[2] The probative value of the registration certificate and the title trust

[3] The case reversing the judgment of the court below which recognized that the death was a title trust on the real estate, the registration of ownership preservation of which was made in the name of the deceased

[2] Generally, in a case where a real estate owner’s title is entrusted to another person, documents proving the legal relationship, such as the registration certificate, are held by the title truster, who is the actual owner. Thus, if the title truster does not possess these documents of legal relationship and instead holds a person who is called the title trustee, this would interfere with the recognition of the title trust relationship, unless there is a clear explanation that he/she would be able to obtain the said documents of legal relationship.

[3] The case reversing the judgment of the court below which recognized the title trust on the ground that, with respect to the real estate on which the registration of ownership preservation was made in the name of a non-resident under the name of the non-resident, the fall cannot be deemed as a title trust to the non-resident in light of various circumstances, such as the contents on the public register, the status of holding a registration right, the status of managing

1. As to the part of the defense of this case

In light of the records, the court below's decision is just in finding facts as to the plaintiff's non-corporate association with the ability to be a party, and there is no error in finding facts in violation of the rules of evidence or in misunderstanding the legal principles as to the ability of the plaintiff's non-corporate association. In other view, the grounds of appeal that the plaintiff's non-corporate association is not a party, and that the plaintiff's non-corporate association is a whole party, and that the plaintiff's non-corporate becomes a party, cannot be accepted.

2. As to the part on the merits

A. The facts acknowledged by the court below and the summary of the judgment are as follows.

(1) The lower court acknowledged the following facts based on the macro-regular evidence.

이 사건 임야인 강원 (주소 1 생략) 임야 34,026㎡는 지방하천인 평창강의 강 가운데에 있는 삼각주 모양의 임야로서, 그 서쪽으로는 폭 150ｍ 정도 되는 강을 건너 같은 읍 후평리 마을이 있고, 그 동쪽으로는 폭 50ｍ 정도 되는 강을 건너 (주소 2 생략), (주소 3 생략), (주소 4 생략), (주소 5 생략), (주소 6 생략)의 각 임야가 있으며, 그 산너머에 원고 부락이 있는데, 이 사건 임야의 북단(강의 상류쪽)은 낮아 물에 잠기는 경우가 많고, 중앙 부위 및 남단은 그보다 높으나 척박하여 비료나 농경기술이 발달하지 않았던 1950년경까지는 농지로서의 가치는 별로 없었던 사실, 원고 부락의 주민들은 예로부터 강폭이 좁아지고 물흐름이 느려지는 이 사건 임야의 동쪽과 서쪽 양안에 각 1개씩 나무와 가마니 등을 이용한 재래식 보(보)를 만들고 위 (주소 5 생략), (주소 6 생략)의 각 임야 등을 끼고 도는 총연장 2㎞ 정도의 수로를 만들어 물을 끌어다 농업에 종사하여 오는 한편, 부락에서 위 (주소 5 생략)의 임야에 있는 작은 재를 넘어 이 사건 임야의 동쪽에 있는 작은 보(폭 50ｍ)를 건너고 이 사건 임야(폭 170ｍ 정도)를 지나 다시 서쪽에 있는 큰 보(폭 150ｍ 정도)를 건너 위 후평리 마을과 강원 횡성 등지로 왕래하여 온 사실, 이 사건 임야가 위와 같이 용수 및 교통로의 확보에 없어서는 아니될 존재였기 때문에 일정 때부터 원고 부락의 주민들은 이 사건 임야에 많은 관심을 기울여 농지로서의 가치가 거의 없던 이 사건 임야에 가축 등이 출입하지 못하도록 하고 식목을 하여 홍수에 유실되지 아니하도록 관리하여 왔고 1943년경부터는 이를 원고 부락의 소유로 관리하여 온 사실, 소외 1, 소외 2, 피고 2도 원고 부락의 주민의 일원으로서 다른 주민들과 함께 위와 같은 방법으로 이 사건 임야를 관리하여 왔는데, 6·25 전쟁으로 이 사건 임야의 지적공부가 멸실되고 1971년경 이를 복구하는 과정에서 원고 부락의 주민들은 부락명의로 복구등록하는 것이 여의치 아니하고 그렇다고 1인의 명의로 하는 것은 처분의 위험이 있어 이를 원고 부락의 유지이자 ○○이씨 △△ □□□파인 소외 1(평창군 ◇◇계장 등 역임 후 1963. 12.부터 1968. 12.까지 원고 부락의 이장 역임), 덕망이 있는 것으로 평가받던 소외 3, ○○이씨 ☆☆☆파인 피고 2(평창군 ▽▽과장 역임 후 평창군▷▷▷▷조합 상무 역임), 소외 2(같은 군 평창면 ◁◁계장) 등 4인의 공동 명의로 신탁하기로 하여 당시 원고 부락의 농지위원으로 ○○이씨인 위 소외 3, 타성인 소외 5, 소외 6 등의 보증서를 받아 위 4인들 공동 명의로 임야대장을 복구등록한 다음 이를 바탕으로 춘천지방법원 평창등기소 1972. 12. 26. 접수 제4639호로 그들 4인 공동 명의의 소유권보존등기를 마쳤고, 그 등기권리증(을 제5호증의 16)은 위 4인 중의 1인으로 당시 위와 같은 지적공부 복구와 등기에 주도적으로 참여하였던 소외 1이 교부받아 소지하고 있다가 그 사망 후 피고 1이 이를 소지하게 된 사실, 원고 부락의 주민들은 그 뒤로도 이 사건 임야를 유지, 보호하기 위하여 수분이 많은 곳에서도 잘 자라는 포플러나무와 은사시나무 등을 식목하는 등 관리를 계속하여 왔는데 그에 필요한 절차를 위 등기명의자들의 이름으로 밟기도 한 사실, 또 1977년경 위 평창강을 건너 원고 부락으로 진입하는 다리가 유실되어 이를 다시 건설하면서 그 동안 원고 부락이 소유하고 있던 부동산인 (주소 7 생략) 답 6,640㎡(소외 7 명의로 신탁), (주소 8 생략) 답 12,360㎡, (주소 9 생략) 답 12,890㎡(각 미등기), (주소 10 생략) 임야 116,926㎡, (주소 11 생략) 임야 20,055㎡, (주소 12 생략) 임야 45,003㎡(각 소외 2 명의로 신탁) 등을 매각하여 공사비를 충당하고 그래도 모자라 주민들에게 농지의 소유비율로 얼마간씩 갹출하면서도 이 사건 임야와 (주소 13 생략) 임야 등은 매각하지 아니한 사실, 그 뒤로도 위와 같은 식목 등의 방법으로 관리를 계속하여 오다가 이 사건 임야가 하천부지로 편입되어 그 보상문제가 대두되자 원고 부락의 주민들은 당시의 이장인 소외 8로 하여금 1991. 7. 12.경 총회를 소집하게 하여 그 등기명의를 원고 부락 앞으로 환원하기로 결의하고 이를 피고 1, 피고 2와 당시 생존하여 있던 소외 2에게 통지하여 협조를 구하였으나 거절당한 사실, 한편, 위 소외 1이 1991. 1. 18. 사망하여 그 공동상속인들의 협의분할에 의한 재산상속에 따라 그의 공유지분인 4분의 1 지분을 피고 1이 단독상속하였고(1991. 8. 5. 그 앞으로 소유권이전등기 완료), 위 소외 2도 1992. 11. 12. 사망하여 처인 피고 3과 자녀들인 피고 4, 피고 5, 피고 6, 피고 7, 피고 8, 피고 9, 피고 10이 그의 공유지분인 4분의 1 지분을 17분의 3(전체지분의 68분의 3)과 각 17분의 2(전체지분의 68분의 2)지분씩 공동상속하였다.

(2) Based on the foregoing factual basis, the lower court determined as follows.

In light of the above facts, the forest of this case was owned by the plaintiff 1, the non-party 2, and the defendant 2 as the ownership of the plaintiff 1 and the defendants, and they are in the position of the title trustee. The defendant 1 succeeded to the status of the title trustee due to the death of the above non-party 1. The defendant 2 succeeded to the status of the title trustee. The defendant 3 and the defendant 4, the defendant 5, the defendant 6, the defendant 7, the defendant 8, the defendant 9, and the defendant 10 jointly inherited their shares, and the above each title trust contract was lawfully terminated upon the plaintiff 1's notification as of July 12, 191 as seen above. Thus, the defendants are obligated to implement the ownership transfer registration procedure for each of the forest of this case to the plaintiff on July 12, 1991.

B. However, it is difficult to accept the lower court’s fact-finding and determination as above, which held the title trust of the forest land of this case owned by the Plaintiff Thailand to Nonparty 1 et al.

(1) In order to recognize that the Plaintiff, as in the instant case, registered the preservation of ownership in the name of an individual for the village resident, held the forest owned by the Plaintiff as a title trust to the said village resident, the forest can only be recognized when there are many materials that can only be recognized as owned by the Plaintiff village in light of the circumstances such as the background or content of the forest owned by the Plaintiff village, the management status of the forest, etc., or when there are many materials that can be recognized as owned by the Plaintiff village in light of other circumstances, such as the management status of the forest, etc., and rather, there are no sufficient materials for the opposing facts (see Supreme Court Decision 94Da29782, Oct. 25, 1994).

(2) Therefore, in the above view, we examine whether the forest of this case can be recognized as a title trust with the above non-party 1, etc. as the ownership of the plaintiff village.

(A) The court below held that the forest land of this case was owned and managed as owned by the plaintiff in 1943, but it cannot be seen that the forest land of this case was owned by the plaintiff or owned by the plaintiff as owned by the plaintiff, or that it was actually managed as owned by the plaintiff, although the forest of this case was not owned by the plaintiff, or it was not owned by the plaintiff as owned by the plaintiff. In addition, according to the judgment of the court below in 1943, it appears that the forest of this case was formed by the plaintiff, and around this time, it appears that the plaintiff village acquired the ownership of the forest of this case as owned by the plaintiff (i.e., whether the plaintiff village acquired the forest of this case was the original acquisition, who purchased the forest of this case from the plaintiff, or who purchased the forest of this case by the plaintiff by the plaintiff or by the prescription acquisition), and there is no other evidence to prove otherwise.

(B) In addition, the court below determined that the forest land of this case is not indispensable for securing the plaintiff village's water and transportation, and therefore, it managed the plaintiff village by giving much attention to it so that livestock can not enter the forest of this case, etc. However, the evidence adopted in accordance with this evidence is that most of the plaintiff village citizens can be prevented, and it is only the plaintiff village's testimony that is merely the plaintiff village 8-2 (No. 494 of the records) and the above recognition are not interfered with according to each statement of No. 5-35, 36 (No. 741 of the records No. 740, No. 741 of the records) and each statement of No. 5-35, No. 5-36 (No. 741 of the records) that held that the above non-party 1 and three others obtained permission to cut standing trees in the forest of this case from March 16, 1987 to April 15 of the same year, it is difficult to accept the above facts.

(C) The court below held that Plaintiff 1 et al. held the title trust of the forest of this case with the above Nonparty 1 et al., but the reasoning of the judgment alone does not reveal whether Plaintiff 1 et al. left the forest of this case or that she was the representative of Plaintiff 1 et al. through Plaintiff 1’s meeting, and there is no other evidence to disclose this otherwise. In addition, according to the reasoning of the judgment below, Plaintiff 1 et al. on behalf of the former head of the Gu or this Chapter, and the above Nonparty 1 et al. and 3 on behalf of Plaintiff 1 et al. at the time of the title trust of the above assertion, and it is difficult to obtain the same merely on the ground that the court below stated that Plaintiff 1 et al. entrusted the title registration of the forest of this case to the above Nonparty 1 et al. after deducting this Chapter.

(D) Meanwhile, in general, where only the real estate owner’s title is entrusted to another person, documents proving the legal relationship, such as the registration certificate, are held by the title truster, who is the actual owner. Thus, if the title truster does not possess any documents verifying such legal relationship and instead holds it by the title truster, it cannot be deemed as impeding the recognition of the title trust relationship, unless there is any explanation that the title truster would be able to obtain as to the circumstance of holding it (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 84Meu1750, 1751, Jan. 29, 1985; 91Da12615, 1262, Jun. 28, 1991). However, the court below’s reasoning in light of the empirical rule as to the circumstances in which the above non-party 1 (the successor, Defendant 1) held with respect to the forest of this case cannot be easily explained.

(3) As to the forest of this case, no entry is made in the public record, which can be seen as the ownership of the Plaintiff village, and the registration certificate was made in the name of the above non-party 1 and the non-party 3, and the above non-party 1 and the above non-party 3 kept the registration certificate. It can only be recognized that the above non-party 1 and the non-party 3 have been managing the forest of this case by cutting standing trees, etc. with permission for cutting trees in the forest of this case. Moreover, there is no reason or material to recognize the circumstances, contents, and other management status that the forest of this case is likely to be owned by the plaintiff village as to the forest of this case. In light of the above circumstances, it is difficult to find that the plaintiff village was a title trust with the above non-party 1 and the non-party 3.

C. Ultimately, the lower court should have determined whether the Plaintiff’s assertion of title trust was true after examining the above points. However, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine on title trust and by misapprehending the remaining rules of evidence, or by failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations, which affected the conclusion of the judgment.

3. Therefore, the lower judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Jae-soo (Presiding Justice)