(a) Whether the provision on exemption from driving without a license applies to a case where an accident occurred while driving a heavy machine with a license without the permission of the owner of the land with the consent of the owner;

(b) Whether the insurer may refuse the payment of the insurance money where the insured under a liability insurance claim for the payment of the insurance money without paying the compensation to the victim after the judgment on the liability insurance became final and conclusive;

(c) Whether or not an insurer of liability insurance is liable to pay damages for delay as prescribed by the Act on Special Cases concerning Expedition, etc. of Legal Proceedings for which payment is ordered by final and conclusive judgment

A. The general terms and conditions of non-licensed driving exemption clause on the general terms and conditions of business automobiles apply only to cases where a non-licensed driving took place in a situation where a policyholder or the insured is controlled or managed. Here, the term "unlicensed driving exemption clause is made in a situation where a policyholder or the insured is controlled or managed" means the case where a non-licensed driving took place with the explicit or implied approval of the policyholder or the insured. Furthermore, in cases where a person who uses or drives a motor vehicle with the consent of the insured and is treated as the insured under an insurance contract (such consent) is approved only by the policyholder or the insured with the consent of the insured, it cannot be said that an implied approval of the policyholder or the insured is not applied. Thus, as long as a non-licensed driving exemption clause on the mid-term driving is insured with the name of the insured, unless there are any special circumstances, it is merely a non-licensed driving exemption clause on the part of the insurer.

B. In case of liability insurance for damages, when the insured has paid damages to a third party or when the insured's liability to a third party is confirmed by such a method as stipulated in the Commercial Act or the insurance clause, the insured may immediately exercise its right to claim insurance against the insurer, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 724 (1) of the Commercial Act. Therefore, the insurer cannot refuse to pay the insured amount pursuant to Article 724 (1) of the Commercial Act against the insured who seeks payment of the insured amount in accordance with such insurance clause.

C. In light of the purport of the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Comprehensive Insurance Policy that stipulate the insured amount to be paid to the insured in personal compensation as the amount including delay damages to be paid by the insured by the final judgment, the insurer is obligated to pay the insured at all, either the original or delay damages, unless there are special circumstances, such as that the amount of damages determined between the victim and the insured is an unfair damage not legally responsible to the insured. Thus, the part of the damages for delay cited in the final judgment of compensation between the victim and the insured cannot be considered as an unfair damage not legally responsible to the insured. Thus, the insurer is also obligated to pay

A. Article 105 of the Civil Act; Articles 6 and 7 of the Regulation of Standardized Contracts Act; Articles 723(1), 723(2), and 724(1) of the Commercial Act; Article 719 of the Commercial Act

A. Supreme Court Decision 91Da36420 Decided December 24, 1991 (Gong1992, 652), 93Da41211 Decided December 26, 1993 (Gong1994Sang, 175) (Gong1994Ha, 1796), Supreme Court Decision 87Da2276 Decided June 14, 198 (Gong198, 023), 92Da28631 Decided November 24, 1992 (Gong193Sang, 237), 94Da2893 (Gong2894, 1959, 195Da29497, 1995, 195Da49794, Sep. 26, 1995)

[Defendant-Appellee] Defendant 1 and 3 others

Dongyang Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd., Counsel for the defendant-appellant in charge of the Korea-U.S. Law Office

Seoul High Court Decision 93Na44885 delivered on March 4, 1994

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. On the first ground for appeal

A) According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance cited by the court below, the court of first instance concluded a comprehensive insurance contract for heavy motor vehicles owned by the plaintiff with the defendant as an insurable vehicle. The non-party Kim Jong-soo entered into a lease contract for heavy motor vehicles of this case with the non-party Kim Jong-soo who was engaged in washing work on the date of the accident of this case and operated the heavy motor vehicle first at the work site of this case for the first time, and operated the heavy motor vehicle of this case, which was inside the drum box attached to the end for the washing work of the above washing work. The non-party Lee Jong-soo was unable to accept the above operation of the above heavy motor vehicle of this case without any justifiable reasons for the judgment of the court below in light of the facts that the plaintiff's operation of the aforementioned heavy motor vehicle of this case was caused by the operation of the above heavy motor vehicle of this case, or the operation of the above heavy motor vehicle of this case without any instruction of the plaintiff Lee Jong-soo's operation of the above construction site of this case.

B) The general terms and conditions of an automobile accident insurance clause apply only to cases where a non-licenseless driving took place in a situation where a policyholder or an insured is controlled or managed by the policyholder or the insured. Here, the term "unlicensed driving is made in a situation where a policyholder or the insured is controlled or managed by the policyholder or the insured" (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 90Meu23899 delivered on December 24, 1991), and the issue of whether a non-licenseless driving was made with an implied approval of the policyholder or the insured shall be determined with the relation between the policyholder or the insured and the non-licensed driver, the operation and management status of the ordinary vehicle, the situation and purpose of the non-licenseless driving, the attitude of the driver or the insured without permission, and the attitude of the insured, etc. (see Supreme Court Decision 200Da93139 delivered on May 10, 1994).

The judgment of the court of first instance, as cited by the court below, judged under the premise that the exemption clause for driving without a license shall apply to the case where the non-party 1 driven the middle-term machine of this case with the consent of the non-party 1, who is the non-party 1, who is the non-party 1, without a license. However, as seen above, as long as the non-party 1, who is the non-party 1, was insured as the non-party 1, the non-party 1, as the non-party 1, the non-party 1, the non-party 1, the non-party 1, the non-party 1, the non-party 1, the non-party 1, the non-party 1, the non-party 1, the non-party 1, the non-party 1, the non-party 1, the non-party 1, the non-party 1, the non-party 1, and it cannot

2. On the second ground for appeal

A) The so-called liability insurance, such as the Defendant’s comprehensive automobile insurance, provides that the insured shall compensate for damages under the law paid by the insured to a third party due to an insured event. Article 724(1) of the Commercial Act provides that “In principle, an insurer shall not pay the insured amount before the insured is compensated for damages due to an accident attributable to the insured, in whole or in part, to the insured.” However, Article 723(1) of the Commercial Act provides that “if the insured becomes final and conclusive due to repayment to a third party, approval, compromise or judgment, the insurer shall, without delay, send such notice to the insured,” and Article 723(2) of the Commercial Act provides that “The insurer shall pay the insured amount within 10 days from the date of receipt of the notice under the preceding paragraph.” Meanwhile, Article 6(1) of the Defendant’s comprehensive insurance clauses (Evidence No. 4 of the Commercial Act) cannot be paid to the insured, who is the insured’s insured’s claim for damages pursuant to the foregoing article 723(2) of the Commercial Act without delay.

B) Furthermore, the insurance contract of this case concluded between the plaintiff and the defendant does not limit the maximum amount of compensation, and it is clear in the record that the insured is the amount including damages for delay to be paid to the insured by the final judgment with respect to the insurance amount to be paid to the insured in light of Article 15 of the above insurance terms and conditions. Thus, the defendant, the insurer, is obligated to pay the insured amount determined by the above final judgment to the insured in accordance with the above terms and conditions. Accordingly, under the premise that the insured is limited to the amount actually paid to the third party, the insured amount to be paid to the insured in the event there is a final judgment between the victim and the insured, the ground of appeal that did not examine whether the plaintiff paid the compensation to the bereaved family of the above letter of

3. On the third ground for appeal

In light of the purport of Article 15 of the above insurance terms and conditions, the insurer is obligated to pay the insured both the original and late payment damages, unless there are special circumstances, such as that the amount of damages determined between the victim and the insured is an unfair damage not legally responsible to the insured (see Supreme Court Decision 93Da25004 delivered on January 14, 1994). In light of the records, the part of the damages for delay cited in the above final and conclusive judgment between the insured and the bereaved family members of the above net gambling and the Plaintiff pursuant to the interest rate under the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings cannot be deemed as an unfair damage that is not legally responsible to the Plaintiff. Therefore, there is no error of law as pointed out in the ground of appeal of the first instance court

4. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant who is the appellant. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Park Jong-chul (Presiding Justice)