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(영문) 대법원 1995. 9. 26. 선고 95감도59 판결
[치료감호][공1995.11.1.(1003),3558]
Main Issues

A. Whether the criminal facts, which are the requirements for care and custody, can be disputed after the establishment of the defendant's case

B. Criteria for determining whether the criminal facts, which are requirements for care and custody, constitute the same or similar crime

Summary of Judgment

A. According to the main sentence of Article 20(2) of the Social Protection Act, the judgment of a custody case is rendered concurrently with the judgment of the accused case. In this case, the criminal facts as the requirement for care and custody are criminal facts that directly constitute the contents of the accused case. Thus, the judgment on whether to recognize them between the two should be consistent and it cannot be different. If the criminal facts have become final and conclusive after the judgment of the accused case becomes final and conclusive, the applicant for care and custody cannot contest the criminal facts which are the requirements

B. Whether the criminal facts, which are the requirements for care and custody, are identical or similar to the criminal facts, shall be based on the criminal facts subject to the punishment or punishment, and it shall not be based on the contents of the act specifically shared at the time of the previous and previous criminal acts.

[Reference Provisions]

(a) Article 20(2) of the Social Protection Act; Articles 5 and 6(2) of the Social Protection Act;

Reference Cases

A. Supreme Court Decision 82Do501 delivered on December 14, 1982 (Gong1983,315) (Gong177 delivered on December 9, 1986). Supreme Court Decision 86Do177 delivered on December 9, 1986 (Gong1987,176)

Applicant for Custody

Applicant for Custody

upper and high-ranking persons

Applicant for Custody

Defense Counsel

Attorney Seocheon-cheon General Law Office (Attorney Choi Byung-mo, Counsel for defendant-appellant)

Judgment of remand

Supreme Court Decision 94Do69 delivered on March 10, 1995

Judgment of the lower court

Gwangju High Court Decision 95No9 delivered on May 12, 1995

Text

The appeal is dismissed.

Reasons

The grounds of appeal by the respondent and the defense counsel are also examined.

According to the records of each judgment bound in the records, the court below recognized the fact that the requester was sentenced to imprisonment with prison labor for 4 years (up to concurrent crimes for the crime of causing obstruction of performance of official duties) on July 16, 1980 by causing violence to prison officers or interfering with the performance of official duties, and destroying windows and equipment, and that the hospital used the staff on the ground that emergency measures are inadequate at the hospital, and used telephone and information signs and damaged them. On March 20, 1986, the court below was sentenced to imprisonment with prison labor for 8 months (up to concurrent crimes for the crime of causing damage) (up to the main office of the Peace Democratic Party head office of the Peace (up to the crime of causing damage) and then damaged them by taking photographs and writing a book, and recognized the fact that the above criminal record of the requester was sentenced to imprisonment with prison labor for 1 year (up to the crime of causing injury and injury) and then was sentenced to imprisonment with prison labor for 2 years (up to the crime of causing injury and injury, and recognized that he was out of the same kind of the hotel as the above crime.

First, there is no evidence to acknowledge that the applicant intentionally damaged the property, and the actual damage is merely a damage caused by negligence while under the influence of alcohol. Thus, according to the main sentence of Article 20(2) of the Social Protection Act, the judgment of the custody case is sentenced concurrently with the judgment of the defendant case in principle. In this case, since the criminal facts constituting the crime of the defendant case as the requirements for the care and custody are the criminal facts of the defendant case immediately, the judgment on the recognition and contents between the two should be consistent and it is apparent that the criminal facts, including the above damage, have become final and conclusive after the judgment of the defendant case of this case, and therefore, it is apparent that the criminal facts including the above damage, have become final and conclusive. Thus, the defendant's judgment of the case of this case, as the respondent for the care and custody, can no longer dispute about the above damage of property.

Therefore, there is no reason to view the issue.

In addition, all of the above crimes of damage to public goods or damage to property of this case are not different in terms of damage to other person's goods in the process of expressing violence against the outside, and in full view of the nature of the crime, means and methods of the crime, tendency of the crime, types of crimes, etc. by the record, it shall be deemed a crime of the same or similar kind. Therefore, the court below's decision to the same purport is just

On the other hand, although the respondent is punished as the crime of damaging public goods as mentioned above, but does not directly harm public goods, he/she is not a crime of the same kind or a similar crime. Whether it is identical or similar is based on the crime subject to punishment or the crime subject to punishment, and it is not based on the contents of the act specifically shared at the time of the crime before and after the crime (see Supreme Court Decision 86Do177 delivered on December 9, 1986), the above assertion is without merit.

Furthermore, examining the risk of recidivism by the record, the judgment of the court below which recognized the risk of recidivism is just and acceptable, and there is no reason to challenge it.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Kim Jong-soo (Presiding Justice)

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