[2] Whether Article 20-2 of the Act on Special Measures for Readjustment of Requisitioned Property is the purport of recognizing the right of repurchase to the person requisitioned (negative)

[2] Unlike the provisions of Article 20 of the Act on Special Measures for Readjustment of Requisitioned Property, the purport of Article 20-2 of the same Act is that the State can sell the requisitioned property, the redemption period of which has expired, to the person requisitioned under a negotiated contract notwithstanding the provisions of the State Property Act, and it does not recognize the preferential purchase right to the person requisitioned.

On the first ground for appeal

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below rejected the plaintiff's claim as stipulated in Article 20-2 of the Act on Special Measures for Readjustment of Requisitioned Properties on April 29, 1994 on the following premise: the defendant purchased the land of this case which was owned by the plaintiff on December 1, 1970 under the Requisitioned Act, and paid compensation for requisition on June 9, 1971 after completing the registration of transfer of ownership under the name of the defendant on May 4, 1971; and the defendant did not use it for military purposes on February 1, 1993, and notified the plaintiff of purchase by a negotiated contract pursuant to Article 20-2 of the Act on Special Measures for Readjustment of Requisitiond Properties; accordingly, on October 11, 1994, the plaintiff applied for purchase of the land of this case on October 11, 1994, but the defendant was incorporated as a repurchase right under the Urban Planning Act, and thus, notified the plaintiff of sale under Article 20-2 (2) of the Act.

The right of repurchase under Article 20 (1) of the Act on Special Measures for Readjustment of Requisitioned Property shall be deemed to have occurred when all or part of the pertinent property becomes unnecessary for military purpose within five years before the expiration of the redemption of the securities paid with the purchase price of the requisitioned property or within five years after the redemption is terminated. Thus, the right of repurchase may be exercised only when the requisitioned property becomes unnecessary for military purpose within the above period, and the right of repurchase shall not be exercised if it becomes unnecessary for military purpose after the above period expires (see Supreme Court Decision 91Da9886, Feb. 11, 1992). In the same purport, the court below held that the requisitioned property becomes unnecessary for military purpose after the expiration of the period stipulated in the above Act on Special Measures for Readjustment of Requisitiond Property, and therefore, it is proper to determine that the right of repurchase under Article 20 (1) of the aforesaid Act has not been created, and there is no violation of the legal principles as pointed out in the grounds of appeal or any violation of the Constitution.

On the second ground for appeal

According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court below, even if the defendant notified the plaintiff on April 29, 194 that he would purchase the land of this case as seen above, the above notification should not be acknowledged as the right of repurchase (right of preferential purchase) to the plaintiff as a notification under Article 20-2 of the Act on Special Measures. Unlike Article 20 of the above Act, the above decision is just to the purport that the State can sell the requisitioned property, the repurchase period of which has expired, to the person subject to requisition under a free contract notwithstanding the provisions of the State Property Act, and not to recognize the right of preferential purchase to the person subject to requisition (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 91Da26690, Oct. 22, 1991), and there is no error of law such as misunderstanding legal principles or violation of the Constitution, etc. as pointed out in the Grounds for Appeal.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed as it is without merit, and all costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Seo Sung-sung (Presiding Justice)