[2] The case holding that an act of a superintendent of education who rejected an application for appointment of a teacher of a kindergarten belonging to an abolished public ○○○○ Infant shall not constitute an administrative disposition subject to appeal litigation

[2] The case holding that even if a person, who is a teacher belonging to the public ○○○○ Infant Center, abolished on December 31, 1991 pursuant to Article 3 (1) of the Addenda of the Infant Care Promotion Act, holds a kindergarten teacher's license under the Education Act, the Superintendent of an Office of Education has a duty to appoint the pertinent teacher as a kindergarten teacher or to respond to his application for appointment of a kindergarten teacher as a kindergarten teacher, or that corresponding to this duty cannot be said to have a right to ask the pertinent teacher to appoint a kindergarten teacher as a kindergarten teacher under the law or sound reasoning, or to have a right to respond to the request for appointment of the pertinent teacher as a kindergarten teacher or a right to respond to the application for appointment of the said teacher, and thus, the refusal of appointment for the pertinent teacher cannot be a administrative disposition that is subject to an appeal litigation.

In order for an administrative agency to be subject to an administrative disposition against which a citizen’s refusal to file an application is an administrative disposition, there must be a right under laws or sound reasoning that allows the citizen to file an administrative action according to the application. If an administrative agency refuses to accept the application of a citizen who is not in accordance with such right and refuses to do so, it does not affect the applicant’s right or legal interest, and thus, it cannot be deemed an administrative disposition that is subject to an appeal litigation (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 84Nu227, Oct. 23, 1984; 95Nu1378, Jan. 23, 196).

However, considering the provisions of Articles 8(1), 9(1), and 3(1), 5(1), and (2) of the Addenda of the Act as amended by Act No. 4475 of December 31, 191, the head of the ○○○○○ Infant Board (hereinafter “public ○○○○ Infant Board”) established and operated by the Si/Gun at the time of the amendment of the Act, and the ○○○○○ Infant Board established and operated by the corporation, organization, or individual with the authorization of the head of the Si/Gun (hereinafter “private ○○○ Infant Board”) shall be reappointed or abolished as a kindergarten under the Education Act by December 31, 193. There is no other obligation to appoint the 1st Amendment of the Act as a teacher of the ○○○○○○ Infant Board (hereinafter “public ○○○○ Infant Board”) as a public teacher of the kindergarten prior to the amendment of the Act, and there is no other obligation to appoint the 1st Amendment of the Act as a public excluding the qualifications of the ○○○.

Therefore, as determined by the court below, as long as the plaintiffs are teachers belonging to the public ○○○○ Infant Academy, which is repealed by Article 3(1) of the Addenda of the amended Act, even if they possess a teacher’s license under the Education Act, the defendant has a duty to appoint the plaintiffs as kindergarten teachers or to respond to whether to appoint the plaintiffs as kindergarten teachers, or to respond to the plaintiffs’ application for appointment as kindergarten teachers. Accordingly, the plaintiffs cannot be said to have the right to request the defendant to appoint them as kindergarten teachers due to the legal or sound reasoning, or to have the right to respond to whether or not to appoint them as kindergarten teachers. Thus, the disposition of refusal of this case cannot be deemed an administrative disposition that is subject to appeal litigation, since the defendant refused to appoint the plaintiffs as kindergarten teachers.

The judgment of the court below to the same purport is just and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles, omission of judgment, or interpretation of statutes as discussed in the grounds of appeal, and it is not appropriate to invoke the case as the case differs from the case. All the arguments are without merit.

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Jeong Jong-ho (Presiding Justice)