[1] The case holding that a person liable for damages against a person who manufactures and sells smuggling shall be held liable for losses on the ground of collusion

[2] Requirements to deem that some enterprisers participating in an unfair collaborative act terminated the unfair collaborative act

[3] The method of calculating the amount of damages caused by an unfair collaborative act under the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act

[4] Whether the direct buyer’s damage caused by the collaborative act itself becomes final and conclusive in terms of the expenses actually paid in excess (affirmative), and whether the direct buyer may limit the amount of damages on the ground of the circumstances in which the buyer transferred all or part of the damage caused by the collaborative act to the subordinate buyer (affirmative)

[1] The case holding that in a case where a company engaged in the bread and solvents business claims compensation for damages on the grounds of collusion between the manufacturers and sellers, the act of restricting the quantity of dust jointly produced by the manufacturers and distributors and determining, maintaining, and changing the price of the dust constitutes an unfair collaborative act that violates Article 19 (1) 1 and 3 of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act and constitutes an unfair collaborative act that violates Article 19 (1) 1 and 3 of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, and thus, the liability for damages arising from the collaborative act is recognized

[2] Where there was an agreement on pricing, etc. and an implementation based thereon under Article 19(1)1 of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, the date on which the unfair collaborative act is terminated is the date on which the implementation of the unfair collaborative act is terminated. Therefore, in order to terminate the unfair collaborative act by a certain enterpriser participating in the agreement, an act contrary to the agreement, such as either explicitly or impliedly expressing his/her withdrawal from the agreement to another enterpriser, and lowering the price level that would have existed without the collusion, should be done in accordance with its independent judgment.

[3] Property damage caused by a tort refers to the difference between the property disadvantage caused by an illegal harmful act and the current property condition of the company which would have existed without the illegal act. It can be said that the other party to the transaction that has paid excess prices due to Kaurel has suffered damages corresponding to the difference between the price that he paid and the price that would have been formed in the absence of collusion. In this case, the most important part in calculating damages is the presumption of competition price that would have been observed if the collusion had not occurred. In order to prevent damages from reaching the unfair conclusion that damages would have been recognized even with respect to the increase in prices due to the market or transactional factor without any causal relationship with the collusion, in the situation where other transaction conditions were maintained in the market at which there was no causal relationship with the collusion, the competitive price should be determined after deducting only the special circumstance of the collusion. However, since it is difficult to automatically measure the above competition price, it is difficult to calculate damages only on the sole basis of the fact that it is difficult to measure the damages, and the court should order the victim to fairly and fairly estimate the damages.

[4] Unlike the case where a direct buyer pays an excess price due to collusion as a final consumer and bears all the damages he/she incurred, even if a direct buyer can transfer all or part of the damages he/she sustained to an indirect buyer, who is a subordinate buyer, by purchasing raw materials at a price higher than the normal price that would have been formed if there was no collusion, and then paying the purchase price of raw materials at a price higher than the normal price that would have already been made, the direct buyer’s damages are determined per se as of the time of transaction, and then the actual damages were recovered by increasing the price of the goods thereafter, cannot affect the determination of damages per se due to a violation of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act. However, in the case of an intermediate product, if the direct buyer’s expenses increase due to the increase in the cost of the direct buyer’s sales of the product at a higher price by using the exclusive position, it can be easily anticipated that the cost would be transferred to a buyer who exists in the subordinate market. The Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act aims at protecting the legal interests of consumers, and it can be seen that the risk of double damages system can be shared.

[1] Articles 19(1)1, 19(1)3, and 56(1)1 of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act / [2] Article 19(1)1 of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act / [3] Articles 19(1)1, 56 subparag. 1, and 57 of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act; Articles 393 and 763 of the Civil Act / [4] Articles 1, 19(1)1, 56 subparag. 1, and 57 of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act; Articles 393 and 763 of the Civil Act

[2] Supreme Court Decision 2007Du12774 decided Oct. 23, 2008 (Gong2008Ha, 1607)

Sam Food Co., Ltd. (Law Firm Gyeong & Yang, Attorneys Yang Ho-ho et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

C. C.C., the lawsuit taking over of the C.C. corporation, and one other (Attorneys Hong Hong-soo et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

April 15, 2009

1. The plaintiff shall pay 1,235,370,00 won per annum to the plaintiff, 227,940,000 won per annum from January 1, 2006 to May 27, 2009, and 20% per annum from the next day to the day of full payment.

2. The plaintiff's remaining claims against the defendants are dismissed.

3. 3/5 of the costs of lawsuit is assessed against the Plaintiff, and the remainder is assessed against the Defendants.

4. Paragraph 1 can be provisionally executed.

The plaintiff shall pay 2,981,843,190 won per annum for the defendant C&S corporation, 753,50 won per annum from January 1, 2006 to the service date of a copy of the written amendment of the claim of this case, and 20% per annum from the next day to the day of complete payment.

1. Basic facts

The following facts are either disputed between the parties, or acknowledged by taking into account the whole purport of the pleadings in each part of Gap evidence 1-1, evidence 3-4 through 9, evidence 12, 13, 14, 19, 23, 28, evidence 6 (including paper numbers), evidence 8, 9-1, 2, and evidence 11, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21, and 22-2, and any part of the evidence 3-11, 15, 16, 17, 17, 18, 21, and 22-1, 3-16, 17, 18, 21, and 22-2, and any part of the statements are not believed.

(a) Status of parties;

Defendant Samyang Co., Ltd., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Defendant Samyang Co., Ltd., Defendant C&C”), Nonparty C&C Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Defendant C&C”), Korea Co., Ltd., Youngnam Co., Ltd., Youngnam Co., Ltd., Youngnam Co., Ltd., c., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “ eight companies”; hereinafter all of the above companies are referred to as “eight companies”) are manufacturers manufacturing and selling Samyang Co., Ltd., Ltd., and the Plaintiff is a company engaging in bak, baking, and business under Article 2 subparag. 1 of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (hereinafter referred to as “Fair Trade Act”).

(b) the current status and characteristics of domestic smuggling markets;

(1) In the past, while the government has restricted the import of beer or announced the price of beer, the sales price notification system was abolished on September 1, 1983, and the smuggling import restriction system was completely liberalized on January 1, 1999, and there is no anti-competitive system in relation to the production and sale of beer.

(2) In 2004, the domestic market price of smuggling is approximately KRW 820 billion on the basis of sales, and the upper 4 enterprises (one of the three enterprises actually engaged in the acquisition of the same portion) occupy approximately 75% of the large 75% of the market share. The market share of each company occupies the upper 3 enterprises equally in excess of 25%, and the market share of the above 8 enterprises is almost rare for the last 3-4 years.

(3) With regard to the current status of supply and demand of smuggling, the total domestic output of 1,791,00 T and total sales volume of 1,792,00 T. 1,792 T. 96.2% out of the total sales volume is sold to the domestic market, and only 69,000t which is the remainder of 3.8% is exported, and the import volume of Smuggling is merely 13,000t volume, and thus, the export and import share is lower.

(4) Smuggling is the second food following the rice that accounts for approximately 24% of the total amount of grain consumption in the Republic of Korea. Smuggling consumption shows the characteristics of the low demand even if the price increases in the market, resulting in a large flexible nature with regard to the powder price, and thus, the change in the quantity of demand is not significant, whereas the decline in the price may occur considerably. In addition, a flexible demand for the powder price indicates the characteristics of the low demand even if the price increases in the market.

C. Unfair collaborative acts by the Defendants

(1) Agreement, etc. on restricted domestic production (sale) of smuggling

(A) Agreement on restricted production (sale) between 2000 and 2001

① On January 22, 2000, 7 companies, excluding Defendant Czeyang, Korea (hereinafter “7 companies”) agreed to examine whether the executives in charge of each company comply with the standard ratio of only once a month, and agreed to examine whether the number of executives in charge of each company complies with each company’s share in the domestic market (hereinafter “standard ratio”). Based on the above agreement, on February 22, 2000, seven companies agreed to enter each company’s share in the 4% association with the exception of the 5% ratio of new shares in bankruptcy at meetings held by representatives of each company (excluding the total quantity of company’s warehouse, i.e. the company’s sales volume and external inventory volume) as follows:

Of the table in the main text, the part of the table CJ (hereinafter referred to as CJ in the table, hereinafter referred to as CJ), the part of the table CJ in the East of Korea, 25.115, 25.115, 18.08.79.724.3524.242

After that, the executive officers and the chief of the business of the seven companies agreed on the monthly standard shipment of each company with meetings at a restaurant within the city once a month.

② Meanwhile, at the time of the 2000 Quantity Agreement, seven companies set the standard ratio of each company on the premise of 94.34% after deducting 5.66% of the expenses of the Association of Samyang as at the time of the 2000 Quantity Agreement, and Defendant Samyang, who did not participate in the agreement, took out more than the percentage of the association expenses, agreed on the standard ratio of 7 companies except for Defendant Samyang company, with the intention of increasing the rate of the association expense by 8% for Defendant Samyang company, while soliciting Defendant Samyang company to participate in the 200. Quantity Agreement, and the 7 companies agreed on the standard ratio of 7 companies, including the reduction of the standard ratio of the sum of the Korean portion of the association expense of Samyang company and the same portion of the same as that of Defendant Samyang company, in March 2001.

③ After the 2000 volume agreement, seven companies, excluding Defendant Samyang, determined the total monthly planned shipment (in-house accommodation) through a business executive meeting held once a month in ordinary, a business director’s meeting, etc., and distributed it according to the standard ratio, and thereafter, agreed to conduct an agreement in a way of inspecting compliance with the plan based on each performance data of seven companies exchanged.

④ On the other hand, Defendant Samyang was excluded from the joint charter (joint transport at the time of import of beer) in the industry on the ground that he did not join the kelel as above, and paid a higher transport cost compared to other companies, and did not recognize the proportion of the association cost according to the actual market share, resulting in damages, such as GSSM fund (agricultural products export support fund) and damages incurred in allocating the quota tariff.

(B) Agreement, etc. on restricted production (sale) of 202

① On February 26, 2002, the number of Defendant Samyang Co., Ltd., who had been at a disadvantage due to a failure to participate in the volume agreement, was ultimately admitted to 7, and on February 26, 2002, 8 Co., Ltd., including Defendant Samyang Co., Ltd., agreed to 8.84% of the base ratio of 3 Co., Ltd. at a meeting, at which each of the representatives of each company attended, to reduce the base ratio of 25%, respectively, and to increase the base ratio of 3 Co., Ltd. to 8.84%. On the other hand, the remaining 16.16% of the total 16.16% to 3 Co., Ltd

8 On March 13, 2002, 8 companies opened a business executive meeting, from March 13, 2002, 2002, 8 companies changed the standard of allocation for each company's quantity from the existing shipping volume to the standard of raw beer processing which is easy to be implemented in the existing shipping volume, and agreed 222,00,000 of the annual total processing standard of beer than 20,000. In addition, eight companies agreed on each company's and monthly planned processing volume at the business director's meeting on the same day or in March.

② Since August 2002, Defendant Samyang, which was incorporated into the instant cartel system, controlled deep sea beer processing in prison based on the agreed standard processing and standard ratio, and the implementation methods are as follows.

8 The eight companies inspected the compliance of the standard processing volume and the planned processing volume of each company at any time through the business executives' meeting, the business director's meeting, etc., and settled them at the end of each year, and reflected the excess or shortage of the planned volume in the next year processing plan. In addition, each company's non-regular inspection and inspection conducted on a non-regular basis as to whether the processing volume of each company complies with each company's processing volume, and the actual inspection was conducted on an intensive basis between 2-3 and 2002 and 203.As a result, the results of the inspection showed a somewhat different difference from the performance plan of some companies, but eight companies settled the excess or shortage in comparison with the plan of 202 by reflecting it in the plan of 203.

(C) Agreement, etc. on the restriction of the volume of production (sale) after 2003

8 The eight companies held a business executive meeting and agreed on the annual standard processing volume (t, 2240,2204,2250,000t, 2205, 2005, 2005). At any time, the eight companies held a business executive meeting, etc. and agreed on the final planned processing volume, and confirmed that mutually agreed processing volume was properly observed in the same manner as in 2002, and if some companies’ performance was somewhat different from the plan, the eight companies settled the excess or shortage in comparison with the plan by reflecting it in the plan plan for the following year, and the above eight companies, even on 2005, observed the nuclear processing plan as a substitute.

(2) Agreement on the price reduction of smuggling

(A) Price increase agreement, etc. on December 2000

① On December 200, 7 companies, except Defendant Samyang, held a business executive meeting during the mid-term session of 200, agreed on the price of class 1 products in populated 1 per 20 km, 300 won per 20 km, and 6.5% increase per 6.5%, and agreed on the specific increase time by holding a business executive meeting at the end of the same month.

② Since December 29, 2000 to February 1, 2001, 7 companies implemented the 1st degree of agency price of the product manufactured in 1st degree as much as the above agreement (in the case of the Korean system, the price was somewhat different from that of the other company before the increase, but the price was equal to that of the other company after the increase, and even in the case of the 3th class product, the average sales price of the product of 1st class, strong, strong, and boomed continuously between January 201 and February 2 of the same year).

(B) Price increase agreement, etc. on February 2001

① On February 201, 2001, seven companies except Defendant Samyang agreed to increase the price of Class 1 products in Smuggling by holding a meeting of operating officers, and agreed to raise the price of class 200 won per 20 km. Around the end of the same month, the Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy held a meeting to agree on the specific period of increase.

② At the end, on February 2001, 7 doctors implemented an agreement by raising the base price of the first-class smuggling from February 1, 2001 to April 1, 200 as indicated below (units; hereinafter the same shall apply).

However, Korea, Korea, and East Asia adjusted the ex post facto price increase time on 4.1.1, and other companies also implemented the price change on 4.4.

본문내 포함된 표 ？ ？ 대한 CJ 동아 한국 삼양 대선 영남 삼화 인상일 ？ 2월 15일 2월 20일 2월 23일 2월 26일 3월 26일 3월 1일 4월 1일 4월 1일 "중력고급 20kg" 인상 전 9,100 9,200 9,080 9,100 9,200 ？ 9,000 ？ 인상 후 10,400 10,500 10,430 10,500 10,500 ？ 10,300 ？ 인상액 1,300 1,300 1,350 1,400 1,300 ？ 1,300 ？ "중력1급 20kg" 인상 전 8,450 8,480 8,450 8,450 8,450 8,400 8,400 8,100 인상 후 9,300 9,280 9,250 9,270 9,270 9,300 9,200 8,800 인상액 850 800 800 820 820 900 800 700 "중력유사 20kg" 인상 전 6,900 6,840 7,160 6,100 ？ ？ 6,800 ？ 인상 후 7,900 7,840 8,160 7,100 ？ ？ 7,800 ？ 인상액 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 ？ ？ 1,000 ？ "강력1급 20kg" 인상 전 9,200 9,280 9,170 9,200 9,180 8,910 9,200 8,600 인상 후 9,900 10,030 9,870 9,950 9,930 9,900 9,900 9,900 인상액 700 750 700 750 750 990 700 1,300 "박력1급 20kg" 인상 전 8,000 7,980 7,990 8,000 8,000 7,900 8,600 ？ 인상 후 8,700 8,780 8,720 8,750 8,720 8,700 9,300 ？ 인상액 700 800 730 750 720 800 700 ？ "중력1급 3kg*6" 인상 전 8,640 8,670 8,670 8,640 8,700 ？ ？ ？ 인상 후 9,210 9,270 9,200 9,480 9,240 ？ ？ ？ 인상액 570 600 530 840 540 ？ ？ ？

(C) Price increase agreement, etc. on September 2002

① On September 16, 2002, eight companies including Defendant Samyang agreed on a summary of the price increase time and scope by holding a meeting of the board of business officers on September 16, 2002, and eight companies agreed on the specific increase time and extent of the price by grade and use of the smuggling product on the 18th and 19th day of the same month, and agreed on the final price increase.

② The eight companies implemented the agreement by raising the price in the same manner as the price agreement was entered in the table below.

Table : omitted

(D) The agreement on the increase in price of class 2 of April 2003

8 The 8 companies agreed to increase the value of class 2 of gravitys and studios from KRW 5,700 to KRW 6,200 through the first meeting of the business officers, executive officers, and the business division, which was held in April 2003, and implemented the above agreement by raising the price from April 24, 2003 to May 19, 2009 as listed below:

Table : omitted

(E) Price increase agreement, etc. on March 2004

On March 31, 2004, 2004, 8 companies held a business director's meeting on March 31, 2004, and finally agreed on the price increase level and time of increase by item, and raised the price of smuggling from April 14, 2004 to May 1, 2004 in accordance with the agreement.

Table : omitted

(3) Agreement on the terms and conditions of transaction in smuggling

8 The eight companies agreed on the abolition or reduction of the incentive through the business executives' meeting and the business director's meeting at around August 2001 and around September 2002, but the incentive has not been reduced, and the agreement was not effective.

(d) Disposition, etc. by the Fair Trade Commission.

(1) As seen above, the Fair Trade Commission: “The agreement that eight companies jointly restrict the domestic production (sale) of smuggling constitutes an agreement that restricts the production, delivery, transportation, or transaction of goods that unreasonably restrict competition with other enterprisers or the transaction of services; and the agreement that jointly raises the price of smuggling constitutes “the agreement that jointly determines, maintains, or changes the price that unreasonably limits competition with other enterprisers” under Article 19(1)3 of the Fair Trade Act; and the agreement that jointly abolish or reduce the incentive constitutes “the agreement that jointly determines the terms and conditions of the transaction of goods or services that unreasonably limits competition with other enterprisers, or the terms and conditions for the payment of the price or the price thereof,” under Article 19(1)3 of the Fair Trade Act; and accordingly, the Fair Trade Commission issued a corrective order, corrective order, penalty surcharge, etc. to eight companies, including the Defendants, as indicated in the attached list, issued an order of publication and payment of penalty surcharge, etc. on April 13, 2006.

(2) On October 25, 2007, the Seoul High Court 2006Nu10858 Ro, Gyeongnam-nam-si's 2006Nu22288 Ro, Cheongnam-do's Roon's 2006Nu22288 of the same court, Gayon's Doyon's Doyon's Doyon, and Doyon's Doyon's 2006Nu2307 of the same court. However, the above court revoked the corrective order in paragraph 4 of the attached list and the penalty surcharge payment order in paragraph 7 and dismissed each other's remaining claims, and revoked the corrective order in Paragraph 4 of the same list on December 5, 207, Doyon's and Doyon's Doyon's Doyon's Doyon's Doyon's Doyon's Doyon's Doyon's Doyon's.

E. Transaction with the Plaintiff

From April 2001 to December 2005, the Plaintiff purchased approximately KRW 21,953,398,001, and approximately KRW 8,174,910,266 from Defendant Samyang to December 2005.

2. Occurrence of liability for damages;

A. The parties' assertion

(1) Summary of the Plaintiff’s assertion

The defendants limited the domestic production of smuggling to a certain level, and as a result, the price of smuggling was naturally formed in accordance with the general demand and supply principle, the defendants increased the price of smuggling by collusion. The above act of the defendants is an unfair collaborative act prohibited under Article 19(1) of the Fair Trade Act. Accordingly, the plaintiff is liable to compensate the plaintiff for damages equivalent to the price raised due to the defendants' collaborative act (from April 2001 to December 2005 in the case of defendant Cychi, from October 2002 to December 2005 in the case of defendant Cychi, from October 2002 to December 2005) from the total purchase amount of smuggling purchased from the defendants, the price calculated by multiplying the price calculated by deducting the price that the plaintiff would have been formed if there was no collaborative act from the actual market price, namely, from the price calculated by multiplying the price calculated by the price calculated by the price that was formed by the defendants, e.g., the plaintiff shall be liable to compensate the plaintiff for damages for damages for delay.

(2) Summary of the defendants' assertion

The defendants made a transaction separately between the plaintiff who is a large buyer and the plaintiff. The defendants are not liable for damages because they cannot be said to be a transaction based on the collusion price.

(b) Markets:

(1) According to the above facts of recognition, seven companies except for Defendant Cyang (from February 2002, 199) agreed to restrict and assign the amount of supply in the domestic smuggling market from 2000 to 2005 (from February 16, 2002, 300). In addition to holding a business executives' meeting and a business director's meeting to prepare detailed action plans, inspection plans, etc. of the above agreement in order to determine the annual shipment amount of each company and to check compliance with the agreement and settle the shortage of the plan in excess of the plan in accordance with the following year plan, the company's agreement was made to limit the production, release, transportation, or transaction of goods jointly, and to increase the price of the products from the end of December 200 to the end of the following year (from September 16, 2002, 30).

As above, eight companies having most of the market share of smuggling jointly restrict the quantity of dust produced (sale) and determining, maintaining, and changing the price of dust is an act of unfairly reducing or restricting competition in the market for manufacturing and selling dust, which constitutes an act of violating Article 19(1)1 and 3 of the Fair Trade Act.

Therefore, the Defendants are obliged to compensate the Plaintiff for the damages caused by the pertinent collaborative act in accordance with Article 56 of the Fair Trade Act.

(2) As to this, the Defendants asserted that the period of collusion should be seen as September 2005, since they withdrawn from collusion on September 2005.

In the event that there was an agreement on price fixing, etc. and an implementation based thereon under Article 19(1)1 of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, the date on which the unfair collaborative act is terminated is the date on which the implementation of the unfair collaborative act is terminated. Thus, in order to terminate the unfair collaborative act, some enterprisers who participated in the agreement should make an explicit or implied declaration of intent informing other enterprisers of their withdrawal from the agreement, and reduce the price at the level that would have existed without collusion according to their independent judgment (Supreme Court Decision 2007Du12774 Decided October 23, 2008).

According to the case's return to this case's return, Gap evidence 1-1, Eul evidence 3-13, and 14, defendant Czeyang continued to have been 0.5 billion won to have been purchased from 0.5 billion won to 20.5 billion won by the plaintiff's purchase of 0.5 billion won after 0.5 billion won (the plaintiff's purchase price was 11,510 won to 205.5 billion won) since it was acknowledged that the defendants continued to have been 10.5 billion won to have been 0.5 billion won by the agreement of 205 billion won to 20.5 billion won (the plaintiff's purchase price was 10.5 billion won to 205.5 billion won) since the plaintiff's purchase price was 10.5 billion won to 20.5 billion won (the plaintiff's purchase price was 1.5 billion won to 205 billion won).

3. Scope of damages.

(a) Method of calculating damages and amount of damages;

(1) in general

Property damage caused by an illegal act refers to the difference between the property disadvantage caused by the illegal harmful act, that is, the property condition that would have existed without the illegal act and the current property condition that caused the illegal act. It can be said that the other party to the transaction that paid the excessive price due to the Kaurel has suffered damage corresponding to the difference between the price that he paid and the price that would have been formed if there was no collusion with the price that he paid.

In this case, the most important part in the calculation of damages shall be the presumption of competition price that would have been observed if there had not occurred any collusion, and in order to prevent the price increase due to any cause in the market or trade without any causal relationship with the collusion from reaching an unfair conclusion that recognizes damages, the competitive price shall be the price excluding only the special circumstance, such as collusion, in the situation where other transaction conditions in the market at issue are maintained as it is.

However, there are cases where it is difficult to automatically measure the above competition price. However, the amount of damages cannot be calculated based only on the simple trend of damages, on the other hand, because it is difficult to measure, the right to receive the plaintiff's compensation should not be infringed. Thus, if it is judged that the amount of damages was properly presumed by scientific and reasonable methods under the support of theoretical grounds and data, the court shall order compensation based on the amount of damages calculated as such.

(2) Damages based on the estimation method of estimating the pharmacological formula

(A) As a note 4, the presumption of such a competitive price is based on ① advance approval visa, ② limit costs or average costs, ③ similar market analysis, ④ structural measurement under the fully competitive assumption, ⑤ the presumption of demand demand through an indiculation under an incomplete competition, and vi) the presumption of price by an indication formula.

Among them, it is expressed as a method of estimation by a measurement and economics model. This is the most representative analysis method used to estimate the dynamic competition price based on the method of estimating the correlation between collusion and other economic factors than collusion by setting various factors affecting the price as a variable and by separating the effect of the collaborative act on the price and the correlation between the collusion and the price by accurately distinguishing the correlation between the price. Among them, it is used to estimate the dynamic competition price. Among them, it is the plenary analysis method used to objectively distinguish and measure the economic factors other than collusion with the price impact on the price.

The method is to specify the correlation between the price (subsidiary variables) and the factors (explosion variables) affecting the price. Among them, one example of the basic model is to set up a price-fixing model taking into account all the variables affecting the price, and to estimate the relationship between the price and the explanation variables by utilizing all the prices between the collusion time and the non-complosion time. Since the variables included in the collusion time have the value of 1 and non-comlosion time, if there is no change in all other conditions, the price of the collusion time is actually increased compared to the price of non-comlosion time.

Therefore, in order to control the factors affecting the price of the dust other than the factors caused by the collusion and to estimate the effect of the collusion after considering the characteristics of the price of the dust affected by the supply and demand of the dust, in addition to the collusion, the amount of damages shall be calculated according to the method in which the price is calculated by considering the factors that affect the price of the dust in addition to the collusion as the factors in which the price of the dust was affected by the price of the dust.

(B) In this case, according to the appraisal result of appraiser yellowle, the amount of damages from April 2001 to December 2, 2005, which the Plaintiff sought against the Defendant C&C, shall be calculated as KRW 2,981,843,190, and the amount of damages from October 2002 to December 2005, which the Plaintiff sought against the Defendant C&C company, as to the amount of damages from October 2002 to December 2005, the amount of damages shall be calculated as KRW 753,509,858. As seen earlier, the amount calculated by estimating the competition price under the theoretical basis and the data and multiplying the actual price by the volume compared with the actual price, shall be deemed as the amount of damages caused by the instant collusion.

(3) Determination as to the Defendants’ assertion

(A) Determination as to the assertion that the use of any further variable after collusion is impossible

(1) Head of a State

In calculating the amount of damages due to the collusion at the time of the appraisal in this case, the Defendants used a more variable after collusion on the ground that there is a possibility that the collusion company would have obtained favorable results and failed to reduce some price after collusion (the price data for the period of collusion as well as the period of collusion when estimating the amount of damages due to collusion would be used to estimate the amount of virtual competition price during the collusion period. However, in order to reduce the presumed amount of damages, it is only possible discussions in the United States where the three times compensation system exists for the violation of the Anti-Basst Act, and there was a low estimated decrease in the amount of damages due to the high price establishment after the collusion, while it is reasonable to reduce the amount of damages. Accordingly, the Defendants asserted that there is a risk that the collusion company would be more likely to estimate the actual collusion effect if the collusion is used after the collusion, even if there is no real probability that the price is higher than the profit polarization price after the collusion to reduce the amount of damages.

(2) Determination

However, according to the appraisal of appraiser's sulfur, the appraiser used the further variables after collusion based on the case and thesis of the United States at the time of the above appraisal. At the time, appraiser needs to use not only the data before and after collusion for the accurate presumption of model, but also the data at the time after collusion. In measuring the effect of collusion by using the data at the time after collusion, even if the collusion is discovered, if the company's price is discovered by using the data at the time of collusion, that is, it is likely that the effect of collusion would be reduced immediately before the collusion, and if the company disregards the realistic incentive that it would not reduce the price promptly, the appraiser included the additional variables as an explanatory variable. The appraiser's assertion that the price at the time of the above appraisal was lower than the average price at the time of collusion (from January 1, 2006 to June 207, 2007) after the completion of the collusion. In other words, even if the price at the time of the above appraisal was found to be lower than the average price at the time of collusion 20.25% 26% of the above price after the collusion.

(B) Determination as to the so-called defense of pre-payment of expenses

(1) Summary of the assertion

The plaintiff's direct purpose of purchasing smuggling is to manufacture them using them as raw materials for products and sell them to end-consumers. Thus, it is closely related between the purchase of smuggling and the sales of the plaintiff's final product. Considering the purport of the compensation system for damages compensating for actual damage caused by tort and the risk of double compensation that may occur in situations where there is no legal basis to prevent indirect buyers from claiming damages, if the plaintiff transferred the increased cost to consumers by reflecting the increase in the price of the final product in the cost of the product, the increased cost of the plaintiff's increased cost due to the increase in the price of the products cannot be deemed as damages, and even according to the result of the appraisal, the plaintiff's total cost, including the total price, cannot be deemed as damages, unless it is clear that the plaintiff transferred the cost.

(2) Determination

Unlike the case where a direct buyer pays an excess price due to collusion as a final consumer and bears all the damages he/she incurred, the direct buyer may transfer all or part of his/her losses to an indirect buyer, who is the subordinate buyer, as in the instant case ( even if the fact was revealed through actual appraisal, etc.), as in the instant case, even if the direct buyer is entitled to transfer all or part of his/her losses to an indirect buyer, who is the subordinate buyer, as it constitutes an intermediate raw material buyer (the price of the product may be raised at a fixed rate or amount corresponding to the price of the smuggling price paid by the Plaintiff pursuant to the prior agreement, etc., barring any circumstances such as where there is no change in the quantity of the product sales, etc., whether the price of the product manufactured by using the smuggling as the raw material will increase the price of the product (cost) and the scope thereof shall be deemed to have been charged entirely with the intent of the Plaintiff (the direct buyer, depending on the case where the excess amount paid by himself/herself)

Therefore, as of the time of transaction by the Plaintiff’s purchase and payment of the price at a price higher than the normal price that would have been formed by the Defendants without collusion, the Plaintiff’s damages shall be determined in itself by the cost already paid in excess of the actual cost, and the Plaintiff’s actual loss was recovered by raising the price of the product thereafter by the Plaintiff’s increase in the price of the product cannot be affected by the Defendants’ wrongful act itself.

In addition, even if the above claims of the Defendants were examined to the effect of offsetting profits and losses, since the smuggling sales contract between the Plaintiff and the Defendants and the product sales contract concluded between the Plaintiff and the consumer are separate contracts, it shall be deemed that there is no proximate causal relation between the increase of illegal smuggling price due to the collusion between the Defendants and the profits acquired based on a separate contract through price increase.

Therefore, the above assertion by the Defendants is difficult to accept (However, the above circumstances that the Plaintiff transferred to indirect buyers, who are subordinate buyers, all or part of the damages that the Plaintiff sustained, can only be considered at the stage of limiting the amount of damages as delineated below).

(b) Preparation;

(1) In general, multiple companies are involved in the production and distribution stage of goods or services. Damage caused by a violation of the Fair Trade Act at a higher level is not limited to one market or transaction, but is widely spread depending on the economic circulation process. In particular, in the case of intermediate materials such as smuggling, if the cost of the direct purchaser increases as the business operator who exists at a higher level sells the goods at a higher level by taking advantage of the exclusive position, it can be easily anticipated that the cost will be transferred to the buyer existing at a lower level market.

On the other hand, the purpose of the Fair Trade Act is to protect the legal interests of consumers, and it is likely that the risk of double compensation may be caused if an indirect buyer files a lawsuit seeking compensation for damages. Therefore, in light of the idea of the fair sharing of damages system, it is possible to limit the amount of compensation for the Plaintiff, a direct buyer, by taking into account all the circumstances, such as the fact and degree of damages and the risk of double compensation.

(2) In relation to the calculation of the previous part, the transition price to the final product price increase due to the increase in the costs due to the increase in the intermediate material is possible, and it is inevitable to verify through the empirical analysis as a result of a variety of results depending on the competition structure and demand type of the final product market. Accordingly, according to the appraiser's appraisal result, various factors (i.e., smuggling price, bread weight, real domestic production, consumer price index, other manufacturing costs, fixed effect index, monthly straw, etc.) using the fixed effect panel model are identified by purely distinguishing the impact of the increase in the brea value due to the increase in the breath price by purely distinguishing the impact of the breath price due to the increase in the breath price, and the pre-determined amount actually estimated by using the quantitative economic methodology is calculated as KRW 1,363,198,732 in relation to the Defendant 309,204,264 won in relation to the Defendant 30.

(3) Thus, considering all the circumstances revealed in the argument of this case, the plaintiff's losses incurred to the plaintiff due to the above collusion is reasonable in light of the purport of the damage compensation system, such as that the plaintiff's bonus, i.e., bounty 766,539,60 won received from the defendants during the collusion period, i.e., gold 432,743,560 won, and gold 1/2 of the total damages amount in relation to the defendant Samyang shall be deducted from the total damages amount. In light of all the circumstances revealed in the argument of this case, the amount of damages suffered by the plaintiff due to the above collusion of the defendants is reasonable in light of the defendants' purport of the damage compensation system, i.e., gold 1,235,370,00 won against the defendant Samyang, and gold 227,940,000 won against the defendant Samyang company.

C. Sub-committee

Therefore, the Plaintiff is obligated to pay damages for delay at each rate of KRW 1,235,370,00, KRW 227,940,000, and KRW 227,940,00 from January 1, 2006 to May 27, 2009, which is the date of the adjudication of this case, to the extent that it is reasonable for the Defendants to dispute the existence or scope of the obligation to perform the obligation after the date of tort, with 5% per annum as stipulated in the Civil Act and 20% per annum as stipulated in the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings from the following day to the date of full payment.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim against the defendants is accepted within the scope of the above recognition, and each of the remaining claims is dismissed as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.

Judges Cho Jae-sung (Presiding Judge)

(1) On September 1, 2007, Defendant C&C Co., Ltd. took over the instant lawsuit following the overall succession of the rights and obligations of the stock company upon the division of C&C from the stock company.

Note 2) As of 2004, the market share in the year 2004 is 24.6% of Korea, Defendant Cwork 25% of Korea, Dong Cwork 16.8% of Korea, 8.4% of Korea, Defendant Cyyang's 10.5% of Korea, 7.3% of comparison, 3.6% of Cywork, and 3.6% of Yong-Namon.

3) The Samyang Coryang Co., Ltd. is a company in charge of the production of the smuggling, which holds not less than 27% of the shares of Defendant Samyang Co., Ltd. for the purpose of management participation, concurrently holds office as the chief or executive officer of Defendant Samyang Co., Ltd., and the substantial right to determine the price and quantity of the domestic sales price and output of the smuggling is Defendant Samyang. In the instant unfair collaborative act, most of the persons who actually participated in the price and production agreement are officers and employees of Defendant Samyang Co., Ltd., and if Defendant Samyang notified of the result of the meeting to Samyang Mayang Co., Ltd., Ltd., the company is practically under the control of

4) There is a difference between scholars in relation to the classification and terms of the above method, but in this case, the terms, classification as described in the appraiser's Yellow Restatements should be followed in this case. ① Method is a method of estimating the price increase due to collusion by directly comparing the price before and after price collusion, ② Method is a method of estimating the price increase due to collusion based on limited costs or average costs, ③ method is a method of estimating the price in the market by finding the market similar to the total price price price in the market, ④ method is a method of estimating the market situation where the total price is not included in the market where the market is not included in the total price analysis under the premise that the total competition is complete, ④ method is a method of estimating the market situation where the total price is not included in the price analysis under the incomplete competitive assumption, and ⑤ method is a method of estimating the market situation where the total price is not included in the price comparison.

5) In addition, it is a method of measuring the suitability to identify the relationship between one dependent variables and one independent variables in the case of analyzing the relationship between one dependent variable and one independent variables. In the case of analyzing the relationship between one dependent variable and one independent variables, it is a multiple-time analysis. It is a multiple-time analysis in order to identify the relationship between one dependent variables and one independent variables.

Note6) The variables considered as the explanatory variables in this case include the following factors: (a) the collusion ever during the participation period of Defendant Cyang company (from April 2001 to September 2002); (b) the collusion ever during the participation period of Defendant Cyang company (from October 2002 to December 2005); (c) the collusion ever after the collusion (from January 2006), the substantial domestic production; (d) the producer price index; (e) the producer price index; (e) the production cost of the raw material cost; (f) the production cost of the raw material price; (f) the production cost of the raw material price; (f) the production price index; (f) the monthly average monthly variable considered to control the seasonal factors; and (f) the fixed effect index to reflect the special characteristics of each product