(a) Legal nature and collection procedure of the additional dues;

B. Whether a person who leased another person's land and executed the development project is liable to pay the development charges under the former Restitution of Development Gains Act (amended by Act No. 4563 of Jun. 11, 1993)

(c) Whether construction projects of golf practice ranges are subject to development charges;

A. The additional dues and aggravated additional dues under Articles 21 and 22 of the National Tax Collection Act, which are applied mutatis mutandis by Article 18(2) of the Restitution of Development Gains Act, are the kind of incidental taxes added to interest for arrears if national taxes are not paid by the due date, and if national taxes are not paid by the due date without the due date for payment without the due date for the additional dues determined by the person liable for taxation, the additional dues are naturally arising under the above provisions of the Act, and the collection procedure commences by demanding the payment by the due date for the notice, but if the payment demand is unreasonable or procedural defect is found, it is only possible to

B. The "project implementer", who is a person obligated to pay development charges under Article 6 of the former Restitution of Development Gains Act (amended by Act No. 4563 of Jun. 11, 1993), does not belong to the person subject to the imposition of the development charges. In the event that another person's land is leased and implemented a development project, the development gains from the increase in the land price shall belong to the landowner unless there are special circumstances. In such a case, the project implementer who is only the lessee is not the person obligated

C. A golf practice range construction project cannot be deemed as a "golf course construction project" as stipulated in Article 5 (1) 9 of the same Act, and further, the "golf course construction project" stipulated in Article 5 (1) of the same Act and each subparagraph 11 of attached Table 4 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 13465 of Sep. 13, 191) cannot be deemed as a "golf course construction project or similar project", and eventually, a golf practice range construction project under the applicable period of the same Act, which is not specified as a project subject to development charges, does not constitute a project subject to development charges.

(a) Article 18(2) of the Restitution of Development Gains Act, Article 21 of the National Tax Collection Act, and Article 22(b) of the former Restitution of Development Gains Act; Article 6(c)9 and Article 5(1)11 of the former Restitution of Development Gains Act, Article 4 subparagraph 11 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 13465, Sep. 13, 191);

A. Supreme Court Decision 86Nu147 delivered on October 28, 1986 (Gong1986, 3139) 85Nu635 delivered on September 20, 198 (Gong198, 1339) 90Nu1168 delivered on May 8, 1990 (Gong1990, 128) B. Supreme Court Decision 93Nu2940 delivered on July 16, 1993 (Gong193Ha, 2314) (Gong193Ha, 2639) 92Nu19354 delivered on August 24, 1993

Plaintiff

Chungcheong Market

Seoul High Court Decision 92Gu19578 delivered on April 7, 1993

1. The part of the judgment below regarding the disposition imposing additional dues is reversed, and the plaintiff's lawsuit on this part is dismissed.

2. The defendant's remaining appeal is dismissed.

3. All costs of appeal as to the above dismissed part are assessed against the plaintiff and the costs of appeal as to the dismissed part are assessed against the defendant.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

1. On the first ground for appeal

A. According to the records, on September 22, 1992, the defendant issued a notice of payment that the development charges of the plaintiff amount to KRW 165,116,240 and the additional charges to the plaintiff amount to KRW 10,801,90,00, which are the amount indicated in the above notice of payment. Thus, the defendant issued a disposition imposing the development charges of KRW 165,116,240, which are the amount indicated on the plaintiff in the above notice of payment, and therefore, it cannot be accepted to argue that the other amount was imposed.

B. The additional dues and increased additional dues under Articles 21 and 22 of the National Tax Collection Act, which are applied mutatis mutandis by Article 18(2) of the Restitution of Development Gains Act, are the kind of incidental taxes added in the meaning of interest for arrears if national taxes are not paid by the due date, and if national taxes are not paid by the due date without the due date for payment without the due date for determination of the due date for the arrears, additional dues are naturally generated and the amount thereof is determined under the above provision of the Act. However, in order to commence the collection procedure, it is possible to urge the payment of the due date by a demand notice, and if the demand for the payment of the additional dues is unreasonable or there is any defect in the procedure, it is only possible to object to the revocation lawsuit against the collection disposition (see Supreme Court Decision 90Nu168 delivered on May

According to the records, on September 22, 1992, the defendant merely notified the purport that the additional dues are KRW 10,801,990 where the payment was not made within the payment period while giving notice of payment of KRW 165,116,240 of the development charges of this case, and it does not appear that the additional dues of this case were determined or that the payment was urged after the expiration of the payment period. Thus, the plaintiff's claim for cancellation of the disposition imposing the additional dues of this case is unlawful.

However, the court below revoked the Defendant’s disposition of imposing the surcharge of this case, and thus, it cannot be reversed as it is unlawful, and this part is sufficient to be reversed and remanded by the party members. Therefore, the part of the judgment of the court below as to the Defendant’s disposition of imposing the surcharge of this case is reversed and the Plaintiff’

2. On the second ground for appeal

The purpose of imposing development charges as prescribed by the former Restitution of Development Gains Act (amended by Act No. 4563, Jun. 11, 1993; hereinafter “this Act”) is to properly recover development gains, so the subject of imposition is the person to whom the development gains actually accrue, and as the subject of imposition is the person to whom the development gains actually accrue, Article 6 of this Act does not correspond to “project operator” if the development gains actually accrue (see Supreme Court Decision 93Nu2940, Jul. 16, 1993; 93Nu2940, Jul. 16, 1993). In cases where a development project is leased and implemented on a parcel of land owned by another person, the development gains from the increase of land value shall belong to the landowner, and in such cases, the project operator who is a lessee shall be deemed not the person to pay the development

In the same purport, the court below's decision that the plaintiff's business was merely conducted by leasing land in this case and it cannot be viewed as the person liable for the payment of development charges is just and it is not erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as pointed out in the theory of lawsuit. There is no ground to

3. On the third ground for appeal

Article 5 (1) of this Act, which was in force at the time of the commencement of the instant business, provides for the business subject to development charges in subparagraph 9, and subparagraph 11 of Article 1 of this Act provides that "golf course construction business" shall be "business similar to those in subparagraphs 1 through 10, as prescribed by the Presidential Decree", and subparagraph 11 of attached Table 1 of Article 4 of the Enforcement Decree of this Act (amended by the Presidential Decree No. 13465 of September 13, 191; hereinafter "the Enforcement Decree of this Act") shall be "a change of form and quality of land to implement the business corresponding to those in subparagraphs 1 through 9", and it does not provide for "a golf course construction business directly subject to development charges" in the above Act and Enforcement Decree

On the other hand, Article 4(1) of the Installation and Utilization of Sports Facilities Act and Articles 2 and 3 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act provide for the golf practice range business as a registered sports facility business, and their regulations are different by stipulating the golf practice course business as a registered sports facility business, and as a sports facility business requiring the report of the golf practice range business, Article 5 of the same Act, Article 2, Article 3 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, and Article 3(1) Item (a) and (l) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act provide for the types of sports facility business and the standards for facilities, etc., in detail, the provisions on golf practice range business are separate from those on golf practice range business, including membership golf course business, general golf course business, and simple golf course business. The purport of the above legislation is not simply different from the size, but it seems that the two is to be different from the nature of the business.

In light of such point, a golf practice range construction business cannot be deemed to be a "golf course construction business" as stipulated in Article 5 (1) 9 of this Act, and furthermore, it cannot be deemed to be a "golf course construction business" as stipulated in Article 5 (1) of this Act and Article 4 (1) 11 of the Enforcement Decree of this Act, and it cannot be deemed to be a "golf course construction business or any similar business". Accordingly, this Act, which does not expressly stipulate a golf practice range construction business as a business subject to the imposition of development charges, and this case's golf practice range construction business under the applicable period of this Act

In the same purport, the court below is just in holding that the construction project of the golf driving range in this case does not fall under the business subject to development charges, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles, such as theory of lawsuit. There

4. Ultimately, the Defendant’s appeal is dismissed as it is without merit, and the costs of appeal on the dismissed appeal and the costs of appeal on the reversed part are assessed against each losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Park Jong-ho (Presiding Justice)