근로자공급사업허가신청거부처분취소
2014Guhap2821 The revocation of revocation of permission for labor supply business
A trade union
The Director General of the Daejeon Regional Employment and Labor Office
March 4, 2015
April 22, 2015
1. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.
2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.
The defendant's disposition of refusal to grant new labor supply business to the plaintiff on May 27, 2013 is revoked.
1. Details of the disposition;
A. On February 25, 2013, executives of the Committee (non-governmental organizations organized for the development of Section C, such as securing additional safety of joint owners of Section B and early completion of construction) establish the Plaintiff, who is a regional unit trade union, and was issued a certificate of report on the establishment of a trade union from the D market on February 26, 2013. As of April 4, 2013, the number of the Plaintiff’s members is 20.
B. On April 4, 2013, the Plaintiff issued a new application for a labor supply business to the Defendant under Article 33 of the Employment Security Act: 450 persons per month, 5,400 persons per year, 7 companies to be supplied: E, F, G, H, I, J, K, and business area: 30 persons per month, 450 persons per month, 5,40 persons per year, 7 companies to be supplied: E, F, H, I, K, and C: C only (hereinafter “instant application”).
C. On May 27, 2013, the Defendant rendered a disposition rejecting the instant application by applying Article 33 of the Employment Security Act (hereinafter “instant disposition”) against the Plaintiff on the grounds as follows.
① In the case of paragraph (3), it may be deemed that there are factors to increase the number of workers due to the increase of the volume of water operated, the extension of wharfs, etc., but the increase of the number of workers does not necessarily mean that the new permit for the supply business is complete (hereinafter referred to as “one point for non-permission”); ② Plaintiff’s executive officers, etc. cannot be deemed to be professionally engaged in the business related to the wharfs under the control of B Committee (hereinafter referred to as “non-permission ground 2 points”); ③ In the case of some wharfs including the supply company, it is unclear whether the supply of workers is completed in the state of completing the reorganization of the supply of harbor manpower system; and even in the case of other wharfs, it is determined that there is a high possibility that many labor supply business entities will not assist smooth wharfs and stability in employment relations (hereinafter referred to
D. The Plaintiff filed an administrative appeal on July 1, 2013 regarding the instant disposition, but was dismissed on February 18, 2014.
【Ground of recognition】 The fact that there has been no dispute, Gap Nos. 1, 2, 3, Eul Nos. 1 and 6, the purport of the whole pleadings
2. Whether the instant disposition is lawful
A. The plaintiff's assertion
1) New permission for domestic labor supply business meeting the requirements for permission is a binding act that must grant permission if the requirements for permission are met, or a binding discretionary act that must issue permission in principle. The Plaintiff satisfies all the requirements for permission for domestic labor supply business, such as the scope of business of a trade union, the status of supply and demand by occupation, and the maintenance of employment stability by region in question.
On the other hand, whether the Defendant is a trade union suitable for carrying out the supply business, which is 2 points for non-permission, does not constitute the requirements for permission under Article 33 of the Employment Security Act. Even if the requirements for permission are deemed to be met, it does not mean that the Plaintiff has expertise in loading and unloading business and work experience in the port site other than the ability to engage in the supply business, and the Plaintiff has technical knowledge about C/port to the extent that it can enter into a contract with a third party for the supply of workers and assign human resources to the loading station, and thus, the above requirements for permission are satisfied. Nevertheless, the Defendant issued the instant disposition denying the Plaintiff’s application on the grounds of 1-3 points
(ii) the deviation and abuse of discretionary power;
Even if a new permission disposition of domestic labor supply business is a discretionary act, the plaintiff constitutes a trade union that can obtain permission of domestic labor supply business upon meeting the requirements for permission as above, and the third basic harbor plan, etc. is expected to continuously increase D regional harbor facilities, etc. In accordance with the basic harbor plan, even if the plaintiff's business area and the existing trade union's business area overlap, the application of this case does not lead to excessive supply of harbor manpower to the members of the existing trade union, even if the application of this case is granted due to the lack of economic influence, and thus, it does not lead to excessive supply of harbor manpower to C. If the application of this case is granted, there may be a competition system between the trade union that supplies harbor manpower. In light of the fact that the existing labor union's discontinuance, discontinuance, and closure of labor union's existing labor union's labor union's labor union's labor union's labor union's labor union's labor union's labor union's labor union's labor union's labor union's labor union's labor union's labor union's labor dispute and physical conflict
B. Relevant statutes
It is as shown in the attached Form.
(c) Fact of recognition;
1) As to the assertion that the requirements for permission are satisfied
A) First, we examine whether the permission of domestic labor supply business is a binding or binding act.
Even if a certain administrative act is a binding act or a discretionary act, whether it is a discretionary act or a discretionary act can not be uniformly defined. Determination shall be made individually in accordance with the form of a provision on the basis of the pertinent disposition, stay or text (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2011Du3388, Dec. 12, 2013; 201Du5490, Jul. 14, 201).
However, Article 33 (3) of the Employment Security Act provides that only a trade union under the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act may obtain permission for domestic labor supply business, and Article 33 (4) of the same Act provides that when the Minister of Employment and Labor grants permission for domestic labor supply business, the scope of business of the trade union, the status of human resources supply by job type by the region, and the maintenance of employment stability
In light of the fact that the provision that forms the basis for the pertinent disposition is "a trade union under the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, etc.," the permitting authority may decide whether to grant permission by comprehensively taking into account the various circumstances, such as the scope of the business of the trade union, the status of the supply and demand of human resources by region and occupation, the maintenance of employment stability, etc., even if the applicant is a trade union under the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, so it is reasonable to deem
B) Even if the permission of domestic labor supply business is a binding or binding act, the Plaintiff is not a trade union under the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act for the following reasons, and thus, does not meet the requirements for the permission.
Article 2 subparag. 1 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (hereinafter referred to as the "Trade Union Act") provides that "worker means a person who lives on wages, salary, or any other income equivalent thereto regardless of the type of occupation," the main sentence of Article 2 subparag. 4 provides that "trade union" means an organization or associated organization organized by a worker as the principal agent for the purpose of maintaining and improving the working conditions and enhancing the economic and social status of workers by independently and separately forming the principal agent," and the proviso of subparagraph 4 (d) provides that "where a person who is not a worker permits the entry of a non-worker, it shall not be deemed a trade union: Provided, That where a dismissed person has requested a remedy to the Labor Relations Commission, it shall not be interpreted as a non-worker until the National Labor Relations Commission makes a decision on the reexamination of the provisions of the Trade Union Act. "worker" under Article 2 subparag. 1 and subparag. 4 (d) of the Trade Union Act shall be limited to a person who is actually employed by a specific employer, barring any special circumstance (see Supreme Court Decision 20384, Mar. 24, 2014).
In this case, in addition to the purport of the entire arguments, evidence Nos. 3, 6, 8, 11, and 13 include the health team, Eul, Eul, Eul, Eul, Eul, Eul, etc., ① The plaintiff was established on February 18, 201, ② The plaintiff's trade union, the plaintiff's chairperson, Eul, Eul, Eul, the secretary general, and Eul, who works for N, P, P, civil engineering, Q, and E cooperation, working for the construction company, and Eul, who worked for the general director of the B Committee (hereinafter referred to as "the plaintiff's representative") and worked for the construction company, Eul, Eul, which had been working for the construction company, as the general director of the B Committee (hereinafter referred to as "the plaintiff's representative"), and the plaintiff was entrusted with the labor supply company, Eul, Eul, the plaintiff's representative, and U.S., which was planned to supply the work at each port and port supply company (the plaintiff's representative of the supply company, and the plaintiff's representative of the local cargo supply company).
Examining these facts in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, M, T, U, etc. among the Plaintiff’s founders do not correspond to “worker” under Article 2 subparag. 4 (d) of the Trade Union Act, since they are not actually employed by a D-regional harbor business entity, and they do not constitute “worker” under Article 2 subparag. 4 (d) of the Trade Union Act. There is no assertion or proof by the Plaintiff as to the special circumstances in which they may join as its members.
C) Therefore, the Plaintiff’s assertion on this part is without merit, premised on the premise that the permission for labor supply business is a binding or binding act.
2) As to the assertion of deviation and abuse of discretionary power
A) First, we examine whether the “whether it is a trade union suitable for the implementation of the supply business” can be considered as one of the considerations when determining whether to grant permission with regard to two points of non-permissions.
The purpose of Article 33 of the Employment Security Act and Article 37 subparag. 4 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act is to prescribe matters necessary for the permission and management of domestic labor supply business pursuant to the Employment Security Act. The Ministry of Employment and Labor’s rules were established as the rules of the secretariat within the administrative agency that set the criteria for determining the permission and management of domestic labor supply business. This is externally effective. Thus, the determination of legality of the pertinent disposition ought to be based on the content and purport of the pertinent statutes, not only on the above permission management regulations, but also on the ground that the pertinent disposition cannot be deemed legitimate, as it conforms to the above permission management regulations. However, unless the above permission management regulations do not conform with the Constitution or laws or the result of its application is considerably unreasonable in light of the content and purport of the grounds for disposition and related statutes, the disposition under the above permission management regulations should not be determined as deviating from the scope of discretion or abusing discretionary power (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2012Du1571, Dec. 26, 2013).
However, labor supply business is highly likely to cause side effects such as safety and health risks of workers, decline in working conditions, inflow of minors, exploitation of workers, interim exploitation of workers, forced labor, violation of human rights, kidnapping, and trafficking, etc. Therefore, Article 33(3) of the Employment Security Act limits only a trade union under the Trade Union Act for which a permit of the Minister of Employment and Labor has been obtained (see Constitutional Court en banc Order 97Hun-Ba31, Nov. 26, 1998). Article 33(4) of the same Act limits the scope of business of a trade union to be performed when determining whether to grant permission.
In light of the purport and content of the pertinent statutes, Article 4 subparag. 1 of the instant Permission Management Regulations provides that “whether it is a trade union suitable for carrying out the supply business” should be considered in granting permission for the labor supply business is considered to have embodied Article 33(3) and (4) of the Employment Security Act. Therefore, the Defendant cannot be deemed to have committed an unlawful act in itself as one of the considerations.
B) Furthermore, we examine whether the Defendant’s instant disposition was deviates from and abused discretionary power, citing one to three grounds for rejection.
However, as seen earlier, the Plaintiff is not a trade union under Article 2 subparag. 4 of the Trade Union Act. Therefore, the Plaintiff cannot obtain permission for domestic labor supply business.
Therefore, without examining whether the Defendant’s 1 and 3 grounds for non-permission were properly considered as the grounds for non-permission, the Defendant’s disposition of this case on the ground of 2 grounds for non-permission is in accordance with the above purport and is an exercise of appropriate discretion. The Plaintiff’s assertion on this part cannot be accepted.
3. Conclusion
Therefore, the plaintiff's claim of this case is dismissed as it is without merit, and it is so decided as per Disposition.
The presiding judge, the senior judge;
Promotion of Judges
Judges fixed-term United States
A person shall be appointed.
A person shall be appointed.