In a case where Gap applied for an employment examination for new staff members of the Financial Supervisory Service and completed a written examination, and Eul, his father, who is the former executive of the Financial Supervisory Service, was informed of Gap's support, and Byung was determined to have passed the written examination, and Byung was selected as a final successful candidate after the interview and then, Gap was selected as a final successful candidate, and work as the employee of the Financial Supervisory Service; and the Financial Supervisory Service rejected Eul's dismissal on the ground that "A passed an employment examination by unfairly changing the number of employees scheduled to be employed, and this constitutes the subject of disciplinary action under the personnel management regulations," the case holding that Gap cannot be deemed to have committed unlawful acts, and since the Financial Supervisory Service did not have any grounds for disciplinary action, Eul's employment contract can be revoked with Gap on the ground that there was an error in important parts.

After Gap applied for an employment examination for new staff members of the Financial Supervisory Service and completed the written examination, Eul, his father, who is the former executive officer of the Financial Supervisory Service, was aware of Gap's support. Byung was the director general of the Financial Supervisory Service, and Byung was the success of the written examination. Since then, Gap was selected as the final successful candidate after an interview and the number of successful applicants for the written examination, Gap was selected as the final successful candidate, and served as the employee of the Financial Supervisory Service. The Financial Supervisory Service, following the disciplinary procedure against Gap, dismissed Eul on the ground that "A was dismissed by unfairly changing the number of successful applicants for employment, and this constitutes disciplinary action under the personnel management regulations."

The Personnel Management Regulations of the Financial Supervisory Service provides that "the person who committed the act of misconduct, defamation, etc." may be subject to disciplinary action, and the language and text of the above provision means that "the person who committed the act of misconduct" objectively falls under the grounds for disciplinary action, and it is reasonable to strictly interpret the grounds for disciplinary action only in cases where the relevant worker is deemed to have committed the act of misconduct, such as misconduct, or aiding and abetting such misconduct, etc., and unless there is any evidence that Gap's father, who is his father, participated in the process of informing that he provided the case, he cannot be deemed to have committed the act of misconduct, pledge, and defamation against the Financial Supervisory Service. Therefore, the above dismissal disposition becomes null and void due to the lack of grounds for disciplinary action, and on the other hand, the person who led and promoted the decision to increase the number of persons scheduled to be employed and the number of persons who passed the employment process for the purpose of passing the employment procedure of the person who passed the employment procedure of the Financial Supervisory Service, and it is reasonable to deem that Gap and the persons who passed the employment contract had not been dismissed.

Article 23(1) of the Labor Standards Act; Article 109(1) of the Civil Act

Plaintiff (Law Firm LLC, Attorneys Cho Nam-tae et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Financial Supervisory Service (Law Firm LLC, Attorneys Lee In-ray et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Seoul Southern District Court Decision 2018Gahap11565 decided June 14, 2019

February 4, 2020

1. The judgment of the first instance court, including any claims added at the trial, shall be modified as follows:

A. It is confirmed that the Defendant’s dismissal disposition against the Plaintiff on July 20, 2018 is invalid.

B. The defendant shall pay 24,483,300 won to the plaintiff.

C. The plaintiff's remaining claims are dismissed.

2. Of the total litigation costs, 60% is borne by the Plaintiff, and 40% is borne by the Defendant, respectively.

3. Paragraph 1-b. above may be provisionally executed.

The judgment of the first instance is revoked. The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff money equivalent to KRW 73,390,500 and KRW 4,413,300 per month from January 1, 2020 to the date of reinstatement (the plaintiff added the claim for monetary payment at the trial).

1. Basic facts

A. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Act on the Establishment, etc. of Financial Services Commission (hereinafter “Financial Services Commission Act”), the Defendant is a special corporation established to conduct the inspection and supervision of financial institutions under the direction and supervision of the Financial Services Commission. The Plaintiff served as an employee of the Defendant following the employment procedure for new employees in 2016.

B. On July 20, 2018, the Defendant issued an action of dismissal (hereinafter “instant action of dismissal”) against the Plaintiff on the ground that “the Plaintiff, who is an employee in charge of employment of the Defendant, unfairly changed the number of scheduled employees. This constitutes an action of dismissal under Article 41 subparag. 1, 3, and 4 of the Personnel Management Regulations.”

C. The Defendant’s personnel management regulations (hereinafter “the instant personnel management regulations”) and the main contents of the Plaintiff’s written oaths submitted at the time of entry are as follows.

본문내 포함된 표 ◆ 인사관리규정 제41조(징계대상) ① 다음 각호의 1에 해당하는 행위를 한 자는 징계할 수 있다. 1. 부정한 행위를 한 자 3. 취업규칙 또는 서약서에 위반한 자 4. 원내 질서를 문란하게 하거나 감독원의 명예를 훼손한 자 제48조(징계의 구분) 징계는 그 경중에 따라 면직, 정직, 감봉 및 견책으로 구분한다. ◆ 서약서 6. 채용 시 감춘 전력＊이나 지원서 기재 내용 및 제출서류 등에서 채용 여부에 영향을 줄 허위가 발견될 경우 즉시 채용이 취소되거나 면직되어도 아무런 이의를 제기하지 않겠습니다. ＊피고의 직원으로서 품위유지에 문제가 될 수 있거나, 금융감독원의 명예훼손과 관련될 수 있는 각종 탈법·불법·부당행위

D. Meanwhile, according to Articles 2 subparag. 3(b) and 82(1) and (2) of the Act on the Prevention of Corruption and the Establishment and Management of the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission (hereinafter “Corruption and Civil Rights Commission Act”), among the Defendant’s employees, “any person who retired ipso facto, removed, or removed from office due to an act of corruption in connection with his duties”, he cannot be employed at a certain institution including a public institution for five years from the date of his retirement. The Defendant directed the Plaintiff at the time of his dismissal that the above employment restriction system applies to the Plaintiff.

[Reasons for Recognition] Gap evidence Nos. 1, 2, 12, Eul evidence No. 32, the purport of the whole pleadings

2. As to the claim to nullify the invalidity of the dismissal of this case

A. Summary of the parties' assertion

1) Plaintiff

The Defendant’s employee Nonparty 1 did not commit any unlawful act in the course of employing the Plaintiff. Even if Nonparty 1 committed any unlawful act, Article 41(1)1, 3, and 4 of the Personnel Management Regulations applies to “offenders” who actually committed such unlawful act, violation of a pledge, or defamation. As such, the Plaintiff did not commit any unlawful act, the said provision cannot be applied to the Plaintiff. Accordingly, the instant dismissal disposition is null and void as there is no grounds for disciplinary action.

2) Defendant

A) As long as Nonparty 1 committed an unlawful act in the course of employment for the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff also constitutes “a person who committed an unlawful act” as prescribed by Article 41(1)1 of the Personnel Management Regulations, as he/she was involved in Nonparty 1’s unlawful act, and thereby making benefit therefrom. In addition, as long as Nonparty 1’s unlawful act on behalf of the Plaintiff was socially controversial, there are grounds for disciplinary action as prescribed by Article 41(1)3 and 41(1)4 of the Personnel Management Regulations against the Plaintiff.

B) Even if there is no ground for the disciplinary action of this case, the original defendant's employment contract was invalid or revoked due to the non-party 1's above misconduct, and the defendant merely made the disposition of this case by applying the disciplinary procedure when confirming the invalidity or expressing his intention to revoke the disposition of this case. Thus, the disposition of this case is valid by the notification or declaration of intention to revoke the invalidation.

B. Determination

1) As to whether the grounds for disciplinary action of this case are acknowledged

A) The rules of employment are prepared by an employer to establish the criteria for the employee’s service discipline or working conditions, and has the nature of legal norms governing collective legal relations between labor and management. In light of the nature of the rules of employment, in principle, the rules of employment should be interpreted in accordance with its objective meaning, and interpretation beyond the objective meaning of the text should be prudent and strict (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2002Da69631, Mar. 14, 2003). In addition, the content of the grounds for disciplinary action stipulated in the rules of employment should not be contrary to the relevant Acts and subordinate statutes, such as the Labor Standards Act, and it should not be construed as grounds for disciplinary action under the social norms (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 98Du4672, Mar.

B) On the other hand, Article 41(1) of the Personnel Management Regulations of this case provides that “a person who committed an act of misconduct, defamation, etc.” may be subject to disciplinary action. In addition, the language and text of the Act refers to “a person who committed an act of misconduct” which objectively constitutes disciplinary action. In addition, the disciplinary action is basically a sanction against an employee’s violation of corporate order. ② Measures under the Civil Act, such as cancellation and termination of labor contract, etc., are characterized as a qualitatively different order punishment. ③ Furthermore, if a defendant takes disciplinary action or dismissal against an employee due to an act of corruption related to his/her duties, the relevant employee is subject to serious legal disadvantage, such as restriction on employment, depending on his/her rights and interests of prevention of corruption. In addition, the grounds for disciplinary action under each subparagraph of Article 41(1) of the Personnel Management Regulations of this case are strictly interpreted to be applied only where the relevant employee can be deemed to have committed an act of misconduct, such as the relevant employee’s act of misconduct, or the relevant employee’s act of aiding and abetting such act.

In regard to this, in a case where the defendant provided that "a person who has failed to meet the requirements for assistance and submitted documents" in the recruitment outline for new students of a university as a person subject to disqualified treatment, the defendant asserts that if another person having close relation with the applicant committed an unlawful act on behalf of the applicant, the applicant who would be entitled to receive such benefit constitutes "other wrongful act" as a person subject to disqualified treatment under the above provision, in light of the Supreme Court Decision 2006Da23817 Decided July 13, 2006, the applicant who would be entitled to receive such benefit should be construed as including the plaintiff who committed an unlawful act. However, it is difficult to view that the failure of a university as an order punishment does not constitute a disciplinary action, but rather, it seems that the above decision would be different from this case and the defendant's assertion cannot be accepted.

C) Regarding the instant case, although Nonparty 1’s employee Nonparty 1 committed a fraudulent act to change the number of persons scheduled to be employed and the number of persons passing an employment examination in order to pass the Plaintiff as seen below 3, as seen in the following 3, and the Plaintiff acquired the profit that the Plaintiff passed an employment examination due to such fraudulent act, and Nonparty 2’s father Nonparty 2 (name 1 omitted) notified Nonparty 3 of the Plaintiff’s support to the Defendant, and then Nonparty 1 went to the Defendant as the above fraudulent act is recognized

However, unless there is any evidence that the Plaintiff participated in the process of informing Nonparty 2 of the support to Nonparty 3, the fact of the recognition as above and other evidence submitted by the Defendant alone cannot be deemed to have committed an unlawful act, a pledge, or a defamation against the Defendant, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge otherwise.

Therefore, the dismissal of this case is null and void because there is no disciplinary cause.

2) As to whether the instant disposition is valid by the declaration of intention to nullify or revoke the labor contract

A) First, as seen in Section 3-C above, the Defendant’s assertion that the instant disposition of dismissal is valid as a notice of invalidation of the labor contract cannot be accepted.

B) Next, the defendant made the instant disposition of dismissal in the form of a disciplinary dismissal through disciplinary proceedings, and as such, the fact that the plaintiff was found to fall under the subject of disciplinary action under Article 41(1)1, 3, and 41(1)4 of the Personnel Management Regulations is as seen earlier.

According to the above facts, the dismissal disposition of this case is merely a disciplinary dismissal, and it cannot be said that the defendant expressed his intention to cancel the labor contract on the ground of mistake to the plaintiff (see Supreme Court Decision 92Da45636 delivered on February 9, 193, etc.).

Therefore, the defendant does not accept this part of the defendant's assertion (the defendant's expression of intent to cancel the labor contract, even though it is deemed that the defendant also expressed his intention to cancel the labor contract through the dismissal of this case, the dismissal of this case and the cancellation of the labor contract are together together, and the dismissal of this case cannot be viewed as only the declaration of intent to cancel the labor contract, and the dismissal of this case as a disciplinary dismissal of this case still exists. Therefore, even if the defendant expressed his intent to cancel the dismissal of this case through the dismissal of this case, the dismissal of this case itself as a disciplinary dismissal of this case cannot be accepted for this reason).

C. Benefits of confirmation and theory of lawsuit

The dismissal disposition of this case is null and void as above. Nevertheless, the defendant's labor relationship of the original defendant was terminated on January 24, 2019, as mentioned in the following 3- E, but as seen above, the anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Act has a employment restriction system against "the person who retired ipso facto, removed, or removed from office due to an act of corruption related to his duties" as stated in the above, and ② the defendant instructed the plaintiff at the time of the dismissal disposition of this case to be subject to the above employment restriction system, it is reasonable to deem that the plaintiff's legal status is at least in appearance and appearance, and it is reasonable to deem that the plaintiff's legal status is at least in danger or apprehension, and the removal of this action of this case is an effective and appropriate means (see Supreme Court Decision 94Da4011, Apr. 11, 1995, etc.).

Therefore, the plaintiff still has a benefit to seek confirmation of invalidity of the dismissal disposition of this case.

3. As to the claim for unpaid wages:

A. The parties' assertion

1) Plaintiff

Since the disposition of dismissal in this case is null and void, the defendant is obligated to pay the amount equivalent to wages from the date of dismissal in this case to the date of reinstatement.

2) Defendant

A) On the wind of the Plaintiff’s father, Nonparty 2, through Nonparty 3, committed improper acts, such as improper solicitation, the Defendant concluded a labor contract with the Plaintiff. Thus, the Defendant’s labor contract by the original Defendant is null and void as it is an anti-social legal act with a contractual condition or monetary consideration, and thus, the Defendant has no obligation to pay wages to the Plaintiff from the beginning.

B) The Defendant or the Defendant concluded a labor contract with the Plaintiff by misunderstanding the Plaintiff that the Plaintiff passed the writing form through a fair recruitment procedure without recognizing the Plaintiff’s rejection of the writing form as having caused unfair influence on the part of Nonparty 2 and Nonparty 3. Therefore, the Plaintiff’s labor contract with the Plaintiff is erroneous in the important part. As the Defendant expressed his intent of cancellation through the instant disposition for dismissal or the preparatory document dated January 23, 2019, the Plaintiff’s labor contract was cancelled and retroactively null and void, and the Defendant did not have any obligation to pay wages from the beginning to the Plaintiff, or at least there was no obligation to pay wages for the period after expressing his intention of cancellation.

B. Facts of recognition

1) On September 7, 2015, the Defendant, a person with the discretionary authority (title 2 omitted), established “2016 Employment Plan for New Staff” with the approval of Nonparty 4 (hereinafter “instant initial plan”). According to this, the total scale of employment is within 70 persons, namely, at least 65 persons who are full-time and full-time members (i.e., at least 48 persons in general service of class 5 and class 6 + at least 5 persons scheduled to be full-time specialized in class 6 + at least 12 persons who are prospective to be full-time employees), with the implementation of the wage peak in 2016: maximum 73 persons where a separate number of persons is recognized due to the implementation of the wage peak in 2016 (number 5 and class 5 of general service of class 5 and class 6 + 5 of career service; and class 5 of class 7 and class 5 of general service of class 5 (number 79-9).

In addition, according to the initial plan of this case, the recruitment procedure is conducted at each stage through “documents screening ? written test (majors and logics), 1, and 2 interviews,” but only 25 times the number of persons scheduled to be employed in the document screening ( approximately 1,50), and two times the number of persons scheduled to be employed in the written examination is to be selected from the written examination.

2) Around September 10, 2015, the Defendant distributed and publicly announced the news report data on the “Plan for Employment of New Staff (2016)”. According to this, 70 or fewer new personnel are selected as a total of 5 or fewer persons in general service, 10 or more professionals in general service, and 5 specialized high-ranking graduates in each field. However, the number of scheduled employment by each field is written only under the name of business management, IT ○, and ○○ in the remaining fields, without disclosing the specific number of persons.

3) On September 24, 2015, Nonparty 1, a general secretary general of the Defendant, as the discretionary decision-making authority, approved the execution of document screening for the employment of new employees in 2016 (hereinafter “documents screening plan”). Accordingly, the number of persons scheduled to be employed in class 5 general service was 53 (in the case of economics supported by the Plaintiff, 11, the remaining 17,9,10,000,000 in each field of business, law, IT, statistics, financial engineering, and consumer science, respectively.

4) Around October 8, 2015, the Defendant’s (name 2 omitted) Nonparty 4, as a person with the discretionary authority, established a “the results of the screening of documents for the recruitment of newly admitted personnel in 2016 and the implementation of the writing screening (the results of the screening of documents and the writing screening plan)” (hereinafter “instant writing screening plan”). According to the foregoing, the class 5 general office employees, as in the instant document screening plan, are employed by 53 persons (the number of persons by field, such as economics, are the same) as in the instant document screening plan.

5) After the Plaintiff completed the written examination on October 24, 2015, Nonparty 2, who was the father of the Plaintiff (title 3 omitted), was employed by the Defendant (title 2 omitted) and (title 4 omitted) who was employed by Nonparty 3 (title 1 omitted). Nonparty 3 was informed of the Plaintiff’s support to the Defendant, and Nonparty 3 was asked by phone to Nonparty 1 to determine whether to pass the written examination by the Plaintiff.

6) On November 3, 2015, Nonparty 1 asked Nonparty 5, a manager of the General Affairs Team, to determine whether the Plaintiff passed the written examination. Nonparty 5 asked Nonparty 5, as a result of the written examination in the field of economics, that the Plaintiff failed to pass the written examination due to Nonparty 22 of the number of persons scheduled to pass the written examination in the field of economics (i.e., 11 persons scheduled to be employed x 2 times).

7) On November 5, 2015, Nonparty 1 asked the personnel team employees, such as Nonparty 6, the head of the personnel team, etc., to the Secretary-General, on the Defendant’s recruitment ability, the results of the application for the increase in the prescribed number of staff, and the possibility of recognition of separate quota due to the introduction of the wage peak system, etc. After hearing their opinions, Nonparty 1 instructed Nonparty 1 to prepare a draft written decision on successful applicants in the written form of written form of written form of written form of written form of written form of written form of order with the content of increasing the number of class 5 to 56 persons set forth in the written form of written form of written form of order in this case and allocating one of them to the field of economics to which the Plaintiff applied. Accordingly, the personnel team, such as Nonparty 6, etc. drafted the draft decision on successful applicants in the written form of written form of written form of written form of written examination that includes

8) On November 6, 2015, Nonparty 1: (a) assumed that the number of persons scheduled to be employed will increase as follows; (b) Nonparty 1 is the maximum number of persons to be employed under the instant initial plan, 73 (56 of the number of persons scheduled to be employed in Grade 5) under the instant initial plan; (c) subsequently, Nonparty 1 obtained the approval of Nonparty 4, who is the discretionary authority (title 2 omitted) for the interim approval on the written “decision on successful applicants for the recruitment of new employees in 2016” included in the successful applicants for the written plan; and (d) obtained the approval of Nonparty 4, who is the discretionary authority.

A person shall be appointed.

9) From December 7, 2015 to September of the same month, the Defendant conducted the first interview and (name 2 omitted) Nonparty 4, the assistant governor in charge of personnel management, Nonparty 7, the assistant governor in charge of personnel management, Nonparty 8, and Nonparty 1, as interview members. However, the Defendant did not increase the number of applicants until December 2015, and Nonparty 4 (name 2 omitted) heard the proposal of Nonparty 7, the number of applicants in the IT field was three, and the number of applicants in the IT field was reduced to three, but the number of applicants in the IT field was decided to return the number of applicants in the first class 5, the number of applicants in relation to which the number was not increased, to the first class 5, the number of applicants in the IT field was determined to be the same as the number of applicants in the second interview on December 11, 2015, following an agreement among the second interview members.

[Evidence] Evidence Nos. 5, 15 through 35, Eul Nos. 1 through 5, 8 through 10, 17, 18, 22 through 31, and the purport of the whole pleadings

C. Whether a labor contract between the original defendant is null and void

The above-mentioned facts and other evidence of the defendant's submission alone are difficult to find that the improper conditions, benefits, etc. were attached to the employment of the plaintiff, and there is no other evidence to find otherwise. Therefore, this part of the defendant's assertion is rejected.

(d) Whether there exists a ground for revocation of an employment contract between the original defendant;

1) Whether there is an error in the important part of a juristic act

In full view of the following circumstances, it is reasonable to view that Nonparty 1 led and promoted the instant decision that, around November 6, 2015, the number of persons scheduled to be employed and the number of persons passing the written screening for the plaintiff's passing of the plaintiff constitutes a fraudulent act detrimental to the fairness of the recruitment process, and that Nonparty 1, except Nonparty 1, and the second interview members and the defendant (title 2 omitted), who are the discretionary decision-making authority of the defendant, were unable to know that the fairness of the recruitment procedure was damaged by the above fraudulent act, and the plaintiff was not properly passed the written screening, and the plaintiff was determined as the final successful candidate. Furthermore, since it is recognized that the defendant did not employ the plaintiff if there was no such error, it constitutes an error in important part, and thus the defendant can cancel the employment contract with the plaintiff on the ground of the above error.

A) The Plaintiff asserts that, on November 6, 2015, Nonparty 1 was merely promoting the instant decision to increase the number of prospective employees and the number of successful applicants of the written and written skills in accordance with the government policy to promote youth employment, under the presumption that the number of prospective employees is not determined and determined. However, for the following reasons, the Plaintiff’s above assertion cannot be accepted, and it is reasonable to deem that Nonparty 1 promoted and ordered the instant decision for the Plaintiff’s pass.

① Around September 7, 2015, the Defendant did not specify the number of persons to be employed until the time of the establishment of the instant initial plan and did not specify the number of persons to be employed (5 general service class 5 to class 48-5). However, even according to the instant initial plan, there was a need to determine the number of scheduled candidates to be employed, which served as the basis for the selection of successful applicants at each stage prior to the document screening or the latest filling type, as the number of scheduled employees to be employed was 25 times the number of scheduled employees to be employed from the document screening type and the number of scheduled employees to be employed was 25 times the number of scheduled applicants to pass the instant initial plan (on the other hand, the date of the instant initial plan). Accordingly, around October 8, 2015, the Defendant, based on the premise that the Defendant’s personnel management team employees to be employed by Nonparty 9 and Nonparty 5, the number of scheduled employees to be employed by Nonparty 1 to May 14, 2015, was 5.

2. Nonparty 1: (a) could change the number of applicants to be employed by Nonparty 1. Nonparty 2, who was the chief executive officer, to whom Nonparty 1: (b) did not reach the first 5-year recruitment plan; (c) could not change the number of applicants to be employed by Nonparty 1. Nonparty 2; (d) could not change the number of applicants to be employed by Nonparty 1. Nonparty 1. Nonparty 2, who was the first 5-year recruitment plan to which Nonparty 1 was the first 5-year recruitment plan; and (d) could not reasonably recognize the number of applicants to be employed by Nonparty 1, who were the first 5-year recruitment plan to which Nonparty 1 was the first 7-year recruitment plan, on the premise that the number of applicants would be less than 1-year recruitment. However, Nonparty 1, who was the first 5-year recruitment plan to which Nonparty 2 would not have passed the first 7-year recruitment plan, as the first 5-year recruitment plan.

Considering each of the above circumstances, the fact that Nonparty 1 promoted and attempted the decision in this case is not because it was reasonably anticipated that the recruitment will increase, but rather because it is intended to pass the plaintiff.

B) The Defendant’s successive implementation of document screening, written tests, and secondary interviews in the course of employment of employees is aimed at realizing the ability through fair procedures in each stage. However, Nonparty 1’s implementation of the instant decision that increases the number of employees scheduled to be employed and the number of successful examinees following the recruitment process constitutes an act detrimental to the fairness of employment process.

C) Although Nonparty 1 promoted the instant decision in order to allow the Plaintiff to pass the written examination, Nonparty 1 made a false statement to Nonparty 4 as if he was promoting the instant decision on the ground that (name 2 omitted) was anticipated to increase the number of employees by hiding such circumstance, and accordingly, Nonparty 4 made a decision of this case to select the Plaintiff as a successful applicant of the written examination by misunderstanding that there was a reasonable ground to increase the number of employees by seeking the Plaintiff to pass the instant decision in fact, thereby impairing the fairness of the recruitment process. Accordingly, Nonparty 1 selected the Plaintiff as a final successful applicant on the ground that the Plaintiff, other than Nonparty 1, was entitled to pass the written examination through a fair procedure, and the Plaintiff was selected as a final successful applicant. Furthermore, as long as the Defendant concluded a labor contract on the premise that the Plaintiff was selected as a final successful applicant through a fair recruitment procedure, whether such recruitment procedure is fair has become a content of the contract, and thus, the Defendant may cancel the labor contract between the Defendant and the Defendant on the ground of mistake.

2) Whether there was gross negligence on the Defendant

A) The Plaintiff asserts that the Defendant’s mistake was caused by gross negligence, and thus, the Defendant’s employment contract with the Plaintiff cannot be revoked on the ground of mistake, in light of the following: (a) the Defendant’s mistake was determined by the Financial Services Commission with the approval of the Financial Services Commission pursuant to Article 45(1) of the Financial Services Commission Act; (b) the Defendant’s full-time decision-making authority (name 2 omitted); (c) Nonparty 4, the Defendant’s full-time decision-making authority (name 2 omitted); and (d) the Plaintiff did not know that Nonparty 1 committed unlawful act; and (e) the Plaintiff cannot be deemed to have caused the Defendant’s mistake in the scope of the Plaintiff’s responsibility.

B) The following circumstances are acknowledged by the facts of recognition as seen earlier, each evidence, and the purport of the entire pleadings, namely, Nonparty 1 was in general in charge of the job of hiring new employees as senior executives of Grade I, and Nonparty 1 was formally subject to the procedure of hearing opinions of the person in charge of the personnel management team in the instant decision while making the instant decision, it is difficult to conclude that there was gross negligence on the part of the Defendant on the ground that Nonparty 4 (name 2 omitted) did not properly grasp whether Nonparty 4 was able to increase the prescribed number without properly supervising Nonparty 1, etc. and without properly grasping whether it is possible to increase the number of personnel. In addition, considering that the occurrence of unfair recruitment procedure was derived from the fact that Nonparty 2, the father of the Plaintiff, who is senior personnel in the financial field, was informed Nonparty 3 of the Plaintiff’s application for the Defendant’s former position (name 2 omitted), the exercise of the Defendant’s right to revoke due to the circumstance that the Plaintiff did not directly participate in the instant decision process, cannot be deemed unjust or gross negligence on the Defendant.

Therefore, the plaintiff's above assertion is not accepted.

(e) Time of termination of employment contract and scope of obligation to pay wages;

1) Even if a claim for the cancellation of a labor contract can be asserted, it is unreasonable to deny retroactively the effect of providing labor to workers performed during the period of time under a labor contract, and thus, the legal relationship formed on the basis of labor services provided by the workers shall not be deemed null and void, and the validity of a labor contract shall be deemed null and void only for the future following the declaration of intent to cancel (see Supreme Court Decision 2013Da25194, 25200, Dec. 22, 2017, etc.).

As to the instant case, it was concluded earlier that the Defendant could not be deemed to have expressed the intent of revocation through the instant disposition of dismissal. However, the fact that the Defendant expressed the intent of revocation of the Plaintiff’s labor contract through the preparatory document dated January 23, 2019, and the fact that the said preparatory document reached the Plaintiff on January 24, 2019 is apparent in the record. According to the foregoing facts, the labor contract between the original Defendant and the Defendant on January 24, 2019 was invalidated in the future.

2) Meanwhile, the instant disposition of dismissal is null and void as above. As from August 1, 2018, the Plaintiff’s status as the Plaintiff’s employee from August 1, 2018, to January 24, 2019, the date of which the labor contract was terminated, and the Plaintiff’s failure to provide labor during the said period is attributable to the Defendant, who is the employer. Therefore, the Plaintiff may seek payment of the entire amount of wages that the Plaintiff could have received from the Defendant during the said period under Article 538(1) of the Civil Act. Furthermore, according to the purport of the entire pleadings in the evidence No. 11, the Plaintiff’s wage that the Plaintiff could have received during the said period is recognized as constituting 24,483,300.

Therefore, the defendant is obligated to pay the plaintiff 24,483,300 won unpaid wages, so the plaintiff's claim for unpaid wages is justified within the scope of the above recognition.

4. Conclusion

The plaintiff's claim shall be accepted within the scope of the above recognition and the remainder shall be dismissed. Since the conclusion of the judgment of the court of first instance differs from that of the court of first instance is unfair, the judgment of the court of first instance, including a claim added in the trial, shall be modified

Judges Park Young-young (Presiding Judge)