2. Costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

A. On February 26, 197, the Plaintiff acquired a 350,000 m2 from Ulsan-dong 90 to 3,309 m3,09 m2 in Ulsan-gu (Seoul-do 90, July 15, 1997: hereinafter referred to as the “instant land”) and transferred it to KimA on March 7, 2009.

B. On June 1, 2009, the Plaintiff filed a transfer income tax base return after deducting the total amount of the transfer income tax calculated by applying the provisions on reduction and exemption of transfer income tax for self-employed farmland for at least eight years under Article 69 of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act (amended by Act No. 921, Jan. 1, 2010) and Article 66 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 21565, Jun. 26, 2009) from the total amount of the transfer income tax calculated by applying the provisions on reduction and exemption of transfer income tax for self-employed farmland for at least eight years. However, on January 8, 2010, the Defendant deemed that the instant land does not constitute self-employed farmland for at least eight years and imposed and dismissed transfer income tax (hereinafter “instant disposition”).

C. The Plaintiff appealed and filed an appeal with the Tax Tribunal on March 31, 2010, but the Tax Tribunal dismissed the appeal on June 17, 2010.

[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence 1-2, Gap evidence 2-2, Eul evidence, Eul evidence 1-3, the purport of the whole pleadings

2. The legality of the instant disposition

A. The plaintiff's assertion

(1) The instant land acquired on February 26, 197, and was transferred on March 7, 2009 by the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff’s family continued to do so for not less than eight years, and thus, the instant disposition, based on the premise that the Plaintiff did not meet the re-village period for not less than eight years, is unlawful.

(2) According to Article 39(1) and (2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea, any person who does not receive unfavorable treatment due to the performance of his duty of military service, and Article 89(1)3 of the Income Tax Act and Article 154(1) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, which provides for non-taxation of one house per household, provides for the period of possession and exemption from the period of residence in cases of transfer due to school attendance, circumstances of work, medical treatment of diseases, and other inevitable reasons. In light of the above, the disposition of this case on the premise that the Plaintiff’s inevitable relocation of his domicile to Busan Metropolitan City for reasons of his military service period and employment is excluded from his own period after March 1985 is against the Constitution, the principle of

(b) Related statutes;

As shown in the attached Form.

C. Determination

(1) In order to be eligible for exemption from capital gains tax, the Plaintiff shall reside in the Si, Gun, Gu, or Gu where the instant land was located for at least 18 years after the Plaintiff acquired the instant land in accordance with the provisions of the Restriction of Special Taxation Act and the Enforcement Decree of the same Act (hereinafter referred to as “requirements for re-election”), and (ii) shall reside in the Si, Gun, or Gu adjacent to the Si, Gun, or Gu where the instant land was located for at least 8 years (hereinafter referred to as “requirements for self-election”), and the burden of proof as to such requirements shall be borne by the Plaintiff (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 90Nu6293, Apr. 23,

(2) Whether it constitutes a requirement for re-operation

(A) The status of the Plaintiff’s residence appearing in the public record, such as resident registration, is as follows (the fact that there is no dispute, entry of No. 4-1 and No. 2, and the purport of the whole pleadings).

(B) The period during which the Plaintiff acquired the instant land from February 26, 1977 to March 7, 2009 during which the Plaintiff is deemed to reside in the Si/Gun/Gu adjacent thereto or the location of the instant land from February 26, 1977 to December 15, 1980 falls short of the requirements for re-laws of not less than 5 years, including 294 days from February 26, 197 and 17 days from February 25, 1983 to March 13, 1985.

(C) As to this, the Plaintiff asserts that the exclusion of the period of military service is against the Constitution and the Military Service Act that it would not be disadvantageously treated due to the performance of the duty of military service, and is against the principle of equity. However, the strict interpretation doctrine derived from the principle of no taxation without law applies not only to the case meeting the taxation requirements, but also to the case meeting the requirements for non-taxation and tax reduction or exemption. Thus, a expanded interpretation or analogical interpretation of the requirements for non-taxation or tax exemption without any justifiable reason for the benefit of taxpayers would result in a result contrary to the principle of tax equity, which is the basic ideology of tax law, and thus, it shall not be allowed (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2005Da19163, May 25, 2006). The purport of the non-taxation tax support for the transfer of self-farmland farmland is to protect farmers with low social

In doing so, (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 87Nu777, Nov. 10, 1987; 94Nu11859, Feb. 3, 1995). As such, it is difficult to view that the period of military service is an unfavorable treatment due to the performance of military service, since it is difficult to view that the period of military service is not an industry during the period of residence as an unfavorable treatment due

(3) Whether the requirements for self-sufficiency are met

The purport of the provision that income accruing from the transfer of farmland as of the date of transfer in which one has cultivated for not less than eight years is exempt from taxation. The purport of the provision is to reduce the tax burden due to the transfer of farmland as part of the land farming policy, and this provision includes not only cases where one has cultivated farmland but also cases where one has had his family living or living together with the same household, as well as cases where one has cultivated farmland (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 94Nu1859, Feb. 3, 195).

In light of the above legal principles, even if the Plaintiff satisfies the requirements for re- village, the Plaintiff’s assertion does not appear to have any reason, as there is no reason to acknowledge that the Plaintiff had cultivated the land of this case with his parents, family members, and the family members, and the family members, and the first, second, and third, during the period of re-villageing, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge that the Plaintiff had cultivated the land of this case during the period of re-villageing. (The Plaintiff did not assert any specific assertion as to how to claim that the Plaintiff cultivated the land of this case only with his parents, family members, and the family members, and the family members, and

(4) Sub-determination

Since the Plaintiff failed to meet the self-sufficiency requirements for not less than 8 years, which are the requirements for exemption from capital gains tax under the Restriction of Special Taxation Act and the Enforcement Decree of the same Act when transferring the instant land, the instant land cannot be deemed as falling under the self-arable farmland subject to exemption from

Therefore, the defendant's disposition of this case is legitimate.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim is dismissed as it is without merit, and the judgment of the court of first instance is just in conclusion, and the plaintiff's appeal is dismissed as it is without merit, and it is so decided as per Disposition.