B. The case holding that the presumption of presumption of the above registration cannot be deemed to have been reversed on the ground that the defendants asserted that there was no sale in the letter of guarantee as stipulated in the above special measures, and that the defendants had completed the registration of ownership transfer in the course of cancelling the title trust, it cannot be deemed that the above letter of guarantee was false.

B. The case holding that even if the Defendants asserted to the effect that, as stated in the letter of guarantee as to the reason for the registration of transfer of ownership completed under the Act on Special Measures, Gap did not sell the disputed land to Eul, it cannot be deemed that the presumption power of transfer of ownership is reversed on the ground that the letter of guarantee is not deemed to have actively denied the Plaintiff’s assertion that it was false, and thus, it cannot be deemed that the above certificate of transfer of ownership was reversed since it was not a confession that the above certificate of guarantee was false.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

A registration of ownership transfer made under the Act on Special Measures for the Registration, etc. of Ownership Transfer (Act No. 3094) is presumed to have been duly made in accordance with the procedure provided for in that Act and to have been consistent with the substantive legal relationship. Thus, in order to reverse such presumption, it is necessary to prove that a letter of guarantee or confirmation provided for in the Special Act, which forms the basis of such registration, was forged or falsely prepared, or that it was not duly registered for any other reason (see Supreme Court Decision 89Meu24797, May 25, 190).

Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in comparison with the records, we affirm the judgment below's rejection of the plaintiff's assertion that if the letter of guarantee or confirmation, which forms the basis for the registration of transfer of ownership completed on December 20, 1970, was made in a false manner from the non-party 1 to the non-party 2 in the future, it is hard to believe that the above non-party 1 sold the land in dispute to the non-party 2 as stated in the above letter of guarantee. On the other hand, the plaintiff alleged that the non-party 1 did not sell the land in dispute to the above non-party 2 as stated in the above letter of guarantee, it is not just to deny the claim, but further, although the non-party 2 asserted to the effect that the land in dispute was made in title trust for convenience with the non-party 1 while cancelling the title trust, it cannot be deemed to have actively denied the plaintiff's assertion that the above certificate of transfer of ownership was false, and thus, it cannot be deemed to have reversed the presumption of the above registration.

In the end, there is no reason to argue that the judgment below erred in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the validity of confession, the presumption of ownership transfer registration, and the falsity of the letter of guarantee.

2. We examine the second ground for appeal.

In addition to the main judgment that deemed that the ownership transfer registration of this case also conforms to the substantive relationship, the part of the judgment of the court below that held that the ownership transfer registration of this case is maintained as it is is reasonable, the main judgment of the court below is justified, and therefore, the theory that the above additional judgment of the court below contains an error of law such as incomplete deliberation, omission of judgment, failure of reasoning, failure of reasoning, etc. cannot be a legitimate ground for appeal. The argument is without merit.

3. Accordingly, the appeal shall be dismissed and all costs of appeal shall be assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Park Jong-ho (Presiding Justice)