreement may be acknowledged until March 31, 2012. As such, pursuant to the main text of Article 3 of the Addenda to the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (Act No. 9930), the collective agreement of this case is not only until June 30, 2011 where the establishment of multiple labor union is prohibited, but also during the period from July 1, 201 to March 31, 2012 where the establishment of multiple labor union is permitted. Accordingly, the collective agreement of the parties to the collective bargaining organization infringes upon another trade union’s right to collective bargaining that may be newly organized after July 1, 201 where the establishment of multiple labor union is permitted, and the Plaintiff’s assertion is without merit.

(b) Exclusionary clause of the procedures for simplification of bargaining windows;

(1) According to Articles 29(2) and 29-2(1) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, which came into force from July 1, 2011, where multiple labor unions exist, a trade union shall determine a representative bargaining trade union and request bargaining. However, the same shall not apply where an employer consents not to undergo the simplification of bargaining windows (the procedures for the decision of a representative bargaining trade union) within the time limit for autonomous decision of a representative bargaining trade union, and a representative bargaining trade union shall have the authority to negotiate with an employer and conclude a collective agreement with an employer for all the trade unions or union members that have requested bargaining. In addition, according to Article 29-2(2) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, all the trade unions which participated in the procedures for the simplification of bargaining windows have decided a representative bargaining trade union autonomously within the period prescribed by Presidential Decree. According to Article 14-2 through 5 of the Enforcement Decree of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, and according to the provisions of Article 14-6 of the Enforcement Decree of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Act, a trade union decided as a trade union pursuant to the above procedure.

Where it is intended to determine a representative bargaining trade union autonomously, the representative, negotiating members, etc. of the representative bargaining trade union shall be jointly signed or sealed and notified to the employer during the period from the date of determination or decision of the trade union which has requested bargaining to the date of 14 days.

(2) Article 29-2(1) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act is legitimate to consent in advance from the employer to not undergo the procedures for simplification of bargaining windows as stipulated under the proviso of Article 29-2(1) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, and Article 29-2(1) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act requires the procedures for simplification of bargaining windows at the time of collective bargaining in principle in order to prevent confusion in collective bargaining due to the diversification of bargaining windows after July 1, 2011 where multiple unions are allowed to establish multiple unions: Provided, however, an exception is recognized if the employer consents thereto. In light of the legislative intent, form, and method of interpretation of the general law, the above exceptional provisions should be strictly interpreted; (2) the procedure for simplification of bargaining windows is premised on the premise that the trade union requesting the bargaining becomes final and conclusive or decided; and (3) the procedure for simplification of bargaining windows begins from the date the trade union requested the bargaining is determined or decided to exclude the period from the date of "employer's consent stipulated under the proviso of Article 19-2(1) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Act.

(1) According to the proviso of Article 2 subparag. 4 and Article 2 subparag. 4 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Commission Act, a union which permits non-workers to join shall be construed as a trade union, but if the dismissed person has requested the Labor Relations Commission to remedy unfair labor practices, it shall be construed as a worker until the Central Labor Relations Commission makes a decision on review. In other words, if a worker is dismissed by an employer, in principle, he/she loses his/her status as a member of a trade union. However, if the dismissed worker requested the Labor Relations Commission to remedy unfair labor practices, he/she shall continue to hold his/

(2) Since the industrial trade union like the Plaintiff’s union does not meet the qualification requirements for a certain employer-subsidiary relationship, it is allowed to join the number of workers employed in various workplaces engaged in the same industry, and even if the worker is dismissed or temporarily in a position, it is allowed to join the industrial trade union as a member.

However, in light of the fact that the collective agreement of this case does not apply to all of the plaintiff union members, but only applies to workers (including workers dismissed by the company) who are parties to each collective agreement among the plaintiff union members, it is reasonable to interpret that the dismissed worker qualification provision of this case does not determine whether a person who asserts that he is an employee is a member of the plaintiff union against each company that is not a party to the collective agreement of this case, but determined whether a person who asserts that he is an employee is a member of the plaintiff union. Thus, the proviso of Article 2 (d) of the Trade Union Act shall apply to the collective agreement of this case. Accordingly, if a person who is dismissed from each company that is party to the collective agreement of this case claims the validity of dismissal against the dismissed company until the final and conclusive judgment of the Supreme Court, the dismissed worker qualification provision of the dismissed worker qualification provision that allows entry and activities within the company is in violation of the proviso of Article 2 (d) of the Trade Union

(d) Provisions concerning treatment of full-time officers;

(1) Determination as to the Plaintiff’s allegation No. 3. D. (1)

According to the provisions of Article 24(1) and (2) and Article 81(4) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, an employee may be employed as a full-time employee if a collective agreement is prescribed or consent is obtained from the employer, and the full-time employee shall not be paid any benefits from the employer during his/her full-time period, and the employer’s payment of benefits to the full-time employee constitutes an unfair labor practice.

The provisions of Article 24 (2) of the Labor Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act and Article 81 subparagraph 4 of the Labor Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, which provide the benefits to the full-time worker, shall not be deemed to be unconstitutional for the following reasons. Thus, the plaintiff's assertion is without merit.

First, it is difficult to see the issue of recognition of the union tenant or the payment of wages to the union tenant as a kind of right to organize under the Constitution or the right derived therefrom, because the union tenant is recognized as the premise of the consent of the employer.

Second, since a pre-employed person exclusively engages in the affairs of a trade union and provides labor, he/she does not have the right to receive wages as remuneration for labor, and the wages of a pre-employed person are in principle borne by the trade union, and even if an employer pays wages to a pre-employed person by collective agreement, it is a matter of the employer’s support or provision of convenience to the trade union. Therefore, even if the payment of wages to a pre-employed person is prohibited by law, there is no room for infringing on the freedom of occupation, the right to work

Third, there is a lot of cases where a trade union actually plays a role as a representative of all employees, and it is desirable to solve the problem of support for an employer's trade union through consultation between the labor and management, and it is not necessary to prohibit the payment of wages to the full-time union workers through autonomous negotiations between the labor and management. However, while the trade union and the employer should pay wages to the full-time union workers in a historical and structural conflict, it may weaken the autonomy of the trade union, may affect the negotiation process with the employer, and ultimately, it is necessary to restrict the employer's payment of wages to the full-time union workers in terms of the possibility of affecting the bargaining process, and ultimately, it is necessary to restrict the employer's payment of wages to the full-time union workers in terms of securing legitimacy of the agreements concluded between the labor and management.

Fourth, it is difficult to view that the wage support for a full-time employee is an unfair labor act, and even if it is decided to punish a violation, it is against the excessive prohibition principle, in that there is a need to eradicate any wrong labor-management practice, such as concerns about the violation of autonomy of a trade union and the formation of a disorderly labor-management relationship due to the establishment of so-called labor-management union.

Fifth, Article 24 (4) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act provides an alternative provision by recognizing the exemption of paid working hours within a certain scope.

Sixth, the Convention No. 135 of the International Labor Organization provides that the representative of workers shall not take any disadvantageous measure against the latter on the ground of their status and activities, and that the latter shall provide appropriate convenience to the latter so that the latter can perform his duties in a prompt and efficient manner. However, it is difficult to view the above Convention as directly regulating the issue of payment of wages to the former. The recommendation of the latter is not a treaty established by the Constitution or a generally accepted international law, and thus, it cannot be viewed as a violation of Article 6(1) of the

(2) Determination as to the Plaintiff’s allegation No. 3. D. (2)

According to the provisions of Articles 1 and 8 of the Addenda to the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (Act No. 9930), Article 24 (2) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act enters into force from January 1, 2010, but it is apparent that the application is postponed until June 30, 2010. Thus, in applying Article 24 (2) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, "the enforcement date of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act" under Article 3 of the Addenda to the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act refers to "the enforcement date of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, January 1, 20

Therefore, a collective agreement concluded before January 1, 2010 constitutes a "collective agreement in force as at the time the Act enters into force," and thus, even though the provision that benefits shall be paid to a full-time employee under the proviso of Article 3 of the Addenda, the collective agreement entered into after January 1, 2010, as in the instant collective agreement, constitutes a "collective agreement in force as at the time the Act enters into force," if the provision that benefits shall be paid to a full-time employee, in violation of Article 24 (2) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, is two provisions that

Therefore, since the provision of this case's full-time officer treatment takes effect only until June 30, 2010, for which the application of Article 24 (2) is postponed, the plaintiff's assertion is without merit.

E. The provision of Article 24 (4) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act provides that the subject of the paid working hours exemption system ("Time") shall be defined as "worker who is not a "workers", and it is not applicable to the union members or negotiating members, etc. only once the union members are union members or union members, etc., not only is the narrow interpretation that is inconsistent with the legal language and text, but also is not allowed since it is inconsistent with the purpose of the law that limits the payment of wages to union members in order to secure the independence of union members and eradicate wrong practices. Accordingly, the plaintiff's assertion is without merit.

F. Article 81 subparag. 4 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act prohibits an employer from engaging in unfair labor practices. The operating expenses refer to all expenses necessary for the establishment of a trade union, including expenses for goods purchase, personnel expenses for union employees, expenses for meetings, such as meetings of the trade union conference, withdrawal equipment, and other expenses that need to be paid from the budget of the trade union. The operating expenses of a trade union shall be paid from the union paid by the union members. If a trade union receives a subsidy from the employer of the expenses necessary for its operation, it would lose autonomy as a conflicting organization, and even if not, it would be prohibited from providing an opportunity for an employer to control or improve the trade union. Accordingly, it is not necessary to determine whether an employer assists the operation expenses of a trade union in itself and separately violates the independence of the trade union. However, Article 81 subparag. 4 and the proviso of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act stipulate that the provision of minimum contributions to welfare funds of senior citizens, economic or other relief measures, etc., and that provision of electric facilities and equipment should not be approved by social norms.

The instant provision of facilities and convenience goes beyond the provision of the minimum office and essential equipment recognized by social norms, and provides that the maintenance expenses of offices, such as communications expenses, electricity and water rates, office supplies, and the daily amount of gasoline per month, and the allowance for duties between associations shall be paid. Thus, the Plaintiff’s assertion is without merit.

G. The main text of Article 32(3) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act provides that “If a detailed collective agreement is not concluded even though both parties continue to engage in collective bargaining before and after the expiration of the term of validity of the collective agreement, the previous collective agreement shall remain in force until three months after the expiration date of the term of validity thereof, except as otherwise agreed upon, the previous collective agreement shall remain in force,” and in the proviso of Article 32(3) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act provides that “if a new collective agreement is not concluded after the expiration date of the term of validity thereof, the previous collective agreement shall remain in force until the date of the conclusion of the new collective agreement, and either of the parties may terminate the previous collective agreement by notifying the other party six

On the other hand, the purport of the proviso is to prevent a long-term subordinate to the previous collective agreement by recognizing one party's right to terminate if there is an automatic extension clause under the collective agreement. Therefore, it is reasonable to see it as a mandatory provision. The restriction of the right to terminate the collective agreement is not allowed against the mandatory provision. Thus, the plaintiff's assertion is without merit.

6. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim of this case is dismissed as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.