B. Whether the right to claim ownership transfer registration due to the continuation of possession and the completion of prescription expires (negative)

(c) A case where it is deemed that the act of unauthorized representation has been ratified or ratified;

(d) The case holding that if a person liable for the registration of ownership transfer of real estate has completed a provisional registration or principal registration for debt security with a third party on such real estate and the third party has not actively participated therein, such juristic act cannot be deemed to be contrary to social order;

(e) Where a person liable for the registration of ownership transfer has made a provisional registration against a third party on the real estate, whether the obligation to register ownership transfer becomes impossible (negative)

(f) Where a person liable for the registration of ownership transfer has made a registration of ownership transfer for a third party on the real estate, whether the obligation to register ownership transfer is impossible;

(b) The claim for ownership transfer registration due to the completion of the acquisition by prescription shall not be extinguished by prescription as long as the occupation of the land continues.

C. In the event that Defendant A and B are liable to transfer ownership to the Plaintiff due to the completion of the prescriptive acquisition on their joint-owned land, the Defendant A made a provisional registration and principal registration on the whole of the above land to Byung without Defendant B’s consent or consent, the Defendants’ assertion that the above obligation to transfer ownership was impossible due to the completion of each registration under Byung’s name should be deemed to include the purport of ratification or ratification of Defendant A’s act of unauthorized representation.

D. In the case of paragraph (c) above, the legal act cannot be deemed as going against social order solely on the ground that the Defendants are liable to register ownership transfer to the Plaintiff.

E. Where a person liable for the registration of ownership transfer has made a provisional registration on the real estate, the provisional registration is merely the one having the effect of preserving the order of priority in the principal registration, and the disposal authority of the person liable for the registration of ownership transfer is not lost, so the provisional registration cannot be said to be impossible to perform the obligation to register ownership transfer

F. Although a person liable for the registration of ownership transfer of real estate has completed the registration of ownership transfer for the sake of a third party's obligation security on such real estate, if the person liable for the registration has no ability to repay his/her obligation, the obligation to register ownership transfer will be impossible unless there are special circumstances.

The defendants' remaining appeals are dismissed.

The costs of appeal dismissed shall be assessed against the defendants.

1. Based on its adopted evidence, the court below acknowledged that the land of this case was inherited by Nonparty 1, who was the head of Nonparty 2, and was living in the house constructed on some of the land, and sold the land of this case to Nonparty 4, the head of Nonparty 3, the head of Nonparty 3, who was the head of Nonparty 4, and the land of this case was purchased on around 1955 while Nonparty 3 was living in the house by leasing a part of the land of this case from Nonparty 4, and he was living in the house of this case. From around that time, the court below held that the land of this case was occupied directly by the above Nonparty 3, who was living in the house of this case, and the land of this case was occupied by the plaintiff from August 10, 1971, which was occupied by Nonparty 3, the head of Nonparty 2, who was the head of Nonparty 5, and that the plaintiff continued to occupy the land of this case after the expiration of the prescriptive acquisition period from December 13, 195.

The above fact-finding by the court below is just and cannot be deemed to have any defect in violation of the rules of evidence, such as the theory of lawsuit. The issue of standing to sue in a lawsuit for performance is to be absorption into the question of the legitimacy of the claim, and this point is without merit as the defendant withdraws from the third day of pleading in the court of first instance on the ground of appeal

2. In the calculation of the period of prescriptive acquisition, the initial date of the commencement of possession shall not be determined at will, but if there is no change to the registered titleholder, the initial date of the commencement of possession shall be determined at the time when the period for the completion of prescriptive acquisition is asserted and confirmed only when the lapse of the period is confirmed (see Supreme Court Decision 78Da2117, Oct. 16, 1979; Supreme Court Decision 87Da2733, Dec. 6, 198). Thus, if the Plaintiff can assert the completion of prescriptive acquisition against the Defendants, the court below recognized the period for the commencement of possession as the time of December 31, 195. In addition, as long as the Plaintiff has continuously occupied the land in this case, the right to claim the transfer of ownership due to the completion of prescriptive acquisition shall not be extinguished by prescription. The argument is without merit

3. The lower court, on the grounds that the Defendants had already completed the registration of ownership transfer and provisional registration with respect to the land of this case in the name of a third party, and thus, the Defendants’ defense that the Defendants had been unable to perform their duty to transfer ownership to the Plaintiff. Furthermore, in the first instance court of this case, upon Defendant 1’s losing judgment against the Defendants of the above contents, determined that Defendant 1 did not follow the procedure for settlement of August 5, 1987, on the grounds that: (a) Nonparty 6, who appears to have known of the above circumstances on May 12, 1987, transferred the land of this case to Nonparty 7 million won including the trial costs of this case, etc.; (b) Defendant 2 and Defendant 3, a co-owner, obtained consent to the disposal of the shares; (c) Nonparty 6’s provisional registration against the Defendants as the right holder on the land of this case; and (d) Nonparty 6 did not complete the registration of ownership transfer with respect to the Defendants’ ownership transfer within the period of time limit of 18 meters from the above.

However, according to the records, the defendants asserted that the obligation of the defendants to transfer ownership to the plaintiff of the plaintiff of this case was impossible on the premise that each registration as to the land of this case is valid. Thus, the above argument should include the purport that defendant 2 or defendant 3 ratified or ratified the act of unauthorized representation by the defendant 1. Thus, the court below should consider at least the ratification of the act of unauthorized Representation by the defendant 1 against the defendant 2 and the defendant 3. Thus, the court below's determination that the above registration is invalid is erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles or incomplete deliberation as to the ratification of the act of unauthorized Representation.

In addition, just because the Defendants knew that they had the obligation to register ownership transfer to the Plaintiff, the legal act cannot be deemed as going against the social order, and the evidence alone by the lower court cannot be recognized as having actively participated in the Defendant 1’s disposal act. Therefore, the lower court’s judgment, which determined that the part corresponding to Defendant 1’s share among each registration of the instant land of this case is invalid, is erroneous in misapprehending the rules of evidence,

However, in cases where a person liable for the registration of ownership transfer has made a provisional registration on such real estate, the provisional registration is merely the effect of preserving the order of the principal registration, and the person liable for the registration of ownership transfer is not deprived of his/her disposal authority, so the provisional registration alone cannot be said to be impossible to perform his/her obligation of registration of ownership transfer. From among the provisional registration against the 757 square meters of the land in this case, the ownership share portion of Defendant 2 and Defendant 3 among the provisional registration against the 757 square meters prior to the above ( Address 2 omitted) cannot be deemed to be valid by the ratification of the said Defendants, or even if the ownership share portion of Defendant 1 is recognized to be valid because

Therefore, illegality related to provisional registration of the 757 square meters prior to the above should not affect the conclusion of the judgment.

Furthermore, the court below held that, since each registration on the above (No. 1 omitted) 1,808 square meters was made for the purpose of security among the land in this case, the possibility of cancellation remains. Thus, the court below held that the performance of the defendants' obligation to transfer ownership registration against the plaintiff is not definitely impossible.

However, even though a person liable for the registration of ownership transfer for a third party's real estate property has completed the registration of ownership transfer for the purpose of a debt security, if the person liable for the registration has no ability to repay his/her obligation, the obligation for the registration of ownership transfer will be impossible unless there are special circumstances. According to the records, not only Defendant 1 but also the remaining Defendants are deemed to have sufficient ability to repay their obligation to Nonparty 6. Therefore, even if it is made for the purpose of a debt security, the ownership transfer registration made in the above non-party 6's future against the above (name 1 omitted) large 1,808 square meters shall be deemed to have become impossible to perform as long as it remains valid. The judgment of the court below shall not be subject to criticism that the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles on the impossibility of performance. The arguments are with merit.

As seen above, the judgment of the court below is reversed and the case is remanded to the court below for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. The remaining grounds for appeal are dismissed and all costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Kim Sang-won (Presiding Justice)