The appeal is dismissed.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Article 327 of the Criminal Act aims to protect the rights of creditors who are imminent in compulsory execution by punishing “a person who has damaged creditors by concealing, destroying, transferring, or falsely bearing an obligation for the purpose of evading compulsory execution.” Thus, the object of the crime of evading compulsory execution, from among the debtor’s property, should be that the obligee can take the object of compulsory execution or preservative measures under the Civil Execution Act (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2006Do8721, Sept. 11, 2008; 2010Do4129, Dec. 8, 2011). Meanwhile, even if the object of the claim to be prohibited from seizure is deposited in the debtor’s deposit account, such deposit does not have the effect of prohibiting compulsory seizure against the debtor’s deposit claim, and thus, it does not constitute a claim to be forbidden from seizure (see, e.g., Supreme Court Order 9Ma4857, Oct. 6, 199; Supreme Court Decision 2015Da5325, Jul. 25, 2015.

2. The court below held that since the right to receive temporary closure benefits under Article 52 of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act does not constitute a claim subject to seizure under Article 88(2) of the same Act, which is prohibited under Article 88(2) of the same Act, and thus, the Defendant’s receipt of temporary closure benefits does not constitute a crime of receiving temporary closure benefits by changing the temporary closure benefits account to another deposit account that is not seized from the existing deposit account that is subject to seizure.

The judgment of the court of first instance is reversed, and the defendant is acquitted.