[2] In a case where Gap et al. referred to as "pro-North Korea", "pro-North Korea", "pro-North Korea," etc. while publishing and posting a letter criticizes Eul et al. on Twitter articles, the case holding that the aforementioned expressive act committed by Gap et al. in Twitter articles merely constitutes a tort because it is merely an expression of opinion or a suspicion of presentation of specific circumstances, or that Eul et al. is a public figure

Recognizing the responsibility of defamation caused by an expressive act ought to be recognized that the reputation was damaged by publicly alleging a fact. An objective social reputation refers to the reputation of a person. Inasmuch as a person referred to as “pro-North Korea” or “pro-North Korea” merely refers to the term “pro-North Korea” or “pro-North Korea” cannot be readily concluded as defamation, and the liability of defamation is recognized even when such expressive act objectively undermines the reputation or reputation.

Determination as to whether an expressive act constitutes defamation ought to take into account not only the expression used, but also the person who and the other party who are or are in a position. Determination of whether an expressive act constitutes defamation cannot be made solely based on the expression “drade,” “defluence,” “pro-North Korea,” “pro-North Korea” or “North Korea pro-North Korea” or such expression, and should take into account the context in which the expression was made. Consideration of the victim’s status is reflected in the doctrine of public recognition. In the case of a full-time public figure of the chief of the public debate, criticism is required for the chief of the public debate, and such criticism should be overcome through the piracy and re-brupting. The position and attitude of the speaker may affect the determination of whether the other party’s reputation was damaged by his/her speech.

In a democratic country, through the free formation and transmission of public opinion, the Majority Opinion should be gathered and maintained to create and maintain democratic political order. As such, the freedom of expression and, in particular, the freedom of expression on public concerns should be guaranteed to the maximum as an important constitutional right. However, in a case where the two legal interests conflict between the guarantee of freedom of expression and the protection of personal rights, the scope and method of regulation should be determined by weighing and balancing the value obtained from the freedom of expression in a specific case and the value achieved by the protection of personal rights.

An expression of critical opinion against another person cannot be deemed unlawful unless there exist extremely exceptional circumstances. However, in a case where the form and content of an expressive act falls under personal attack that is insulting and definite, or infringes on personal rights by making a public announcement that distorted facts going beyond a certain degree of exaggeration regarding another person’s personal affairs, it may constitute tort as exceeding the bounds of expression of opinion.

(B) Even in cases where a statement of fact is partially included in the media’s criticism or political opposition against a public official, etc., tort liability should be established with due care. As seen above, the Supreme Court has recognized liability only in cases where a press report is deemed liable for a malicious or very rush attack beyond the scope of legitimate press activities, such as surveillance, criticism, and check against a public official or public service society, and is deemed to have considerably lost reasonableness.

If the expression concerns a public figure’s political ideology, a special meaning exists. The greater national and social influence of a public figure is, and the political ideology of which a public figure exists is greater, may affect the future of the State. Therefore, the political ideology of a public figure should be thoroughly disclosed and verified, and a wide range of issues should be allowed as long as there is any doubt or suspicion about it, and a public debate should be conducted. The raising of suspicion against it should not be obstructed in the name of the honorary protection of the public figure, and it is democratic to ensure that it can be attitudeed in the competition process through debate on pros and cons.

However, it is almost impossible to prove that the political ideology of an individual or organization is not clearly revealed externally, and that it has been actually impossible to prove exactly what ideology he/she has in light of the nature of political ideology. Therefore, when considering whether the raising of suspicions or subjective evaluation is consistent with the truth or there are reasonable grounds to believe that it is true, strict proof should not be required as in the case of the general public, and the burden of proof should be mitigated by presenting specific circumstances that can raise suspicions or make subjective evaluation.

Furthermore, the issue of ideology and friendship, etc., which are the object of the public defense, is a key issue that determines the State’s future and the existence form of individual citizens. This debate is bound to involve an evaluative element. Therefore, the freedom of expression on this issue should be broadly guaranteed, and as long as an attack against the other party does not distort the other’s basic position, the division of a partial error or a certain degree of error should not block this issue by readily recognizing the responsibility of tort.

It is not desirable to impose judicial responsibilities by directly intervene in the debate or debate on political ideology. Although the political ideology of a certain person is a factual issue, in many cases, it is impossible to determine whether it is a mixture of opinions and evaluations without debate or evaluation.

(C) Being inaccurate or inappropriate expressions in any era, society, or society. On the other hand, imposing heavy legal responsibility on all such expressions cannot serve as a solution. Although strict measures are required for expressions exceeding a certain limit, it should be premised on ensuring more broad freedom of expression for free debate and mature democracy prior thereto. This is because partial erroneous or exaggerated expressions in the process of free expression of opinion and public debate cannot be avoided, and the freedom of expression is required to be functioned. Therefore, in order to narrow the scope of imposing legal liability on the grounds of defamation or insult, and more strict response should be taken as to expressions clearly exceeding the legally acceptable limit.

In order to guarantee freedom of expression from the responsibility due to defamation, the so-called “slurfing room” should be secured. There are cases where an inappropriate or unfair expression should be held liable for intentional or political responsibility, and there are cases where legal responsibility should be borne. There should not be an attempt to impose an unconditional legal liability on matters that should be held liable for intentional or political responsibility. There should be left a free and neutral space from the legal judgment for the freedom of expression.

The guarantee of freedom of expression is not a matter of left and right. The freedom of expression ought to be guaranteed regardless of the inventive step or the free expression, but has the opportunity to learn each other’s advantages and supplement each other’s unity. Although the situation in which both parties are against each other, the general public should have an opportunity to determine who is right and wrong by examining his/her debate and debate. In the process of political and ideological debate, i.e., the part that can be seen as being merely an investigation exaggeration or an influent expression that can be ordinarily held in the process of political and ideological debate may result in excessive restriction on the freedom of expression.

[Dissenting Opinion by Justice Park Jung-hwa, Justice Min You-sook, Justice Kim Seon-soo, Justice Lee Dong-won, and Justice Noh Jeong-hee] In a democratic country, freedom of expression should be guaranteed to the maximum extent possible, and in particular, criticism and verification of public figures and political ideology should be thoroughly conducted, but there is a certain limit to freedom of expression.

The premise of democracy based on the freedom of expression and its recognition and tolerance of those who have different thoughts. The freedom of expression, on the premise that thoughts and ideas recognize and use another person, can only be hidden. “Exclusion” and “sale” that does not recognize the other party as the other party to the debate can be fundamentally obstructed a democratic debate. Since the perception of the freedom of expression may cause awareness of democracy, there is a need for careful approach. Until now, the term “pro-North Korea”, “North Korea”, “North Korea”, and “▽▽▽▽▽▽▽▽▽”) have been used as a means of attack to exclude those who are prescribed as such in our society from the objects of democratic debate. In view of the fact that inaccurate or unexpected expressions in our society are difficult, given that there is a need to prevent free expression of opinion and public debate as much as possible, it is necessary to ensure that a certain extent of free expression of opinion of the other party should be guaranteed.

[2] In a case where Gap et al. referred to as "pro-North Korea", "pro-North Korea", "pro-North Korea", and "▽▽▽▽▽▽▽▽▽▽ alleged as the expression of "pro-North Korea" in preparing and posting comments against Twitter comments or articles, the case holding that the above expressive act by Gap et al. is not unlawful when considering that the meaning of the above expressive act is objectively determined, rather than a statement of fact, if it is objectively determined, and whether there is a statement of fact in order to constitute defamation, and the degree of damage should vary depending on whether it is true or false. However, even if the above expressive act includes a statement of fact, there is a presentation of specific circumstances where it is deemed that there is considerable reason to believe that there is a doubt or assertion against public official Eul et al. as the truth, considering that the above expressive act by Gap et al. is merely an expression of opinion or an assertion of opinion with specific circumstances.

1. Case progress and key issues

A. Plaintiff 1, while serving as a member of the National Assembly belonging to ○○○○○○ Party, served as the representative of ○○○○○ Party from July 2010, and served as a member of the National Assembly belonging to △△△△△△ Party from around December 2011, and served as the representative of △△△△△△△ Party. Plaintiff 2, as the husband of Plaintiff 1, is working as the co-representative attorney at △△△△ Party.

Defendant 1 opened and posted a book that criticizes the plaintiffs in his Twitter account from March 21, 2012 to March 24, 2012, as shown in attached Table 9 of the lower judgment. Defendant 2, as a representative of the Central Election Countermeasure Committee for the 19th National Assembly member at the time of the election of the 19th National Assembly member, was prepared and posted on March 25, 2012 as shown in attached Table 10 of the lower judgment. Defendant 3 and Defendant 4, who are the reporters belonging to Defendant New Daily Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Defendant New Daily”), drafted and posted a book that criticizes the plaintiffs as shown in attached Tables 1 and 12 of the lower judgment, and Defendant 1 and Defendant 4 drafted and posted it on the website of the 19th National Assembly member election for the 19th National Assembly member of the Republic of Korea, as Defendant 2, as the representative of the Central Election Management Committee for the 19th National Assembly member of the Republic of Korea.

B. The part against Defendants 2, 6, and 8, as well as the part against Defendants 6 and 8, as well as the part against Defendants Digital Chosun, which were related to Defendants 6 and 8, are deemed not to constitute tort, such as defamation, and thus, the Plaintiffs’ claim is dismissed. The part against Defendants 1, 3, 4, and Defendant New Daily, Defendant New Daily, Defendant 7, and 9, and the part against Defendant Digital Chosun, and the part against Defendant Digital Chosun, related to Defendants 7 and 9, are deemed to constitute tort due to defamation, etc., and partly accepted the Plaintiffs’ claim.

The specific contents of each defendant's judgment are as seen below 3.A and 4.

C. As to the part that the lower court did not constitute tort such as defamation, the Plaintiffs appealed on the part that the lower court did not constitute defamation, etc., and argued that defamation was not established mainly while filing an appeal on the part that the lower court found that tort was constituted by defamation, etc.

D. The key issue of the instant case is whether tort liability is established due to defamation. The lower court clearly separated and determined the part corresponding to defamation and the part corresponding to personal attacking expressions against Defendant 1, etc., and Defendant 1’s grounds of appeal are mainly concentrated on the part where the lower court acknowledged defamation.

2. Illegal liability such as defamation caused by political expressions

Before determining whether the judgment of the court below on tort such as defamation is valid, we first examine how to take the attitude about tort such as defamation by political expression.

A. The press is a pillar that supports democracy. No democracy may exist unless free expression of opinion and active debate are guaranteed. Accordingly, the freedom of speech and publication guaranteed by Article 21(1) of the Constitution is one of the essential conditions for realizing the declaration under Article 1(1) of the Constitution, “the Republic of Korea is a democratic Republic.”

Although defamation or insult against another person is not allowed, excessive liability for defamation and insult should not be a means to prevent a political expression of opinion or free debate. If a political expression is excessively wide recognized as a scope of defamation or insult or its boundary is ambiguous, the freedom of expression in the Constitution is bound to be an empty and uneasible fundamental right. This is the reason why an in-depth and prompt approach to defamation and insult is needed.

B. The Criminal Act separates the crime of defamation and the crime of insult. To establish the crime of defamation, a statement of fact must be made. The statutory penalty differs depending on whether it is true or false (Article 307(1) and (2) of the Criminal Act). If a statement of fact is not made, the crime of insult can only be established (Article 311 of the Criminal Act). Although there is no express provision as to the establishment of tort caused by defamation or insult under the Civil Act, it is desirable to regard defamation, etc. under the Civil Act as identical to defamation or insult under the Criminal Act from the perspective of consistency in legal terms and uniformity in legal system. Therefore, if a statement of fact is not made, defamation under the Civil Act should not be established. However, in response to the fact that the crime of insult under the Criminal Act can be established, it is desirable to separately recognize tort liability with respect to an expression of insulting and personal opinion.

C. Defamation, which is a tort under the Civil Act, refers to an act of openly expressing a fact to infringe on a social objective assessment of a human value, such as a person’s character, virtue, reputation, and credit. In addition, an expressive act explicitly expressing a fact to the extent likely to infringe on another’s social assessment may constitute defamation. However, an expressive act expressing a opinion or comment may constitute defamation if the assertion of a hidden basic fact, which serves as the basis of the opinion, is implicitly included in light of the overall purport thereof, and if the fact may infringe on another’s social assessment. An expressive act that separately expresses a fact that serves as the basis of the opinion can constitute defamation if it can infringe on another’s social assessment solely on the publicly alleged basic fact (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2013Da26432, Sept. 10, 2015).

However, purely expressing opinion alone does not lead to defamation. However, if the form, content, etc. of an expressive act falls under an insulting and dissipated personal attack or infringes on personal rights by publishing distorted facts going beyond a certain degree of exaggeration about another’s personal affairs, such act may constitute a tort separate from defamation (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2012Da19734, Aug. 20, 2014).

As can be seen, since the requirements for establishing tort under the Civil Act vary from the case where a fact is indicated and the case where an opinion is expressed, it is necessary to distinguish between cases where an expression constitutes a certain case of expression. In order to determine whether an expression among an article is a statement of fact or a statement of opinion, it is necessary to examine the meaning of an expression in relation to the overall purport of the article, and the underlying social flow, and to examine whether it is possible to determine the authenticity of an expression (see Supreme Court Decision 200Da14613, Dec. 24, 2002, etc.).

In a case where an expression in an article constitutes a statement of facts concerning a specific person’s political ideology, a public official, the said expression should not be required to strictly prove such an assertion as general cases when examining whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that such assertion or assertion conforms to the truth or is true (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2000Da37524, 37531, Jan. 22, 2002). However, even in such a case, the content and method of a press report, the content and public interest of suspicions, the degree of lowering the social evaluation of the public official or the public service society, the degree of effort to verify facts from news gathering or news gathering, the degree of effort to verify facts from news gathering or news gathering, and other surrounding circumstances, if a press report deviates from the legitimate scope of the press activities, such as monitoring, criticism, and check against the public official or the public service society, and is obviously or seriously deprived of reasonableness as a result of such a press report’s surveillance or attack, etc. (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 20019Do509.).

D. Defamation and insult should be dealt with separately, and the recognition of liability should also vary, thereby ensuring broad freedom of expression in relation to political debate or expression of opinion.

Recognizing the responsibility of defamation caused by an expressive act ought to be recognized that the reputation was damaged by publicly alleging a fact. An objective social reputation refers to the reputation of a person. Inasmuch as a person referred to as “pro-North Korea” or “pro-North Korea” merely refers to the term “pro-North Korea” or “pro-North Korea” cannot be readily concluded as defamation, and the liability of defamation is recognized even when such expressive act objectively undermines the reputation or reputation.

Determination as to whether an expressive act constitutes defamation ought to take into account not only the expression used, but also the person who and the other party who are or are in a position. Determination of whether an expressive act constitutes defamation cannot be made solely based on the expression “drade,” “defluence,” “pro-North Korea,” “pro-North Korea” or “North Korea pro-North Korea” or such expression, and should take into account the context in which the expression was made. Consideration of the victim’s status is reflected in the doctrine of public recognition. In the case of a full-time public figure of the chief of the public debate, criticism is required for the chief of the public debate, and such criticism should be overcome through the piracy and re-brupting. The position and attitude of the speaker may affect the determination of whether the other party’s reputation was damaged by his/her speech.

In a democratic country, through the free formation and transmission of public opinion, the Majority Opinion should be gathered and maintained to create and maintain democratic political order. As such, the freedom of expression and, in particular, the freedom of expression on public concerns should be guaranteed to the maximum as an important constitutional right. However, in a case where the two legal interests conflict between the guarantee of freedom of expression and the protection of personal rights, the scope and method of regulation should be determined by weighing and balancing the value obtained from the freedom of expression in a specific case and the value achieved by the protection of personal rights.

An expression of critical opinion against another person cannot be deemed unlawful unless there exist extremely exceptional circumstances. However, in a case where the form and content of an expressive act falls under personal attack that is insulting and definite, or infringes on personal rights by making a public announcement that distorted facts going beyond a certain degree of exaggeration regarding another person’s personal affairs, it may constitute tort as exceeding the bounds of expression of opinion.

E. Even in cases where a statement of fact is partially included in the media’s criticism or political opposition against public officials, etc., tort liability should be established with due care. As seen above, the Supreme Court has recognized liability only in cases where a press report is deemed to have considerably lost reasonableness as a malicious or highly rush attack beyond the scope of legitimate press activities, such as surveillance, criticism, and check against public officials or public service society, beyond the scope of legitimate press activities.

If the expression concerns a public figure’s political ideology, a special meaning exists. The greater national and social influence of a public figure is, and the political ideology of which a public figure exists is greater, may affect the future of the State. Therefore, the political ideology of a public figure ought to be thoroughly disclosed and verified, and a wide range of issues should be allowed as long as there is any doubt or doubt thereon, and a public debate is required to be held. It is democratic to ensure that the raising of suspicion against a public figure should not be obstructed in the name of an honorary protection of a public figure, on the grounds that it is prior to the accurate argument or public judgment is made, and that it should be attitudeed in the course of competition through debate for pros and cons (Supreme Court Decision 200Da37524, 37531 Decided January 22, 2002).

However, it is almost impossible to prove that the political ideology of an individual or organization is not clearly revealed externally, and that it has been actually impossible to prove exactly what ideology he/she has in light of the nature of political ideology. Therefore, when considering whether the raising of suspicions or subjective evaluation is consistent with the truth or there are reasonable grounds to believe that it is true, strict proof should not be required as in the case of the general public, and the burden of proof should be mitigated by presenting specific circumstances that can raise suspicions or make subjective evaluation (see, e.g., the above judgment).

Furthermore, the issue of ideology and friendship, etc., which are the object of the public defense, is a key issue for determining the State’s future and the existence style of individual citizens. This debate is inevitably accompanied by an evaluative element. Therefore, the freedom of expression on this issue should be broadly guaranteed, and as long as an attack against the other party does not distort the other’s basic position, the division of a partial error or a certain degree of error should not readily block this issue by readily recognizing the responsibility of tort (see Supreme Court Decision 2000Da14613, Dec. 24, 2002, etc.).

It is not desirable to impose judicial responsibilities by directly intervene in the debate or debate on political ideology. Although the political ideology of a certain person is a factual issue, in many cases, it is impossible to determine whether it is a mixture of opinions and evaluations without debate or evaluation.

F. Being inaccurate or inappropriate expressions in any era, society, or society. However, imposing heavy legal responsibility on all such expressions cannot serve as a solution. Although strict measures are required for expressions exceeding a certain limit, it should be premised on ensuring more widening the freedom of expression for free debate and mature democracy prior thereto. This is because partial erroneous or exaggerated expressions in the process of free expression of opinion and public debate cannot be avoided, and the freedom of expression is required to have a hidden room necessary for its survival in order to function as a freedom of expression (see Supreme Court Decision 2000Da37524, 37531, Jan. 22, 2002). Therefore, the scope of imposing legal liability on the grounds of defamation or insult should be narrow, but more strict countermeasures should be taken against expressions exceeding a legally acceptable limit.

In order to guarantee freedom of expression from the responsibility due to defamation, the so-called “slurfing room” should be secured. There are cases where an inappropriate or unfair expression should be held liable for intentional or political responsibility, and there are cases where legal responsibility should be borne. There should not be an attempt to impose an unconditional legal liability on matters that should be held liable for intentional or political responsibility. There should be left a free and neutral space from the legal judgment for the freedom of expression.

The guarantee of freedom of expression is not a matter of left and right. The freedom of expression ought to be guaranteed regardless of the inventive step or the free expression, but has the opportunity to learn each other’s advantages and supplement each other’s unity. Although the situation in which both parties are against each other, the general public should have an opportunity to determine who is right and wrong by examining his/her debate and debate. In the process of political and ideological debate, i.e., the part that can be seen as being merely an investigation exaggeration or an influent expression that can be ordinarily held in the process of political and ideological debate may result in excessive restriction on the freedom of expression.

3. Determination on the grounds of appeal by Defendant 1, Defendant 3, Defendant 4, Defendant New Daily, Defendant 7, Defendant 9, Defendant Digital Chosun, and Defendant Shipbuilding

A. The judgment of the court below

(1) The part of the claim against Defendant 1

The lower court acknowledged that Defendant 1 posted the following comments on his/her Twitter account. In other words, the Plaintiffs were pro-North Korea-North Korea-North Korea-North Korea-North Korean-North Korea-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-Korean relationship, which is the premise of the National Security Act, published a thesis that denies the 6/25 South Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-Korean-Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-Korean relationship. Plaintiff 2 created a pro-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-Korean relationship from January 1, 2012>

On the premise of such factual basis, the lower court determined as follows by distinguishing the tort caused by defamation and personal attack, and determined consolation money due to Defendant 1’s tort. ① In Korea where the National Security Act is in force, where a specific person is classified as “pro-North Korea” or is classified as “pro-North Korea” in which North Korea is pro-North Korea, or North Korea is regarded as a pro-North Korea, in which a specific person is perceived as a pro-North Korea’s political force or North Korea’s political force is regarded as a pro-North Korea’s political force, he/she is subject to criminal punishment by committing an act denying the identity and constitutional basic order of the Republic of Korea as a person who is obliged to be subject to criminal punishment by committing an act denying the identity and constitutional basic order of the Republic of Korea, and thus his/her reputation and reputation are considerably damaged, and thus, such act should be deemed to be prejudicial to that person’s reputation. ② In the above Twitter comments, it cannot be deemed sufficient that the Plaintiffs raised suspicion or subjective evaluation of their own character as a pro-North Korea and North Korea’s.

(2) The part of the claim against Defendant 7, Defendant 9, Defendant Digital Chosun, and Defendant Shipbuilding

The lower court acknowledged the following facts. ① Defendant 7 prepared and posted an article in attached Form 15 of the lower judgment with the content of citing Defendant 1’s Twitter bulletin on online newspaper online newspapers operated by Defendant Digital Chosun. ② Defendant 9 prepared and posted an article in attached Table 17 of the lower judgment with the content of citing Defendant 1’s Twitter bulletin on the daily newspaper newspapers published by Chosun.com and Defendant Chosun Shipbuilding.

이어서 원심은 다음과 같은 이유로, 피고 7, 피고 9, 피고 디지틀조선, 피고 조선일보가 원고들에게 불법행위로 인한 위자료를 지급할 의무가 있다고 판단하였다. ① 피고 7에 대하여는, 다른 사람의 말을 인용하였다는 이유만으로 명예훼손의 책임이 부정되는 것은 아니고, 피고 7은 기자로서 특히 다른 사람의 명예를 훼손하는 타인의 말을 보도할 때에는 그것이 진실인지 여부에 관하여 조사할 주의의무가 있으나 이러한 주의의무를 다하였다고 보기 어렵다. 의혹의 제기나 주관적인 평가를 내릴 수 있는 구체적 정황의 제시가 충분하다고 볼 수 없다. 또한 위와 같은 표현의 내용은 다른 표현들과 결합하여 부부인 원고들이 대등한 관계가 아니고, 이데올로그인 원고 2가 지적 능력이 부족한 때부터 원고 1을 조종하고 이용하였다는 인상을 주는 것으로서, 사실을 왜곡하여 인격을 침해하는 표현이다. ② 피고 9에 대하여는, 피고 1의 위 트위터 게시글을 인용하여 보도하면서 원고 2가 ▽▽▽▽연합보다 북한에 더 우호적으로서 이적단체로 판결된 ‘◎◎◎ ◎◎◎◎ ◎◎◎◎’와 가깝다고 함으로써, 원고 1과 원고 2가 종북·주사파임을 암시하거나 강조한 기사이다.

(3) The portion of the claim against Defendant 3, Defendant 4, and Defendant New Daily

The lower court acknowledged the following facts. ① Defendant 3 drafted and posted an article in [Attachment 11] of the lower judgment on the online newspaper New Daily, which cited Defendant 1’s Twitter bulletin, on the online newspaper New Daily. ② Defendant 4 concluded the Plaintiffs to be pro-North Korea/North Korea to return to the Republic of Korea in the aforementioned New Daily, and prepared and posted an article in [Attachment 12] of the lower judgment that the aforementioned provision should be punished as the National Security Act.

For the following reasons, the lower court determined that Defendant 3, Defendant 4, and Defendant New Daily had the obligation to pay consolation money for tort to the Plaintiffs. ① In that regard, with respect to Defendant 3, it cannot be deemed that the presentation of specific circumstances that may raise suspicion or make subjective evaluations on the aforementioned part of the judgment regarding Defendant 7, and is an expression that infringes on character by distorted facts. ② As to Defendant 4, the lower court concluded the Plaintiffs as pro-North Korea/North Korea to return the Republic of Korea, and should punish them under the National Security Act. The expressions also include suspicions, anti-defluences, anti-espionages, and insulting expressions that cannot be seen in other newspapers without any effort to respect personality. There is no evidence to acknowledge that Defendant 4 made efforts by the Plaintiffs to confirm facts from coverage or insulting news gathering to news gathering. Even if the Plaintiffs are public figures, it is not only a malicious or malicious expression that the Plaintiffs have prepared the foregoing news report, but also is also deemed to have considerably lost character beyond the scope of the media activity.

B. Determination on Defendant 1’s grounds of appeal

(1) The lower court determined that tort liability, such as defamation, was established against the above Twitter comments or articles prepared and posted by Defendant 1, etc.. The lower court determined that the part of the Plaintiffs’ “pro-North Korea forces”, “pro-North Korea” part, and “pro-North Korea” part of the “pro-North Korea forces”, and “pro-North Korea” constituted defamation individually on the premise of such determination. In so determining, the lower court deemed that the Plaintiffs were subject to criminal punishment by committing an act that dispro-North Korea’s identity and constitutional basic order with the unpro-North Korean regime and committing an act that denies the Republic of Korea’s identity and constitutional order, and deemed that they were anti-social forces (the part of the lower judgment that deemed as the grounds for final appeal among the lower judgment is the part that used expressive acts, such as pro-North Korea, pro-North Korea, pro-North Korea, and pro-North Korea, constitutes defamation, and that the part caused by personal attack is not clearly

However, examining the facts indicated in the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the aforementioned legal doctrine, it should be deemed that Defendant 1, etc.’s expressive act in the above Twitter or news articles (hereinafter “instant expressive act”) is merely an expression of opinion or a suspicion at the presentation of specific circumstances, and thus, it does not constitute tort, or that the Plaintiffs’ recognition is not illegal in light of the fact that such expressive act is public official

In order to objectively determine the meaning of the instant expressive act, there is room to regard it as an expression of opinion rather than an expression of fact. In order to constitute defamation, the issue of whether a statement of fact exists and the degree of damages ought to be different depending on whether it is true or false. The lower court did not determine whether the instant expressive act is a fact or a false fact. Even if the instant expressive act includes a statement of fact, there is room to deem that there was a presentation of specific circumstances to deem that there is a reasonable ground to believe that an assertion of suspicion or assertion against the Plaintiffs, a public official, was true. More detailed examination is as follows.

(2) The lower court concluded that, in determining the meaning of the instant expressive act by Defendant 1, etc., the term “pro-North Korea”, “North Korea”, “North Korea”, and “▽▽▽▽▽▽”) were significant and that the facts were publicly stated.

In determining the meaning of the expressive act, the ordinary meaning of the words used is one of the important criteria for determination. However, even when considering the ordinary meaning of the above words, it is not reasonable for the lower court to regard all the instant expressive act as a statement of fact.

First, the phrase “pro-North Korea” was used in criticizeing the so-called “self-North Korea” to the effect that the so-called “genderion” of ○○○○○○○○ Party had no identity and autonomy in relation to the party’s policies or ideological direction, and was used in various ways until the meaning of “pro-state and anti-social forces,” namely, “pro-state and anti-social forces,” which new the principal ideology and deny the identity and consistency of the Republic of Korea,” and “persons who seem to have a critical view on the government’s anti-North Korea policy.”

Next, since the words “pro-North Korea” have arisen from the situation where the Republic of Korea and North Korea are opposite, the concept and scope of the term itself vary depending on the historical and political situation, such as changes in the relationship between the Republic of Korea and North Korea, changes in North Korea’s position or attitude toward the Republic of Korea, and the degree of tension between the two countries. Moreover, given that not only the average general public but also the people who have become the subject of the expression are bound to feel feel in respect of the term “pro-North Korea,” it is difficult to objectively determine the meaning of “pro-North Korea.”

The same applies to the instant expressive act. In a case where an article using the term “North Korea-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-North Korean-Korean-North Korean-Korean-North Korean-North Korean-Korean-North Korean-Korean-North Korean-Korean-Korean-North Korean-Korean-North Korean-Korean-Korean-North Korean-Korean-Korean-North Korean-Korean-Korean-North Korean-Korean-

In light of the times and political circumstances where the democratic political system has been developed over a ten-year period since the above Supreme Court ruling was rendered and the freedom of expression has been expanded, evaluation of the term “North Korea” should also be changed. In this case, the term “North Korea” in the instant case may be deemed as a epidemiologic director in order to criticize the political behavior or attitude of the Plaintiffs on the operation of the △△△△△ Party or the 19th election of proportional representative National Assembly members, because it was used in parallel with the term “North Korea”, and thus, it may be deemed that the term “North Korea” was operated by the △△△△△ Party or the 1

(3) At the time of the instant expressive act, Plaintiff 1 was officially recognized as a member of the National Assembly and the representative of the public party. In light of Plaintiff 2’s husband, Plaintiff 2, and his social activity experience, etc., which may be known through records, it would suffice to deem that there was a public position or a position equivalent thereto. Therefore, there is a need to allow a wide range of questions or suspicions as to the Plaintiffs’ political ideology. In particular, Plaintiff 1, as a member of the National Assembly who enjoys the privilege of immunity, had sufficient opportunity to undergo citizen’s evaluation through mutual political public criticism, such as rebuttal and criticism, corresponding to the expressions “▽▽▽▽▽▽▽▽

According to the record, there were a lot of media reports relevant to the instant expressive act. Around March 2012, Nonparty 1 and Nonparty 2, at the time of Nonparty 2, who were joint representatives of △△△△△△△△△ Party at the time of Nonindicted Party 1 and May 2012, Nonparty 2 argued to the effect that “the political party that is called as △△△△△△ Group” exists within the △△△△△△△△ Party. On March 21, 2012, when the instant expressive act was carried out, the news bulletin on March 21, 2012, which was the time of the instant expressive act, “The Plaintiff 1 himself/herself generated a material?” From the article, “The Plaintiff 2, who was the head of △△△△△△△△△△△△△△△△△△△△△△△△△△△△ Group, was an active news article, and even the Plaintiff 1 was the representative of the △△△△△ Party.”

In addition, on May 14, 2012, Nonparty 3, a media performer in the past ○○○○○○○○ Party, evaluated Plaintiff 1 as follows: (a) “I am sa sacity, which was revealed as a Maiopt of the fact-finding of the advancement of the division, but is far close to the lower, and why is, I am hickly, and I am hickly hickly off this division; (b) I am hickly, I am hickly, and I am hicked. I am hickly, I am hickly, I am hickly, the force of the political party saved with the power desire at the end.”

Considering such media reports and circumstances at the time, there is room to deem that Defendant 1, etc. had considerable grounds to believe that the instant expressive act was true.

(4) Even if liability for defamation is denied on the ground that there is no statement of fact in the expressions such as pro-North Korea or pro-North Korea, insult or personal attack may also be a tort, a thorough examination should be conducted as to whether tort liability is recognized on the ground of insult, etc. (as seen above, the part recognizing liability for damages on the ground that the personality was infringed due to insulting expressions (section 33 of the judgment of the lower court) or the part denying sexual discrimination (section 35 of the judgment of the lower court) are not included in the allegation in the grounds of appeal. Therefore, it is clearly clear that the determination on this part is not made). Considering that the instant expressive act was conducted in the course of political and ideological debate, a careful decision should be made in view of the degree of guarantee of freedom of expression beyond moral or political responsibility.

(5) Nevertheless, the lower court recognized the illegality of the instant expressive act by Defendant 1, etc., even if it recognized defamation and considered that the Plaintiffs were public figures. In so determining, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the establishment of tort by defamation, thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment

4. Judgment on the plaintiffs' grounds of appeal

A. The part of the claim against the defendant 2

The lower court determined that Defendant 2’s name as indicated in [Attachment 10] of the lower judgment announced by Defendant 2 could not be recognized as illegality on the following grounds. The above name is a political comment by a party representative, which is a question of whether Plaintiff 1 was influenced by the political party or the fact that Plaintiff 1 was not significantly involved in the process of selecting a candidate for the election of the 19th National Assembly member. Such doubt of doubt seems reasonable.

Examining the relevant legal principles and evidence duly admitted, the lower court did not err in its judgment by misapprehending the fact beyond the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules, contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of

B. As to the claim against Defendant 8 and the claim against Defendant Digital Shipbuilding related thereto

The lower court determined that the article 16 attached to the lower judgment that Defendant 8 reported was not illegal for the following reasons. Defendant 8, as the reporter of Defendant Digital Chosun Shipbuilding, cited and reported the above name that Defendant 2 announced as a representative of the Central Election Countermeasures Committee of △△△ Party. Since the illegality of the above name is not recognized, the foregoing article cited and reported is not recognized as illegal.

The lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding the establishment of defamation by publicly alleging false facts, contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal.

C. The part of the claim against the defendant 6 and the related claim against the defendant Digital Shipbuilding and Chosun Chosun.

For the following reasons, the lower court determined that the illegality of the article No. 13 attached to the lower judgment, which was prepared by Defendant 6, who is the reporter of the Defendant Digital Chosun Shipbuilding, and the Chosun Chosun Day, was not recognized. ① Of the above articles, the part directly related to Plaintiff 1 is not only the part that Plaintiff 1 is not the actual nor the actual objection of the ▽▽▽▽▽▽▽▽▽▽△ Union. The key contents of the article are as to who is and is operated by the head of the ▽▽▽▽▽▽▽▽▽▽▽△△△△△. ② Even if the part that Plaintiff 1 did not have substantial authority is detrimental to Plaintiff 1’s reputation, the following circumstances must be taken into account. In other words, Plaintiff 1 should be subject to a certain degree of suspicion and criticism as a political person who is a public figure. The issue raising or suspicion regarding the matter related to a public figure is widely permitted and subject to open debate. The article deals with the question about who is actually true and considerable interest of the ▽▽▽▽▽▽▽▽△△ affairs are extremely difficult to prove it.

Examining the relevant legal principles and evidence duly admitted, the lower court did not err in its judgment by misapprehending the fact beyond the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules, contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of

5. Conclusion

Without examining the remaining grounds of appeal by Defendant 1, etc., the part against Defendant 1, etc. among the judgment below is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the court below for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. All appeals by the plaintiffs are dismissed, and the costs of appeal against Defendants 2, 6, and 8 are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices, except for a dissenting opinion by Justice Park Jung-hwa, Min You-sook, Justice Min You-sook, Justice Kim Dong-soo, Justice Lee Dong-won, and Justice Noh Jeong-hee as to

6. Dissenting Opinion by Justice Park Jung-hwa, Justice Min You-sook, Justice Kim Seon-soo, Justice Lee Dong-won, and Justice Noh Jeong-hee as to the grounds of appeal by Defendant

A. As to the meaning of the Majority Opinion

The Majority Opinion does not seem to have asserted a new legal doctrine regarding the recognition of defamation by a statement of fact. The Majority Opinion, including Supreme Court Decision 2013Da26432 Decided September 10, 2015, regarding the criteria for recognition in a mixture of statement of fact and statement of opinion, and Supreme Court Decision 2000Da14613 Decided December 24, 2002, regarding the criteria for determining a statement of fact related to the political ideology of a specific person who is a public figure, including Supreme Court Decision 200Da37524, 37531 Decided January 22, 2002, Supreme Court Decision 204Da35199 Decided May 12, 2006, and Supreme Court Decision 200Da146175 Decided 14, 198, regarding the criteria for recognition in a case where two legal interests conflict between protection of personality rights and guarantee of freedom of expression.

The legal doctrine regarding the criteria for distinguishing facts from expression of opinion, guarantee of freedom of expression and its limitation, which the Majority Opinion considers as the grounds for reversal, has already been applied to various aspects in several cases. Accordingly, the Majority Opinion does not determine a new legal doctrine, but only applied the existing legal doctrine in the instant case.

B. The significance and limitation of freedom of political expression

(1) In a democratic state, freedom of expression should be guaranteed to the maximum, and in particular, criticism and verification of public figures and political ideology should be made thoroughly, but there should be certain limits to freedom of expression. “If press reports go beyond the legitimate scope of media activities such as surveillance, criticism, and check against public officials or public service society, and are assessed to lose substantial reasonableness as a malicious or highly rush attack,” “where the form and content of an expression constitutes an insulting and definite personal attack or infringe on personal rights by making a public announcement distorted of facts going beyond a certain degree of exaggeration about another’s personal affairs,” “where the attack against the other party is distorted of the other party’s basic position,” etc. It goes beyond the bounds of freedom of expression, and constitutes tort. Ultimately, both the majority opinion and the dissenting opinion should guarantee freedom of expression to the maximum extent possible in a democratic state, and in particular, criticism and verification of public figures or political ideology should be made thoroughly, but there is no limit to freedom of expression.”

(2) The freedom of expression and the premise of democracy based on the freedom of expression are recognized and tolerance of those who have different thoughts. On the premise of recognizing and toleranceing another person, the freedom of expression can only be hidden. “Exclusion” and “sale” that does not recognize the other party as the other party to the debate may be fundamentally obstructed a democratic debate. Since the perception of freedom of expression is likely to excluding other persons, a careful approach is needed. In our society, the term “pro-North Korea”, “North Korea”, “North Korea”, and the “▽▽▽▽▽▽▽▽▽▽”) have been used as a means of attack to exclude the people as defined in such position from the objects of democratic debate. In order to reach democracy through a reasonable and democratic debate, such extreme expressions should be avoided. In view of the fact that inaccurate or unfavorable expressions in our society are unlikely to be recognized as the other party to the debate, it is necessary to ensure that the other party’s free expression of opinion and the other party’s expression of opinion should be restricted to the maximum extent possible, and if so, it is necessary to guarantee the public expression and the other party’s free expression.

(3) The fact that the instant case is not a criminal case for imposing a penalty, but a civil case for seeking compensation for damages. Criminal procedures and criminal liability therefrom, which are undertaken to impose a penalty, are deemed to be the last means because the State’s power limits fundamental rights by exercising public power against the citizens. On the other hand, civil procedures and civil liability, as a matter of principle, may be recognized if one party infringes on his/her rights, as it is for the relief of rights between individuals. Accordingly, there is a difference in the degree of illegality where criminal liability is imposed and civil liability is imposed. It would be desirable to suppress criminal liability on the grounds of expressive act in a democratic society. However, taking civil liability into account, it is necessary to recognize if one party illegally damages his/her reputation or is insulting.

It is an established legal doctrine to distinguish civil liability and criminal liability. In a case where a police officer used a gun in the process of suppressing a criminal offender and caused the death of a criminal, the Supreme Court determined that tort liability under the civil law can be recognized regardless of whether the judgment of innocence on the use of a gun became final and conclusive. As such, the Supreme Court held as follows: “Criminal liability arising from a tort is held liable for an act violating the legal order of society, and is subject to public sanction (criminal punishment) against the offender; while civil liability is imposed on the offender for an act violating the legal order of society, the civil liability is held liable for the infringement of another person’s legal interest; thus, the compensation for damages is based on the guiding principle; thus, the damage compensation system is the fair and reasonable burden; thus, even if it does not constitute a criminal offense, whether it constitutes a tort under the civil law should be examined from a different point of view from criminal liability.”

C. As to the part concerning defamation by statement of fact

(1) In citing the lower court’s determination as to Defendant 1’s claim, the Majority Opinion set the scope of the Supreme Court’s determination on the following grounds by citing the lower court’s determination, “a determination that tort liability, such as defamation, is constituted.” In addition, the Majority Opinion concluded that the lower court determined that the term “pro-North Korea”, “North Korea North Korea”, and “pro-North Korea” solely constituted a statement of fact, and concluded that the term is not a statement of fact, but a statement of opinion or doubt-raising rather than a statement of fact as a multiple concept (pro-North Korea), and an investigative exaggeration. Therefore, the Majority appears to have recognized that the term “pro-North Korea” constituted a statement

(2) The Majority Opinion runs counter to the lower court’s lawful findings of fact.

The Twitter comments posted by Defendant 1 on 22 occasions include three words, such as “pro-North Korea North Korea” “pro-North Korea pro-North Korea”, and “pro-North Korea discourses”, were combined and used. In addition, the specific facts, such as the name of a specific political party and the real name of related persons, are indicated.

구체적으로 게시한 내용을 살펴보면 다음과 같다. “원고 1 뒤를 이을 주사파 차세대 아이돌 소외 4가 당선된 △△당 청년비례 선거조작, 이게 더 큰 문제인데.”, “종북 주사파의 조직 특성상 원고 1에게는 판단할 권리조차 없을 겁니다. 조직에서 시키는 대로 따라하는 거죠. ▽▽▽▽연합에서 원고 1로 버티고 가겠다고 결정했으면 그 길로 가는 겁니다.”, “원고 1 남편 원고 2가 2004. 12.에 발표한 6·25 남침을 부정하는 〈국가보안법의 전제인 북한에 의한 무력남침, 적화통일론의 허구성〉이란 논문, 이게 주사파 ▽▽▽▽의 입장이지요.”, “원고 1이 ▽▽▽▽연합의 마스코트에 불과하다면, 원고 1은 남편과 함께 ▽▽▽▽ 그 자체입니다.”, “제가 아는 바로는 대학 1학년 때부터 ▽▽▽▽연합에서 원고 1을 찍었고, 남편 원고 2 등이 대중선동 능력만 집중적으로 가르쳐서 아이돌 스타로 기획했습니다.”, “▽▽▽▽연합이 실제로 머리 역할하는 원고 2, 소외 5 대신 이들의 부인인 원고 1, 소외 4를 얼굴마담으로 내세우는 건, 김정일이 미녀응원단 돌리는 것과 똑같은 발상으로 보입니다.”, “원고 1 남편 원고 2가 ▽▽▽▽연합의 브레인이자 이데올로그라는 점은 다들 알고 있습니다. 6·25 남침을 정면에서 부정하는 인물이죠.”, “원고 1 남편이 자신은 ▽▽▽▽의 이데올로그란 게 코메디라는데, 소외 6 가짜론, 6·25 남침 부인론 만들어내는 게 이데올로그의 역할이지 뭡니까?”, “저는 원고 2가 이데올로그라 표현했어요, ▽▽▽▽의 종북담론을 만들어낸 건 팩트니, 문제 없죠.”

The articles written by Defendant 4 also use the expression “pro-North Korea-North Korea-North Korea-North Korea-North Korea-North Korea-North Korea-North Korea relationship relationship,” “Plaintiff 1......, in the course of the abortion, the pro-North Korea-North Korea-North Korea-North Korea-North Korea relationship organization, Plaintiff 2, who is affiliated with Plaintiff 2, runs as a pro-North Korea-North Korea-North Korea-North Korea relationship,” and “Plaintiff 1 associate military personnel, Plaintiff 2, et al., are working as a pro-North Korea-North Korea-North Korea relationship. At this time, the organization created by the North Korean-North Korea-North Korea relationship, as a pro-North Korea-North Korea relationship.”

The articles written by Defendant 3 cited and reported Defendant 1’s Twitter comments. The contents of the reports are as follows: “The relationship between Plaintiff 1-Plaintiff 2 and Nonparty 4-B and the husband of Nonparty 5 is too equal. The husband is the head of the husband, and the denial plays a role, and the husband is planning another r. another r. r.” “The proportional representative candidate for the △△△△△△△△△△△△△△△△△△△△△△△△△ Party is a planned product with the representative of Plaintiff 1, which was created by the △△△△△△△△△△△△△△△△△△△△△△△△△○, a political party for the △△△△△△△△△△△△△△△△△△△△△△△△△△△△△△ Party” and “Plaintiff 1 was marked in the ▽△△△△△△

The article written by Defendant 7 also cited Defendant 1’s comments, and added the article “ Nonparty 5, the husband of Nonparty 4 candidate, was detained as a charge of creating and working for a pro rata organization called the “YYUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUU

The lower court recognized that the Plaintiffs’ reputation was damaged due to a statement of fact on the grounds that, in full view of the fact that Twitter comments were used in a parallel with pro-North Korea and pro-North Korea, and the context, preparation, and dissemination of the aforementioned Twitter comments, the expressions that a specific person is affiliated with the ▽▽▽▽▽▽▽▽▽▽▽”) recognized as a pro-North Korea force or pro-North Korea force, by pro-North Korea’s political power, and by committing an act of denying the identity and constitutional basic order of the Republic of Korea, and that such expressions were committed as a person subject to criminal punishment by committing an act of denying the identity and constitutional basic order of the Republic of Korea, who is an anti

Furthermore, the lower court denied the liability for damages on the ground that the knives prepared by Nonparty 7, a co-defendant 7, was merely a pure opinion without a statement of fact, and that the Plaintiffs did not dispute this part, and thus became final and conclusive. Defendant 2 denied defamation according to the criteria set forth by the Majority Opinion on the ground that

As such, the lower court, based on lawful fact-finding, classified the words “pro-North Korea”, “North Korea”, “North Korea”, and “North Korea”, “North Korea”, “North Korea” and “North Korea”, along with the language and text of the expression used in each posting, and divided into the language and text of the article into the overall purport of the article, and the text and text of the article, which is recognized as a statement of fact in relation to the underlying social trend.

If so, even though the court below can be seen as a critical or investigative exaggeration of the politician, it is clear that the court below did not neglect this aspect.

(3) The majority opinion is inconsistent with Supreme Court Decision 2000Da14613 Delivered on December 24, 2002.

The Majority Opinion determined that the use of the term “pro-North Korea” does not constitute a statement of fact, and that an article using the term “pro-North Korea” was already recognized as defamation by a statement of fact. As to the above Supreme Court Decision 2000Da14613 Decided December 24, 2002, it is explained that the above Supreme Court Decision examined the entire purport, etc. of the article along with the language of the relevant expression, and determined as a statement of fact. Although the above Supreme Court Decision 2000Da14613 Decided December 24, 200, the expression “pro-North Korea” appears to be purely expressed, it is reasonable to view the article as a statement of fact that can prove the authenticity, considering the whole of the article

It can be understood in the same context of Supreme Court Decision 2000Da37524, 37531 Decided January 22, 2002, which held that a media organization’s article expressed the method of strike by the National Federation of Democratic Trade Unions as soon as possible constituted defamation.

The instant case has the same structure as the above two Supreme Court Decisions. Examining the context in which Defendant 1 et al. used the expressions of pro-North Korea and the purport of the entire text, it means that the Plaintiffs are affiliated with the ▽▽▽▽▽▽▽▽△ members, which are perceived as pro-North Korea force or pro-North Korea force, and used it as a force that denies the identity of the Republic of Korea and the constitutional basic order by pro-enemy North Korea’s political power

(4) The Majority Opinion erred by misapprehending the standard point of time for determination.

The Majority Opinion, prior to the Supreme Court Decision 200Da14613 Decided this case’s ruling, which recognized the pro-North Korea as defamation by a statement of fact, has developed a democratic politics for more than one year, and considering the times and political situation in which the freedom of expression has been expanded, the evaluation of the term “pro-North Korea” should be changed. The term “pro-North Korea-North Korea-North Korea-North Korea-North Korea-North Korea-North Korea-North Korea-North Korea-U.

In determining whether a specific expression is a statement of fact, the above precedents have already been revealed that it is necessary to examine the meaning of the relevant expression in relation to the underlying social flow, and the determination of whether a statement of fact is a statement of fact should examine the social background and flow at the time of use of such expression.

At the time of the declaration of the Supreme Court decision, the instant expressive act, including Defendant 1, etc., was carried out in the form of Defendant New Daily, which was evaluated as twitter and newspaper with remuneration tendency, and the name was received and announced by the party employees at the time. While Plaintiff 1 is the representative of a political party, Plaintiff 2 was in a position equivalent thereto, in light of the overall situation of our society at the time, the Plaintiffs were located in the minority. At the time of the instant expressive act, the said expressive act was carried out with the intention of preventing the votes obtained by △△△△△△, which represents the advancement of the 19th National Assembly election in the 19th National Assembly members. In order to determine whether the political ideology, which the government and the Defendants claimed, was in the position of the minority. The Majority Opinion seems to have strongly expressed that it is difficult for the general public to control and promulgate the so-called “the election campaign” of this case, rather than in the situation of the 19th National Assembly members, and that it would be difficult for the two people to feel and feel.

The Majority Opinion does not seem to view the expressive act that was made within such social context from the present point of view as of the date of the Supreme Court ruling that held two presidential elections and general election of National Assembly members and that of the Supreme Court ruling that held inter-Korean summits

(5) The Majority Opinion, without any evidence, acknowledged that there was considerable reason to believe that the instant expressive act was true.

The Majority Opinion argues that there is room to deem that Defendant 1, etc. had a considerable reason to believe the instant expressive act as true in light of the contents and circumstances of the press reports and the situation at the time of such media reports. In light of the foregoing, there is room to deem that there is a considerable reason for Defendant 1, etc. to believe that the instant expressive act was true.

However, the lower court determined that, in full view of the following circumstances: (a) on April 16, 207, when the Majority Opinion recognized various media reports including the media reports, it was determined that there was an organization of the “” organization that was sentenced to the judgment of the case of violation of the National Security Act against Nonparty 8, etc. on April 16, 2007; (b) in the course of the investigation or trial, there was no evidence from which Plaintiff 1 was aware of the fact that Plaintiff 1 was in the position of the ▽▽▽▽▽▽▽▽▽▽▽▽; (c) and (d) Nonparty 9, etc., who was suspected of being in the position of the said ▽▽▽▽▽▽▽▽▽▽▽▽▽▽▽▽” was indicted as a conspiracy of insurrection, but there was no evidence to confirm that Plaintiff 1 was in the process of investigation or trial, and there was no evidence to prove that Plaintiff 1 was in the said Twitter comments, North Korea, North Korea, and North Korea. Meanwhile, the lower court determined that there was no sufficient evidence to deem that Defendant 2’s subjective evidence to present evidence.

The majority opinion does not state any point after the fact-finding and decision of the court below.

(6) The lower court’s conclusion is compressed into the part ordering a corrective report.

The lower court ordered the Defendants to make a corrective report stating that “The Plaintiffs are affiliated with the ▽▽▽▽▽▽▽▽△ Group that is a pro-North Korea and North Korea-North Korea-North Korea-North Korea organization, and the Plaintiffs were also pro-North Korea-North Korea-North Korea-North Korea, but Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 were affiliated with the ▽▽▽▽▽▽▽▽▽△△ group as a pro-North Korea-North Korea organization or was not confirmed as North Korea-North Korea-North Korea-North

In the instant expressive act, the term “pro-North Korea” means pro-North Korea’s pro-North Korea’s pro-enemy and may be placed in the same affiliation as North Korea’s pro-North Korea. The term “North Korea pro-North Korea” refers to a group that commemorates the Revolution of South Korea’s Democratic Revolution, which is the route of North Korea’s revolution with the guiding ideology and action guidelines. It can be understood as having been used as an organization consisting of North Korea and pro-North Korea’s pro-North Korea.

Therefore, the court below is correct to have determined that a person who is subject to criminal punishment by committing an act denying the identity and constitutional order of the Republic of Korea and who is subject to criminal punishment in the case where a specific person is classified as a “North Korea” or a North Korea is classified as a “North Korea” in the reality of the Republic of Korea where the South and North Korea is pro-North Korea and the National Security Act is in force, or is classified as a “North Korea” in which the North Korea is pro-North Korea and North Korea is pro-North Korea, or that the person should be subject to criminal punishment by committing an act denying the identity and constitutional order of the Republic of Korea, and that the person’s social reputation and reputation are considerably damaged thereby, and thus,

D. As to the part on the infringement of personal rights due to insulting expressions

(1) The expression of the Majority Opinion on insult is erroneous beyond the scope of determination.

The major issue of the instant case is whether tort liability is established due to defamation, and in determining the grounds of appeal by Defendant 1, etc., the Majority clearly stated that “the lower judgment recognizing defamation is erroneous in the misapprehension of legal doctrine.” It also stated that the part for which liability for damages was recognized due to insult is not determined.

However, while examining only the illegality of the lower court in relation to defamation as above, the Majority Opinion determined that the same standard should apply to defamation and insult along with the same reasoning, and determined as to whether the infringement of personal rights by insulting expressions was committed by “..... the scope of insult is too broad or not,” “... the scope of imposing legal liability on the ground of insult is narrow,” “...... the scope of imposing legal liability on the ground of insult is narrow,” and “.. the process of political and ideological debate... whether to recognize legal liability should be determined with caution in consideration of the degree of guarantee of freedom of expression.”

However, the part of infringement of personal rights due to insulting expressions is not different in the final appeal. The reasons are as follows.

(2) We examine whether the claim for damages on the ground of tort caused by insulting and personal attack expressions and the claim for damages on the ground of tort caused by defamation is a separate subject matter or the same subject matter of lawsuit.

In criminal law, defamation is stipulated in Article 307(1) and (2), and insult is stipulated in Article 311, and it is necessary to strictly distinguish both parties in order to determine whether the prosecutor's indictment constitutes the elements of a crime.

However, it is merely a difference in legal evaluation as to whether a statement of fact is a statement of fact or merely an expression of opinion under the Civil Act. The instant expressive act, which constitutes the cause of the claim, is the same as the instant expressive act, which constitutes the cause of the claim, and the relevant norms are the same as the right to claim damages pursuant to Articles 750 and 751 of the Civil Act. Therefore, both parties

As can be seen, defamation or insult under the Criminal Act is strictly divided under the Criminal Act; however, under the Civil Act, the liability for damages arising out of tort may be generated as an infringement on personal rights. Whether any writing is a defamation containing a statement of fact, or going beyond a simple expression of opinion, or both insulting and suplicating expressions are treated as one claim as liability for damages arising from mental harm pursuant to Articles 750 and 751 of the Civil Act. The court comprehensively recognizes expressions as “defacing or insulting, thereby infringing on social reputation and personal rights.” The court may determine the amount of consolation money for the entire expression as a whole.”

As to Defendant 1, Defendant 7, Defendant Digital Chosun, Defendant 3, Defendant 4, and Defendant New Daily, the lower court recognized both the expressions of defamation and insult, and determined the amount of consolation money for each Defendant by combining these expressions. The comments and articles of this case contain the combination of the parts to be deemed as defamation as a statement of fact and the parts to be deemed as insulting expressions.

(3) The Supreme Court precedents are not different from those mentioned above.

Supreme Court Decision 2001Da84480 Decided March 25, 2003 stated that the court below's expression recognized as defamation by a statement of fact cannot be seen as a statement of fact, and thus, the part may constitute a tort that deviates from the limit as an expression of opinion because it constitutes personal attack by a statement of fact. Supreme Court Decision 2005Da65494 Decided April 9, 2009 stated that even though it is difficult to regard the expression recognized as defamation by a statement of fact in the court below as a statement of fact, if the part is recognized as a statement of fact, it remains only the issue of determining the amount of consolation money if it is recognized as a infringement of personal right by an insulting expression, and this is the full power of the court of fact-finding, and the conclusion that the court below recognized tort is justifiable and dismissed the appeal.

(4) After remand, the lower court’s deliberation and determination are as follows.

Even if the judgment of the court below is reversed in accordance with the majority opinion, there is no error in the misapprehension of the legal principle that recognized the infringement of personal rights due to insulting expressions, and the court below should maintain the part that recognized the infringement of personal rights due to insulting expressions before remanding. Furthermore, even if the court below rejected the statement of facts in accordance with the majority opinion as to the expressions recognized as defamation due to insult of facts, the court below should separately determine the amount of consolation money for the following portions.

E. As to the establishment of tort due to insult, etc.

As seen earlier, the majority opinion also contains the content as shown in the judgment of the court of final appeal regarding the tort caused by insult, etc., and this part of the court below’s determination that tort caused by insult, etc. is constituted.

The lower court acknowledged that the instant expressive act by Defendant 1, Defendant 3, and Defendant 7 was an equal relationship with the Plaintiffs, who were married, and that Plaintiff 2, who was a couple, gave rise to the appearance that Plaintiff 1 was steering and using Plaintiff 1 from the time when Plaintiff 2, who was a couple, was insufficient to have intellectual ability, and thus, constitutes an infringement of personality by distorted distortion. In addition, the lower court determined that the instant expressive act by Defendant 4, without any effort to respect the character of the said expressive act, was unlawful on the grounds that such expressive act was written in suspicions, anti-defluences, and insulting expressions that cannot be seen in other newspapers, such as this weapon, and

As seen earlier, the part of the Majority Opinion that “the recognition of legal liability on the ground of insult, etc. ought to be determined carefully cannot be affected by the said judgment of the lower court that recognized the infringement of personal rights by an insulting expression. Meanwhile, the Majority did not state any opinion on the part that the lower court determined that Defendant 4’s instant expressive act was illegal as an insulting expression, and it appears that the lower court’s determination was justifiable.

Of the instant expressive act by Defendants 1, 3, and 7, the part that the lower court deemed that the Plaintiffs, who are the couple, are not equal relations, and that Plaintiff 2, who was fluor, had been in the operation and use of Plaintiff 1, among the instant expressive act by Defendant 1, Defendant 3, and Defendant 7, was defluent with Plaintiff 1, on the premise of the defluent point of view of women, and thus, is defluent with Plaintiff 1’s character, and cannot be said to have infringed upon Plaintiff 1’s character. Even if political and ideological controversy exists, the expression that infringes on the personality from the perspective of

F. Conclusion

Ultimately, the lower court’s determination that recognized Defendant 1, etc.’s tort liability against the instant expressive act due to defamation and personal insulting expressions is justifiable. In so doing, contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine as to factual times in civil defamation, or by misapprehending the legal doctrine as to the grounds for rejecting illegality and the criteria for determining reasonableness.

As a matter of the freedom of expression in our society, we can see the purport of opposing the Majority Opinion for the foregoing reasons, we can see that a mature democratic debate culture is established by taking advantage of the hate, hostile, and excluding expressions against the socially weak and minority.

Justices Kim Jong-soo (Presiding Justice)