The meaning of "when the false statement of a witness is admitted as evidence for a judgment" under Article 422 (1) 7 of the Civil Procedure Act, and whether the above false statement is a ground for retrial under the above provision of the Civil Procedure Act in cases where it is used as an opposing evidence to dismiss evidence, but it is not possible to employ any evidence rejected without any opposing evidence (negative)

Article 422 (1) 7 of the Civil Procedure Act provides that "when a false statement of a witness is admitted as evidence for a judgment" means the case where the false statement is provided as direct or indirect materials for fact-finding which is the basis of the order of judgment, and it is probable that the court would have rendered a judgment different from the judgment in question if the false statement had not been taken into account. Therefore, in a case where the false statement is used as an opposing evidence rejecting evidence conforming to the facts alleged by the parties, the evidence rejected is deemed as its content itself and thus, it is impossible to employ a witness, even if there is no dissenting evidence, it does not constitute grounds for retrial even if the false statement was rendered as a conviction.

Article 422(1)7 of the Civil Procedure Act

[Plaintiff-Appellant] Plaintiff 1 and 1 other (Law No. 4455, Dec. 27, 1988) (Law No. 1987, Dec. 27, 1988) (Law No. 1989, Feb. 22, 1991)

Appellant Park-Woo et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant

Edive interest

Appellee

Kim Jong-su, Counsel for the defendant-appellant who is an outdoor 6 others

Seoul High Court Decision 87Na4131 Decided May 4, 198

Seoul High Court Decision 90Rena400 delivered on February 7, 1991

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal shall be assessed against the plaintiff (appellant).

The grounds of appeal by the plaintiff (the plaintiff hereinafter) are examined (the supplementary appellate brief was submitted after the expiration of the period for submitting the appellate brief, and it is examined to the extent that it supplements the grounds of appeal).

Article 422 (1) 7 of the Civil Procedure Act provides that "when a false statement of a witness is used as evidence for a judgment" means a case where the false statement is provided as direct or indirect material for fact-finding which has become the ground for the order of judgment and it is probable that the court rendered a judgment different from the judgment in question if the false statement had not been taken into account (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 87Meu356, Jun. 23, 1987; Supreme Court Decision 87Meu2602, Dec. 27, 198). Thus, in cases where the false statement is used as an opposing evidence that excludes evidence that corresponds to the facts of the plaintiff's principal, the excluded evidence is deemed as having no credibility in its content, and if it is impossible to employ it even without any opposing evidence, it does not constitute grounds for retrial even if the false statement was obtained as a conviction.

According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court below, although the court below cited the testimony of Nonparty 1 as opposing evidence that the plaintiff purchased the land of this case on February 8, 1971, the court below rejected the evidence that corresponds to the facts of the plaintiff proposal. However, the evidence No. 4-1 (sale Contract) which corresponds to the facts of the plaintiff's proposal is considerably contradictory to the contents of the judgment, and even if the testimony of Nonparty 1 is not considered as opposing evidence, it is extremely difficult to believe that the judgment subject to a retrial has been ratified after the fact that the plaintiff's intervenor confirmed the registration of transfer of ownership, which was made by a forged document from the plaintiff's supplementary intervenor in the future of the non-party 1, as to the land of this case, was taken the testimony of the non-party 1 as a comprehensive evidence, but the above additional fact does not affect the order of the judgment subject to a retrial, and even if the testimony of the non-party 1 was excluded from the testimony of the non-party 1, it is not probable to have affected the order of this case.

In light of the records, we agree with the above judgment of the court below, and there is no error of law as to the interpretation of bona fide acquisitor under the State Property Act by misunderstanding the legal principles of the provisions of the Civil Procedure Act, such as the theory of lawsuit.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Song Man-man (Presiding Justice)