In a case where the object of the claim prohibited from seizure is deposited into the debtor’s deposit account, whether such deposit claim constitutes a claim prohibited from seizure (negative) / Whether a crime of evasion of compulsory execution is established in a case where the existing deposit account used to receive the object of the claim prohibited from seizure is received through another deposit account that is not attached by the creditor (negative)

Where the object of the claim to be prohibited from seizure is deposited into the debtor's deposit account, the deposit is no longer effective against the debtor's deposit claim, and such deposit does not constitute the claim to be prohibited from seizure. However, the object of the claim to be prohibited from seizure is not subject to compulsory execution or preservative disposition until it is deposited into the debtor's deposit account. Thus, even if the existing deposit account used to receive the object of the claim to be prohibited from seizure receives it through another deposit account that is not attached by the creditor, it cannot be deemed as an act of infringing on the creditor's rights. Thus, the crime of evading compulsory execution is not established

Article 327 of the Criminal Act, Article 246(1) of the Civil Execution Act

Supreme Court Decision 99Ma4857 Decided October 6, 1999 (Gong1999Ha, 2463) Supreme Court Decision 2013Da25552 Decided July 10, 2014 (Gong2014Ha, 1563)

Defendant

Prosecutor

Attorney Min-law

Suwon District Court Decision 2016No3375 decided April 13, 2017

The appeal is dismissed.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Article 327 of the Criminal Act aims to protect the rights of creditors who are deprived of compulsory execution by punishing “a person who has injured creditors by concealing, destroying or transferring property with the intent to escape from compulsory execution or by bearing false debts.” Thus, the object of the crime of evading compulsory execution should be that the creditor from among the debtor’s property may be subject to compulsory execution or preservative measures under the Civil Execution Act (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2006Do8721, Sept. 11, 2008; 2010Do4129, Dec. 8, 2011).

Meanwhile, where the object of the claim to be prohibited from seizure is deposited in the debtor's deposit account, it does not have the effect of prohibiting seizure on such deposit claim, and such deposit does not constitute a claim to prohibit seizure (see Supreme Court Order 99Ma4857, Oct. 6, 199; Supreme Court Decision 2013Da25552, Jul. 10, 2014, etc.). Since the object of the claim to be prohibited from seizure is still not subject to compulsory execution or preservative disposition until it is deposited in the debtor's deposit account, it cannot be deemed that the existing deposit account used to receive the object of the claim to be prohibited from seizure is a risk of infringing on the creditor's rights even if the debtor receives the object through another deposit account that is not attached by the creditor, and thus, it cannot be deemed that compulsory execution is an act of infringing on the creditor's rights.

2. The court below reversed the judgment of the court of first instance and sentenced the defendant not guilty on the ground that the right to receive temporary disability compensation benefits under Article 52 of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act does not constitute a claim prohibited from seizure under Article 88(2) of the same Act, and thus, the defendant's act of receiving temporary disability compensation benefits by changing the receipt account of temporary disability compensation benefits from the existing deposit account to another deposit account that is not seized from the existing deposit account, was not a crime. In light of the aforementioned legal principles and records, the judgment of the court below is just and there is no error of law by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules, or by misapprehending the legal principles

3. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Kim Jae-hyung (Presiding Justice)