[2] The case holding that each disciplinary measure is lawful in a case where the Army Chief of Staff took a disposition of removal, etc. against the military advocates who filed a constitutional complaint on the ground that the "Direction of Measures to Prevent Druplicious Access in the Military" and Article 47-2 of the former Military Personnel Management Act, the grounds therefor, and Article 16-2 of the former Military Service Rule, which violated fundamental rights, and accordingly the Minister of National Defense removed them from the military

[2] In a case where the Minister of National Defense’s “Direction of Measures for the Scenes Cut-off in the Military” and Article 47-2 of the former Military Personnel Management Act (amended by Act No. 9293, Dec. 31, 2008); Article 16-2 of the former Military Service Rule (amended by Presidential Decree No. 21750, Sept. 29, 2009), which is the basis of the Act, filed a constitutional complaint on the grounds that the military advocate’s violation of fundamental rights is unconstitutional; and accordingly, the Chief of Staff removed the military advocate from office; and accordingly the Minister of National Defense removed the military from office, the case holding that each disciplinary measure was lawful on the ground that the military advocate’s filing of the constitutional complaint does not go against the law, even if the filing of the constitutional complaint by the military advocate itself, it can be deemed that the military advocate did not fulfill his duty to obey the direction and order of the Minister of National Defense, which is the highest commander of military service; and it constitutes “collective action for work other than military service.”

2. As to Plaintiff 1, the dismissal disposition by Defendant Army Chief of Staff on March 18, 2009 and the expulsion disposition by the Minister of National Defense on March 20, 2009 shall be revoked respectively.

3. The claims of plaintiffs 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 are dismissed, respectively.

4. Of the costs of lawsuit, the part arising between plaintiffs 1 and the defendant Army Chief of Staff, and 30% of the part arising between the Minister of National Defense shall be borne by the above plaintiffs, and 70% by the above plaintiffs, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, and by the defendant Army Chief of Staff and the head of the Defense Facilities

A. On July 22, 2008, the Minister of National Defense (hereinafter “the Minister of National Defense”) designated 23 kinds of books, including “Korea-style culture in North Korea,” as “indonesbook” on the grounds that they may adversely affect the mental strength of soldiers, and issued orders to take measures to prevent entry into the military unit of the said book (hereinafter “instant order”).

B. At the time of the issuance of the instant order, Plaintiff 1 was serving as the legal branch of the Army Headquarters, Plaintiff 2 as the Captain, the military court of the Army headquarters, Plaintiff 5 as the Captain, Plaintiff 6 as the National Defense Facility Headquarters of the Army, Plaintiff 3 as the Captain, Plaintiff 3 as the Captain, and Plaintiff 4 as the military advocate at the Special Army Command of the Army. However, on October 22, 2008, the Plaintiffs filed a constitutional complaint jointly with the Plaintiffs (hereinafter “instant constitutional complaint”) on the grounds that the instant order and the relevant statutes violate the Plaintiffs’ fundamental rights. < Amended by Presidential Decree No. 21750, Dec. 31, 2008; Presidential Decree No. 21750, Sep. 29, 2009>

C. On March 18, 2009, the defendant Army Chief of Staff (hereinafter "the president of defendant Army") issued the following disciplinary measures against the plaintiff 1 through (4), and against the plaintiff 2: (1) through (5) each disciplinary measure; (2) each disciplinary measure against the plaintiff 3, 4, and 6 with the approval of the Minister of Justice pursuant to Articles 56 subparagraph 1, 2, 3, 57 (1), and 58 (3) of the Military Personnel Management Act; (3) each disciplinary measure against the plaintiff 3, 4, and 6 on the same day; (2) The disciplinary measure against the plaintiff 3 was taken under Article 56 subparagraph 3 and Article 57 (1) of the Military Personnel Management Act; (3) The disciplinary measure against the plaintiff 4 was taken under Article 56 subparagraph 1, Article 56 subparagraph 5, and Article 57 (1) of the same Act; and (5) the disciplinary measure against the plaintiff 6 on March 1, 2009.

【Facts of Suspected Disciplinary Action】

① The Plaintiffs immediately filed a constitutional complaint without following the recommendation process through the chain of command with the intention of Defendant Minister not to comply with the instant direction.

② The Plaintiffs filed a constitutional complaint collectively by gathering visitors through telephone, Internet, e-mail, and direct contact with each other for the purpose of protesting against the instant order.

③ Plaintiff 1 and 2, without obtaining the permission of the Minister of Justice, directly or through his agent, announced the opinion that impregnating the instant instructions in the media, and slandered, insulting, insulting, or publicly announced his opinion and sovereignty on the outside of the military.

④ Plaintiff 2 filed a false business trip in the name of collecting public defender data, and received a written petition on personal affairs from an attorney who will act as an agent for the constitutional complaint, etc., and Plaintiff 1 instructed Plaintiff 2 to do so.

⑤ Plaintiff 2, by directly contact newspaper reporters or pointing out the writing on the homepage of the law branch, harming the honor of Defendant Minister and criticize the remarks of the National Assembly members belonging to a specific political party, etc., and published a letter to criticize the remarks of the National Assembly members belonging to the specific political party.

D. On March 20, 2009, the Defendant Minister ordered the Plaintiff 1 to be removed from the military register and to be enlisted in the military service as of March 18, 2009. On the same day, the Defendant president changed the education period in the Army Information School from October 2, 2008 to May 31, 2009 to “from October 2, 2008 to March 16, 2009” and ordered the Plaintiff to wear back as of March 17, 2009 at the same time, and issued a personnel order to confirm the volume and order to be enlisted in the military service against the said Plaintiff on March 24, 2009.

[Reasons for Recognition] Evidence Nos. 1 through 7, Evidence No. 4, and the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Determination on the legitimacy of the instant lawsuit

A. We examine ex officio the part of the instant lawsuit regarding ① Order of the Defendant Minister for the recruit of the Plaintiff 1 among the instant lawsuit, ② Change of the educational period of the Defendant president, and revocation of the original disposition.

(1) According to Article 66(1) of the former Military Service Act (amended by Act No. 9620, Apr. 1, 2009; hereinafter the same), where an officer on active duty is removed from the military service as he falls under the grounds for disqualification for appointment under the Military Personnel Management Act, or his status is lost, the officer on active duty is transferred to the officer in supplemental service. Thus, even if there is no separate disposition by the administrative agency, the officer on active duty is transferred to the recruit service immediately pursuant to the above legal provision, and thus, an administrative agency’s order to recruit the recruit service does not constitute a disposition that directly causes changes in the rights and obligations of the people, and in such a case, the officer assigned to supplementary service may be relieved from the recruit service, claiming the effect of the expulsion disposition, and thus, the order to recruit the Plaintiff 1 does not fall under the disposition subject to appeal, and there is no interest in legal action seeking its revocation.

(2) According to the second sentence of Article 12 of the Administrative Litigation Act, even after the effect of the disposition has expired due to the lapse of the period, the execution of the disposition, or any other cause, if there is a legal interest that can be recovered due to the cancellation of the disposition, the revocation lawsuit may be instituted. As to the above facts recognized, the president of the defendant, like the above facts, changed the education period, which was “from October 2, 2008 to May 31, 2009” and “from March 2, 2008 to March 16, 2009,” and at the same time ordered the original education period as of March 17, 2009, Plaintiff 1 had already been recovered immediately after the lapse of the education period based on the original personnel order, and thus, even if the change of the above education period and the original education period were revoked, Plaintiff 1 had no legal interest in the above education period or the status that was the same as the above disposition, and thus, there is no legal interest in the change of the original education period or status.

B. Determination on this safety defense

(1) As to Plaintiff 1’s filing of the instant lawsuit on the ground that the expulsion of Defendant president and the personnel order for the enlistment in the recruit service are unlawful, Defendant president and Defendant president’s filing of the instant lawsuit to seek the revocation thereof. As such, Defendant president and Defendant president’s filing of the personnel order against the said Plaintiff is merely confirming the expulsion and the order for the enlistment in the recruit service for the purpose of arranging the Army’s daily assignment in the Army, and thus cannot be subject to a disposition of appeal. Accordingly, Plaintiff 1’s filing of the lawsuit by Defendant president

(2) According to Articles 13(1) and 43(1) of the Military Personnel Management Act, an officer may be appointed, discharged, or removed by the President in principle, but the Minister of National Defense may appoint, discharge, or remove an officer from the military register with the authority delegated by the President. According to the above facts acknowledged, the defendant minister, who is the appointing authority of the plaintiff 1, lost the status of the above plaintiff as an officer in active duty service by issuing a expulsion order against the above plaintiff, resulting in a direct change in the legal status of the above plaintiff. As seen above, the above plaintiff is incorporated into the above supplementary service pursuant to Article 66(1) of the Military Service Act according to the order of the Minister of Justice, and thus, the expulsion and the assignment order of the above plaintiff in the military register of the defendant president is merely a confirmation measure to deal with the above change in the status of the above plaintiff, and it does not constitute a disposition subject to appeal litigation, since it does not affect any change in the rights and duties or legal status of the above plaintiff.

Therefore, the main defense of the defendant president is justified.

C. Sub-committee

If so, the part of the instant lawsuit seeking the order of the Defendant Minister to recruit the recruit of Plaintiff 1, the expulsion of the Defendant president and the assignment of the recruit, the alteration of the duration of the training, and the revocation of the original disposition is unlawful.

3. Judgment on the merits

A. The plaintiffs' assertion

Each of the instant disciplinary actions and the expulsion of the Defendant Minister against Plaintiff 1 should be revoked in full due to the following reasons.

(1) Absence of grounds for disciplinary action

① Facts suspected of disciplinary action: The plaintiffs exercised the right to claim a trial, which is the fundamental right under the Constitution, by filing the instant constitutional complaint based on the judgment that the instant order infringed on the plaintiffs' fundamental rights. This is not only a matter to be recommended to the superior officers in the chain of command, but also does not have any duty to recommend. Accordingly, this part of the facts do not constitute grounds for disciplinary action under Article 56 subparag. 3 of the Military Personnel Management Act.

② Facts of suspicion of disciplinary action: The plaintiffs merely filed the instant constitutional complaint under the joint name, and did not hold a meeting to file the constitutional complaint collectively, and did not engage in collective action for activities other than military service for purposes contrary to public interest. Thus, this part of the facts do not constitute grounds for disciplinary action under Article 56 subparag. 3 of the Military Personnel Management Act.

③ Facts of suspicion of disciplinary action: The attorney, who represented the plaintiffs' constitutional complaint, did not directly interview or broadcast the press media or contributed to broadcasting, and the plaintiffs 1 and 2 did not directly interview or broadcast the instructions of this case with the press media, and did not publish any opinion or flag, or slander or insult the military brain, outside the military, and thus did not violate any order or duty prescribed by Acts and subordinate statutes or undermine the honor and dignity of the military, and thus, this part of the facts does not constitute grounds for disciplinary action under subparagraphs 2 and 3 of Article 56 of the Military Personnel Management Act.

④ Facts suspected of disciplinary action: Plaintiff 2 was traveling a business trip with legitimate permission due to the need for business, and was not a private official for filing a constitutional complaint by filing a false application for an order for a business trip, not a private official for filing a constitutional complaint, such as accepting a written petition on personnel affairs. Plaintiff 1 did not impose an order for a false business trip to Plaintiff 2 for a private official by ordering Plaintiff 2 to submit a false business trip, and thus, this part of the fact does not constitute grounds for disciplinary action under Article 56 subparag. 3 of the Military Personnel Management Act.

⑤ Facts of suspicion of disciplinary action: Plaintiff 2’s publication of the instant order and the Defendant minister’s direction on the website (JGC-NET) of the branch of the internal communications network of the Army, or criticisming the remarks of the National Assembly members belonging to a specific political party does not constitute defamation, violation of the duty to maintain dignity or comply with the duty to maintain dignity, or violation of the duty to prohibit a specific political party’s dissenting act; thus, this part of the facts do not constitute grounds for disciplinary action under Article 56 subparag. 2 and 3 of the Military Personnel Management Act

Therefore, there is no ground for the disciplinary action against the plaintiffs.

(2) Violation of disciplinary procedure

① In order to deliberate on disciplinary action against Plaintiffs 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6, the Central Disciplinary Committee of the Army Headquarters participated in the disciplinary action as an executive secretary, who is not a military advocate. ② Plaintiff 2 was deprived of the opportunity to attend and make statements in the above disciplinary committee, and there was an error of law in the disciplinary proceedings, such as evidence submitted before the disciplinary committee was held, not being present during the deliberation process.

(3) A deviation from or abuse of discretionary power

In light of the fact that the purpose of filing the instant constitutional complaint by the Plaintiffs is not to circumvent or circumvent the instant order, but to obtain legal judgment on the constitutionality of the instant order and the relevant statutes, and that the Plaintiffs were faithfully performing their duties as military advocates, each of the instant disciplinary actions against the Plaintiffs is too harsh.

B. Relevant statutes

Attached Form is as shown in the attached Form.

C. Facts of recognition

(1) Circumstances of the instant instruction

(A) On July 22, 2008, the Defendant Minister issued the instant order based on Article 16-2 of the Military Service Rule to strengthen the spirit of the national army by cultivating the firm state control, the custody, and the military spirit of the soldiers, and ordered the military officers of various levels of military units to designate 23 books, including “North Korea’s culture,” “North Korea’s strategy for economic development,” “nuclear and Korean Peninsula,” and to order the military officers of various levels of military units to prohibit entry of the said books into the said books, to check and report whether they carried them into the military unit, and to train soldiers’ mental education.

(B) After this case’s instruction, Defendant Minister convened a deliberation committee on decoration and cultural materials of the Ministry of National Defense (including seven members, such as the chairperson of the National Defense Education Policy Center, the director of the executive secretary’s mental power division, and the director’s cultural policy division) to review the details of the above books. The above committee presented a review opinion that the instant order was a legitimate measure on August 15, 2008.

(C) On August 27, 2008, with respect to the designation of the said 23 books by the Defendant Minister as “unstory book,” the National Human Rights Commission expressed its external opinion that “it is necessary to establish clear standards and procedures as to the restrictions on measures to restrict books and other representations in the military unit and to have explicit legal basis.” On August 31, 2008, the Defendant Minister changed the term “unstory book” only to “unstory book,” without taking any particular measure with respect to the 23 books designated as “unstory book,” from the instant order to “unstoy book,” without taking any particular measure.

(D) Of the two-three-three-dimensional books designated as “Indones book,” the “North Korea’s culture,” “North Korea’s economic development strategy,” and “Nuclear and the Korean Peninsula,” etc. among these three-three-three-dimensional books were unilaterally praiseed by North Korea. Of them, the said three-dimensional books were determined as pro-enemy contents with the contents of propaganda or assistance of North Korea in the case of Seoul Central District Court Decision 2008Da1165, Apr. 21, 2009.

(2) The process and process of filing the instant constitutional complaint by the Plaintiffs

(가) 원고들은 2008. 7. 31. 신문 기사 등을 통하여 이 사건 지시가 있음을 알게 되었는데, 원고 3은 2008. 8. 4. 육군 내부통신망 법무병과 홈페이지(JAGC-NET)에 이 사건 지시의 부당성을 지적하며 “그동안 제가 읽었던 책들이 불온도서라니 머리가 띵해지는군요, 제가 불온한 사람이 된 것 같군요”라는 소감을 적은 글을 게재하였고, 원고 1, 2도 그 무렵 신문기사와 원고 3의 글을 읽고서는 이 사건 지시에 위헌의 소지가 있다는 생각을 하게 되어 이에 관하여 의견을 교환하기 시작하였다.

(B) During August 2008, Plaintiff 2 presented an opinion on the constitutionality of the instant order at the time of the KAF’s Week meetings of the Military Court in the Army, and sought from the KAF head and Plaintiff 1 the statement that he/she is aware of it in the Ministry of National Defense’s office, which is the relevant Ministry, the Ministry of National Defense. At that time, he/she asked the Ministry of National Defense and the legal officer in charge of the Ministry of National Defense about the legality of the instant order from the Ministry of National Defense’s office, and the relevant legal officer respondeded to the current review of the instant order (the competent legal officer was requested from the Ministry of National Defense’s security policy on August 26, 2008 to review the legitimacy of the instant order from the Ministry of National Defense’s security policy and the Ministry of National Defense on September 30, 2008.)

(C) Notwithstanding the foregoing expression of opinion by the National Human Rights Commission, Plaintiff 2 decided to file a constitutional complaint against the instant order, so that the Defendant would not have any room to reconsider the instant order, and the Plaintiff 1 consented thereto and recommended Plaintiff 2 to prepare the draft constitutional complaint. Plaintiff 2 began to prepare a summary of the written constitutional complaint by reviewing the fundamental rights infringed upon by the instant order and the legality of the instant order from around that time.

(D) On September 2008, Plaintiff 2 expressed to the effect that Nonparty 1, who was a reporter of the Hanman daily newspaper, was demotedly criticized Nonparty 2 on the designation of the “comfort book” through the instant order by Defendant Minister, and that Plaintiff 2 would raise an issue in any way, such as filing a constitutional complaint, if there is no particular measure within the Ministry of National Defense.

(E) On October 23, 2008, Plaintiff 2 was going to make a business trip with permission from September 25, 2008 to 15:00 on the following day from September 13:00 to September 25, 2008 to collect data related to the public defender system in the Han-U.S. legal seminars in 2008, which were scheduled to be made on October 23, 2008, and Plaintiff 2 was asked from Plaintiff 1 to “the attorney-at-law sent to the Ministry of National Defense by Nonparty 2, including the above plaintiffs, to receive a written request for a personnel petition to the Ministry of National Defense.” The plaintiff 1 received a written request for a personnel petition from the said plaintiffs and received a written request for a business trip to the Ministry of National Defense.”

(f) On September 25, 2008, Plaintiff 2 collected materials related to public defender in Seoul, the Ministry of National Defense and the Chief of the High Court for Armed Forces, the Chief of the Defense Department and the Chief of the Military Court for Armed Forces. On September 25, 2008, Plaintiff 2 moved back to the Ministry of National Defense at around 17:40, and then he left the Ministry of National Defense at around 17:50, and he entered the Ministry of National Defense at around 12:50 on the following day, and submitted a written petition on personnel affairs delivered by Nonparty 2 to the Ministry of National Defense and collected materials related to public defender at around 23:0.

(G) On October 15, 2008, Plaintiff 2 published a statement to the effect that “A request for a constitutional complaint on this case’s order should be filed,” and on October 6, 2008, Plaintiff 2 opened the draft of a written request for a constitutional complaint on this case’s order after leaving his home in order to receive a four-day high-class training course at the Army General Administrative University at his home located in Gangnam-gu Seoul, Gangnam-gu, Seoul, to leave his home, and then leaving his office and leaving his home, and then started to prepare a draft of the written request for a constitutional complaint on this case’s order after leaving his home. Around October 15, 2008, Plaintiff 2 completed a draft of a twenty-dimensional amount of the draft on this case’s 20 pages, and put it to Plaintiff 1.

(h) On October 17, 2008, Plaintiff 1 decided to appoint Nonparty 2 as an attorney to act on behalf of the claimant for adjudication on constitutional complaint, and examined the draft of the above draft of the adjudication on constitutional complaint, and on October 17, 2008, Nonparty 2 and Plaintiff 2 also gathered that “the draft of the above draft was focused solely on the illegality of the instant order, but it was changed in the form of a constitutional complaint against statutes by adding the part of infringement of fundamental rights under the Military Personnel Management Act and the Military Service Rule, which is the basis of the instant order, to the form of a constitutional complaint against statutes,” and the draft was revised to Nonparty 2 and Plaintiff 2. The above third person should complete the petition for adjudication as soon as possible as possible because it is appropriate to file a constitutional complaint rapidly, and if the claimant directly contact with the press, only the attorney at the bar who contacted with the press and represents the position of the claimant.”

(i) On October 208, reflecting the Plaintiff 1’s revised opinion, Plaintiff 2 completed the original copy of the written request for adjudication on constitutional complaint and stated Plaintiff 1, 2 and Plaintiff 3, 5, and 6 who participated in the written request for adjudication on constitutional complaint as follows: (a) Nonparty 2 provided Nonparty 2 with materials to be attached to the written request for adjudication on constitutional complaint, such as the written request for adjudication on constitutional complaint, including Plaintiff 1, 2, and the written request for adjudication on constitutional complaint (the written request for adjudication was added to each claimant’s name on October 22, 2008, Nonparty 3 and Nonparty 3 were added to each claimant’s name on October 21, 2008).

(j) On September 208, Plaintiff 3 met with Plaintiff 2 in early 2008, or Plaintiff 2 told Plaintiff 2 to join the constitutional complaint by reviewing the basic rights infringed upon by the instant order and the legitimacy of the instant order and reporting the outline of the written request for constitutional complaint. After that, Plaintiff 2 sent a revised opinion after reviewing the draft of the written request for constitutional complaint prepared by Plaintiff 2. Plaintiff 5 was enrolled in the process of high-ranking group, such as Plaintiff 2, and Plaintiff 6 was enrolled in the course of serving as a school member of the Army Criminal Administration for the Army that was attended by Plaintiff 2 while Plaintiff 2 was working as a school member of the Korea Army Criminal Service for the Army that was attended by Plaintiff 2, and Plaintiff 2 was called “to attend the request for constitutional complaint on the instant order.” Plaintiff 4 sent the draft written request for constitutional complaint from Plaintiff 2 to Nonparty 2, 2008, and then sent it to Nonparty 1 and Nonparty 2, 3, 2008, respectively, on October 23, 201.

(k) On October 22, 2008, Nonparty 2 and Plaintiff 2 exchanged opinions on the preparation of a written request and revised and supplemented the written request on three or four occasions, and finally completed the written request for adjudication on constitutional complaint with 47 pages on October 22, 2008. Nonparty 2 received the final written request for adjudication on constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court at least 16:00 on the same day.

(l) From the date of the receipt of the written request for adjudication on constitutional complaint to the Constitutional Court, Nonparty 2 had an interview with the media, such as newspapers and broadcasting, or by telephone, in relation to the filing of the instant constitutional complaint. This was concentrated on the news, newspapers, Internet media, etc. from the day of the receipt of the written request for adjudication on constitutional complaint. In one of the news, the notice of the written request for adjudication on constitutional complaint before the final completion stage stated by the President and the Defendant by the Defendant was recorded and broadcasted on the screen. The contents of the interview reported to the media are as follows.

The Ministry of National Defense, in the form of a statement in the main text, did not change the direction that the Ministry of National Defense will continue the time-diclicious classification without legal basis, and thus, the military advocates were paid a lawsuit at the disadvantage of the military advocates. The Ministry of National Defense made a critical opportunity for the Ministry of National Defense to make a statement that “the military personnel is not required to bear.” The Ministry of National Defense requested the judgment that it was infringed on the fundamental rights of the C News, and filed a constitutional complaint.

(m) On October 24, 2008 in a daily newspaper to which he belongs, Nonparty 1: “At the latest, Plaintiff 2 met Plaintiff 2. The designation of the French book by the Ministry of National Defense was believed to have been committed against the freedom of conscience formation, and it was thought that it was not necessary to report the damage to the constitutional spirit. In order to develop our military, the military must thoroughly reflect the trust in the military and the purpose of existence of the military. Finally, Plaintiff 2 was an article stating that “The Ministry of National Defense, which was the recommended book at the time of the participating government, was posted to the extent that the Ministry of National Defense was no longer satched, and the content was reported.”

(n) From October 208, the Ministry of National Defense had been subject to regular inspection by the National Defense Committee of the National Assembly in 2008 from October 23, 2008, and was scheduled to hold a comprehensive audit. Before the filing of the Plaintiffs’ constitutional complaint, several National Assembly members asked the Minister of Justice about the legitimacy of the instant order, and on this basis, the Minister asked the Minister of Justice about the need to maintain and strengthen the military mental power in charge of national security. In response, the filing of the Plaintiffs’ constitutional complaint and the comprehensive audit by the National Assembly National Defense Committee of the Republic of Korea following the day when the interview was published by the media, the legitimacy of the instant order and the responsibility of the Plaintiffs were discussed, and the issues of the Plaintiffs’ responsibilities were raised.

(o) On November 6, 2008, Plaintiff 2 stated the title of “pump or chest open to scarbane” on the homepage of the Ministry of National Defense (hereinafter “The Ministry of National Defense”) on October 23, 2008, the National Assembly’s general audit site of the National Assembly National Defense Committee, stating that the National Assembly members belonging to Hanrara are unreasonable to file a constitutional complaint against the Plaintiffs without going through the military command system. On the other hand, Plaintiff 2 stated that “I am flick and flick so that I am unflick and flick so that I am unflick, and the background attached to the back is too rare and open, while I am am flick, I am me to consider the anti-sexual outcome of the National Assembly exemption privilege.” On December 31, 2008, I stated that “In particular, I amflish to the Ministry of National Defense, I would have to give an excessive instruction to the commander of the military administration.”

(3) Details of the instant disciplinary action

(A) In light of the issue of the filing of the Plaintiffs’ constitutional complaint, the president instructed the remainder of the Plaintiffs other than Plaintiff 5 to investigate the disciplinary action, and requested the National Army Headquarters Central Disciplinary Committee of Korea to make a disciplinary action against the above Plaintiffs from October 30, 208 to March 10, 2009 after completing the investigation of disciplinary action against the above Plaintiffs.

(B) On March 17, 2009, the Chairman of the Central Disciplinary Committee of the Army Headquarters appointed Nonparty 4, 5, and 6 as a disciplinary secretary on March 18, 2009, and held a committee for resolution on disciplinary action against Plaintiff 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6. The above Nonparty 5 and 6 were officers appointed as military advocates, and Nonparty 4 was not appointed as military advocates.

(C) On March 17, 2009, Plaintiff 1 appeared and stated at the Central Disciplinary Committee of the Army Headquarters, which was held on March 14:00, and Plaintiff 2 sent a written statement and explanatory materials in lieu of the attendance and statement of the committee to Nonparty 5 on the day following the difficulty in attending the committee due to the fact that Plaintiff 2 was transferred to the 2nd group headquarters on the same day and should make a report of non-performance at that place. Nonparty 5 submitted to the said committee a written statement sent by 10:17 on the day on which the committee was held, but Nonparty 5 failed to verify the explanatory materials sent by e-mail between 10:46 and 10:55, and failed to submit to the said committee.

(D) On March 18, 2009, Plaintiff 6 submitted to the Central Disciplinary Committee of the Army Headquarters, which held on March 18, 2009, a statement substituting the attendance and statement, and expressed his/her intent to withdraw the constitutional complaint, and the constitutional complaint was withdrawn.

(E) The Central Disciplinary Committee of the Army Headquarters decided each of the instant disciplinary actions against Plaintiffs 1, 2, 3, and 4, and reprimand against Plaintiff 6, respectively, and Defendant president took the disciplinary action against Plaintiff 1, 2, 3, and 4 on March 18, 2009 as a resolution of the said Committee against Plaintiff 1, 2, 3, and 4 on March 18, 209, and mitigated the disciplinary action against Plaintiff 6 as a postponement of reprimand.

(F) On March 19, 2009, the National Defense Facility Disciplinary Committee decided to take five days of disciplinary action against Plaintiff 5, and the head of the defendant defense facility headquarters took disciplinary action against the above committee’s resolution.

(G) The Plaintiffs were dissatisfied with each of the instant disciplinary measures taken by the president of the Korea Army and the head of the Korea National Defense Agency, and filed an appeal against the Ministry of National Defense. However, on April 30, 2009, the Defendant Minister dismissed the Plaintiffs’ appeal in accordance with each of the respective decisions of the Military Personnel Disciplinary Appeals Review Committee against the Plaintiffs on April 24, 2009 by the Ministry of National Defense. Meanwhile, the Ministry of National Defense, during the deliberation process, received and confirmed the explanatory materials of Plaintiff 2, which were omitted by the Central Disciplinary Committee of the Korea Army Headquarters.

[Reasons for Recognition] The evidence mentioned above, Gap's evidence 9 through 13, 15, 17, 20 evidence, Eul's evidence 5 through 15, 18, 20, 21, 30, 31, 33, 35, 36, 38, and 53, and the purport of the whole pleadings

D. Determination

(1) Determination as to the existence of grounds for disciplinary action

(A) (1) Facts of suspicion of disciplinary action

1) According to Article 57 of the State Public Officials Act, Article 47-2 of the Military Personnel Management Act, and Article 4 of the Military Service Rule, a soldier’s duty to obey an order of his superior. We examine whether the Plaintiffs’ filing of the instant constitutional complaint, which was revealed in the facts of suspicion, violated the duty to obey the instant order.

2) Article 111(1) of the Constitution provides, as the authority of the Constitutional Court, that “an adjudication on the constitutionality of a law by a court’s recommendation” in subparagraph 1, Article 111(1), and Article 41(5) provides, “an adjudication on constitutional complaint prescribed by a law,” and accordingly, Articles 41(1) and 68(2) of the Constitutional Court Act provide, “an adjudication on constitutionality of a law,” and “an adjudication on constitutionality of a law,” and “an adjudication on constitutionality of a law,” and Article 68(1) of the Constitutional Court Act provides, “an adjudication on constitutionality of a law,” and “an adjudication on constitutional complaint may be filed with the Constitutional Court by a court’s recommendation on constitutionality of a law, an adjudication on constitutionality of a law, and an adjudication on constitutionality of a law,” and accordingly, Article 41(1) and 68(2) of the Constitutional Court Act provides, if a military personnel’s right to constitutionality is infringed by a law, order or disposition.

3) Article 5(2) of the Constitution provides that “The mission of the State Armed Forces shall be to guarantee national security and to perform a decent duty of defending national land, and shall maintain political neutrality.” In order to support the constitutional performance of the duties of the National Armed Forces, the State Public Officials Act, the Military Personnel Management Act, and regulations on military service based thereon, etc., recognize the specificity of the organization of the National Armed Forces and impose the duty to obey orders of their superior officers. In other words, Article 4 subparag. 4 of the Military Service Rule provides that “The military forces shall be established to establish a strict military flag at all times to maintain military command, maintain order, and uniformly comply with certain policies, and preserve and display combat forces, and that “the military officers shall obey the order of their superior and to observe laws, regulations, and orders,” and Article 6 provides that “The military officers shall be subject to the duty of defense in the same manner as those of the State’s duty of defense, who shall observe the concept and duty of the National Armed Forces, and shall be subject to strict and strong command of the State and its maximum duty of defense.”

Ultimately, there is no doubt that military advocates also have the right to file a constitutional complaint, but there is an inherent limit in the exercise of the military, and there is a limitation on the duty to obey instructions or orders of superior officers, including the Minister of National Defense, in light of the special power relationship of the military organization. Therefore, even in cases where instructions or orders of superior officers, including the military commander, are based on Acts and subordinate statutes, barring any special circumstance, if such instructions or orders are based on the restriction on the fundamental rights of military personnel, the officer of the military branch shall respect the will of the person entitled to instructions or orders, and shall not refuse such instructions or orders without permission. If such instructions or orders are filed on the ground that they infringe on fundamental rights, it would interfere with the exercise of the commander's right to command which is recognized to maintain a special power relationship within the military, or would be in the form of objection by the superior, and thus, the exercise of the right to file a constitutional complaint against his/her superior's instructions or orders should be considered in terms of the degree of infringement on fundamental rights and the degree of infringement on fundamental rights by the person subject to command or order.

4) As to the instant case, whether the instant order infringes on the basic rights of soldiers residing in barracks guaranteed by the Constitution, and whether the relevant statutes, such as Article 47-2 of the Military Personnel Management Act and Article 16-2 of the Military Service Rule, are in violation of the Constitution, shall be finally determined by the Constitutional Court, etc. The filing by the Plaintiffs of the instant constitutional complaint in order to obtain such judgment cannot be deemed unlawful. However, in light of the following, the filing by the Plaintiffs of the instant constitutional complaint can be deemed to have failed to fulfill their duty to obey instructions and orders by their superior officers.

① Article 16-2 of the Military Service Rule according to the delegation of Article 47-2 of the Military Personnel Management Act prohibits military personnel from possessing or acquiring a stowing items. According to the above acknowledged facts, the instant order issued by the Defendant Minister includes not only the instant constitutional complaint, but also the following documents: (a) it is based on the relevant statutes, as the order and order of the highest person in charge of the armed forces, who prohibited the entry into the territorial territory of the books that have been deliberated by the Deliberation Committee composed of experts inside the Ministry of National Defense (the three books were confirmed to be pro-enemy materials by the court) and has been based on the deliberation of the Deliberative Committee composed of experts inside the Ministry of National Defense; and (b) all soldiers within his/her command should respect and comply with the instant order. Accordingly, in filing a constitutional complaint, the Plaintiffs should have carefully respected their will in violation of the Constitution and laws to the maximum extent possible. However, as seen thereafter, the Plaintiffs concluded that the instant order violated the Constitution and expected the exercise of a group inside the military, thereby causing unnecessary controversy in the process of raising the constitutional complaint.

(2) As seen earlier, a constitutional complaint may be filed against the relevant law, order, etc. in a case where the fundamental rights under the Constitution are directly infringed upon by law, order, etc. As such, the Plaintiffs may file a constitutional complaint against the relevant law, order, etc.; however, in a case where the fundamental rights under the Constitution are infringed by a specific enforcement act based on the relevant law, the Plaintiffs may file a lawsuit seeking cancellation, etc. with the court on the enforcement act; on the other hand, in a case where the fundamental rights under the Constitution are infringed by a specific enforcement act based on the relevant law, a lawsuit may be filed against the court; in a case where the court requests an examination on the unconstitutionality or illegality of the order, rule, etc., or requests an adjudication on the unconstitutionality of the pertinent law to the Constitutional Court, and the request for adjudication on the unconstitutionality of the pertinent law is dismissed by the court. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs asserted that the instant order, including the Plaintiffs, may infringe upon the fundamental rights against the soldiers living in barracks, by deeming the instant order as a disposition under the Administrative Litigation Act.

The plaintiffs, who are military advocates as well as military advocates with the general and abstract duties to obey the direction and order of the defendant minister at the same time, respect to the intention of the conductor to the maximum extent possible, do not stand against the direction of this case, and have chosen the method of careful and appropriate remedy in consideration of the importance of the case and the political strike in a way that does not provide unnecessary debate and political controversy, but immediately filed the constitutional complaint of this case without careful and careful review. In this regard, the filing of the constitutional complaint of this case is not appropriate.

(3) According to Article 24(1) of the Military Service Rule, where a military service order is beneficial or legitimate, a proposal may be made to his/her superior solely in accordance with the chain of command, but in such cases, even if his/her superior makes a decision different from his/her own opinion, he/she shall always respect his/her superior’s intent and obey it. Even if this provision does not impose an unconditional duty on a subordinate regardless of whether or not the order of his/her superior is legitimate, if the order of his/her superior is based on a law and subordinate, if the order of his/her superior is based on the law and subordinate, he/she shall respect his/her intention to the maximum extent possible, and even if he/she intends to correct it, it shall not interfere with the chain of command through appropriate internal procedures. However, according to the above recognized facts, the Plaintiffs cannot be said to have made such efforts

5) In full view of all other grounds for the instant disciplinary action against the Plaintiffs, which were seen above, the Plaintiffs filed the instant constitutional complaint, and eventually, even if the filing of the instant constitutional complaint itself cannot be deemed to go against laws and regulations, the Plaintiffs shall have pure constitutional judgment as to whether the instant order violated fundamental rights or the unconstitutionality of the Military Personnel Management Act and subordinate statutes, which are the premise thereof. Furthermore, the Plaintiffs shall not respect the intent of the commander with the intent to circumvent instructions and orders based on the superior’s laws and regulations, which are required for the special power relationship inside the military, and shall proceed to the instant constitutional complaint without examining appropriate remedy methods in consideration of the seriousness of the case and the political strike. Accordingly, it may be deemed that the Plaintiffs, as military personnel, failed to fulfill their duty to obey orders and orders by the Minister of Justice,

6) Therefore, this part of the facts charged constitute grounds for disciplinary action in this respect.

(2) Facts of suspicion of disciplinary action

1) The Armed Forces is an organization that is assigned with a strong duty to prevent the protection of the lives and property of the people by performing the duty of national security and national defense. Thus, in any circumstance, strong interruption between military assistants is required in order to perform a function as a military unit, and strong command and command system necessary for the performance of duties must be maintained. Therefore, an act that may make it impossible to lead the military command, and furthermore, may be a serious threat to the existence of the military itself requires strict sanctions for the establishment of the military command and the maintenance of absolute order and return relationship inside the military. Accordingly, the restriction on fundamental rights that a soldier can enjoy is limited only in the form of a constitution or law, and even in such a case, the essential contents of such fundamental rights can only be restricted, in light of such special characteristics of the military, different characteristics from that of the fundamental rights of the general public.

2) In such purport, Article 110(3) of the Constitution directly limits the fundamental rights of soldiers. Articles 56 through 66 of the State Public Officials Act impose a duty of good faith on a public official. Furthermore, a soldier is subject to regulation on fundamental rights through the Military Personnel Management Act and the Military Service Rule. Article 13(1) of the Military Service Rule delegated by Article 47-2 of the Military Personnel Management Act limits a soldier’s fundamental rights by stipulating that a soldier shall not engage in collective action for any day other than military service.

3) The term "collective action for activities other than military service" refers to a collective action committed by a large number of soldiers for specific purposes that undermine the essence of military service, such as undermining the discipline of military service or undermining the nature of military service, and such action does not need to be continuously conducted, and it does not need to be organized to the extent that it has the form of command (see Supreme Court Decision 90Nu4839 delivered on April 23, 1991). In light of the need for the establishment of a military command system according to the unique characteristics of the military organization, the need for the maintenance of a relationship of command and command inside the military, and the special need for the restriction of fundamental rights of military personnel, where it is unclear whether or not a superior's order is justifiable or unreasonable, the action of a large number of soldiers seeking immediate examination of a collective action in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the military without any effort made by the inside the military without regard to the motive or intent of the order, other than the procedure prescribed in the military, can be jointly taken into account in the course of the order's internal action.

4) The above facts and the following circumstances recognized as follows: ① among the books designated as books prohibited from bringing in the military through the instant order, the books containing the contents of unilaterally praise North Korea are included, and there are reasonable grounds for the Defendant to determine that there is a need to take measures to prevent the entry of such books into the military unit for the protection of national security and free democracy, the prevention of ideological conflicts inside the military, etc. Therefore, it is difficult to conclude that the instant order was clearly erroneous; ② The Plaintiffs did not suggest correction, etc. of the instant order in accordance with the procedures set by the direct superior officers such as the Army Chief, the Army Chief, the Military Court Chief, and the Ministry of National Defense; ③ the Plaintiffs’ filing of constitutional complaints against the instant order and the statutes based on the instant order was not related to the Plaintiffs’ duties, but rather to act as litigation at the level of personal remedy; ④ during that process, the Plaintiffs filed a constitutional complaint against the instant order with the view to criticize the Minister of Justice who issued the instant order, and the Plaintiffs jointly presented opinions on the instant order, other than the Defendants’ filing the constitutional complaint with the same intent.

5) Therefore, the facts charged constitute grounds for disciplinary action.

(c) Facts of suspicion <3>

1) According to Article 17(1) of the Military Service Rule and Article 22(1) and (3) of the former Military Service Directive (amended by the Ministry of National Defense Directive No. 1092, Aug. 4, 2009) of the same Act, soldiers shall not publish matters concerning national defense and military affairs outside the military or engage in external activities outside the status of military personnel without permission of the Minister of National Defense, and shall instruct the head of the relevant department to conduct an interview in advance where he/she receives a request for an interview from the press on important matters, such as national defense policies, etc.

According to the above facts, it is difficult to readily conclude that Plaintiff 1 and 2 directly announced their opinions or interviewed with the press on the instant order.

2) However, according to Article 56 subparag. 2 of the Military Personnel Management Act and Article 9 of the Military Service Rule, a soldier shall not engage in any act detrimental to the military's prestige and dignity as a soldier, and a soldier's act detrimental to his dignity regardless of whether it is inside or outside of his duties is one of the grounds for disciplinary action. Disciplinary action is a punishment that can impose a punishment without the intention of disturbing order as to the act of flight of a person disturbing order in order to maintain the internal order in a special status relationship, and a special status and power relationship distinct from the general public is recognized as an organization that is distinct from the general public. Thus, even if the expression, act, or method permitted by the society is recognized, it constitutes a ground for disciplinary action under the above provision that damages the military's prestige or disturbs the military's command by making words and behavior that seem to cause damage to the military's dignity and trust or violate the order of his superior.

3) According to the above facts, since the plaintiff 2 did not file a constitutional complaint with respect to the order of this case, the plaintiff 1 and 2 expressed the reporter of the personal friendly daily newspaper, criticism and gradation of the order of this case, and the unconstitutionality of this case. ② After the newspaper to which the above reporter belongs, the article 2 argued that the plaintiff 2 expressed impergy about the impergy of the military within the newspaper to which he belongs, and criticizes that it was unreasonable, the article was reported; ③ there is a problem when the plaintiff 1 and 2 communicates with the lawyer who is to act on behalf of the plaintiff 1 and 2 with the press, and the lawyer is in charge of the press contact by representing the opinion of the claimant. After the constitutional complaint was filed, there is no room for the above plaintiffs 1 and 2 to directly inform the outside of the press of this case as to whether the above plaintiffs were justifiable, and as a result, the plaintiffs' opinions and opinions on the order of this case were found to be unlawful.

4) Therefore, this part of the facts charged constitute grounds for disciplinary action within the scope of recognition as above.

(d) Facts of suspicion of disciplinary action

Article 47 of the Military Personnel Management Act and Article 7(1) of the Military Service Rule provide that the duty of good faith is the most important duty imposed on military personnel who are public officials, and the duty of good faith is to promote public interest and to prevent disadvantage (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 84Nu575, May 14, 1985). The above acknowledged facts and the following circumstances are acknowledged as follows: ① although the rank of Plaintiff 1 is higher than that of Plaintiff 2, it was not at a position to direct work and non-business matters; ② The main purpose of Plaintiff 2 applied for a business trip to the Ministry of National Defense was to collect data related to the public defender system to be announced at the Han-U.S. legal seminars for the main purpose of which Plaintiff 2 applied for a business trip, ③ The time of Plaintiff 2’s non-public service during the business trip is presumed to be less than the time of Plaintiff 2’s private service during the business trip, ④ The fact that Plaintiff 2 violated the duty of good faith and non-party 2’s appeal cannot be discussed.

Therefore, the facts charged do not constitute grounds for disciplinary action.

(e) Facts of suspicions (5)

According to the above facts, among the facts charged, it can be recognized that the plaintiff 2 met the newspaper reporter or criticizes the statements of the military or the statements of the defendant minister, and criticizes the plaintiff 2 from the law branch of the law branch of the law branch of the law, and criticizes the plaintiff 2's remarks of the National Assembly members belonging to Hanra. It is difficult to judge that such acts of the plaintiff 2 are acts detrimental to his superior's honor or opposing a specific political party or political organization. However, as a member of the State Council, the defendant Minister has the authority to assist the President with regard to the state affairs, take charge of military matters under the order of the President, direct and supervise the Chief of Staff of the armed forces, and direct and supervise each Chief of Staff. The above acts of the plaintiff 2 were recklessly criticized the exercise of authority under the law of the defendant minister, who is the commander of the national defense and military affairs, and such acts may be evaluated as damaging the military's life and body, and thereby damaging the military's trust as a result, it constitutes an act damaging the military's dignity under Article 26 of the Military Personnel Management Act.

Therefore, the facts alleged in this part constitute grounds for disciplinary action.

(f) Sub-decisions

The plaintiffs' assertion in this part is with merit in that some of the facts charged with a disciplinary action and the facts charged with a disciplinary action are not subject to grounds for disciplinary action. Thus, it is erroneous that the president of the defendant's president and the chief of the defendant's defense facility headquarters should take all of the facts charged with a disciplinary action against the plaintiffs as grounds for disciplinary action. However, if it is sufficient to recognize the validity of the relevant disciplinary action only with some of the other grounds for disciplinary action, it is not illegal even if the relevant disciplinary action is maintained (see Supreme Court Decision 2002Da5155, Jun. 25, 2004, etc.). Thus, we will examine the appropriateness of each of the instant disciplinary action

(2) Determination as to whether disciplinary proceedings are unlawful

(A) According to Article 6 of the Decree on the Disciplinary Action against Military Personnel, if there is a military advocate belonging to the military unit or agency in which the disciplinary committee is established, the secretary shall appoint the chairperson from among the military advocates, but does not set the number of secretaries. According to the above findings, the chairman of the National Army Headquarters Central Disciplinary Committee for the plaintiffs other than the plaintiffs 5 shall appoint the non-party 5 and the non-party 6 who is the military advocate as a disciplinary secretary and operate the committee. Thus, there is no violation of law.

(B) According to Articles 9 and 10 of the Military Personnel Disciplinary Decree, a person subject to the disciplinary deliberation may attend the disciplinary committee and make a statement in writing or in writing, state or submit evidence that is beneficial to the person subject to the disciplinary deliberation, and the disciplinary committee may make a disciplinary decision in writing if the person subject to the disciplinary deliberation fails to attend without any justifiable reason that makes it impossible to attend the committee. According to the above acknowledged facts, the plaintiff 2 did not attend the committee because it overlaps with the date on which the Army Headquarters was moved into the second group headquarters headquarters, and the materials sent on the day on which the above committee was held, but it is difficult to view that there is a justifiable reason that the above reason was not sufficient to attend the committee, and as long as the written statement substituted for the plaintiff's statement was submitted to the committee and reflected in the deliberation on the disciplinary cause, the executive secretary cannot be said to have been deprived of the right to attend the disciplinary committee, right to make a statement or right to submit evidence.

(C) Therefore, this part of the plaintiffs' assertion is without merit.

(3) Determination as to whether discretionary power has been abused or abused

(A) Whether to impose a disciplinary measure on a person subject to disciplinary action who is a public official is at the discretion of the person having authority to take the disciplinary measure. Even if the disciplinary measure is not a reason for disciplinary action, it may be considered as materials to be taken into consideration for disciplinary action (see Supreme Court Decision 2001Du10455, May 28, 2002, etc.). However, if it is deemed that a disciplinary measure as a person having authority to take the disciplinary measure has abused discretion that has considerably lost validity under the social norms, the disciplinary measure is unlawful only if it is deemed that the person having authority to take the disciplinary measure has abused the person having authority to take the disciplinary measure, and if it is intended that the disciplinary measure against a public official has considerably lost validity under the social norms, the disciplinary measure should be determined based on a specific case, including the characteristics and nature of duties, the content and nature of the reason for the disciplinary measure, administrative purpose to achieve the decision by the disciplinary measure, and various criteria for disciplinary action, etc., and the contents of the disciplinary measure should be objectively and objectively acknowledged (see Supreme Court Decision 2012Du13Du.

(B) Plaintiff 1

According to the above evidence and evidence evidence No. 16, plaintiff 1 passed the Military Advocates Examination in 2000 and was appointed as military advocate on March 3, 2001, and contributed to the Gun by faithfully performing the duties assigned to the military such as the leader of an association, military court, military judge, and military judicial officer, etc. In 2005, the first army commander commendation was awarded in 2006, and the Army Chief of Staff were selected as commissioned military officer for the year 2009, and the plaintiff 1 tried to receive constitutional judgment on the instant order compared to plaintiff 2, and it is insufficient to view that the plaintiff 1 led to acts recognized as grounds for disciplinary action. Considering the above circumstances, if the above plaintiff's qualification becomes final and conclusive upon being dismissed, it is impossible to obtain the plaintiff's authority to take disciplinary action against the plaintiff as the first disciplinary officer for the purpose of disciplinary action, and the result of the above disciplinary action can be excessively deducted from the plaintiff's authority to the above plaintiff.

As a result, the removal of the plaintiff 1 by the defendant president against the plaintiff 1 is illegal because it exceeds the scope of the disciplinary discretion.

(C) Plaintiff 2

According to the above evidence, Gap evidence Nos. 16 and Eul evidence Nos. 25 and 26, the plaintiff 2 passed the judicial examination in 2005 and was appointed as military judicial officer after being appointed as a public defender in April 2008. On the other hand, the plaintiff 2 led the act of misconduct recognized as the cause of the disciplinary action of this case with strong prejudice as to the unconstitutionality of the order of this case compared to the plaintiff 1, and thereby led the act of misconduct recognized as the cause of the disciplinary action of this case. The plaintiff 2 caused serious prejudice to the military, and the defendant 2 expressed that the defendant 2 had no intention to serve in the military through the Central Disciplinary Committee of the Army and the Appeal Review Committee of the Military Personnel Disciplinary Action against the Ministry of National Defense and other press media, and expressed that the defendant 2 had no intention to serve in the military any more clearly and objectively, it should not be viewed that the degree of the above plaintiff's flight of this case is inappropriate and that the defendant 2 deviates from and abused discretion objectively.

(D) Plaintiffs 3, 4, 5, and 6

In light of the grounds for disciplinary action against the above plaintiffs, each of the instant disciplinary action against plaintiffs 3, 4, and 6 by the president of the defendant president and against plaintiffs 5 by the chief of the defendant defense facility headquarters cannot be viewed as deviating from or abusing the authority of disciplinary discretion because it is objectively and objectively unfair.

(4) The theory of lawsuit

Therefore, each of the instant disciplinary actions against the Plaintiff 1 against Defendant 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, based on the premise that the removal and the above removal are legitimate, is unlawful.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, among the instant lawsuit, the part of the instant lawsuit seeking the Defendant Minister’s order to recruit the recruit of Plaintiff 1, the expulsion order to recruit the recruit and the assignment order to the recruit service, the alteration of the duration of education, and the revocation of the original order, is unlawful and dismissed. The part of the Plaintiff 1’s claim for the removal disposition by the Defendant president against Plaintiff 1 and the revocation of the expulsion disposition by the Defendant Minister is acceptable, and the claim by Plaintiff 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 is dismissed as it is without merit.

[Separate] Relevant Acts and subordinate statutes: omitted

Judges Kim Jong-chul (Presiding Judge)