Main Issues
[1] The meaning of "in the course of operation" under the terms and conditions applicable to an accident insurance contract which only provides a security for a traffic accident
[2] 심야에 엘피지 승용차를 운전하여 목적지로 향하여 운행하던 중 눈이 내려 도로가 결빙되어 있어 도로 상태가 좋아질 때까지 휴식을 취할 목적으로 도로변에 승용차를 주차한 후 시동을 켠 채 승용차 안에서 잠을 자다가 차내에 누출된 엘피지 가스의 폭발로 화재가 발생하여 운전자가 소사한 경우, 자동차의 운행중의 사고에 해당한다고 한 사례
Summary of Judgment
[1] The term "operation" under the terms and conditions applicable to an accident insurance contract with special agreement for securing only traffic accidents refers to the use of an automobile in accordance with the usage of the relevant device as stipulated in Article 2 of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act, and the term "the relevant device" refers to the device continuously fixed to an automobile, which is a device with the structure of the automobile, and where all or part of the aforementioned devices are used according to their respective intended use, it is difficult to regard it as an accident during operation even if the accident is used regardless of its nature or risk as a means of transportation.
[2] 심야에 엘피지 승용차를 운전하여 목적지로 향하여 운행하던 중 눈이 내려 도로가 결빙되어 있어 도로 상태가 좋아질 때까지 휴식을 취할 목적으로 도로변에 승용차를 주차한 후 시동을 켠 채 승용차 안에서 잠을 자다가 차내에 누출된 엘피지 가스의 폭발로 화재가 발생하여 운전자가 소사한 경우, 자동차의 운행중의 사고에 해당한다고 한 사례.
[Reference Provisions]
[1] Article 2 subparagraph 2 of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act, Article 726-2 of the Commercial Act / [2] Article 2 subparagraph 2 of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act, Article 726-2 of the Commercial Act
Reference Cases
[1] [2] Supreme Court Decision 92Da8101 delivered on April 27, 1993 (Gong1993Ha, 1539), Supreme Court Decision 93Da55180 delivered on April 29, 1994 (Gong1994Sang, 1612), Supreme Court Decision 96Da7359 delivered on May 28, 1996 (Gong1996Ha, 198), Supreme Court Decision 9Da41824 delivered on January 21, 200 (Gong200Sang, 479)
Plaintiff, Appellee
Plaintiff 1 and two others (Attorneys O Tae-tae et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)
Defendant, Appellant
Samsung Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. and one other (Defendants, Counsel for the defendant-appellant)
Judgment of the lower court
Seoul High Court Decision 99Na42140 delivered on November 19, 1999
Text
All appeals are dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the Defendants.
Reasons
We examine the grounds of appeal.
1. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the non-party 1 entered into an insurance contract with the non-party 2 of this case on October 10, 198 on the condition that the non-party 1 entered into an insurance contract with the non-party 2 of this case on the condition that the non-party 1 entered into an insurance contract with the non-party 1 of this case on the non-party 1 of this case on the non-party 1 of this case on the non-party 2 of this case on the non-party 1 of this case on the non-party 1 of this case on the non-party 1 of this case on the non-party 3 of this case on the non-party 1 of this case on the non-party 1 of this case on the non-party 1 of this case on the non-party 2 of this case on the non-party 1 of this case on the non-party 1 of this case on the non-party 2 of this case on the non-party 1 of this case on the non-party 1 of this accident.
In light of the records, there is no error of law such as misconception of facts due to violation of the rules of evidence, as alleged in the ground of appeal.
2. The term "operation" under the terms and conditions applicable to an accident insurance contract with special agreement for securing only traffic accidents refers to the use of an automobile in accordance with the usage of the relevant device as stipulated in Article 2 of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act (see Supreme Court Decision 93Da55180, Apr. 29, 1994). The term "relevant device" refers to a device continuously fixed on a motor vehicle, which is the unique device of the motor vehicle with the structure of the motor vehicle. If all or part of the various devices are used according to their respective intended use, it is difficult to regard the vehicle as an accident during operation until the accident is used regardless of the nature or risk of the vehicle as a means of transportation (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 96Da7359, May 28, 1996; 9Da41824, Jan. 21, 200).
Based on the facts acknowledged above, the court below determined that the above accident occurred at the time of the accident, and the temperature was high since it was late at night or new walls around the time of the accident, and that Nonparty 1’s destination had not yet reached the destination, and Nonparty 1 had been driving at the middle destination, which was nearly different from the middle destination’s horizontal boundary at the middle destination, and that Nonparty 1’s original plan did not diving but returned to the middle destination’s house at the time of the accident, and that it was difficult to see that the above accident occurred at the time of the accident at the time of the accident, and that the road near the site of the accident at the time of parking, which was open to the public, for the purpose of the safe operation of the vehicle at the time of the accident, and that it was difficult to see that Nonparty 1 was driving from the point of view that it was a small-sized vehicle at the time of the accident at the time of the accident, and that it was difficult to see that the accident occurred at the time of the accident to 10th of the road for safe operation.
The above judgment of the court below is justified in light of the above legal principles as the purport that the vehicle of this case cannot be deemed to have been used regardless of its nature or risk as a means of transport, and there is no error of law such as misunderstanding of legal principles as to the meaning of "run" and "traffic disaster" under the insurance terms and conditions as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal.
In addition, it cannot be deemed that the case pointed out by the Defendant and the instant case are the same.
3. Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.
Justices Son Ji-yol (Presiding Justice)