[1] The requirements for the establishment of office management where a private person performs the state's affairs

[2] In a case where Eul corporation subsidized pest control operations under the direct direction of the Korea Coast Guard to prevent damage when oil spills occurred in the oil tanker Eul corporation's oil tanker, the case holding that Eul corporation may claim pest control expenses from the State on the basis of administrative management

[1] In order to establish the administration of affairs, first of all, it is required that the office work is another person's business, that is, the intention of executing the office work on behalf of another person, and furthermore, it is not clear that the dealing with the office work of another person is disadvantageous to the principal or against his will. However, in case where the office work of another person is the state, in principle, that the private person cannot perform the office work of the state without legal basis, the office work of the state is established only when the private person's involvement in the affairs of the state, such as urgency in dealing with the office work, is justified. A private person can claim reimbursement of necessary or beneficial expenses incurred in the course of performing the office work of the state to the extent that it is reasonable.

[2] In a case where Eul corporation engaged in marine pest control business, etc. subsidized pest control work under the direct direction of the Korea Coast Guard to prevent damage, the case affirming the judgment below which held that Eul corporation can claim for expenses for pest control based on the government's administrative management, on the ground that Eul corporation's measures alone were in need of emergency response measures to the extent that it is difficult to prevent marine pollution caused by crude oil outflow, the above pest control work belongs to the state's duty and interest area that Eul corporation could handle for national interests, and Eul corporation was ordered and controlled by the Korea Coast Guard while performing pest control work.

[1] Articles 734 and 739 of the Civil Act / [2] Articles 734 and 739 of the Civil Act

[1] Supreme Court Decision 2013Da30882 Decided August 22, 2013 (Gong2013Ha, 1719)

Jeju Environment Co., Ltd. (Law Firm Samyang, Attorneys Noh Jeong-ba et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Republic of Korea (Government Law Firm Corporation, Attorneys Seo Young-young et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Huba Switzerland Ship Co., Ltd. and one other

Seoul High Court Decision 2009Na99916 decided January 13, 2012

All appeals are dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against each party.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. As to the Defendant’s ground of appeal on the management of affairs under the Civil Act

A. Whether the management of affairs is established

(1) In order to establish the administration of affairs, first of all, it is required that the administration of affairs is another person’s affairs, and that the intention of the administration of affairs on behalf of another person is to vest in another person, i.e., the actual benefit of administration, and furthermore, it is not clear that the administration of affairs is disadvantageous to the principal or against his/her will (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2013Da30882, Aug. 22, 2013). However, in cases where affairs of another person are affairs of a State, in principle, private person cannot perform affairs of the State without legal basis, inasmuch as the administration of affairs of the State performed by a private person is of a nature that private person can perform on behalf of the State, and the administration of affairs is established only when the private person’s involvement in affairs of the State, such as urgency of the administration of affairs, is justified, and the private

Meanwhile, Articles 48(2) and 50(1) of the former Prevention of Marine Pollution Act (repealed by Article 2 of the Addenda to the Marine Environment Management Act, Act No. 8260, Jan. 19, 2007) provide that when discharging wastes, such as oil, etc., such as oil, etc., into the sea, the owner of a ship on which discharged oil, etc. were loaded or loaded shall immediately take necessary preventive measures, such as prompt collection and disposal of discharged oil, etc., and the Commissioner of the Korea Coast Guard shall take necessary measures in cases where the owner of the ship fails to take such measures as above or where he/she deems it difficult to prevent marine pollution by itself, or where he/she deems

(2) According to the reasoning of the lower judgment, the lower court acknowledged the facts as indicated in its reasoning, and determined that the instant outflow accident falls under the Defendant’s mandatory area and interest sphere that the Plaintiff could handle the Defendant’s affairs in light of the following: (a) the Defendant declared an area likely to be damaged due to the instant outflow accident as a special disaster area; and (b) the Defendant’s auxiliary ship company, such as the Defendant’s vehicle owner, etc. (hereinafter “HV SP”), such as the Defendant’s vehicle owner, etc., declared the area likely to be damaged due to the instant outflow accident as a special disaster area; and (c) the Defendant’s actions were in need of emergency response measures to the extent that it is difficult to prevent marine pollution due to the instant outflow accident; and (d) the Plaintiff’s subsidization under the direct direction of the Korea Coast Guard for the prevention of damage due to the instant outflow accident falls under the Defendant’s duty area and interest sphere that the Plaintiff could process the Defendant’s affairs without the Defendant’s duty to manage the Defendant’s work.

(3) In light of the above legal principles and records, such judgment of the court below is just and acceptable. In so doing, it did not err by exceeding the bounds of the principle of logic and experience and the principle of free evaluation of evidence, or by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence

B. Whether it constitutes abuse of rights

(1) According to the reasoning of the lower judgment, the lower court determined that, in light of the following: (a) even if the liability limitation procedure is in progress, it is anticipated that the Plaintiff, who subsidized the marine pollution response work due to the instant outflow accident, filed an application for commencing the liability limitation procedure under the former Guarantee of Oil Pollution Damage Compensation Act (amended by Act No. 8581, Aug. 3, 2007; hereinafter “oil Pollution Act”); and (b) there was a separate lawsuit in addition to the liability limitation procedure in the Act on the Procedure for Limiting the Liability of the Shipowners, etc., the lower court did not seek reimbursement of expenses incurred by the Plaintiff on the ground that the Plaintiff, who supported the marine pollution response work due to the instant outflow, was unable to seek reimbursement

In light of the relevant legal principles and records, such determination by the court below is justified and acceptable. In so doing, it did not err by misapprehending the legal principles on the relationship between the Oil Pollution Act and the Civil Act, thereby affecting the conclusion of the judgment

(2) In light of the reasoning of the lower judgment and the record, the Plaintiff’s claim for reimbursement of expenses against the Defendant based on business management under the Civil Act does not constitute an abuse of rights. Therefore, even if the lower court did not render any special judgment, the lower court did not err by omitting the judgment that affected the conclusion of the judgment.

2. Plaintiff’s ground of appeal concerning calculation of the amount of redemption of expenses and Defendant’s ground of appeal

According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court below, the court below acknowledged the following facts: (a) the costs of the Plaintiff spent for prevention and removal measures of the outflow accident of this case were assessed on the basis of the circumstances calculated by SPS SP (hereinafter “SP”) 318,450,947, etc.; (b) The Oil Pollution Act limits the costs of prevention and removal measures to be compensated by the shipowner to the reasonable extent within the reasonable scope; (c) the costs of prevention and removal measures are planned to calculate the amount of damages; and (b) the amount of damages is determined to be limited to the amount exceeding 318,450,947, and the costs of prevention and removal are assessed on the ground that the Plaintiff’s employees were present at the scene of the Plaintiff’s pest prevention and removal assistance work; and (d) the amount and number of the equipment, personnel, goods, etc. and time of the Plaintiff’s employees invested at the site by the damage adjustment agency with expertise in calculating the amount of damages.

In light of the relevant legal principles and records, the judgment of the court below is just and acceptable. In so doing, it did not err by misapprehending the legal principles as to the scope of return of office management expenses, thereby affecting the conclusion of the judgment.

3. As to the Plaintiff’s ground of appeal on satisfaction of payment

A. As to the appropriation of an obligation to reimburse the expenses, interest, and principal, Article 479 of the Civil Act provides that the order of appropriation is stipulated in Article 479 of the Civil Act and Article 476 of the Civil Act on the appropriation of a designated appropriation is not applicable mutatis mutandis, in principle, such appropriation shall be made in the order of expenses, interest, and principal. The order of appropriation may not be designated unilaterally differently from the above order of legal order even though the obligor and obligee are not the obligor. However, in a case where there is a special agreement between the parties or where it is deemed that the other party has not raised an objection without delay, and that an implied agreement has not been reached by failing to do so, the order of appropriation may be recognized differently from the order of appropriation (see Supreme Court Decision 2009Da12399, Jun. 11, 2009)

B. According to the reasoning of the lower judgment and the record, it is reasonable to view that, at the time of paying the interim settlement to the Plaintiff, the Switzerland Center excluded interest or delay damages from the details thereof, and accordingly, the Plaintiff also received interim settlement payments and agreed with the Plaintiff and Hubee, the Plaintiff and Hubee had agreed to repay interim settlement payments to the principal for expenses incurred in taking pollution response measures. Furthermore, the grounds such as repayment that achieve the purpose of the claim are indivisible, joint and several liability obligor, joint and several liability obligor, and joint and several liability obligor, if the obligation jointly and severally assumed with other debtors is extinguished due to repayment by any obligor taking absolute effect on the part of the obligor, etc. (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2012Da85281, Mar. 14, 2013). Thus, the effect of the extinction of the obligation is deemed to affect all other obligors (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2012Da85281, Mar. 14, 2

C. Therefore, the lower court was justifiable in its conclusion to have rejected the Plaintiff’s assertion that the interim settlement amount was appropriated to the principal of office expenses by designating the details at the time of the interim settlement payment, but it is not appropriate for the lower court to have determined that the interim settlement amount was appropriated to the principal of office expenses. Therefore, it did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine on appropriation of performance, which affected the conclusion of the judgment.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against each losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Park Poe-young (Presiding Justice)