[2] Whether Article 2 of the Addenda to the amended Securities Investment Trust Business Act of September 16, 1998, which provides for the range of retroactive application of the newly amended provision concerning redemption of beneficiary certificates, is unconstitutional because it is unclear in its meaning (negative)

[3] Legal status of a distributor under the former Securities Investment Trust Business Act

[4] Whether a selling company’s obligation to repurchase beneficiary certificates with its proprietary property under the former Securities Investment Trust Business Act violates the performance distribution principle or limited liability principle, which is the basic principle of an investment trust (negative)

[5] Whether Article 7 of the former Securities Investment Trust Business Act, which provides for a selling company's obligation to repurchase beneficiary certificates, violates the principle of clarity (negative)

[6] The case holding that in light of the position of the selling company in a securities investment trust and its form of business, it cannot be deemed that the selling company's burden of redemption with its own property cannot be deemed as contrary to the principle of self-responsibility solely on the ground that the management company takes charge of the actual management of beneficiary certificates

[7] The case holding that the company's obligation to repurchase with its proprietary property under the former Securities Investment Trust Business Act does not essentially harm the company's separate management of the trust property or infringe on the essential elements of the principle of limited liability in accordance with the legal principles of the trust, and thus cannot be deemed as a deviation

[8] Whether Article 7 of the former Securities Investment Trust Business Act, etc., which provides for a selling company's obligation to repurchase with its own property, infringes on the selling company's freedom of occupation, freedom of business and property rights in violation of the principle of excessive prohibition or guarantee of property rights under the Constitution

[9] The method and standard for determining clarity in delegated legislation

[10] The case holding that Article 23 (2) of the former Securities Investment Trust Business Act does not violate the principle of prohibition of comprehensive delegation, on the ground that, although the grounds for partial termination of the trust are delegated to the Presidential Decree, the specific criteria or scope of delegation itself is not limited to the specific criteria or scope of delegation, it can be derived from delegation criteria, such as that, in order to maintain trust property and ensure the appropriateness of its management, various regulations prescribed under the same Act should be limited to the grounds for partial termination of the trust in an organic and systematic manner in consideration

A. As to the first ground for appeal

Article 2 of the Addenda to the Securities Investment Trust Business Act (amended by Act No. 558 of September 16, 1998; hereinafter “Revised Investment Trust Business Act”) provides that “The amended provisions of Articles 7(4) through (7) and 30 shall apply from the redemption of beneficiary certificates issued for the first time after this Act enters into force (limited to the extension of the trust contract period; hereinafter in this Article the same shall apply) pursuant to the terms and conditions of trust. However, the amended provisions of Article 2 of the Addenda to the Revised Investment Trust Business Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 16544 of the Revised Investment Trust Business Act) shall apply to the redemption of beneficiary certificates to the truster company at the time of entry into force of this Act within the limit of one year from the date prescribed by Presidential Decree, but the amended provisions of the Revised Investment Trust Business Act No. 97 of the Revised Investment Trust Business Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 1659 of the Revised Trust Business Act).”

In addition, Article 2 of the Addenda to the amended Investment Trust Business Act clearly states that the case where the newly amended provisions are applied in relation to the redemption of beneficiary certificates is the case where the beneficiary certificates are redeemed in accordance with the trust terms and conditions enacted for the first time after the enforcement of the amended Act or the trust terms and conditions that are modified to extend the trust contract period, and it is not clear in its meaning. In addition, Article 2 of Addenda to the amended Investment Trust Business Act minimizes the possibility of retroactive application of the amended provisions, and Article 13(2) of the Constitution, which provides that the purpose of the enactment of the Securities Investment Trust Business Act for the protection of beneficiary certificates and Article 13(2) of the Constitution, which provides that the property rights shall not be deprived by retroactive legislation, and therefore, Article 2 of Addenda to the amended Investment Trust Business Act shall not

In full view of the admitted evidence, the court below recognized the fact that the trust establishment date of the investment trust of this case was July 2, 199, and accordingly, Defendant Puden Social Asset Management Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “Defendant Puden”) established the investment trust agreement of this case on the same day and performed the business of the management company. Since there is no evidence to prove that Defendant Puuden changed the trust agreement of this case after September 16, 199, since there was no change in the trust agreement of this case since September 16, 199, the former Investment Trust Business Act applies to the redemption of beneficiary certificates of this case in accordance with Article 2 of the Addenda of the amended Investment Trust Business Act and Article 2 of Addenda of the amended Act to the Securities Investment Trust Business Act. Furthermore, in light of the aforementioned legal principles and related Acts and subordinate statutes, the judgment of the court below is justified, and there is no violation of the Constitution or the misunderstanding of legal principles as argued in the Grounds for Appeal.

B. Regarding ground of appeal No. 2

In full view of the history and process of the former Investment Trust Business Act, the contents of each provision of Articles 2(5), 7(1) and (2), and 9(1) of the former Investment Trust Business Act, and the contents of Article 4(1) of the instant investment trust agreement entered into between Defendant Puden Social and Defendant Puden Securities Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “Defendant Puden Securities”), the Defendant Treatment Securities, a selling company, shall be deemed an independent party who conducts business of selling beneficiary certificates on its own responsibility, not merely a truster company’s agent in a securities investment trust (see Supreme Court Decision 2002Da19018, Dec. 8, 2006, etc.). In the same purport, it is proper that the lower court determined that the Defendant Treatment Securities is an independent party. In so doing, it is not erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the legal status of the selling company, as otherwise alleged in the grounds of appeal.

C. Regarding ground of appeal No. 3

(1) As to the assertion of unconstitutionality due to non-petition legislative omission

The former Investment Trust Business Act (amended by Act No. 785, Dec. 8, 2006; Act No. 7885, Feb. 21, 2006; Act No. 20144, Feb. 2006; Act No. 2014, Feb. 21, 2006; Act No. 2014, Feb. 21, 2006; Act No. 20135, Feb. 22, 2006; Act No. 2010, Feb. 23, 2006; Act No. 20134, Feb. 23, 2006; Act No. 2010, Feb. 3, 2007; Act No. 20130, Feb. 3, 200, etc.).

On the other hand, the issue of whether to impose a redemption obligation on the selling company, etc. for the protection of beneficiaries, such as the former Investment Trust Business Act, or not to impose a redemption obligation on the selling company, etc. or the revised Investment Trust Business Act belongs to a policy decision based on the reasonable discretion of the legislator. In the end, in the securities investment trust, the selling company cannot be deemed to have a legislative obligation under the Constitution to prevent the selling company from bearing a redemption obligation by its proprietary property. Therefore, the argument in the grounds of appeal on this point is not acceptable.

(2) As to the assertion of unconstitutionality of Articles 7 and 30 of the former Investment Trust Business Act

(A) On the assertion of violation of the principle of clarity

In the legislation, since the legislation that clearly regulates all individual legal relations is technically impossible, it is inevitable to define it in a way that requires the court's supplementary interpretation to a certain extent within a somewhat broad or broad range of scope, and if it can be removed by the interpretation of the court, it cannot be viewed as unconstitutional (see Supreme Court Order 2004Kaga27, July 28, 2005, etc.).

Article 7 of the former Investment Trust Business Act imposes the obligation to repurchase beneficiary certificates on the selling company, Article 30 of the Act provides that the management company permitted to sell beneficiary certificates from Article 30 may repurchase beneficiary certificates with its own property, provides the basis for two repurchase methods, such as repurchase due to partial termination of the trust. Meanwhile, Article 23(2) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Investment Trust Business Act and Article 12 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Investment Trust Business Act (amended by Act No. 23(2) of the Investment Trust Business Act (amended by Act No. 12548, Feb. 29, 200) does not sell beneficiary certificates already redeemed with its own property, if the management company or the selling company does not sell the beneficiary certificates already redeemed with its own property, it permits a large amount of claim for redemption of beneficiary certificates, and does not stipulate a beneficiary's claim for redemption on the ground of partial termination of the trust. If each of the above provisions is interpreted systematically, it is interpreted that the company's ordinary claim for redemption for the redemption of the trust company's own property.

In the same purport, the court below determined that Article 7 of the former Investment Trust Business Act cannot be deemed to be in violation of the principle of clarity, and in light of the above legal principles, the decision of the court below is justified, and there is no violation of the Constitution or misunderstanding of legal principles concerning the principle of clarity as alleged in the grounds of appeal.

(B) As to the assertion of violation of the principle of self-responsibility

The court below held that the selling company in the securities investment trust shall enter into the sales contract with the truster company and, on the other hand, deliver the beneficiary certificate savings contract with the company holding large assets and business network, incorporate it into the contract contents, provide investment trust explanatory note, etc., and purchase and keep beneficiary certificates thereafter, and as a result, directly receive sales remuneration and repurchase fees from the beneficiary, etc. for its own responsibility and account in the securities investment trust, the selling company is authorized to sell beneficiary certificates after reviewing in advance the contents of the relevant beneficiary certificate and its commercial nature. In light of the above selling company's position and form of business, it cannot be said that the management company is liable to redeem the beneficiary certificates only on the ground that it is entrusted with the actual management of the beneficiary certificates. In light of related statutes and legal principles, the above judgment of the court below is just and acceptable, and there is no violation of the Constitution or the misunderstanding of legal principles as alleged in the grounds for appeal.

(C) As to the assertion that the legislative discretion was exceeded

The court below held that the selling company's substance of redemption in repurchase with the company's proprietary property is the repurchase of beneficiary's beneficiary certificates, and the trust property for the trustee company of the truster company is maintained as it is. On the other hand, the selling company may request the truster company to terminate the re-purchasing beneficiary certificates or expect and hold future profits according to its own judgment, but the selling company shall calculate the redemption price paid to the beneficiary by the selling company to the beneficiary according to the policy purpose of promoting the securities investment trust by protecting the beneficiaries more strongly, and make it paid on the day in principle according to the base price of the date of claim for redemption, and it does not essentially undermine the separate management of the trust property, and if there are inevitable reasons such as large-scale claim for redemption of beneficiary certificates, it does not infringe on the essential substance of the principle of limited liability under the law of trust, such as where the obligation is corrected or modified. In light of the relevant law and legal principles, the above judgment of the court below is just and acceptable, and there is no violation of the Constitution or the misunderstanding of legal principles as argued in the Grounds for Appeal.

(D) As to the assertion that property rights, freedom of business, freedom of choice of occupation, and violation of the principle of excessive prohibition

Even if a seller's obligation to repurchase its inherent property is acknowledged in accordance with the provisions of the former Investment Trust Business Act and the standardized terms and conditions, this is to protect beneficiaries who purchase beneficiary certificates from the selling company in a situation where the management of investment trust and the policy to separate the sales of beneficiary certificates is implemented, and to expect the selling company to play a role as a market developer to revitalize the securities investment trust, and if there are unavoidable reasons such as large-sum claim for redemption of beneficiary certificates, the obligation is modified or modified. Thus, this cannot be deemed as contrary to the basic principles of investment trust, including the performance distribution principle and limited liability principle (see Supreme Court Decision 2002Da19018, Dec. 8, 2006, etc.). In addition, even considering the content of the obligation borne by the selling company, it is difficult to view that the selling company as in the case of principal guarantee agreement, etc., not to bear all losses of beneficiaries, but to obtain the amount to repurchase beneficiary certificates at the base price on the day of claim for redemption from the selling company to the extent to be secured by the beneficiary's right to repurchase.

The judgment of the court below to the same purport is correct, and there is no violation of the Constitution or misapprehension of the legal principles as alleged in the grounds of appeal.

(E) As to the assertion of violation of the principle of equality

As seen earlier, the former Investment Trust Business Act was enacted in policy decisions to protect beneficiaries and revitalize securities investment trust. It does not go against the basic principles of investment trust. In addition, even if there is discrimination against the selling company in terms of Article 7 of the former Investment Trust Business Act, which provides for the redemption obligation against the selling company, in that it is not only a loss of beneficiaries, but also a burden of repurchase of beneficiary certificates with the base price on the date of claim for redemption, and the public interest derived therefrom, it is not small, it is a discrimination within the legislative formation limit. It is within the reasonable discretion of the legislator whether the selling company is not subject to redemption obligation with its own property for the protection of beneficiaries, such as the former Investment Trust Business Act. Thus, it cannot be deemed that the former Investment Trust Business Act unreasonably discriminates against the selling company compared to the amended Investment Trust Business Act. Moreover, even if there is a difference between the selling company and the beneficiary due to the difference in self-sufficiency between the selling company and the selling company, the former Investment Business Act does not immediately regulate the purpose and contents of the trust Business Act.

In the same purport, the court below's rejection of the assertion against the principle of equality of the defendant treatment securities is justified, and there is no violation of the Constitution or the misapprehension of the legal principles as alleged in the grounds of appeal.

(3) As to the assertion of unconstitutionality of Article 23(2) of the former Investment Trust Business Act

In determining the degree or predictability of the clarity of delegation, it shall not be determined with only one specific provision in question, but shall be determined with an organic and systematic comprehensive consideration of the entire relevant provisions (see Constitutional Court Order 94Hun-Ma113, Aug. 29, 1996). In particular, the degree of the demand for clarity of delegation changes depending on the type and nature of the object to be regulated, and the degree of the demand for clarity of delegation changes depending on the type and nature of the object to be regulated, and the clarity and concreteness of legislative delegation is relatively mitigated compared to other areas in which the regulation of various facts or change of factual relations is anticipated (see Constitutional Court Order 2002Hun-Ba82, Jul. 24, 2003).

Article 23(2) of the former Investment Trust Business Act does not limit the specific criteria or scope of delegation itself while delegating the reason for partial termination of the trust to the Presidential Decree. However, the reason for partial termination of the trust requires limited recognition to ensure the stable maintenance of trust property. On the other hand, the change of the reason and the addition of various regulations may be expected according to changes in the economic and social environment, so flexible regulations by administrative legislation rather than by law should be more rational, and in this respect, the demand for clarity of delegation should be mitigated.

The court below held that the former Investment Trust Business Act provides various regulations for the maintenance and proper management of trust property (Article 17(1), (3), and (4) for the faithful management of trust property (Article 17(1), (1), (3), and (4) for the restriction on the management of trust property (Article 18), for the restriction on the management of trust property and for the restriction on the management instruction for the trustee company (Articles 32 and 33), for the prohibition on the management instruction for the trustee company's proprietary property (Article 39), for the prohibition on the management of trust property (Article 40), for the division and management of trust property (Article 40), and for the demand for change of management instruction for trust property (Article 41), and that if these regulations are interpreted systematically and systematically in consideration of the stable maintenance of trust property, the above provisions cannot be seen as violating the principle on the prohibition of comprehensive delegation, and it cannot be seen as violating the freedom of business or there is no violation of property law as alleged in the ground for appeal.

D. Regarding ground of appeal No. 4

The contents of a general transaction agreement shall be interpreted objectively and uniformly on the basis of the average customer's understanding potential without considering the intent or specific circumstances of each party to the contract. When the contents of a contract are not clear or doubtful in terms of customer protection, the terms and conditions shall be interpreted in favor of the customer, and shall be interpreted in limited terms and conditions (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2005Da35226, Oct. 28, 2005; 96Da12009, Jun. 25, 1996; 96Da1209, Jun. 25, 1996). In addition, it is unclear that the provisions of a standardized contract belonging to a disposal document are unclear, and the interpretation of the parties' intent as defined in the standardized contract is at issue due to the difference between the parties on the interpretation of the standardized contract, it shall be reasonably interpreted in accordance with logical and empirical rules by comprehensively considering the motive and background leading up to the agreement, the purpose to achieve the agreement, the parties' genuine intent, etc. (see, etc.).

원심은 그 채용 증거들을 종합하여, 피고 푸르덴셜이 1999. 7. 2. 이 사건 투자신탁을 설정하면서 제정한 약관(이하 ‘이 사건 구약관’이라 한다)에는 수익증권의 환매에 관하여 구 투신업법의 규정 내용과 같은 취지로 규정되어 있는 사실(제2조 제8항, 제16조 제1항 내지 제3항, 제25조 제1항 내지 제3항), 피고 대우증권은 2002. 3. 30. 피고 푸르덴셜과 사이에 피고 푸르덴셜이 설정한 투자신탁의 수익증권을 위탁판매하기로 하는 수익증권 위탁판매계약(이하 ‘이 사건 위탁판매계약’이라 한다)을 체결하면서 피고 대우증권이 판매업무를 자기의 책임으로 수행하고 수익자에 대하여는 선량한 관리자로서의 주의의무를 다한다는 내용 등의 약정을 하고, 그에 기하여 2002. 12. 24.부터 판매회사로서 이 사건 투자신탁의 수익증권을 고객들에게 판매한 사실, 그런데 피고 푸르덴셜은 피고 대우증권에게 이 사건 투자신탁의 수익증권 판매를 위탁하면서 수익자에게 제시·교부될 신탁약관으로 이 사건 투자신탁 설정 당시 제정된 이 사건 구약관을 제공하여야 함에도 이 사건 구약관이 아닌 별도의 약관(이하 ‘이 사건 신약관’이라 한다)을 교부하였고, 그에 따라 원고도 이 사건 매입 당시 피고 대우증권으로부터 이 사건 구약관이 아닌 이 사건 신약관을 교부받았는데, 이 사건 신약관에는 수익증권의 환매에 관하여 이 사건 구약관 제16조 제1항 내지 제3항, 제25조 제2항, 제3항과 동일하게 규정되어 있으나, 제2조 제8항에는 ‘환매라 함은 수익자의 청구에 의하여 위탁회사가 신탁재산의 일부해지를 통하여 조성한 자금을 수익자에게 지급하는 것을 말한다’고 규정되어 있고, 제25조 제1항에는 ‘판매회사는 발행한 수익증권이 매각되지 아니한 때에는 이 투자신탁의 일부해지를 위탁회사에게 요청할 수 있으며, 수익자가 수익증권의 환매를 청구한 때에는 이 투자신탁의 일부해지를 위탁회사에게 요청하여야 한다’고 규정되어 있어 구약관과 다소 차이가 있는 사실, 한편 피고 대우증권이 이 사건 위탁판매계약에 따라 피고 푸르덴셜로부터 제공받은 이 사건 투자신탁설명서에는 ① 이 수익증권은 언제든지 환매가 가능하나, 다만 위탁회사의 해산, 허가취소 등의 사유로 인하여 환매에 응할 수 없는 경우에는 수탁회사에게 직접 청구할 수 있으며, 판매회사가 해산 등의 사유로 인하여 환매에 응할 수 없는 경우에는 위탁회사 또는 수탁회사에게 직접 청구할 수 있다는 내용, ② 환매청구일의 기준가격을 적용하여 환매청구 당일 환매대금을 지급한다(환매청구일 = 환매시 기준가격 적용일 = 환매대금 지급일)는 내용, ③ 수익증권의 환매청구가 대량으로 발생하여 위탁회사 또는 판매회사의 재산으로 지급할 수 없는 때에는 환매청구일로부터 15일 이내에 환매대금을 지급할 수 있다는 내용, ④ 천재·지변, 유가증권시장의 폐쇄·정지 또는 휴장, 기타 부득이한 사유가 있는 경우에는 금감위의 승인을 얻어 그 사유가 해소될 때까지 환매를 연기할 수 있다는 내용이 기재되어 있는 사실 등 그 판시와 같은 사실을 인정한 다음, 이 사건 투자신탁 설정시에 제정된 신탁약관은 이 사건 구약관이라 할 것이나, 원고가 이 사건 수익증권을 매입할 당시 제시·교부받은 신탁약관은 이 사건 신약관이므로, 이 사건 구약관이 아닌 이 사건 신약관만을 교부받은 원고에 대한 관계에서는 적어도 위탁회사, 수탁회사, 판매회사 및 수익자 사이의 이 사건 수익증권 판매 및 환매에 관한 법률관계에 편입되어 적용될 신탁약관은 이 사건 신약관이라고 봄이 상당하다고 판단하고, 나아가 이 사건 구약관에서는 환매의무의 원칙적인 방식으로 위탁회사 또는 판매회사의 고유재산에 의한 환매를 예정하고 있는 구 투신업법의 취지에 따라 제16조에서 수익자는 수익증권을 매입한 판매회사에 환매를 청구하고, 환매청구를 받은 판매회사는 환매청구가 있는 날의 기준가격으로 그 수익증권을 환매하고 환매대금을 지급하며, 수익증권의 환매청구가 대량으로 발생하여 판매회사의 고유재산으로 환매대금을 지급할 수 없을 때에는 환매청구일로부터 15일 이내에 지급할 수 있도록 규정함으로써 환매청구 당일의 기준가격으로 판매회사의 고유재산에 의한 환매의무를 정하고 있었는데, 이 사건에 적용되는 신약관도 비록 환매의 정의와 신탁의 일부해지 사유가 개정 투신업법의 취지에 따라 약간 수정되었으나 여전히 판매회사의 고유재산에 의한 환매의무를 정한 제16조는 그대로 유지되고 있는 점, 판매회사인 피고 대우증권과 위탁회사인 피고 푸르덴셜 사이에 체결된 이 사건 위탁판매계약서에 의하면, 판매회사인 피고 대우증권은 수익증권의 판매업무를 피고의 책임으로 수행하기로 약정한 점, 피고 대우증권이 이 사건 투자신탁의 수익자들에게 제시·교부한 이 사건 투자신탁설명서에도 환매청구일의 기준가격을 적용하여 환매청구 당일 환매대금을 지급하되, 수익증권의 환매청구가 대량으로 발생하여 판매회사의 고유재산으로 지급할 수 없는 때에는 환매청구일로부터 15일 이내에 환매대금을 지급할 수 있다고 명시되어 있는 점 등 이 사건 신·구 약관의 규정 및 그 변경 내용, 이 사건 위탁판매계약 및 투자신탁설명서의 내용 등 제반 사정을 종합하여 보면, 판매회사인 피고 대우증권은 위탁회사인 피고 푸르덴셜로부터 신탁을 일부 해지하여 조성한 자금을 지급받은 때 비로소 수익자인 원고에게 환매대금을 지급할 의무가 발생한다고 볼 수는 없고, 자신의 고유재산으로써 수익자인 원고의 이 사건 수익증권에 대한 환매청구에 청구 당일 응하여야 한다고 판단하였는바, 관계 법리와 기록에 비추어 살펴보면, 이와 같은 원심의 사실인정과 판단은 옳은 것으로 수긍이 가고, 거기에 상고이유의 주장과 같은 약관의 해석에 관한 법리오해의 위법이 있다고 할 수 없다.

2. As to the Plaintiff’s ground of appeal against Defendant Puden social

The court below held that, in light of the relevant provisions such as the former Investment Trust Business Act and the new terms and conditions of this case, since the plaintiff purchased the beneficiary certificates of this case from the defendant Treatment Securities, the defendant Treatment Securities, which are the selling company, cannot be deemed to have the right to claim the redemption price of this case against the defendant Puden Social, unless it is a case (Article 7 (2) proviso of the former Investment Trust Business Act and Article 16 (1) of the new terms and conditions of this case) where the defendant Treatment Securities cannot comply with the redemption due to dissolution, etc. under the Securities and Exchange Act or other Acts (Article 7 (2) proviso of the former Investment Trust Business Act and Article 16 (2) of the new terms and conditions of this case). In

3. Conclusion

Therefore, each appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against each losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Jeon Soo-ahn (Presiding Justice)