(영문) 대전지방법원 2014.11.7.선고 2014나103426 판결

A. Within the scope of the property inherited from the network D, the Defendants shall pay 57,00,00 won per annum from May 14, 2013 to November 7, 2014; and 20% per annum from the following day to the full payment.

B. The plaintiff's remaining claims against the defendants are dismissed.

2. 1/2 of the total litigation costs arising between the Plaintiff and the Defendants shall be borne by the Plaintiff, and the remainder 1/2 by the Defendants respectively.

3. Paragraph 1(a) may be provisionally executed.

Purport of claim and appeal

1. Purport of claim

Defendants, Co-Defendant E of the first instance trial, and F, each of the Plaintiff KRW 114,00,000, and any of them

From May 14, 2013 to the service date of a copy of the complaint of this case, 5% per annum and the day following the day of complete payment.

For up to twenty percent per annum, each share of 20 percent shall be paid.

2. Purport of appeal

Of the judgment of the first instance, the part against the Defendants is revoked, and the Plaintiff’s claim against the Defendants is dismissed.

Reasons

1. Basic facts

A. The Plaintiff entered into an automobile comprehensive insurance contract with G as a named insured person with respect to the vehicles of 28 B-1317, which are owned by G, and when the insured (including the insured and the insured’s women, etc.) is different from non-insurance vehicles (if the amount of damage exceeds liability insurance, the amount of damage exceeds the amount paid as liability insurance, the Plaintiff shall be paid insurance within the limit of KRW 200,000 for the initial excess, but if the Plaintiff pays insurance proceeds, the amount of damage shall not exceed the amount paid as liability insurance.

In order to acquire the damage claim that the insured has against the obligor for damage within an urgent insurance amount, a special contract was made to substitute for the acquisition of the damage claim that the insured has against the obligor for damage (hereinafter referred to as the "special contract for the damage security for the non-insurance").

B. On October 17, 2012: (a) around 45, D used D’s pro-friendly HIG’s children) and F’s Hashed F’s Hashed F’s Hashed F’s Hashed Hashed *** A’s Hashed Hashed Hashed Hashed Hashed Hashed Hashed Hashed Hashed Hashed 2, Seo-gu, Daejeon, Seo-gu, Daejeon, while driving a 4-distance off from the Daejeon Black-dong Hashed Hashed 2 complex, without operating the steering gear and shocking road delivery boundary (hereinafter referred to as “the instant accident”), caused the death of Hashed Hashed Haa, and died of D’s accident.

C. The Plaintiff, which entered into with G, paid KRW 14,00,000, to his heir of H with respect to the death of H due to the instant accident, based on a non-life insurance special agreement under the said comprehensive automobile insurance contract with G.

D. The Defendants are parents of D. The Defendants.

【Uncontentious facts, entry of Gap evidence 1 through 4 (if each number is available, issuance of a number; hereinafter the same shall apply) and the purport of the whole pleadings

2. The plaintiff's assertion and judgment

A. The plaintiff's assertion

The plaintiff selectively asserts that the defendants are liable to compensate for damages as a supervisor of an incompetent person under Article 755 of the Civil Act, to protect and supervise a minor D, and thus, they are liable to compensate for damages due to a tort under Article 750 of the Civil Act, or to compensate for damages due to a tort. Since the plaintiff paid to H's heir the insurance proceeds of KRW 114,00,000, and thereby the defendants exempted the defendants from the obligations equivalent to the above amount, the defendants are liable to compensate for damages to the plaintiff.

B. Determination

1) First, with respect to whether the Defendants are liable under Article 755 of the Civil Act, it is reasonable to deem that D was a student of 16 years old who attended a high school at the time of the occurrence of the instant death, as seen earlier, and therefore, D has an intelligence to change liability for tort (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 88Meu2745, May 9, 1989). Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s above assertion on the premise that D had no responsibility for tort is without merit.

2) Next, we examine the Defendants’ liability under Article 750 of the Civil Act.

Even if a minor is held liable for tort on his own due to his ability, if there is a proximate causal relation with the minor's breach of duty by the supervisor, the supervisor shall be liable for damages as a general tortfeasor. However, in such a case, the existence of proximate causal relation with the loss of the supervisor's duty and the occurrence of damages must be proved by the claimant (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2003Da5061, Mar. 28, 2003).

However, comprehensively taking account of the aforementioned evidence and evidence, and the overall purport of each statement and pleading of the evidence No. 2 through No. 14 (including numbers in the case of numbers), D were male students who were in the first grade of high school at the time of the instant accident, but were under the protection and supervision of parents in an economic aspect. D was subject to a disposition of three days prior to the attendance at high school pursuant to Article 17(1)6 of the Act on the Prevention of and Countermeasures against School Violence, and it was difficult for the Defendants to find that it was difficult for them to view that it was difficult for them to have been subject to the aforementioned disposition to take measures to prevent school violence because they did not have been subject to the said disposition due to the fact that there was no other reason to believe that it was an accident or an accident that they did not have been subject to the said disposition due to the fact that they had been under the control of the school due to their negligence, including the aforementioned measures to prevent school violence. However, according to the above evidence, D and I did not seem to have been able to have been able to have been engaged in the Defendants.

Therefore, this part of the Plaintiff’s assertion is without merit, which is premised on the occurrence of the instant accident by negligence, in which the Defendants neglected the duty to protect and supervise D.

3) Finally, we examine the defendants' liability as the heir of D.

D Without Class II driver's licenses, D caused the instant accident by negligence in which the steering gear was not operated properly, and thereby caused the death of H. As such, it is liable to compensate for the damages suffered by H. Since the Plaintiff paid insurance money to the Plaintiff, and there is no dispute between the parties that KRW 114,00,00,000 is within the reasonable scope of the damages compensation for H., the Defendants, the inheritor of D, as the Plaintiff, who acquired the damages claim for the instant accident on behalf of the Plaintiff within the scope of the insurance money in accordance with Article 682 of the Commercial Act, are liable to compensate for the damages incurred by H., and at the rate of KRW 57,00,000 as the reward for damages to the Plaintiff who acquired the damages claim for the instant accident on behalf of the Plaintiff within the scope of the insurance money in this case ( = 114,00,000 X inheritance 1/2) and the amount of damages for delay from May 14, 2013 to the date of payment of the insurance money in this case.

Accordingly, the Defendants asserted to the effect that the Defendants’ responsibility should be limited to the scope of inherited property, since they were qualified acceptance of inheritance of D’s property, so the Defendants’ aforementioned defenses by the Defendants are reasonable, since they were defenses to the effect that the Defendants’ liability should be limited to the scope of inherited property, and there is no dispute, and according to the evidence Nos. 1 and 1 of the Daejeon Family Court on December 31, 2012, the Defendants filed a report of qualified acceptance with the Daejeon Family Court No. 201792, Jan. 11, 2013, and received a judgment of acceptance of the same. Therefore, the aforementioned defense by the Defendants is reasonable.

Therefore, the defendants are obligated to pay the above money to the plaintiff within the scope of property inherited from D.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim of this case against the defendants is justified within the scope of the above recognition, and the remaining claim is dismissed as there is no ground, and the part against the defendant in the judgment of the court of first instance as to the defendant is unfair, and it is so modified as per Disposition.