[2] The case affirming the judgment below holding that Byung cannot acquire the ownership of the above land under the former Farmland Reform Act and thereby does not constitute a crime of breach of trust against Byung in case where Gap was prosecuted on charges of selling the above land to a third party and acquiring financial benefits equivalent to the market price and causing losses to Byung by completing the registration of transfer of ownership, although Eul had the duty to follow the procedure for the registration of transfer of ownership of each land to the deceased Eul, Eul was obligated to follow the procedure for the registration of transfer of ownership to Byung

[3] The case affirming the prosecutor's ground of appeal on the purport that the court below should have acknowledged the crime of breach of trust by considering "B's heir" rather than "the victim" as the victim in the facts charged of the defendant's breach of trust ex officio without any changes in the indictment, and affirmed the court below's decision which acquitted the defendant only as to the crime of breach of trust where "the victim" was indicted

[2] In a case where Party B was indicted on charges of acquiring pecuniary benefits equivalent to the market price of the above land and causing losses to Party B by disposing of the above land to a third party and completing the registration of ownership transfer in violation of Party B’s duty even though Party B’s above duty was inherited, the case affirming the judgment below that Party B cannot acquire the ownership of the above land under the former Farmland Reform Act (repealed by Article 2 of the Addenda to the Farmland Act, Act No. 4817, Dec. 22, 1994), since Party B’s sale of land between Party B and C did not have an intention to own or own it, since Party B cannot acquire the ownership of the above land under the former Farmland Reform Act (repealed by Article 2 of the Addenda to the Farmland Act, Act No. 4817, Dec. 22, 1994).

[3] The case affirming the court below's decision that the court below should have acknowledged the crime of breach of trust by considering Eul's inheritors, other than those stated as the victim, as the victim in the charges of breach of trust against the defendant ex officio without any changes in the indictment, on the grounds that the defendant's defense method to respond to the case where Eul's inheritors are recognized as the victim is different from the charges of violation of trust, and thus the defendant's exercise of his defense right could cause substantial disadvantages to the defendant's exercise of his defense right, and that the court below's ex officio decision not to recognize Eul's inheritors as the victim cannot be seen as significantly contrary to justice and equity.

1. Regarding ground of appeal No. 1

A. The purchaser of farmland who is neither a self-employed nor a self-employed person under the former Farmland Reform Act (amended by Act No. 4817, Dec. 22, 1994; hereinafter "former Farmland Reform Act") (amended by Act No. 4817, Jan. 1, 1996; hereinafter "former Farmland Reform Act") cannot acquire ownership of the farmland regardless of whether the certificate of purchase and sale of the farmland was issued, and if the purchaser of the non-farmer did not have a self-employed or self-employed intent, the purchaser may not file a claim against the seller for the implementation of the procedure for registration of transfer of ownership (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 9Da62609, 62616, Aug. 22, 2000).

B. The court below held that even if the deceased non-indicted 1 had a duty to follow the procedure for the ownership transfer registration of each of the instant land to the deceased non-indicted 2, and the deceased non-indicted 1's wife did not inherit the above duty, the defendant acquired property benefits equivalent to the market price of the instant land and suffered losses to the victim non-indicted 3 by selling the instant land to a third party and completing the ownership transfer registration in violation of his duty, the court below held that the defendant did not purchase and sell the instant land for a certain period of time since he did not have any intention to purchase and sell the instant land for the following reasons: ① Non-indicted 3 was present at the court of first instance, and the motive for the purchase of the instant land did not reach the age of the deceased non-indicted 3 when he did not purchase and sell the instant land; ② Non-indicted 3 did not have any intention to purchase and sell the instant land for a period of time since he did not purchase and sell the instant land to the non-indicted 3 for sale and purchase.

C. Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the records, the above judgment of the court below is just and acceptable, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the former Farmland Reform Act and the crime of breach of trust, as otherwise alleged in the

2. Regarding ground of appeal No. 2

A. In order to recognize facts constituting an offense different from the facts charged as stated in the indictment ex officio without changing the indictment, the court shall not only be deemed identical to the facts charged, but it shall not cause any substantial disadvantage to the defendant's exercise of his/her right to defense. Even in such cases, unless punishment is imposed, it shall not be deemed erroneous on the ground that the court did not recognize the facts constituting an offense ex officio, unless it is deemed that it significantly goes against justice and equity in light of the purpose of criminal procedure, such as prompt discovery of substantial truth by appropriate procedures, unless it is acknowledged that such facts constitute an offense (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2008Do11042, Jun. 11, 2009; 2009Do1601, Jan. 14, 2010).

B. The argument in the ground of appeal No. 2 is valid, since the sales contract on the instant land between Nonindicted 1 and Nonindicted 2 is valid, the court below may ex officio without any changes in the indictment to the purport that the heir of Nonindicted 2, other than Nonindicted 3, indicated in the facts charged, should have recognized the establishment of the crime of breach of trust by deeming the victim as the victim. However, unlike the facts charged in this case, if the heir of Nonindicted 2, as the victim, is recognized as the victim, there is no change in the defense method of the defendant to cope with it, and thus, there is a concern that the defendant's exercise of the defendant's right of defense might be practically disadvantaged. In light of the records, the court below

Therefore, the court below's decision on the charge of breach of trust against non-indicted 3 as the victim is just, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the modification of indictment as alleged in the ground of appeal.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Hong-hoon (Presiding Justice)