2018Na10564 Compensation for damages

1. A;

2. B

[Plaintiff-Appellant] Plaintiff GB

Attorney GC

1. F;

Attorney Lee Dong-hwan, Counsel for the plaintiff

3. I

4. J Co., Ltd.

Defendant 2 through 4-Law Firm Hongk Law, Counsel for defendant 2-4

[Defendant-Appellee]

6.O;

7. Pstock company.

8. Qua Co., Ltd.

Defendant 5 through 8 (Attorney Choi Jong-soo, Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

2.H

5. M.

Seoul Central District Court Decision 2012Gahap34257 Decided May 15, 2013

Seoul High Court Decision 2013Na38444 Decided August 8, 2014

Supreme Court Decision 2014Da61654 Decided October 10, 2018

July 18, 2019

September 26, 2019

1. Of the judgment of the first instance, the part of the judgment ordering the Plaintiffs to pay KRW 8,00,000 to Defendant F, and the part against the said Defendants to pay KRW 8,00,000,00 to Defendant I and J Co., Ltd., jointly with Defendant O, Defendant O, P, and Q, in excess of the amount calculated at the rate of KRW 2,00,000 per annum from March 27, 2012 to September 26, 2019, and KRW 5% per annum from the next day to September 26, 2019, and KRW 20 per annum from the day of full payment. The Plaintiffs’ claim corresponding to the revoked part is dismissed.

2. Of the judgment of the court of first instance, the part against the plaintiffs falling under the following order of payment shall be revoked.

Defendant H and J Co., Ltd. jointly pays to the Plaintiffs 3,00,000 won, Defendant M and P jointly pay 2,00,000,000 won and 20% per annum from March 27, 2012 to September 26, 2019, and 20% per annum from the next day to the day of full payment.

3. Of the judgment of the court of first instance, the part against Defendant J Co., Ltd., P Co., Ltd. and Q Q is revoked, and the plaintiffs’ claim corresponding to the revoked part is dismissed.

4. The remaining appeals by Plaintiffs and Defendant F, I, J,O, P, and Q are dismissed, respectively.

5. Of the total litigation costs, 80% is borne by the Plaintiffs, and the remainder is borne by the Defendants.

6. The part concerning the payment of money under paragraph (2) may be provisionally executed.

1. Purport of claim

A. For the plaintiffs:

1) Defendant F is KRW 50,000,000;

2) A) Defendant J Co., Ltd.: 100,000,000

B) Defendant H and I jointly with Defendant J Co., Ltd. and KRW 50,000,000, out of the amounts set forth in the above paragraph (a) above;

3) Defendant M and Defendant P jointly KRW 30,000,000;

4) DefendantO, Defendant P and Defendant Q Co., Ltd. jointly KRW 30,000,000

In addition, with respect to each of the above amounts, 5% interest per annum from March 27, 2012 to the date of the first instance judgment, and 20% interest per annum from the next day to the date of full payment.

B. 1) Defendant J Co., Ltd.: (a) from the date of service of the first instance judgment, the title of the correction report (attached Form 1) on the top of the article on the front page of the online newspaper U(V)’s website for 48 hours; and (c) the character thereof for 48 hours, the main text of the correction report should be searched; and (d) the main text of the correction report should be searched at the bottom of the main text of the article on the correction report, and it can be searched with the article on the correction report at the bottom of the main text of the article on the correction report; and (e) the size and active nature of the title and main text are the same as that of the article on the correction report; and (e) the above correction report may be stored and searched in the database of the article

B) Defendant P, for 48 hours from the date of delivery of the judgment of the first instance, shall indicate the title of the correction report (attached Form 2) on the top of the list of articles on the front page of the online newspaper WW (X)’s website in [Attachment 2] and insert it in [Attachment 2], the contents of the correction report shall be searched. The contents of the correction report shall be inserted at the bottom of the main text of the article on the correction report, and the above correction report shall be searched with the article on the correction report, and the size and activity of the title and main text shall be published in the same manner as the article on the news report, and after 48 hours have elapsed, the above correction report shall be stored and searched in the news database.

2) If Defendant J Co., Ltd and P did not perform their obligations under paragraph (1) above, they shall pay to the Plaintiffs the amount calculated at the rate of KRW 500,000 per day from the day following the due date until the due date.

C. 1) Within seven days from the date this judgment became final and conclusive, Defendant Q Co., Ltd. published a correction report (attached Form 3) in the article publishing the article excluding the Y’s social aspect (attached Form 3) in the title 24 in the name of the 24 grade high morals, and the main text in the name of class 18 in the name of class 18 in the second class.

2) If Defendant Q Q does not perform the obligation under the above paragraph (1), the amount calculated at the rate of KRW 500,000 per day from the day following the deadline to the day the performance is completed shall be paid to the Plaintiffs.

2. The purport of the plaintiffs' appeal

A. Of the judgment of the court of first instance, the part against the plaintiffs falling under the following additional payment order shall be revoked.

B. As to the plaintiffs:

1) Defendant F is KRW 15,000,000;

2) A) Defendant J Co., Ltd. KRW 30,000,000;

B) Defendant H and I jointly with Defendant J Co., Ltd. and KRW 15,000,000 out of the amounts set forth in paragraph (a) above;

3) Defendant M and Defendant P jointly KRW 10,000,000;

4) DefendantO, Defendant P and Defendant Q Co., Ltd. jointly KRW 10,000,000

In addition, with respect to each of the above amounts, 5% interest per annum from March 27, 2012 to the date of the judgment of the appellate court and 20% interest per annum from the next day to the date of full payment.

3. Purport of appeal by Defendant F, I, J,O, P, and Q

Each part of the judgment of the first instance against the Defendants shall be revoked, and all of the plaintiffs' claims corresponding to the revocation shall be dismissed.

1. Basic facts

A. Plaintiff A, while serving as a member of the National Assembly belonging to AC, served as the representative of AC Party from July 2010, and served as a member of the National Assembly belonging to AD Party from December 201, and served as the representative of AD Party from December 201. Plaintiff B, as the husband of Plaintiff A, is working as the representative attorney of GB as the representative of the law firm GB.

B. Defendant F created a “DB” and worked as a representative, and written and posted the same text in his Twitter account from March 21, 2012 to March 24, 2012.

C. Defendant H, a reporter belonging to Defendant J Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Defendant J”), prepared and published articles such as online newspaper U on March 26, 2012, and on March 27, 2012 (attached Form 5), and attached Form 6. Defendant P Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Defendant P”) and Defendant Q Q (hereinafter referred to as “Defendant Q”), who is a reporter belonging to Defendant P Co., Ltd. and Defendant P Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Defendant P”), written and published the same articles in W and Y [Attachment 7] and [Attachment 8] on March 26, 2012 (hereinafter referred to as “the instant expressive act” collectively).

[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10 (including virtual numbers; hereinafter the same shall apply) and the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Illegal acts such as defamation caused by political expressions;

Defamation that constitutes tort under the Civil Act refers to an act of infringing on a social objective assessment of a person’s character, virtue, reputation, and credit, by publicly expressing a fact. An expressive act that explicitly expresses a certain fact to the extent likely to infringe on another person’s social assessment may constitute defamation. However, an expressive act that expresses a certain opinion or comment may constitute defamation if the assertion of a hidden basic fact, which serves as the basis of the opinion, is implicitly included in light of the overall purport thereof, and if the fact may infringe on another person’s social assessment. An expressive act that separately expresses a fact that serves as the basis of the opinion in expressing a certain opinion, may constitute defamation if it can infringe on another person’s social assessment solely on the basis of the publicly alleged basic fact (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2013Da26432, Sept. 10, 2015).

However, purely expressing opinion alone does not lead to defamation. However, if the form, content, etc. of an expressive act falls under an insulting and dissipated personal attack or infringes on personal rights by publicly announcing a fact going beyond a certain degree of exaggeration as to another person’s personal affairs, such act may constitute a tort separate from defamation (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2012Da19734, Aug. 20, 2014).

In a case involving tort liability due to a political expression, defamation and insult should be dealt with separately, and the recognition of responsibility should be different, thereby ensuring broad freedom of expression in relation to political debate or expression of opinion. Accordingly, to recognize defamation liability due to a political expressive act, it is recognized that reputation has been damaged by a statement of fact. In order to determine whether an expressive act constitutes defamation, not only the expression used but also the expression used to determine whether such expressive act constitutes defamation should be taken into account as well as the expression in which the speaker and the other party are in a position. In such a case, in the case of a public figure of the chief public figure of public debate, criticism shall be faced and such criticism shall be overcome through piracy and re-rupture. The position of a speaker or his/her usual attitude may affect the determination of whether the other party’s reputation has been damaged by his/her speech.

Since in a democratic country, through the free formation and transmission of public opinion, the majority opinion should be gathered and maintained to create and maintain democratic political order, the freedom of expression, in particular, the freedom of public concerns, as an important constitutional right, should be guaranteed to the maximum extent possible. As such, in cases where a statement of fact is partially included in the media that criticizes public officials, etc. or expresses political opposing opinions, recognition of tort liability should be careful. Although a certain person’s political ideology is a matter of fact, in many cases, it is impossible to determine it without any debate or evaluation, and thus, it is not desirable to impose judicial liability by directly intervention in a debate or debate on a political ideology.

In the process of political ideological debate, it would be an outcome that excessively limits the freedom of expression to prohibit and impose legal responsibilities on the parts that can be seen as being merely an ephetorological exaggeration or a lusical expression that can be ordinarily seen as being in the process of political ideological debate.

3. Determination on the claim for damages

A. The plaintiffs' assertion

Although there was no fact that the plaintiffs joined the "BC" organization, Defendant F, H, I, M, andO (hereinafter referred to as "Defendant F, etc.") stated false facts as if they belong to the organization of "BC" or news articles listed in attached Form 4 or attached Form 8, the plaintiffs classified the plaintiffs as pro-North Korea North Korea North Korea North Korea and damaged the plaintiffs' reputation, and they infringed the plaintiffs' personality rights by using a pro-de expression against the plaintiffs. Accordingly, Defendant F, etc. and each media organization of this case, Defendant J. P and Q are obliged to pay consolation money due to defamation or personal rights infringement to the plaintiffs.

B. Whether defamation constitutes defamation

1) Whether the case constitutes factually

Although the term "pro-North Korea" means the attitude of unsatising North Korea in the past, it has been used in various ways from the meaning of "the ability of anti-state and anti-social forces" to the meaning of "the person who seems to have a favorable attitude toward North Korea," and "the person who seems to have a critical opinion on the government's major policies," and "the person who has a critical opinion on the government's major policies." In addition, this term is derived from the situation where the Republic of Korea and North Korea are hostile, according to the political situation, the concept and contents of the term itself are changed, and the average person as well as the person who feel the expression as an average person as well as the person who feel the expression against this word are bound to change, so it is difficult to objectively determine its meaning. The same applies to the term "pro-North Korea", but it can be understood that the term "pro-North Korea" generally refers to a person who satising the subject's ideology, and therefore, can not be seen as a criticism of the context or situation before and after the expression.

In the instant expressive act, the expression “pro-North Korea” or “North Korea-North Korea-North Korea-North Korea-North Korea-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korea relationship was used in political criticism of the issue of the AD party’s suspicion of the operation of the presidential election of proportional representation and the issue of the decision-making method in the political party. This can only be seen as a simple expression of opinion as a rhetorical exaggeration to criticize the political behavior or attitude of the

On the other hand, the expression to the effect that "the plaintiff belongs to BC" is an expression that belongs to a specific organization, and constitutes a factual presentation, and there is no room for such expression to constitute an expression that lowers the social value and evaluation of the plaintiffs depending on the context in which such expression was used and the social perception of "BC". However, the defendants asserted that the above expression is unlawful in light of its content, purpose, circumstances, etc., even if it is deemed that it impairs the reputation of the plaintiffs, and thus, it will be examined below.

2) Whether illegality is denied

Considering that the part of the instant expressive act falls under BC, it is reasonable to view that the instant expressive act is not unlawful in light of the following circumstances.

At the time of the instant expressive act, Plaintiff A was officially recognized as a representative of a member of the National Assembly and a public party, and Plaintiff B, his husband, was in a position equivalent to public recognition or a similar position in light of his social activity experience. Therefore, there is a need to allow a wide range of questions or suspicions on the Plaintiffs’ political ideology. In particular, Plaintiff A had sufficient opportunity to be able to undergo citizen’s evaluation through mutual political and political public defense by responding to the report of “BC member” as a member of the National Assembly who enjoy the exemption privilege.

In this case, although the data that the plaintiffs may recognize that they belong to BC is not verifiable, it is recognized that the relevant press reports that could support the contents of the instant expressive act before and after the instant expressive act were not many (the purport of the entire pleadings and arguments as follows).

At around March 2012, 2012, GA claimed that the Chairman of the Special Committee on AD 2 had a political right called "BC within AD." On March 21, 2012, the EX could not recognize and resign from the article "A himself/herself," which was a common political party such as E-C and resignation. It is so far as the 2ndm of AD 2 did not take precedence over its own decision-making. It is so far as the 2nd of AD 2nd of AD 2, which was the public figure of B1 at the time of D 1st of May 2012. It was widely known that the 2nd of AD 2nd of AD 2nd of the 2nd of the 2nd of the 2nd of the 2nd of the 2nd of the 2nd of the 2nd of the 2nd of the 2nd of the 2nd of the 2nd of the 2nd of the 2nd of the 2nd of the 3th of the 2nd of the 2nd of the 3th of the 2nd of the 3th of the 2nd of the 2nd of the 3th of the report.

Considering the contents of press reports, circumstances at the time of such media reports, and the status of the plaintiffs, a wide range of questions about the plaintiffs' political ideology need to be permitted. Considering the fact that the plaintiffs have to take the suspicion and criticism as a public figure, the instant expressive act by Defendant F, etc. was conducted for the public interest as a matter of public interest, and thus, there may be reasonable grounds to believe that the contents were true. Thus, it cannot be deemed that the instant expressive act constitutes an unlawful act that constitutes an attack with malicious or gross considerable reasonableness on the ground of the instant expressive act.

C. Whether personal rights are infringed

However, even if the filing of a matter of public concern ought to be widely permitted, the method of expression ought to be selected on the basis of respecting the other party’s personality, and even if there is any matter subject to criticism, it is not permissible to place insult by an insulting expression. In addition, if the form and content of an expressive act constitutes an insulting and definite personal attack, it may constitute a separate type of tort against defamation.

Defendant F (Attachment 4) marked the Plaintiff A from the first year of university and college, and the Plaintiff B, etc. planned the Plaintiff BC as Ahylone by focusing only on his ability to instigate the public to the Plaintiff. The husband is the head, the denial is the husband, and the Plaintiff was unable to take the face fence instead of B, and the Defendant H, M, andO planned the Plaintiff to put the Plaintiff into the public part of BC by citing such Defendant F’s notice, referring to the head, the denial is the role, the Ahyl planning product, the Plaintiff’s planning product, and the Plaintiff’s first year from the university, the Plaintiff et al. planned the Plaintiff to put the Plaintiff into the public part of BC (the Plaintiff was the husband’s ability to instigate), and the Plaintiff planned to put the Plaintiff into the public part of BC (the Plaintiff was the husband’s ability to put the Plaintiff into the public part of BC).

Among the instant expressive acts, the said expressions as to the Plaintiffs’ relationship are not equal relations with the Plaintiffs, but with the appearance that Plaintiff B operated and used Plaintiff A from the time when Plaintiff B had no social experience, and thus, constitutes an expression that infringes on the Plaintiffs’ personality.

In addition, Defendant 1 (Attached 6), in the article of [Attachment 6], he did not pass the multiple judicial public notice, was easy in the opening, and was in the name of North Dop BL, but he was in the middle of North Dop BL. BC affiliated with B is an organization created by the forces as soon as possible, and B is a person who has an idea that follows the remarks claimed by the North Dop as poppy, and in the title of the expressions alleged by B, who made efforts as the representative of the North Dop, and who is in color of the expressions alleged by B, it can be known that he is a person who has an idea of thought, so far as soon as possible, by using excessively an emotional and ambiguous hate expression, without any effort to respect the personality of the plaintiffs.

Furthermore, the Plaintiffs asserts that the expression “pro-North Korea, North Korea, and BC” itself is an ambiguous expression that infringes on the Plaintiffs’ personality rights. However, as seen earlier, since the Plaintiffs’ ideological inclinations as those who are officially recognized or in a position equivalent to public recognition are public concerns, it is necessary to be widely permitted to raise an issue thereof. In the case of such political ideological expressions, the concept of the term itself and the appraisal of the relevant expression should vary depending on the times, political situation, and the situation before and after the relevant term was used. In light of the fact that the instant expressive act was made in order to criticize the political behavior or attitude of the Plaintiffs, the mere fact that the Plaintiffs used the expression “pro-North Korea, North Korea, and BC” against the Plaintiffs cannot be said to have infringed on the Plaintiffs’ personality rights.

D. The defendants' liability for damages

Therefore, the defendants are obligated to pay consolation money to the plaintiffs due to the above tort (the defendant J is a joint tortfeasor against each of the above tort committed by the defendant H and I, and the defendant P is jointly obligated to pay consolation money as joint tortfeasor against each of the tort committed by the defendant M andO, and the defendant Q is jointly obligated to pay consolation money as joint tortfeasor against the tort committed by the defendant M andO, and each of the above circumstances is determined as KRW 8,00,000 for the defendant M and J, KRW 3,000 for the defendant M and J, KRW 8,000 for the defendant M and J, KRW 2,00,000 for the defendant M and P, and KRW 2,00 for the defendant M and Q, KRW 2,00 for the defendant M and Q.

Therefore, Defendant F is jointly liable to the Plaintiffs for damages from March 27, 2012 to March 27, 2012, Defendant H and J 3,00,000, Defendant I and J 8,000,000, Defendant M and P jointly with each other; Defendant M and P 2,00,000,000,2,000,000, and each of the above money jointly with each other; Defendant F, H, J, J, M,O, P, P, and Q were jointly liable to pay damages from delay calculated from March 27, 2012 to September 26, 2019, each of which is the date of tort under the Civil Act.

4. Determination on a request for a corrective statement

The Plaintiffs seek for the publication of a correction report to Defendant J, P, and Q, a press organization, as an appropriate measure for restoring honor pursuant to Article 764 of the Civil Act on the premise that the honor of the Plaintiffs was damaged due to the instant expressive act.

However, the claim for a corrective statement based on Article 764 of the Civil Act is premised on establishing a tort of defamation. As seen earlier, the Defendants cannot be deemed to have unlawfully damaged the reputation of the Plaintiffs through the instant expressive act. Therefore, the Plaintiffs’ claim based on such premise cannot be accepted.

5. Conclusion

Therefore, each claim for damages against the Defendants shall be accepted within the scope of recognition as above, and the remaining claims for damages against the Defendants and the claim for a corrective statement shall be dismissed on the ground that they are without merit.

Among the judgment of the first instance, the part concerning the plaintiffs' claim for damages against defendant F. I, J,O, P, and Q is unfair in accordance with a different conclusion. Thus, the part concerning the plaintiffs' appeal against the above defendants which accepted part of the above defendants and ordered payment in excess of the above recognized amount shall be revoked, and the plaintiffs' claim corresponding to the revoked part shall be dismissed. The remaining appeal by the above defendants and the appeal against the above defendants against the above defendants shall be dismissed as there is no ground

Since the part of the judgment of the court of first instance regarding the plaintiffs' claim for damages against the defendant H, J, M and P is unfair with different conclusions, part of the plaintiffs' appeal is accepted, and the part against the plaintiffs corresponding to the above recognized amount in the judgment of first instance is revoked, and the payment is ordered to be made to the above defendants, and the remaining appeals by the plaintiffs are dismissed.

Among the judgment of the court of first instance, the part on the claim for a corrective statement against Defendant J, P, and Q is unfair in its conclusion. As such, the appeal by the above Defendants is accepted, and the part against the above Defendants in the judgment of first instance is revoked, and the plaintiffs' claim corresponding to the revoked part is dismissed.

Judges of the presiding judge;

Judges Lee Jae-chul

Judges Kim Kim-ro

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.