Article 422(1)7 of the Civil Procedure Act, “when the false statement of a witness becomes evidence of the judgment” refers to a case where the false statement is provided as direct or indirect materials for fact-finding that affects the order of judgment, and the text of judgment would have to vary if the false statement had not been made. Thus, even if the false statement was excluded, it does not affect the text of judgment because the remaining evidence alone is recognized as a key fact and it does not constitute a ground for retrial even if the false statement was received a final judgment of conviction of perjury (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 82Da146, Dec. 27, 1983; 89Meu24247, Feb. 22, 1991; 90Da12861, Nov. 8, 1991; 9Da15914, Jan. 21, 1992).

According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court below, the court below acknowledged that the establishment registration of a neighboring mortgage in the name of the defendant (the plaintiff, the defendant hereinafter) on the real estate in this case was invalid for the cause caused without the consent of the plaintiff (the plaintiff, the plaintiff, and the plaintiff) who was the owner of the plaintiff (the plaintiff, the plaintiff) by Park Jong-do, and recognized that the testimony of a witness employed as evidence for fact-finding in the judgment for retrial in this case, which accepted the plaintiff's claim, was a false statement, which was convicted of perjury and the judgment became final and conclusive. In the above witness's testimony, it is obvious that there was no consent of the plaintiff as to the establishment of the above right to collateral security, which is the main facts recognized in the above judgment, and it was obvious that the defendant was aware of it, which affected the main part of the judgment. Accordingly, the judgment for retrial in this case had a ground for retrial as provided in Article 422 (1) 7 of the Civil Procedure Act. After considering all all the evidence presented in the remaining case except the testimony of the above witness and all evidence, the defendant's new assertion that the establishment registration was invalid in the defendant's judgment.

However, even if only the remaining evidence, other than the testimony of the above witness who was recognized as a false statement and finally found guilty of perjury, if such a false statement is recognized as it is, it would have been sentenced to the same judgment even if there was no false statement, and therefore, such false statement may not affect the text of the judgment subject to a retrial. Therefore, it shall not be acknowledged as a ground for retrial under Article 422 (1) 7 of the Civil Procedure Act, since such false statement is related to the recognition of a new assertion in the instant case after the pronouncement of the judgment subject to a retrial, and even if the text of the judgment subject to a retrial could vary by recognizing that the statement could affect the text of the judgment subject to a retrial.

Therefore, the judgment of the court below finding that there was a ground for a retrial in the judgment subject to retrial solely on the fact that there was a judgment of conviction as to the false testimony of the above witness, is erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the grounds for retrial under Article 422 (1) 7 of the Civil Procedure Act, which affected the conclusion

Therefore, the judgment of the court below is omitted, and the case is remanded to the court below. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Chocheon-sik (Presiding Justice)