Samsungbow Scholarship Foundation, et al. (Law Firm Sejong, Attorneys Lee Jong-hee et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

KTB Asset Management Co., Ltd. and one other (Attorneys Lee Dong-gu et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

September 4, 2015

Seoul Central District Court Decision 2011Gahap82631 Decided October 30, 2014

1. All appeals filed by the Plaintiffs and the Defendants, and the request for return of provisional payments by Defendant KB Asset Management Company are dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by each party, and the costs of filing an application for the return of provisional payments shall be borne by Defendant KTB Asset Management Company.

1. The plaintiffs' claims and purport of appeal

The judgment of the first instance court is modified as follows. The Defendants jointly and severally pay to each of the plaintiffs 50 billion won with 5% interest per annum from June 29, 2010 to the service date of a copy of the complaint of this case, and 20% interest per annum from the next day to the day of complete payment.

2. Purport of the defendants' appeal

The part against the Defendants in the judgment of the first instance is revoked, and all of the plaintiffs' claims against the Defendants corresponding to the above revoked part are dismissed.

3. Purport of application for the return of provisional payments by Defendant KTB Asset Management Company

The plaintiffs shall pay 24,368,788,140 won, each of which is 24,368,788,140 won and 15.5 billion won, each of which is 8,868,788,140 won from October 30, 2014; and 5% per annum from November 5, 2014 to the date of delivery of a duplicate of the application for the return of provisional payments of this case; and 20% per annum from the following to the date of full payment.

1. Basic facts

The reason why this Court is to use this part is that "No. 18, 2010" of the last 14th sentence of the judgment of the court of first instance is "No. 2010.4. 28, 2010" and "No. 14 through 19 of the 18th sentence is "No. 49" and "No. 49" of the last 18th sentence is the same as the corresponding part of the judgment of the court of first instance, and thus, it is acceptable in accordance with the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

6) On December 13, 2013, the Seoul Central District Court found the Defendant guilty of the violation of the Capital Markets Act due to an unfair solicitation on the ground that “the Defendant provided a conclusive judgment on uncertain matters in soliciting investment or provided information that could mislead the financial investment business entity to believe that it is certain to be certain,” but found the Defendant not guilty of the facts charged that “the Defendant provided a fraudulent transaction or deception to the Plaintiffs to attract the investment of this case,” and sentenced the Defendants to a fine of KRW 100 million (the above court Decision 2011Gohap1372).

7) Both Defendants and prosecutors appealed against the above judgment, and the Seoul High Court dismissed all of the appeals on October 24, 2014 (Supreme Court Decision 2014No73 Decided October 24, 2014). The Defendants and prosecutors appealed against the above judgment and continue to be Supreme Court Decision 2014Do14924 Decided October 24, 201.

2. Whether the Defendants are liable for damages arising from unfair trading or deception

A. Summary of the plaintiffs' assertion

No one shall intend to gain money or any interest in property by using a document containing a false description or representation of a material fact or an omission of a description or representation of a material fact necessary for preventing others from being misled, in connection with the trading, etc. of financial investment instruments (Article 178(1)2 of the Capital Markets Act).

However, the Defendants, despite being aware of the financial situation of the Busan Savings Bank at the time of soliciting the instant investment, have committed a series of unfair trading or deception as follows, are liable for compensating the Plaintiffs for the damages arising therefrom.

1) The Defendants prepared a letter of intent for investment in this case for the purpose of preventing the financial soundness of the Busan Savings Bank rather than the interests of the Plaintiffs, which are investors. On April 7, 2010, without disclosing the situation of the Busan Savings Bank and the process of preparing the intent for investment, etc., the Second Fund Management Committee of the Plaintiff Foundation in 2010 and the First Fund Management Advisory Committee of the Plaintiff on April 28, 2010 of the Plaintiff Foundation induced investment in the Busan Savings Bank on April 2010.

2) The Defendants explained the instant investment to the Plaintiffs, not because the reason why the Busan Savings Bank requires capital increase is not because the internal insolvency was revealed as a result of the inspection of the Financial Supervisory Service, but because the Financial Supervisory Service requires the establishment of excessive allowances. The Defendants explained that the Plaintiff’s high-income investment is very stable as it guarantees the students’ high-income of 12% per annum by acquiring the major shareholders of the Busan Savings Bank, who are the main owners of scholarships and dividends, and who are the major shareholders of the Busan Savings Bank, and that the Busan Savings Bank’s major shareholders and executive officers have no moral defects.

3) In preparing the additional data on June 16, 2010 (hereinafter “instant additional data”), the Defendants entered false information as to the important matters necessary to prevent the Plaintiffs from being misled, and omitted entry into financial advisory fees, allowances for bad debts of Busan 2 Savings Bank, and conflicts of interest, etc., and distributed them by the Plaintiff Foundation Management Committee on June 17, 2010, which decided whether the instant investment was made.

4) On June 17, 2010, the Defendants, at the third fund management committee of the Plaintiff Foundation, provided false explanation on the ratio of BISD, the sales process of Brazil State bonds, the weight of this PF loan, the relationship with the Busan Savings Bank, and the details leading to the investment of this case using the funds, the position of the Financial Supervisory Service, the results of the joint inspection of the Financial Supervisory Service, the soundness of the major shareholders of the Busan Savings Bank, the financial status of the Busan Savings Bank, the possibility of allocating 12% per annum, and the possibility of recovering investment funds.

5) The Defendants, through a management normalization implementation plan received from the Busan Savings Bank on June 23, 2010, knew of the fact that the financial situation of the Busan Savings Bank on June 2009 and the data publicly announced by the Busan Savings Bank on December 28, 2009, the financial statements prepared by the Busan Savings Bank are very poor. The financial statements prepared by the Busan Savings Bank on June 23, 2010 fall short of 8% despite capital increase with 150 billion won, so that the financial statements prepared by the Busan Savings Bank on June 28, 2010 are likely to fall short of 8%, so that the financial statements prepared by the Busan Savings Bank on June 25, 2010 are likely to fall short of 8%, and that the Plaintiffs may have suffered losses in the total amount of the investment funds due to the occurrence of the 8/8 clubs event, etc., and that the Financial Supervisory Service had presented only the ratio of B/S on June 29, 2010 at the time of making inquiries.

B. Determination

1) The drawing up of the letter of intent to make the instant investment on March 30, 2010 and the inducement of investment by April 2010

The plaintiffs asserted that the intent to make the instant investment was made in order to recognize the risk of large-scale insolvency of the Busan Savings Bank, which was revealed as a result of the joint inspection by the Financial Supervisory Service and the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation, such as the decline in BISD and the decline in the 8/8 club, etc., and to prevent this situation. However, in light of the following circumstances acknowledged or inferred from the aforementioned, it is difficult to conclude that the explanation, etc. by the 2nd Fund Management Committee of the Plaintiff Foundation and the 1st Fund Management Advisory Committee of the Plaintiff School constituted fraudulent unfair trading or deception on April 7, 2010 or April 28, 2010, there is no other evidence to acknowledge otherwise.

A) On March 2010, the result of the examination by the Financial Supervisory Service was not “large-scale insolvency that revealed the window dressing accounting fact of the Busan Savings Bank,” but “The Busan Savings Bank should accumulate an increased allowance for bad debts exceeding KRW 200 billion in accordance with the asset soundness evaluation standard changed by the Financial Supervisory Service, and thereby, the connection BISD ratio will decline.”

B) In the event that the Busan Savings Bank withdraws, some of the circumstances with the Defendants, such as the occurrence of losses to the fund managed by the Defendants, etc. However, considering the Defendants’ liability to be borne by the Defendants in the event of the failure of the investment in this case, such circumstance alone is difficult to readily understand that the Defendants conspired with the Busan Savings Bank Management to describe, explain, or intentionally conceal important matters against the Plaintiffs in collusion with the management of the Busan Savings Bank, thereby leading up to fraudulent unfair trading or deception.

2) Investment interest rates created at the beginning of May 2010, and solicitation of investment by June 16, 2010

In light of the following circumstances, the evidence Nos. 4 and 58 through 63, which is acknowledged by comprehensively considering the overall purport of the pleadings, it is difficult to conclude that the Defendants’ solicitation of investment until June 16, 2010 constitutes fraudulent unfair trading or deception, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge it.

A) On April 8, 2010, Nonparty 1 requested Nonparty 2 of the Busan Savings Bank to provide data necessary to prepare an investment premium, etc. on April 8, 2010. From around April 13, 2010, Nonparty 1 received data necessary to prepare the estimated financial statements, etc. of the Busan Savings Bank from Nonparty 2 from Nonparty 2. If some errors were pointed out by Nonparty 1, Nonparty 1 received data from the Busan Savings Bank by correcting them and sending them again.

B) In the part of the general opinion of the Investment Ri Art, the essence of the instant investment is “an investment to reduce non-performing assets through the expansion of capital and to support the re-influence of a superior savings bank on the basis of equity capital appropriated to reduce non-performing assets through the expansion of capital.”

C) It is difficult to readily conclude that the Defendants had been specifically aware of the specific numerical value, such as the connected BISD ratio and the amount of capital increase beyond the generally known content on the inspection result of the Financial Supervisory Service at the time of preparing an investment premium rate.

D) On May 27, 2010, the Plaintiffs asserted to the effect that Defendant 2 visited the Financial Supervisory Service on the part of May 27, 2010, the Plaintiff came to know of the fact that the Busan Savings Bank’s insolvency was revealed from Nonparty 3’s director. However, Nonparty 3 stated in the first instance trial (Seoul Central District Court Decision 201Dahap1372) against the Defendants in the first instance trial (Seoul Central District Court Decision 201Dahap1372) that “after Defendant 2 told Defendant 2 to attract capital increase of the Busan Savings Bank, it would be desirable to ensure that it would not cause any problem to the protection of investors by providing accurate financial information of the Busan Savings Bank to investors of the Busan Savings Bank, but it did not inform the Defendants of the alternative contents and specific values of the results of the joint inspection in writing or verbally, or would be unreasonable.”

E) In relation to the morality of major shareholders of the Busan Savings Bank, Defendant 2 discussed transparency in the process of emphasizing that the Busan Savings Bank's efforts had been made by major shareholders and management of the Busan Savings Bank to grow into the industry-level Savings Bank. The focus of stories before and after a transparency talks was that the Busan Savings Bank's continuous growth is expected and there is no problem in dividend if the Busan Savings Bank resolves only the bad debt allowance problem due to joint inspection by the Financial Supervisory Service.

F) Furthermore, Defendant 2 merely stated at the time that “The Busan Savings Bank has shown an annual interest of 50 billion or 60 billion won in the past five years, and determined that its degree of interest can be seen even during the past five years in light of such a fact.” It does not appear to be the purport that the Busan Savings Bank’s management deterioration situation due to illegal acts such as major shareholders is not certain.

3) As to the instant additional data

A) The Plaintiffs specifically asserted as follows with respect to false description or indication, or omission of description or indication of the necessary important matters in the instant additional data.

① The instant additional data contains “the anticipated results at the end of June 2010,” instead of the item “Financial Advisory Fee,” and in comparison with the final return report by the Financial Supervisory Service, it should be deemed that the method of calculating the connecting BISD ratio is false. In addition, the said additional data included in the e-mail attachment document sent by Nonparty 4 to Nonparty 1, which was modified by Nonparty 1 and Nonparty 5, and were subsequently deleted from the instant additional data. This constitutes omission of description on necessary important matters.

② The first instance that the Defendants sent to Nonparty 4 stated KRW 326.2 billion in total amount of the bad debt allowances required by the Busan Savings Bank and the Busan Second Savings Bank. However, in the instant additional data, approximately KRW 92 billion in the bad debt allowances amount of the Busan Second Savings Bank are deleted, and only KRW 234.2 billion in the bad debt allowances required by the Busan Savings Bank are included in only the bad debt allowances required by the Busan Savings Bank. This constitutes omission in the description of necessary important matters.

③ The Defendants knew on October 2010 that the Busan Savings Bank would undertake to acquire shares of the Daejeon Savings Bank amounting to KRW 40.4 billion after the date of the investment transfer of this case. Such fact is a conflict of interest between the Plaintiffs and the Defendants. Nevertheless, the Defendants’ failure to state it in the additional data of this case constitutes omission of material matters.

④ The original e-mail attachment data sent by Nonparty 4 to Defendant KTB Asset Management on June 16, 2010, the audit result of the Financial Supervisory Service was not yet finalized, but it was the most important issue regarding the additional accumulation of allowances for bad debts as a result of changes in the standards for accumulation of allowances for bad debts. However, at the end of Nonparty 1 and Nonparty 5’s correction or demand of correction, the prosecutor of the Financial Supervisory Service completed the inspection of the instant additional data, and as a result of the inspection, it was written to the effect that there was no other issue other than the additional accumulation of allowances 2,34.2 billion won due to changes in the standards for accumulation of allowances for bad debts. This constitutes a false description on important matters.

B) However, in light of the following circumstances, Gap evidence Nos. 27, 29, 41, 42, 74, Eul evidence Nos. 5, 15, 16, 35, 36, and 85, and Eul evidence Nos. 5, 15, 16, 36, 36, and 85, it is difficult to conclude that the above part as pointed out by the plaintiffs constitutes a fraudulent unfair trading or deception, aside from whether the above part constitutes a violation of the duty to explain or an unfair solicitation by the defendants, and there is no other evidence

① As a result of an inspection conducted on the side of the Busan Savings Bank on June 2010 by the Financial Supervisory Service, the numerical value 1.02% of the connection BS ratio between the Busan Savings Bank as indicated in the instant additional data is equivalent to the interim confirmation document and the connection BS ratio on the final return report prepared by the Financial Supervisory Service around July 2010 (hereinafter referred to as the “ear return”).

② In light of the fact that the numerical value of the connecting BISD ratio after capital increase with consideration as stated in the ear Report is indicated as 8.69%, it cannot be deemed that 8.13% of the connecting BISD ratio after capital increase issued by the Busan Savings Bank, as indicated in the instant additional data, is false.

The plaintiffs asserted that the number of additional data in this case was 50 billion won higher than that of the major shareholders (the plaintiffs anticipated that the BS ratio would amount to 9.14% at the time of the major shareholders' increase of B0 billion won) The ratio of BS on the additional data in this case is calculated by reflecting "the sale of claims to camping 100 billion won" and "the anticipated results of June 30, 2010, including financial consulting fees," and the ratio of BS 10 billion won at the end of the Busan Financial Supervisory Service's increase of 97.6 billion won on June 30, 2010, the ratio of BS 50 billion won on the additional data in Busan Financial Services Commission's increase of 50 billion won on the ground that the ratio of BS 10 billion won on the additional data in Busan Financial Services Commission's increase of 50 billion won on the basis of the ratio of BS 5 billion won on the revised data on the e-mail savings in Busan Financial Services 196 billion won on June 2010,

However, it is difficult to conclude that the ratio of BS 1 to B 60% of the additional 70% of the additional 13% of the additional 8.13% of the additional 5% of the 10.3% of the amount of capital increase of major shareholders, etc. in addition to the 10.0 billion won of the additional 30% of the additional 5% of the 19.3% of the additional 5% of the 19.3% of the additional 5% of the 19.3% of the additional 7% of the 19.3% of the additional 5% of the 19.3% of the additional 5% of the 19.3% of the amount of capital increase of the 19.3% of the additional 5% of the 19.3% of the additional 5% of the 19.3% of the amount of financial advisory fees of the financial advisory fees of the Busan Bank and the additional 200 billion won of the 20.5% of the additional 1.3% of the 28.

③ The Plaintiffs asserted to the effect that this would result in the manipulation of BISD rates by appropriating false earnings, but the Financial Supervisory Service, which has expressed the opinion that it is reasonable to prohibit or regulate the receipt of financial advisory fees in the same form as the present, has calculated the connecting BISD rates including the financial advisory fees when preparing the ear Report (only dispute over the amount of the financial advisory fees, and the Plaintiffs also recognize the fact that the consolidated BISD rates were calculated by reflecting the financial advisory fees when preparing the ear Report). Furthermore, at the time of preparing the instant additional data, the Financial Services Commission did not enact any provision prohibiting the receipt of financial advisory fees by the Financial Services Commission, or did not provide any administrative guidance that prohibits the savings banks from receiving the financial advisory fees.

④ The instant additional data merely appears to have been prepared by Nonparty 5, etc. on the side of the Busan Savings Bank and e-mail, etc. after consultation with the Busan Savings Bank, and cannot be deemed to have been arbitrarily modified and processed. Thus, solely on the ground that some of the contents of the draft are different, it cannot be deemed that there was a false entry in the said additional data.

⑤ As acknowledged earlier, the instant additional data does not stipulate that the rate of BISD was calculated by reflecting the financial advisory fee of KRW 140 billion, and only state “the reflection of anticipated performance results at the end of June 2010.” In determining whether the Plaintiffs are to invest in the instant fund, it appears that the Plaintiffs were to provide complete information in determining whether to invest in the instant additional data. However, insofar as the estimated financial statements attached to the instant additional data contain the revenue portion of the fees, the possibility that the financial advisory fee part may not be separately stated in the main text because, in addition to the revenue amount of the fees stated in the estimated financial statements attached thereto, it may be misunderstood that the financial advisory fee is generated separately from the revenue amount of the fees stated in the estimated financial statements attached thereto by the investors. Therefore, it is difficult to deem the omission of the description of

④ The fact that the Busan Savings Bank’s allowance for bad debts worth KRW 20,34.2 billion, stated in the instant additional data, is identical to the amount of the provisional certificate and the final return report prepared by the Financial Supervisory Service around July 2010, as a result of the inspection conducted by the Financial Supervisory Service on the side of the Busan Savings Bank, which was issued to the Busan Savings Bank on June 2010, and the allowance for bad debts worth KRW 234.2 billion should be additionally accumulated as a result of the inspection conducted by the Financial Supervisory Service.

7) The issue of capital increase and the fund management committee of this case, which were the center of discussion, was the BISD ratio between the Busan Savings Bank, and the amount of the bad debts fund to be accumulated in the need, affected the BISD ratio, and the BISD ratio was prepared in the additional data of this case, including the Busan Savings Bank.

8) As multiple values on the investment premium, which was first presented to the investor side, are prepared on the sole basis of the Busan Savings Bank, it seems that the amount of the bad debts fund required to be accumulated in the additional data in this case is stated on the sole basis of the Busan Savings Bank in order to make it possible to determine the change in values.

① In the process of disposing of the amount equivalent to KRW 12.5 billion in the Busan Savings Bank’s equity shares acquired by the Defendants through the KTB Central Busan Savings Fund, and around October 2010, the Busan Savings Bank, which was about four months after the issuance of the instant shares, should take over approximately KRW 25.7% in the Daejeon Savings Bank’s equity interest from the Han field, etc., in which Defendant KTB assets were listed, and around 40.7 billion after the issuance of the instant shares, it is difficult to readily conclude that the reason why the KTB Central Savings Fund was unable to exercise put to cash options in the Busan Savings Bank due to the difficulty in the financial situation of the Busan Savings Bank’s Busan Savings Bank, was that the Busan Savings Bank was unable to obtain approval from the supervisory authority, and that it did not have a duty to pay approximately KRW 40.4 billion in the 3rd Bank’s equity interest, and thus, it cannot be concluded that there was a conflict of interest.

(10) It is basically a strategic issue of the Busan Savings Bank’s strategic determination whether the Plaintiffs would use the paid-in capital increase for any purpose, in the absence of special provisions on the usage or plan of the investment money at the time of investing the money in the Fund.

11. The part on the 6th page of the instant additional data, on the premise that the Busan Savings Bank has a 100% equity interest in the Daejeon Savings Bank, the total amount of KRW 52.8 billion is reflected in the loss amount of the Daejeon Savings Bank on the premise that the Busan Savings Bank has a 100% equity interest in the Daejeon Savings Bank. Even though the Busan Savings Bank did not explicitly state that it is scheduled to purchase the equity interest in the Daejeon Savings Bank, the Defendants would not have intentionally concealed such fact.

(12)In the draft of the instant additional data sent by Nonparty 4 to Nonparty 1, stating, “the audit result has not yet been determined,” but the instant additional data indicates, “the inspection of the Financial Supervisory Service was terminated,” but it cannot be readily concluded that this part of the instant additional data was false merely because the instant additional data differs from the draft. Nonparty 5 and Nonparty 1 sent electronic mail for the preparation of data several times on the side of the Busan Savings Bank. Nonparty 4 sent the Busan Savings Bank to Nonparty 1 on June 16, 2010. Nonparty 4 stated, “the inspection of the Busan Savings Bank was terminated,” and Nonparty 1, etc. alleged to mean, “the inspection was terminated on the spot,” and it is difficult for the prosecutor to think that the additional data was terminated at the Busan Savings Bank’s time and on the other hand, and it is difficult for the prosecutor to think that it was final and conclusive at the Busan Savings Bank’s time and on other occasions, and that it was concluded in the Busan Savings Bank’s internal document.”

4) As to Defendant 2’s statement at the third fund management committee of the third fund foundation

In light of the following circumstances, the statements in Gap evidence Nos. 27, 29, 39, 74 and Eul evidence Nos. 31, which are acknowledged by comprehensively considering the overall purport of the pleadings, it is difficult to conclude that the statements in the above committee by defendant 2 constituted a fraudulent unfair trading or deception, aside from whether they constitute a violation of the duty of explanation to the plaintiff foundation or an unfair solicitation. There is no other evidence to acknowledge it.

A) The number of BISD rates explained by Defendant 2 at the meeting of the 3rd Fund Management Committee is not significantly different from the number stated in the final return report by the Financial Supervisory Service.

B) It is acknowledged that Defendant 2 did not instruct Defendant 2 to calculate the BISD ratio in remuneration to the employees of the Defendant KTB asset management at the time of the preparation of the instant additional data. However, the Financial Supervisory Service, while evaluating the asset soundness of the PF loans of the Busan Savings Bank, conducted an inspection by applying a new method of evaluating the feasibility of the PF project, not by the previous criteria, but by evaluating the financial soundness of the PF loans of the Busan Savings Bank. The result was that a considerable number of claims classified as normal credit have been rated as credit prior to the date, and Defendant 2 could be deemed to have been regarded as having been sufficiently strict, and that such a determination was “probed.”

C) Defendant 2’s statement to the effect that “the additional data of this case was obtained and confirmed entirely by the Financial Supervisory Service” appears to be “data accurately reflected in the results of the joint inspection of the Financial Supervisory Service.” As seen earlier, Defendant 2’s diverse numbers, such as the actual BISD ratio and the amount of allowances for bad debts, are not significantly different from the number indicated in the final report of the Financial Supervisory Service.

D) The contents and purport of Defendant 2’s statement that explained the results of joint inspection of the Financial Supervisory Service and the Busan Savings Bank and the Savings Bank of the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation at the meeting of the Third Fund Management Committee is merely that, when Defendant 2 judges, the savings banks in Korea should be strictly required to close all doors if the criteria for the demand for allowances are applied to all Savings Banks. Therefore, the same shall not apply to the failure of the Financial Supervisory Service.) and it appears to have experienced its opinion that the criteria for inspection of the Busan Savings Bank are strict. Therefore, it cannot be deemed that Defendant 2 explicitly explained the position of the Financial Supervisory Service or there was an intentional intent on such basis.

E) Although Defendant 2 mentioned as the issue of allowance for bad debts without confirming the correct reason that the Financial Supervisory Service had the Plaintiff sell Blue State bonds to the Busan Savings Bank, Defendant 2, who had the supervising authority inspect the Busan Savings Bank as a whole at a very strict level, was merely seen as having talked about the case of the Blue State bonds, and it is difficult to view it as an intentional explanation in light of the purport and flow of the overall talk as above.

F) Although the portion of the PF loan business place of the Busan Savings Bank was not the PF, Defendant 2 presented the “The current status of the PF of the Busan Savings Bank’s Real Estate PF and the future collection plan sheet,” which is the data received from the Busan Savings Bank at the meeting of the 3rd Fund Management Committee. The list is written in detail on the name of the business that the Busan Savings Bank granted the PF loan, the name of the contractor, the balance of the loan, the amount of the reserve fund, and the anticipated business profit following the inspection by the Financial Supervisory Service.

G) Defendant 2 appears to have discussed transparency in the process of emphasizing that it was due to the fact that the Busan Savings Bank’s major shareholder and management’s efforts, etc. were made in the process of growing up to the industry level savings bank. The focus of the previous stories was that the Busan Savings Bank’s continuous growth would not have any problem with dividends in the future if it resolves only the issue of bad debts allowance due to joint inspection by the Financial Supervisory Service. Meanwhile, Defendant 2 stated, “In the past five years, Busan Savings Bank has seen an interest of KRW 50 billion to KRW 60 billion every year, and determined that its degree can be seen in light of such fact,” and it does not appear to be clear to the effect that it would not result in management deterioration due to illegal acts such as major shareholder, etc. in Busan Savings Bank. Furthermore, as examined in paragraph 6 of the above, it cannot be deemed that Defendant 2 had intentionally aggravated the financial statements of the Busan Savings Bank’s financial statements to the extent that it could have become difficult to recover the asset soundness and profit and loss structure at the time.

5) As to the product proposal as of June 25, 2010 and the response materials to the question at the early 28 June 2010

A) Although a plan to implement management normalization on June 23, 2010 states that the actual Busan Savings Bank’s BISD ratio (2.17% as of June 2009, 1.21% as of December 2009, and 8/8% as of December 2009) and the possibility that it would decline, there is no dispute between the parties that the product proposal as of June 25, 2010 and the answer documents as of June 28, 2010 are not included therein.

B) However, in light of the following circumstances that are either recognized by the aforementioned evidence and the purport of the entire pleadings or easily inferred from them, the above part cannot be viewed as a fraudulent unfair trading or deception by the Defendants, apart from whether it can be seen as a violation of the Defendants’ duty to explain, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge it otherwise.

① After the instant investment, the Financial Supervisory Service’s Busan Savings Bank and its affiliated savings bank’s actual inspection of assets and liabilities or prosecutorial investigation was conducted, and accordingly, the Busan Savings Bank’s window dressing accounting was revealed. Accordingly, it cannot be deemed that the Defendants could have known the fact that the financial statements of the Busan Savings Bank were divided through a management normalization implementation plan on June 23, 2010.

② According to the materials published after the Busan Savings Bank issued capital increase of KRW 150 billion on June 2010 (written evidence No. 87), the connection BISD ratio exceeds 8%) 8.31% is stated as 8.31%.

③ Defendant 2, Nonparty 1, and Nonparty 5: (a) prepared the instant product proposal, etc. related to the sale of the Fund; (b) basically, the financial statements, etc. of the Busan Savings Bank published in the electronic disclosure system of the Financial Supervisory Service were basically a primary data; and (c) in the process of receiving e-mail with the Busan Savings Bank on several occasions, the error in the calculation result of the Busan Savings Bank or the point of time of calculating the BISD ratio was pointed out and corrected.

④ BS ratio, as of the end of December 2009, stated in the product proposal as of June 25, 2010, was 9.42%, which was published in the half-yearly report of February 16, 2010 by the Busan Savings Bank.

⑤ From March 2, 2010, the essence of the Financial Supervisory Service’s joint examination conducted on the basis of the strict application of asset soundness classification standards to PF loans. The Defendants explained to the Defendants on June 28, 2010 through “data reply to the questionnaire questions” (Evidence No. 46).

(6) Furthermore, the BISD ratio stated in the business normalization implementation plan in 2009 was calculated retroactively by the Financial Supervisory Service on March 2010 as of the end of the year 2009 by applying the revised standards for setting up allowance for bad debts that were considered in calculating BISD ratio as of the end of March 2010. Therefore, it cannot be deemed that the Defendants knew of such fact.

7) Although the Defendants had already indicated in the instant additional data as of June 2010, the connection BISD ratio prior to the application of the standards for the change of Busan Savings Bank was 8.86%, and the connection BISD ratio was 1.02% after the application of the standards for the change. The Plaintiffs also knew that the BISD ratio may differ from the contents previously published by the Busan Savings Bank according to the strengthening of asset soundness classification standards. In such a situation, it is difficult to view that the Defendants, as of June 2, 201, stated the Plaintiffs as they were the connection BISD ratio as they had already been previously published by the Busan Savings Bank.

(8) The contents of the recommendation for postponement of eight or eight clubs are likely to lower the BISD ratio to the capital increase with 150 billion won for the Busan Savings Bank as of June 2010, and in such a case, it is a recommendation to the supervisory authority to the effect that the BISD ratio would be suspended on a temporary basis as of June 8, 2010. In addition, it is different from the investment explanation data, and there is no specific prediction that the BISD ratio would be lower to any of the causes, or there is no objective material to support it. Ultimately, insofar as it cannot be determined that the Defendants knew or could have known that the BISD ratio of the Busan Savings Bank was less than 8% as of June 2010, the connection ratio was less than 8%, and the content was not included in the additional materials, and it cannot be deemed that there was no intentional omission in the description.

6) The overall motive or intent

In light of the following circumstances, it is difficult to readily conclude that the Defendants conspired with the management of the Busan Savings Bank in collusion with the management of the Busan Savings Bank to state, explain, or intentionally conceal a material fact, or that there was a motive to conduct fraudulent unfair trading or deception, or that the Defendants could have discovered that it was false by reporting detailed data and values on the management status provided by the management status of the Busan Savings Bank, and there is no other evidence to prove otherwise.

A) On June 30, 2010, the total consignment amount of Defendant KTB asset management was 10,715 billion won. The Busan Savings Bank’s consignment amounted to 1.56 billion won. The proportion of the consignment amounted to 6.44% even if both Busan Savings Bank and affiliated Savings Bank’s consignment amounted to 6.5 billion won. On the other hand, the Plaintiff’s consignment amounted to 140.9 billion won, which was 12 billion won, was 1.32%, and the consignment amounted to 16.49%. Meanwhile, from around 2007 to around 2010, the Plaintiff Foundation was 1.9 billion won in operating the Plaintiff’s assets amounted to 16.5 billion won in operating the Plaintiff’s Foundation, and around 201.5 billion won in operating the Plaintiff’s assets amount to 1.49% in total.

In light of the aforementioned circumstances, even if it is recognized that there is a certain degree of economic interest between Defendant KTB Asset Management and Busan Savings Bank, in order to prevent the Plaintiff from withdrawing from the market, it cannot be concluded that the Defendants intentionally presented false data and presented false information to the Plaintiffs and presented different contents to the Fund.

B) Nonparty 6 and Nonparty 7, an executive officer of the Busan Savings Bank, did not inform Defendant 2 of the fact of window dressing accounting in a criminal case, and the fact of window dressing accounting was revealed through the prosecutor’s investigation on February 201 after the Busan Savings Bank was ordered to suspend its business, and before that time, it was not revealed at the time of the prosecutor of the Financial Supervisory Service. Thus, even if Defendant KTB asset management was inspected at the time of issuing capital increase, it stated to the effect that it was “the fact of window dressing accounting of the Busan Savings Bank was not known,” and there was no objective evidence to deem that Defendant 2 knew of the fact that objective data, such as the published data or estimated financial statements of the Busan Savings Bank at the time of promoting the investment in this case.

C) Although Defendant 2 had prepared the instant investment intent in advance to the Busan Savings Bank before proposing the Fund, the said investment intent is stated in the letter as follows: “KB asset management will have the intent to make an investment within the maximum of KRW 100 billion with respect to the conversion priority share that is to be issued by Busan Mutual Savings Bank, as follows: Provided, That this intent is not an investment commitment, and the final investment decision is confirmed in accordance with our internal decision-making process.” However, even according to the above description, Defendant KTB asset management is not an investment commitment to the conversion priority share that is to be issued by the Busan Savings Bank, and it is not an investment commitment to make an investment.

D) In preparing documents, such as the instant product proposal, with respect to the sales of the Fund, Defendant 2, Nonparty 1, and Nonparty 5 basically considered the financial statements, etc. of the Busan Savings Bank published in the electronic disclosure system of the Financial Supervisory Service as primary data. In the process of exchanging e-mails with the Busan Savings Bank for data preparation several times, Defendant 2, Nonparty 1, and Nonparty 5 pointed out and revised errors such as the result of calculation of the Busan Savings Bank or the point of time of calculation of BISD ratio, etc. In fact, the Busan Savings Bank’s connection BISD ratio, the amount of allowances for bad debts to be accumulated, etc. were not different from

E) In the first instance, Defendant KTB’s inspection on the Busan Savings Bank was conducted on the part of the Busan Savings Bank’s assets management, but it was received from Nonparty 7, the auditor of the Busan Savings Bank, “I would substitute the actual inspection as a result of the inspection of the Financial Supervisory Service, because the inspection of the Financial Supervisory Service was conducted on the current Busan Savings Bank,” and it is difficult to deem that the financial investment business entity should undergo a regular inspection on the invested company in selling the investment products. Moreover, it is difficult to view that the financial investment business entity’s sales of the investment products is under the special inspection of the Financial Supervisory Service, etc. at the time of the Busan Savings Bank as a result of the inspection’s actual inspection at the request of the Board of Audit

C. Sub-committee

Ultimately, it is difficult to view that the Defendants conducted unfair trading or deception against the Plaintiffs even though they knew of the financial situation of the Busan Savings Bank at the time of soliciting the instant investment, and it is difficult to view that they conducted unfair trading or deception. Accordingly, this part of the Plaintiffs’ claim for damages

3. Whether the Defendants are liable for damages due to the Defendants’ breach of their duty to protect investors at the fund management stage

A. Summary of the plaintiffs' assertion

1) Violation of the regulations on prevention of conflicts of interest

No financial investment business entity shall, without a justifiable reason, make profits of investors or make a third party gain profits from its financial investment business without a justifiable ground (Article 37(2) of the Capital Markets Act). A financial investment business entity shall inform the investor concerned of the occurrence of conflicts of interest (Article 44(2) of the Capital Markets Act). If it is deemed that there is a possibility of conflicts of interest (Article 44(2) of the Capital Markets Act), and shall not trade or make any other transaction if it is deemed difficult to lower the possibility of conflicts of interest (Article 44(

However, the fact that the Busan Savings Bank is expected to accept an amount equivalent to KRW 40.4 billion after the investment of this case is in conflict of interest between the plaintiffs and the defendants, but Defendant 2 was actively concealed without notifying the plaintiffs at all. Thus, the defendants are liable to compensate for the violation of the duty to prevent conflicts of interest under the Capital Markets Act.

2) Violation of the duty to protect investors in the course of managing collective investment property

A collective investment business entity owes the fiduciary duty of due care to investors in managing the collective investment property (Article 79(1) of the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act). A collective investment business entity owes the fiduciary duty of due care to protect investors’ interests (Article 79(2) of the Financial Investment Services and

However, as Defendant 2 neglected to pay attention to a good manager in the course of managing collective investment property by failing to take any measures to secure bonds for the plaintiffs in the situation where Asian trust participating in capital increase with stocks issued by Busan Savings Bank collects investment funds, Defendant 2 is liable for compensating for the plaintiffs' damages.

B. Determination

1) Violation of the regulations on prevention of conflicts of interest

As seen earlier, it cannot be readily concluded that the circumstances asserted that the Plaintiffs are conflicts of interest under the Capital Markets Act are conflicts of interest. Thus, it cannot be concluded that the Busan Savings Bank did not notify the Plaintiff that it would take over an amount equivalent to KRW 40.4 billion in the interests of Daejeon Savings Bank after the instant investment, on the same ground that it cannot be viewed as fraudulent unfair trading or deception. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Defendants violated the duty to prevent conflicts of interest under

2) Violation of the duty to protect investors in the course of managing collective investment property

In light of the following circumstances acknowledged by the purport of the entire arguments and evidence, it is difficult to acknowledge that the Defendants violated the duty to protect investors in the course of managing collective investment property solely based on the circumstance or evidence presented by the Plaintiff, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge it.

A) The Plaintiffs asserted that the Plaintiff should have taken active measures such as exercising put options in the event that Asian trust collects investment money. However, it cannot be readily concluded that the Defendants should have taken measures to actively recover the investment money, recognizing that the financial soundness of the Busan Savings Bank was deepened and that the Asian trust sold stocks.

B) Although the investment of the fund of this case basically contributed to the accumulation of allowance for bad debts, it does not have to keep the amount invested by the Busan Savings Bank in a certain account as the bad debts allowance, but it is basically a strategic determination issue of the Busan Savings Bank. Thus, it is difficult to view the use of the investment fund of this case as the acquisition price of stocks and the increase price of capital by the Daejeon Savings Bank.

C) On November 22, 2010, the Plaintiffs were deemed to have participated in the issue of new shares issued by the Busan Savings Bank (25.8 billion won, Busan Savings Bank 68.3 billion won) on November 22, 2010, but there was no evidence that they raised an objection thereto (No. 42-1 of the evidence No. 42).

D) After the instant investment, the Defendants informed the Plaintiffs of the management status, etc. of the instant fund from time to time. On December 201, 2010, it was anticipated that the connection BS ratio of the Busan Savings Bank would be less than 7%, and on February 15, 2011, the Defendants notified Nonparty 8 of the exercise of the right to purchase shares and the right to pledge in accordance with the shareholder agreement.

E) On March 2011, the Defendants entered into a financial advisory service contract with Anjin Accounting Firm and concluded a financial advisory service contract and continued to sell the shares of the Busan Savings Bank and the shares subject to the claim for joint sale.

C. Sub-committee

Therefore, this part of the plaintiffs' claim for damages cannot be accepted under the premise that the defendants violated the rules to prevent conflicts of interest or violated the duty to protect investors in the course of managing collective investment property

4. Whether the defendants are liable for damages due to the defendants' breach of duty of explanation or unfair solicitation

A. Summary of the assertion

1) The plaintiffs

Defendant 2 not only did he sufficiently explain the risk, etc. of investment in the solicitation of the instant investment, such as “goods that produce 12% profit without risk,” but also did an act of providing a conclusive judgment on an uncertain matter or informing information that is likely to mislead an uncertain matter to be believed to be certain, and thus, Defendant 2 is liable to compensate the Plaintiffs for damages therefrom.

2) The Defendants

Defendant 2 did not have itself made the statement that the Plaintiffs asserted, or even if such statement was made, it was made before or after the decision-making on investment with respect to specific investment goods was made. Since the Plaintiffs’ Fund Management Members or Fund Management Advisory Members decided the instant investment without any influence on Defendant 2’s speech, it cannot be deemed that the Plaintiffs interfered with the formation of risk awareness in determining the instant investment.

B. Legal principles

Article 47(1) of the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act provides that “a financial investment business entity shall, when soliciting an ordinary investor to make an investment, explain to the ordinary investor the contents of the financial investment instrument, the risks associated with the investment, and other matters prescribed by Presidential Decree so that the ordinary investor can understand them.” Article 47(3) of the said Act provides that “a financial investment business entity shall not explain, or omit an important matter in a false or distorted manner (referring to an act of providing or misleading a conclusive judgment on an uncertain matter or informing that it is likely to mislead any person to believe that an uncertain matter is certain)” and Article 49 Subparag. 2 of the said Act provides that “a financial investment business entity shall not provide a conclusive judgment on an uncertain matter or inform any person that is likely to mislead another person to believe that an uncertain matter is certain” in making an investment solicitation.

Therefore, when a financial investment business entity solicits a customer to make an investment, it has a duty to protect the customer by clearly explaining the characteristics and major contents of the product, including the risks associated with the investment, so that the customer may make a reasonable investment decision based on the information. When the customer suffers loss as a result of the violation of such duty of care, tort liability is established. In this case, the degree of explanation to the customer should be determined by comprehensively taking into account the characteristics of the product in question, the level of risk, the customer’s investment experience and ability, etc. In order to establish tort, the solicitation is a case where the investor interferes with the investor’s right awareness of the risks inevitably accompanying the transaction or actively recommends the transaction that entails excessive risks in light of the customer’s investment situation, and ultimately, it can be evaluated as an act of violation of the duty of protecting the customer. Furthermore, such duty of explanation or prohibition of unfair solicitation as well as the duty of protecting the investor is not excluded as an ordinary investor, but can be mitigated to the extent of its duty).

(c) Fact of recognition;

The following facts are not disputed between the parties, or may be acknowledged by comprehensively taking into account the respective descriptions of Gap evidence Nos. 1, 2, 8, 27, and 74 and the whole purport of the arguments.

1) Soliciting the Plaintiff’s school

A) On April 28, 2010, Defendant 2 said that at the first meeting of the Fund Management Advisory Committee for the Plaintiff’s School, Defendant 2 could connect “goods that offer 12% profits without any risk” to “goods that present 12% profits.”

B) On May 27, 2010, Defendant 2 recommended the head of the Plaintiff’s school Nonparty 9 to make an investment in the preferred share issued by the Busan Savings Bank to Nonparty 9, and said, “If there is a risk of investment being made in a preemptive level, it would make such proposal to the Scholarship Foundation, and at all, safe investment without any problem.”

2) Recommendation for the Plaintiff Foundation

A) On April 7, 2010, at the second meeting of the Fund Management Committee (hereinafter “the second meeting of the Fund Management Committee”) of the Plaintiff Foundation in 2010 on April 7, 2010, Defendant 2: (a) “It is necessary for the Government to set up a reserve excessively; (b) at this time, it is necessary to issue those items such as the priority for repayment conversion, and make a full put-off white, so that it may receive 12-13% of the total put-off amount. It is unreasonable for the other party to receive. It is because it is necessary for the other party to do so, and is so, .... whether it is necessary for us to do so, and ... whether it is necessary for us to do so, and ... whether it is necessary for us to make an investment of 50 billion won per three years, but it is necessary to do so, and now it is difficult to do so.”

B) On June 17, 2010, Defendant 2 made the following remarks at the third fund management committee meeting of Plaintiff Foundation in 2010 (hereinafter “third fund management committee meeting”) around 07:30.

① As to the need for capital increase and investment risk of the Busan Savings Bank, I do not go again to the market once more than six months. It stated that “12% of the total amount of the 12% demand reserve was explicitly demanded by the Supervisory Board to appropriate the strict standard for its capital increase, and it is now reported to the Busan Savings Bank that ..... ... is the largest c.m., the need for capital expansion from the position of the Busan Savings Bank.”

② With respect to the demand for accumulation of the allowance for bad debts to Busan Savings Bank and its amount, the Financial Supervisory Service stated that “The demand for the allowance of KRW 234.2 billion itself was ..... even if the normal operation of the ....... is shaking, it was calculated as follows: (a) the amount of the allowance for bad debts was calculated as much as possible; (b) the amount of the allowance for bad debts to the Busan Savings Bank; and (c) the amount of the allowance for bad debts was calculated as much as possible; and (d) the amount of the allowance for bad debts would be calculated as much as possible; and (d) the same shall apply to the case data.”

③ As to the position of the Governor of the Financial Supervisory Service on the announcement and capital increase with the result of the inspection of the Busan Savings Bank, “I would know why the supervisor’s actual inspection was conducted, for three months or more, and if I would apply the criteria for requesting allowances to all savings banks to Busan Savings Bank, I would like to close the Korea Savings Bank; . I would like to come up with the head of the supervisory office and the director general in charge of the Financial Supervisory Service, and . I would like to see that I would come up until the Busan Savings Bank increases its capital. If I would like to see that I would come up with the head of the supervisory office and the director general in charge of the Financial Supervisory Service. I would like to see that I would easily speak that I would like to see what I would not issue. I would like to see. I would like to make an investment by our Foundation in an exemplary case at the supervisory authority.”

④ With respect to the management and financial status of the Busan Savings Bank, the fact that “this fact is nothing more than 100 billion won,” and the Busan Savings Bank basically does not need to do so, and it is very important to see how it will be the Busan Savings Bank, i.e., e., how 100 billion won has come and 100 billion won, or how she will come into the Busan Savings Bank, and breathly. Dobbbly, Dobbbly, whether the company will make more inputs, and is not whether the amount should be more invested in this company. .. Dobly, if our proposal was submitted as soon as our 10 billion won has been presented, it would be so far as our 10 billion won has been put into the Busan Savings Bank, i.e., to the effect that the Busan Savings Bank will live in the Republic of Korea, i. e., to the effect that the Busan Savings Bank will be an excellent savings.

⑤ With respect to the possibility of loss of investment, “B, for example, if you are ...., 12% of the total amount to be recovered in the market even if we receive 12% of the total amount to be recovered, . Ha we look at the land, hyp, match, 51% of the total amount to be recovered. . 10 foot Savings Bank is holding 51% of the total amount to be recovered? If we do so, us cannot recover 100 foot Savings Bank? If you do so, ? ... 20 billion won per week of the withdrawal?”

D. Establishment of the defendants' liability for damages

1) Breach of duty to explain the defendants' investment risk factors, etc.

A) According to the above facts and the aforementioned evidence and the purport of the entire pleadings, Defendant 2: (a) at the time of speaking in the above paragraph (c) above; (b) at the time of proposing investment in the Fund, the Busan Savings Bank must acquire the shares of Daejeon Savings Bank in KRW 40.4 billion from Han field, etc. around 4 months after capital increase; (c) at the time of the Busan Savings Bank suffered shares in the Busan Savings Bank; (d) at the Busan Savings Bank held the Busan Savings Bank; (e) at the rate of 60% of the shares in the Busan Savings Bank’s business; (c) the Busan Savings Bank’s success in the business; (d) the Busan Savings Bank’s financing and the collection of its loans or investment funds is higher than those of other Savings Banks; and (e) at the time of proposing investment in the Fund, it is recognized that the Busan Savings Bank did not have any significant risk of acquiring shares in the Investment Savings Bank, as it did not provide an explanation of the investment risk of acquiring shares in the Investment Savings Bank; and (e) the Busan Savings Bank did not provide an investment Savings.

B) Also, as seen earlier, the number of the connection BS rates on the instant supplementary data was calculated on the premise that the Plaintiff was aware of the financial advisory fee of KRW 140 billion as profit. The Defendants did not state that “the amount of connection BS rates was calculated on the premise that the Plaintiff was aware of the financial advisory fee of KRW 140 billion as profit” in preparing the instant supplementary data. Such financial advisory fees are matters that can be considered as risk factors in the event that the Plaintiff provided the content to investors, which is large in size and Busan Savings Bank had human resources capable of providing such advisory services, and whether such revenue recognition is possible continuously.

C) Next, according to the aforementioned evidence, in the draft of the instant additional data, the amount of the bad debts fund to be additionally established in accordance with the new standard of the Financial Supervisory Service was stated as KRW 326.2 billion by linking Busan Savings Bank and Busan District2 Savings Bank. However, it is also acknowledged that the instant additional data stated to the effect that there was no other issue except the bad debts fund of KRW 234.2 billion, as a result of the inspection by the Financial Supervisory Service.

D) Ultimately, the Defendants emphasizes only the certainty of 12% annual revenues without properly explaining the information on the investment risk, such as the possibility of loss of the instant investment. This should be deemed to have failed to provide the Plaintiffs with the necessary information or failed to provide the necessary explanation at the stage of soliciting investment. They should be deemed to have not provided the Plaintiffs with the necessary information on the risk factors, etc. of priority investment issued by the Busan Savings Bank at the stage of soliciting investment. They should be deemed to have not provided the Plaintiffs with the necessary information or failed to provide the necessary explanation. They should not be deemed to have provided any information required by the Defendants, 4, 5, 13, 34, 39, 42, 45, 46, 48, 53, 62, 62, 73, 1, 11, 2, 2, 222, 25, 28, 32, 33, 46, 114, and 117.

[In full view of all of the above evidence, it cannot be deemed that the Plaintiffs already knew of the pertinent information as alleged by the Defendants, and that the Defendants provided sufficient information. Meanwhile, insofar as the obligation to act is objectively acknowledged, even if the obligor did not recognize the existence of the obligation, it does not affect the establishment of the tort, and the same applies to the case where a tort is established due to a breach of the duty of disclosure. Thus, even if the Defendants did not recognize the existence of the obligation of disclosure due to negligence or mistake, illegality cannot be denied (see Supreme Court Decision 2010Da8709, Apr. 26, 2012).

2) Unfair solicitation by the Defendants

A) In light of the following circumstances acknowledged by the aforementioned evidence, Defendant 2 shall be deemed to have recommended the Defendants to invest in the Fund from April 7, 2010 to June 17, 2010 through the statement of the above paragraph (c) above. The above statement cannot be deemed to have not been recommended to invest in specific investment goods, nor to have been made after the Plaintiffs made a decision on investment (it shall be deemed that Defendant 2 still had been at the stage of soliciting the Plaintiff Foundation to invest in the Fund at the third fund management committee meeting) on the sole basis of the circumstance alleged by the Defendants, the evidence Nos. 7 and 139, etc.

① Around March 30, 2010, Defendant 2 had already prepared and delivered a letter of intent to make an investment in the instant case on the side of the Busan Savings Bank, stating that “The intent to make an investment within the limit of KRW 100 billion is to be issued by the Busan Savings Bank.”

② From March 30, 2010 to the meeting of the Second Fund Management Committee of Plaintiff Foundation and the first meeting of the Fund Management Advisory Committee of Plaintiff’s school from March 30, 2010, Defendant KTB continued to perform the work of amending the Articles of Incorporation and the review of estimated financial statements of Busan Savings Bank as well as Busan Savings Bank.

③ On May 7, 2010, the Defendants explained to the Plaintiff that the Plaintiff was the Busan Savings Bank. On May 10, 2010, around May 10, 2010, the Plaintiff sent an investment premium containing the specific contents of the Fund. On May 10, 2010, at the meeting of the Second Fund Management Sub-Committee of the Plaintiff Foundation, the Defendants presented the said investment premium and explained the Plaintiff’s investment in the Fund to Busan Savings Bank. The said investment premium included 12% per annum on the investment premium.

④ Around May 27, 2010 and June 17, 2010, Defendant 2 explained the instant fund to each Plaintiff’s school and the Plaintiff’s Foundation.

⑤ Around June 17, 2010, Defendant 2’s statement made by the Third Fund Management Committee was presented to the Fund Management Committee that “In addition to the investment of KRW 50 billion in each of the 50 billion capitals by the Samsung Scholarship Foundation and the Posium, it is necessary to require an increase of KRW 50 billion by major shareholders, etc., and, if so, it is only necessary to invest.” As such, Defendant 2’s statement to the major shareholder of the Busan Savings Bank, etc. is presented.

④ It is clear that the Plaintiff Foundation’s intent to make a quasi-investment that was issued to Defendant 2 at the meeting of the third fund management committee was the condition that the major shareholder of the Busan Savings Bank, etc. would increase the amount of KRW 50 billion. Moreover, the Seodaemun-gu itself would have an intention to participate in the investment of KRW 50 billion in the event that the major shareholder of the Busan Savings Bank increases the amount of KRW 50 billion first, and it does not finally determine an investment.

7) Even after the meeting of the third fund management committee, the Plaintiff Foundation asked the Defendants of various questions related to the instant fund investment case of Busan Savings Bank, such as the status of PF loans, etc., and Defendant KTB asset management conducted the act of preparing and sending relevant data to Samsung Scholarship Scholarship Foundation.

① In accordance with the structure of the instant fund, a contract was concluded in a fixed manner between Defendant KTB asset management and trust companies, etc., and the Plaintiff Foundation paid KRW 50 billion to the Plaintiff Foundation, following the lapse of 12 days from June 17, 2010, when the third fund management committee was held.

9. In the event that an unexpected situation occurs between June 29, 2010 and June 29, 2010, the Plaintiffs appears to have been able to withdraw their intent to make an investment at any time, and there is no circumstance that may hinder the Plaintiffs from making an investment.

B) Whether an act constitutes “providing a conclusive judgment on an uncertain matter” and “an act of informing the contents likely to mislead the Plaintiffs to believe that it was certain to be certain” should be normatively determined on the basis of an average investor with ordinary care. As acknowledged earlier, Defendant 2 solicited the Plaintiffs to invest in the Fund in Busan Savings Bank, with regard to uncertain matters, such as the degree of risk of investment in Busan Savings Bank, the amount of allowances for bad debts, the position of the Financial Supervisory Service, 10 billion won, and the financial situation of Busan Savings Bank after capital increase with consideration to KRW 10 billion, etc., the following: (a) using a conclusive expression, such as “influence without any problem”; (b) ; (c) ; (d) ; (d) ; (d) ; (e) ; (e) ; (e) ; (e) ; and (e) ; (e) ; and (e) ; (e) ; and (e) ; and (e) ; and (e) ; and (e) ; (e) ; (e) ; (e) ; (f) ; (f) ; (f) ; (f) ; and (f) ;

C) Although Defendant 2 did not publish the results of the inspection of the Busan Savings Bank and the affiliated savings bank by the Financial Supervisory Service, it is acknowledged that Defendant 2 made a statement that “If ..... was to come to the position of the supervisory director and the director in charge of the Financial Supervisory Service, the head of the supervisory authority would come to go to the position of the supervisory authority.” Although Defendant 2 did not reach the point of falsely explaining the situation of the joint inspection of the Busan Savings Bank and affiliated savings bank and the position of the Financial Supervisory Service, it is evident that the statement constitutes an act of providing a conclusive judgment on uncertain matters or informing information that is likely to mislead Defendant 2 to believe that it is certain (it cannot be seen as different even if Defendant 2 used the ordinary decent horse with the intention of Defendant 2).

D) Although the plaintiffs' fund management members or fund management advisory members are experts groups that can well understand the product structure and inherent risks of the fund of this case, and the plaintiffs' investment inclinations or investment experience are enough to accept the risk of the fund of this case, considering the following: ① the plaintiffs' fund management members or fund management advisory members and defendant 2's pro rata relationship, ② the career in the financial investment business, ③ the plaintiffs' funds prior to the investment of this case, ③ the management of the fund of this case, and ④ the basic structure of the investment of this case was partially changed by reflecting the opinions of other fund management members or fund management advisory members; ④ the basic structure of the investment of this case is consistent with the proposals made by defendant 2, even though the plaintiffs decided to make the investment of this case exclusively by the behavior of defendant 2's exaggeration, it should be deemed that at least the plaintiffs' decision to make the investment of this case affected the conclusive and conviction expressions of defendant 2.

3) Existence, etc. of causation

A) As seen earlier, the Defendants did not provide the Plaintiffs with the necessary information on the risk factors of preferential investment issued by the Busan Savings Bank at the stage of soliciting their investments, and informed the Plaintiffs of the contents that could provide a conclusive judgment on uncertain matters or be mistaken for certain matters. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs did not receive sufficient information, as well as the fact that they decided to invest the Fund in this case was interfered with the formation of a proper understanding on the risk of investment in this case. It is sufficiently recognized that the Defendants failed to provide sufficient information, and that they did not request the Defendants to provide information on the investment in this case under the circumstances required by the Defendants, or their assertion or presentation, or that they failed to provide information on the investment in this case, and they did not request the Financial Supervisory Service to provide information on the investment in this case or to provide information on the investment risk to the Plaintiffs, and they did not appear to have provided the Defendants with the aforementioned explanation or explanation of their respective investment risk management members or to prevent the Defendants from violating their respective investment risk, even if they did not appear to have provided any information or explanation of their respective investment risk.

B) Meanwhile, the Defendants asserted that the Plaintiff is a person corresponding to a professional investor under the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act, and thus it is difficult to view that the Plaintiff is subject to the duty to explain, etc. under the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act, which is applied at the time of soliciting investment to ordinary investors. However, at the time of the instant investment, the Plaintiffs were not registered as a professional investor under Article 9 of the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act and Article 10 of the Enforcement Decree of the Enforcement Decree of the said Act (which appears to have been designated as a professional investor only as of January 9, 2014). As seen earlier, even if the Plaintiff is a professional investor, it cannot be seen as subject to the duty to explain, etc. under the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act.

C) In addition, the Defendants asserts to the effect that the damages incurred to the Plaintiffs due to the instant investment are not due to the Defendants’ breach of duty to explain, but due to the Plaintiff’s gross account and defective loan by Busan Savings Bank, which was not clarified by the financial authorities, and the ethical business suspension order by the Financial Supervisory Service, and the matters arising from the breach of duty to explain, etc. are irrelevant to the bankruptcy of the Busan Savings Bank, and thus, there is no causation with the Plaintiffs’ damages

However, the Plaintiffs’ damages were affected by the Defendants’ breach of duty to explain and unfair solicitation, and the remaining value was incurred by the Plaintiffs’ investment in the instant beneficiary certificates. As such, the Defendants’ breach of duty to explain and the Plaintiffs’ losses cannot be deemed to have no causation between the Plaintiff’s losses. However, the Defendants were not aware of the accurate window dressing accounting of Busan Savings Bank at the time of soliciting investment, and the circumstances that the Defendants did not anticipate the business suspension order before the Financial Supervisory Service can only be considered as the circumstances that limit their liability.

D) The Defendants listed a large number of Supreme Court rulings on breach of explanation duty, etc., and argued about the establishment of this part of the liability for damages against the Defendants. However, as seen earlier, in this case, Defendant 2 directly recommended the investment of the Fund based on trust relationship with the representative director of Defendant KTB asset management and the Plaintiffs’ Fund Management Officer or Fund Management Advisory Commissioner, which are based on trust relationship with other members. ② The instant investment was an important factor in investment judgment: (i) the financial situation of the Busan Savings Bank; (ii) the business status and prospects; (iii) the management ability of the Busan Savings Bank; and (iii) the Plaintiffs did not have any direct access to such investment information; and (iii) the Defendants maintained close relationship with the Busan Savings Bank for a long time; (iv) the Defendants maintained a close relationship with the Busan Savings Bank; (iv) even if there was no prior knowledge of the large-scale accounting of the Busan Savings Bank itself, it cannot be denied that they were in a favorable position to understand the important investment information; and therefore, the aforementioned assertion cannot be accepted.

4) Sub-committee

Therefore, the defendants are liable for compensating the plaintiffs for damages caused by their breach of duty of explanation and unfair solicitation, and the defendants' arguments disputing this cannot be accepted.

5. Scope of damages.

A. Relevant legal principles

Property damage caused by a tort is a difference between the property disadvantage incurred therefrom, i.e., the property condition that would have existed without a tort and the current property status. It includes active damages that would have lost existing interests and passive damages that could not obtain profit from the future. Whether such damage actually occurred should be determined reasonably in light of ordinary social norms (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 91Da33070, Jun. 23, 1992; Supreme Court Decision 2010Da76368, Jul. 28, 2011). Meanwhile, the amount of damage sustained by an investor due to an unfair solicitation by an asset management company under the Indirect Investment Act is an amount calculated by subtracting the total amount of money recovered or recoverable from the investment principal based on the beneficiary certificates acquired from such investment (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2012Da29649, Jan. 24, 2013).

B. The plaintiffs' damages

1) On June 29, 2010, the fact that the plaintiffs invested KRW 50 billion each in the Fund of this case is as seen earlier, and the fact that the plaintiffs are unable to recover all of the investment principal invested in the Fund of this case is no dispute between the parties.

2) Furthermore, in light of the following circumstances acknowledged by the evidence and the purport of the entire pleadings as seen earlier, it is reasonable to view the value of the converted preferential stock, which is the underlying asset of the instant fund, as zero won, and the remaining value of the beneficiary certificates of the instant fund as zero won. Ultimately, the Plaintiffs’ damages are equivalent to the investment principal, and such damages are deemed as having already been objectively determined as of June 29, 2010 in view of the financial status of the Busan Savings Bank.

A) The instant investment was made in the structure that the Korea Securities Finance Co., Ltd., a trustee company, takes over the conversion priority shares of the issuance of the Busan Savings Bank and received at least 12.1% per annum from the Busan Savings Bank based on the issue price of 56,500 won per share during the period of holding priority shares. The Korea Securities Finance was made in the structure that the Plaintiff, the beneficiary, pays the said dividend or the purchase price at the time of the sale of shares

B) As seen earlier, as of the end of December 2010 of the Financial Supervisory Service’s actual inspection of assets and liabilities, the Busan Savings Bank, Busan Savings Bank, Central Savings Bank, Daejeon Savings Bank, Daejeon Savings Bank, and Jeonju Savings Bank are both in capital erosion. As of the end of December 2010, the BISD ratio was -50.29%, -43.35%, -43.35%, -28.48%, -25.29%, -1.56%.

3) As to this, the Defendants asserted that the amount of damages suffered by the Plaintiffs, the trustee company of the instant fund, is not yet determined, since the Korea Securities Finance, which is the trustee company of the instant fund, was distributed from the bankruptcy procedure to the Busan Savings Bank, can be transferred to trust property and can be transferred from the beneficiary certificates again.

However, as seen earlier, the remaining value of the beneficiary certificate of this case is zero won at the time of the investment of this case. Even if Korea Securities Bank received a distribution of damages claim against the bankrupt Busan Savings Bank in the bankruptcy procedure and there is a possibility of compensating the plaintiffs for some damages later, such circumstance alone alone cannot be deemed to have remaining value of the beneficiary certificate of this case (it cannot be deemed that the beneficiary certificate of this case has been modified to the damage claim as it is), the above assertion cannot be accepted.

(Supreme Court Decision 2014Da826 Decided September 15, 2015, Supreme Court Decision 2012Da29649 Decided January 24, 2013, Supreme Court Decision 2011Da25695 Decided December 13, 2012, etc., which are required by the Defendant, are clear that all the remaining value of the beneficiary certificates remains, or that the remaining value is not actual and conclusive, and is distinguishable from this case and its factual relations).

C. Limitation on liability

In light of the aforementioned evidence and the purport of the entire pleadings, it is reasonable to limit the amount of damages to be paid by the Defendants to 40% of the damages suffered by the Plaintiffs under the principle of fairness.

1) The fund of this case is invested in convertible priority shares issued by the Busan Savings Bank, and if the Busan Savings Bank liquidates the bankruptcy due to the financial failure of the Bank, it is placed in the order higher than the creditor, and there was a high investment risk that inevitably exists in the light of pursuing a high profit of 12% per annum.

2) The Plaintiffs’ Fund Management Members or Fund Management Advisory Members decided to make the instant investment constituted experts with considerable expertise in the field of financial investment, and the actual Plaintiffs’ Fund Management Members or Fund Management Advisory Members have been partially changed by reflecting their opinions.

3) The occurrence of the loss of the Fund is fundamentally attributable to the window dressing accounting of the Busan Savings Bank. This is not revealed in the assessment of asset soundness between March 2010 and June 2, 201, and it is difficult to readily find out the fact of window dressing accounting of the Busan Savings Bank even if the Defendants, prior to the determination of the investment of this case, failed to conduct the actual inspection of the Busan Savings Bank.

4) The phrase “major investment risk” in the product proposal of this case prepared by the Defendants includes risks of deterioration of business environment, minimum dividend unpaid risks, and Exit Risk. The Plaintiffs’ Fund Management Members or Fund Management Advisory Members are also aware of the possibility of principal loss of the Fund, which is high-profit goods.

5) The instant fund is a so-called “private equity fund” formed according to individual contracts between a trustor and an investor, and requires more strict principle of self-responsibility to the Plaintiffs compared to the public offering fund (public offering fund).

6) Even if the Plaintiffs were not registered as a professional investor under the Capital Markets Act at the time of the instant investment, the Plaintiffs met the investment scale requirement to ensure that the balance of the financial investment instruments would be treated as a professional investor more than 10 billion won and at least 7). Moreover, the Plaintiffs were engaged in a similar business with a financial institution that raises profits from the management of deposited funds, and had extensive investment and transaction experience.

7) Indirect investment goods, such as the instant fund, are separate from the assets of the asset management company’s inherent property, to vest the profits and losses incurred from the management of the trust property in the beneficial interest holder. In such a case, the asset management company is merely to acquire the management remuneration.

8) While Defendant 2 worked as a management member of the Fund or a fund management advisory member of the Plaintiffs, Defendant 2 recommended a large number of investments, and the Plaintiffs accepted this and received a reasonable investment benefit (see, e.g., evidence 40, evidence 21, and evidence 131).

D. Determination as to the Defendants’ assertion of mutual aid

1) The Defendants asserts that even if liability for damages against the Plaintiffs is recognized, the remaining value of the beneficiary certificates of this case from the investment principal, namely, the amount of damages of the Plaintiffs should be deducted from the amount calculated by deducting KRW 28,009,817,935, which shall be distributed to the Plaintiffs according to the dividend forecast rate of 28.01% from July 14, 2015, prepared by the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation of Busan Savings Bank (Evidence No. 142).

2) However, such assertion by the Defendants is difficult to accept for the following reasons.

A) Only the circumstance alleged by the Defendants or the evidence submitted by the Defendants, including the evidence No. 142, cannot be deemed as having actually received or confirmed the distribution of KRW 28,009,817,935 in the present situation.

B) Next, as seen earlier, inasmuch as the value of underlying assets of the Fund is not less than zero (0) as the value of the instant beneficiary certificates is also zero (0) won, thereby the Plaintiffs’ damages are determined. It does not change solely on the ground that the Korea Securities Finance, a trustee company of the Fund, can incorporate the damages therefrom into the trust property by exercising the damages claim against the Busan Savings Bank, etc. against the Bankrupt Savings Bank, etc. It does not change solely on the ground that the perpetrator, who lost his/her property right due to the tortfeasor’s tort, can be compensated for damages by exercising the rights under a contract or the damages claim against any third party other than the perpetrator. This is not different from the fact that the perpetrator, who lost his/her property right, can be compensated for damages by exercising the rights under a contract or the damages claim against the perpetrator (see Supreme Court Decision 2006Da47677, Mar

C) The Plaintiffs, the beneficiary certificates holders of the instant fund, suffered losses from the loss of the investment money due to the Defendants’ breach of the duty to explain or unfair solicitation, and thus, can seek damages therefrom from the Defendants. However, the Plaintiff may seek damages from Busan Savings Bank’s financial statements, but may seek direct compensation against the officers and employees who performed window dressing accounting and the Busan Savings Bank, the employer, etc. (the Plaintiff). Furthermore, on the ground that the Plaintiff, as the trustee company of the instant fund, acquired the underlying assets of the instant fund, which was valuable due to window dressing accounting through the Korea Securities Finance, which bears the fiduciary duty against the Plaintiffs, by seeking compensation against the Busan Savings Bank, etc. for damages ultimately.

However, the ratio of liability of the bankrupt Busan Savings Bank, which intentionally performed the window dressing accounting, shall be more than 40% of the defendants' liability ratio recognized in this case and 68.01% of the total estimated dividend rate of 28.01% of the bankruptcy claims of the Busan Savings Bank claimed by the defendants. Thus, as alleged by the defendants, even if there is a possibility that the plaintiffs can receive additional 28.01% of the total amount of damages in the bankruptcy proceedings against the bankrupt Busan Savings Bank through the Korea Securities Bank, a trustee company of the Fund in this case, even if there is a possibility that the plaintiffs can receive additional 28.01% of the total amount of damages in the

[The Defendant’s damage compensation liability and the bankrupt Busan Savings Bank’s damage liability are independent liabilities arising from separate causes or liabilities with the same economic purpose. With respect to overlapping parts, if one of the obligations becomes extinct due to repayment, etc., the other party’s obligation is deemed to have a so-called quasi-joint and several liability extinguished. In a case where a part of the other debt is extinguished due to repayment, etc. when one of the other debt is in a relationship of quasi-joint and several liability with each other, the first extinguished part should be deemed not to be the part jointly and severally liable with the other debtor, but the part jointly and severally liable with the other debtor, in light of the intent of the quasi-joint and several liability system to ensure the payment of the entire amount of the obligation (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2009Da

E. Sub-committee

Therefore, the Defendants are jointly and severally liable for damages to each of the Plaintiffs, each of which is KRW 20 billion (=50 billion of the invested principal x 40%) and the Defendants are jointly and severally liable for the payment of damages calculated at each of the annual rates of 5% per annum under the Civil Act and 20% per annum under the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings from the next day to the date of full payment, from June 29, 2010, to the date of adjudication of the first instance court, which is the date of adjudication of the first instance court, to October 30, 2014.

As to this, the Defendants asserted to the effect that damages for delay after June 29, 2015, the due date for the payment of the instant fund, should be deemed to be July 14, 2015, where the amount to be distributed as a result of the bankruptcy proceedings against the bankrupt Busan Savings Bank, is determined. However, as seen earlier, the remaining value of the instant beneficiary certificates is zero won, and the amount of damages suffered by the Plaintiffs at that time shall be deemed to have been determined. Accordingly, the above assertion cannot be accepted.

(1) After the closure of the first instance trial, the Defendants filed a counterclaim to the same effect as Seoul Central District Court Decision 2014Gahap47615 (hereinafter “Seoul Central District Court Decision 2014Da47615), and asserted that the Plaintiffs are obligated to transfer beneficial rights to the Defendants in order to prevent double benefit resulting from the instant beneficiary certificates, and to request the Defendants to express their intent to transfer beneficial rights to the beneficiary certificate investor account book prepared and kept by Daewoo Securities Co., Ltd.., and the aforementioned counterclaim was withdrawn on May 14, 2015. Meanwhile, the Defendants filed the counterclaim to the effect that Seoul High Court Decision 2015Na12965 (Seoul High Court Decision 2015) was withdrawn on June 8, 2015. Meanwhile, even if the Defendants asserted that “The Plaintiff’s obligation to compensate for damages to the Plaintiff has concurrent performance relation with the Plaintiff’s obligation to transfer the beneficiary certificates of this case to the Defendants,” the Defendants’ assertion that the Plaintiffs’ remaining cause of the instant beneficiary certificates can not be seen as the Plaintiff’s double savings account.

6. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiffs' claims against the defendants shall be partially accepted within the scope of the above recognition, and the remaining claims shall be dismissed without merit. Since the judgment of the court of first instance is justified, all appeals filed by the plaintiffs and the defendants shall be dismissed without merit, and for the same reason, an application for return of provisional payment against the plaintiffs of the defendant KTB asset management shall be dismissed as well as an application for provisional payment is without merit (as of October 30, 2014 and November 5, 2014, the principal and interest to be paid to the plaintiffs as of October 30 and November 5, 2014, the above defendant's damages amount to be paid to the plaintiffs as of October 30, 2014, according to the judgment of the court of first instance of provisional execution (as of the judgment of the court of first instance, KRW 1,50,000,000,000,000 won paid to the plaintiffs on November 5, 2014).

Judges Kim Jong-soo (Presiding Judge)

Note 1) In accordance with the degree of soundness of a financial institution’s credit, if the credit is divided into five stages, namely, normal, necessary, fixed, recovered, and estimated loss, it means bad credit not exceeding fixed one.

Note 2) The Defendants asserted that their ratio “8.33%” is “8.33%, but this appears to be erroneous.

3) The Defendants responded to the question “The reasons why there is a big difference between the BISD ratio as of December 2009 and the BISD ratio as of March 2010”, “The Financial Supervisory Service demanded to set aside allowances in accordance with the strengthened standards through a gold audit and calculated BISD ratio by reflecting these requirements.” Even if the Defendants did not notify the results of re-calculated the BISD ratio as of June 2009 and the end of December 2009 according to the strengthened standards, it cannot be deemed as a false statement or an omission of important matters, and even if the Defendants notified the BISD ratio as of December 209 according to the strengthened standards, it does not seem to have affected the Plaintiffs’ decision on investment.

4) Meanwhile, as seen earlier, the Plaintiffs asserted to the effect that such acts by the Defendants constitute unfair trading or deception.

5) A dealer under the former Indirect Investment Asset Management Business Act (amended by Act No. 8635 of Aug. 3, 2007, repealed by Article 2 of the Addenda to the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act (amended by Act No. 8635 of Feb. 4, 2009; hereinafter “Indirect Investment Act”) bears the duty of care to protect investors so that investors can make reasonable investment decisions based on information by providing investors with correct information on the profit structure and risk factors of investment trust. In addition, at the investment solicitation stage, the seller’s duty to protect investors cannot be deemed excluded solely on the ground that the investor is not an ordinary investor. However, the extent of the investor’s duty to protect investors can be determined differently, taking into account the characteristics and risk level of investment trust assets, investor’s investment experience and expertise. In addition, when an investment trust dealer solicits customers to purchase beneficiary certificates pursuant to the Indirect Investment Act, the seller should clearly explain the characteristics and main contents of the relevant beneficiary certificates, including the risk of investment, so that customers can make reasonable investment decisions.

Note6) Reference materials attached to the defendants' reference documents dated September 24, 2015 see 3

(5) The term "professional investor" in this Act means any of the following investors who has the ability to reduce risks arising from investment, in light of expertise in financial investment instruments, the size of assets owned, etc.: Provided, That where a professional investor prescribed by Presidential Decree gives written notice to a financial investment business entity of his/her intent to be treated as an ordinary investor in the same manner as an ordinary investor, the financial investment business entity shall give consent, except in extenuating circumstances, and where the financial investment business entity gives consent, the investor shall be deemed the ordinary investor; 5. Other persons prescribed by Presidential Decree shall be deemed the ordinary investor. Article 10 (Scope, etc. of Professional Investors) of the Enforcement Decree of the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act (hereinafter referred to as "person prescribed by Presidential Decree" in Article 9 (5) 5 of the Act means a corporation or organization (excluding a foreign corporation or organization) that meets all of the following requirements. (b) A corporation or organization (excluding a foreign corporation or organization) that satisfies the requirements under item (b) shall submit relevant data:

8) The Plaintiffs trusted financial statements with the window dressing accounting and purchased investment shares of 50 billion won in the beneficiary certificates of the instant fund. The Plaintiffs did not perform such investment act if they did not have such window dressing accounting. Therefore, they should be deemed to be able to directly exercise the right to claim damages for tort against the officers and employees of the Busan Savings Bank and the Busan Savings Bank.

9) Article 5(3) of the Trust Contract concluded between Korea Securities Finance and Defendant KTB Asset Management provides that “The term of this investment trust contract shall be five years from the date of initial creation of the investment trust, but shall be the date of termination of the trust contract from the date of initial creation of the investment trust” (Article 5(3) of the Trust Contract).

10) All damages for delay as of October 30, 2014 and part of the principal amount of damages for delay as of October 30, 2014

Note 11) The principal amount of damages remaining as of November 5, 2014 and damages for delay calculated by the rate of 20% per annum from October 31, 2014 to November 5, 2014.