[1] The meaning and scope of “medical practice” under Article 27(1) of the Medical Service Act that strictly prohibits unlicensed medical practice

[2] The purport of allowing a person holding a license for medical technicians under Articles 1, 2, and 3 of the Medical Technicians, etc. Act, and Article 2 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act to perform duties in a specific field under Article 2(1) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act among medical practices under the instruction of a medical doctor or dentist, etc. / Whether a medical technician constitutes a non-licensed medical practice in cases where a medical technician performs medical practice beyond the scope and limit of duties under the Medical Technicians, etc. Act and the Enforcement Decree of the same Act (affirmative), and whether the same applies to cases where a medical technician performs medical practice under the instruction

[3] In a case where a dentist Gap et al. and dental sanitarian Eul were indicted on charges of violating the Medical Service Act by making the Defendant Eul et al., not a medical practitioner, a medical practitioner, in the course of the multiple-fluoral care for the patient's shock, the case holding that, in full view of all the circumstances, the title and intermediary procedure performed in the process of shock treatment can be performed only by a dentist who is a medical practitioner, and even if the Defendant Eul et al. performed such a procedure under the direction or supervision of the Defendant Gap, it constitutes non-licensed medical practice

[1] Article 27(1) of the Medical Service Act allows only medical persons to perform medical practice, and even if a medical person is a licensed medical person, the licenseless medical practice is strictly prohibited. Here, the term “medical practice” refers to the practice of prevention or treatment of diseases by conducting diagnosis, autopsy, prescription, medication, or surgical treatment based on medical expertise and experience and function, and other acts that are likely to cause harm to public health and sanitation if not performed by a medical person. “The risk of harm to public health and hygiene if performed by a medical person is sufficiently abstract risk” is sufficient, and thus, it cannot be said that there is no risk to a patient specifically.

[2] Articles 1, 2, and 3 of the Medical Technicians, etc. Act and Article 2 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act shall be classified as clinical pathology, radiation technician, physical therapy technician, occupational technician, dental technician, dental technician, and dental sanitary technician. A person holding a medical technician license shall be allowed to perform medical practice in a specific field prescribed by Article 2(1) of the Enforcement Decree of the Medical Technicians, etc. Act, according to the medical doctor’s or dentist’s instruction. In principle, only medical personnel can perform medical practice. However, with respect to a specific field where there is a concern for causing harm to human life, body, or public health among medical practice, a person having knowledge and experience about the risks, etc. that may cause harm to human body in the specific field, and a license should be granted to a person having the ability to confirm the reaction of human body caused by the relevant medical practice, determine whether there is any danger or not, and allow him/her to perform medical practice in the specific field.

Therefore, even if a medical technician is a medical technician, if he/she conducts a medical act beyond the scope and limit of duties prescribed by the Medical Technicians Act and the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, it constitutes an unlicensed medical practice, and this is also applicable even if it was conducted in accordance with

[3] In a case where a dentist Gap et al. and dental sanitarian Eul were indicted on charges of violating the Medical Service Act by making the Defendant Eul, not a medical practitioner, a medical practitioner, in the course of the multiple-fashion charging treatment for the patients' impulses, the case holding that, in full view of all the circumstances, unlike the cryping and the cryping procedure conducted for the prevention of shock, only a dentist, who is a medical practitioner, can perform the cryping and the cryping procedure conducted in the course of shock treatment beyond the scope and limits of duties of dental sanitarians permitted by the Medical Technicians, etc. Act and the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, and even if the Defendant Eul et al. conducted such a procedure under the direction or supervision of the Defendant Gap, it constitutes an unlicensed medical practice

[1] Article 27(1) of the Medical Service Act / [2] Articles 1, 2, and 3 of the Medical Technicians, etc. Act; Article 2(1) of the Enforcement Decree of the Medical Technicians, etc. Act / [3] Article 30 of the Criminal Act; Article 27(1) of the Medical Service Act; Article 87(1)2 of the former Medical Service Act (Amended by Act No. 13658, Dec. 29, 2015); Article 1, 2, and 3 of the Medical Technicians, etc. Act; Article 2(1)6 of the Enforcement Decree of the Medical Technicians, etc. Act

[1] Supreme Court Decision 2010Do5964 Decided May 10, 2012 (Gong2012Sang, 1031) / [2] Supreme Court Decision 2002Do2014 Decided August 23, 2002 (Gong2002Ha, 2265), Supreme Court Decision 2007Do4655 Decided August 23, 2007, Supreme Court Decision 2009Do1337 Decided September 24, 2009

Defendant 1 and one other

Defendants

Law Firm Bernero, Attorney Masung-mun

Daejeon District Court Decision 2016No3284 Decided November 2, 2017

All appeals are dismissed.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. A. Article 27(1) of the Medical Service Act permits a medical person to perform medical practice only, and even if a medical person is a licensed medical person, the medical practice is strictly prohibited. Here, the term “medical practice” refers to preventing or treating a disease by conducting a diagnosis, autopsy, prescription, medication, or surgical treatment based on the experience and function based on medical expertise, and other acts that are likely to cause harm to public health and sanitation if a medical person does not perform it. “The risk of harm to public health and hygiene if a medical person does not perform it is sufficiently abstract risk,” and thus, it cannot be said that there is no harm to public health and sanitation solely on the ground that a patient does not pose a risk (see Supreme Court Decision 2010Do5964, May 10, 2012).

B. Meanwhile, Articles 1, 2, and 3 of the Medical Technicians, etc. Act and Article 2 of the Enforcement Decree of the Medical Technicians, etc. Act (hereinafter “Enforcement Decree of the Medical Technicians Act”) classify medical technicians, radiation specialists, physical therapy specialists, occupational technicians, dental technicians, and dental hygienists as medical technicians. Under the instruction of medical doctors or dentists, only medical professionals are allowed to perform a specific field of medical practice under Article 2(1) of the Enforcement Decree of the Medical Technicians, etc. Act. However, in principle, medical professionals are allowed to perform medical practice. As to a specific field where there is less risk of causing harm to human life, physical health, or public health among medical practice, they obtain knowledge and experience about the risks, etc. that may cause harm to human body, verify the reaction of human body caused by the relevant medical practice, determine whether there is any possible ability to cope with the situation, and allow a license holder to perform the relevant medical practice with limited guidance on the specific field (see Supreme Court Decision 200Do2842, Feb. 28, 2002).

C. Therefore, even if a medical technician is a medical technician, if he/she performed a medical act beyond the scope and limit of duties prescribed by the Medical Technicians Act and the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, it constitutes an unlicensed medical practice. This also applies even if he/she performed a medical act in accordance with a doctor’s or dentist’s instruction or instruction (see Supreme Court Decisions 2007Do4655, Aug. 23, 2007; 2009Do1337, Sept. 24, 2009).

2. Review of the evidence duly admitted by the first instance court and the lower court reveals the following circumstances.

A. The procedures for the multiple charging treatment for pacifies are largely comprised of the formation of dynamics through the elimination of pacifics, the name, the franing, the brokerage, the filling of back, and the coordination. The term “acid” is to disseminate the pacific agents with the pacific components, thereby enhancing the earth’s contact ability by corrosioning the pacific quality or the legal sciffic quality and the upper part of the pacific quality. Unlike the legal pacific quality, the upper part of the pacific body, with less than the legal pacific quality, is exposed to teachers’ fiber networks of organic ingredients. Unlike the legal pacific quality, it is difficult to approach the upper part without any subsequent pacificing treatment by spreading the racific body. The term “hipling” is to be done before the last part of the pacific and the pacific composition.

B. In the past, name, setting, and three stages of this crowdfunding have been written, but the present is still using a combined product at each stage.

(c) In the process of impulse treatment, the exposure of an infant’s satisfy is shaking due to the formation of an excessive dynamic due to the elimination of an infant, and as a case may be exposed to the satisfy’s satisfy, and as a result, to the satisfy’s gys or measurements. The satisfying process in a large quantity of satisfys is an important process that is sensitive to technology and has a critical impact on the satisfy of multiple satisfys. After the elimination of the satisfy, it is very important to prevent the satisfy’s satchy from being contaminated by the patient’s invasion or germs, and if the s

D. In the process of stoptop charging procedure for the prevention of impulses (so-called “stoping,” hereinafter referred to as “actualization”), the Ministry of Health and Welfare is also allowed to engage in the c toptop and do so. The Ministry of Health and Welfare is regarded as a practice permissible to dental hygienists. As a process for the prevention of c toptopism, c toptop and top top top top toptop top top top top toptop top top top toptop top top toptop top toptop top toptop top top top toptop top top top top top top toptop top top top top top top top top top top top top

3. Examining the above circumstances in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, it is reasonable to deem that the word and crowdfunding surgery performed in the process of impulse treatment is a medical practice beyond the scope and limitation of the duties of dental technicians permitted by the Medical Technicians Act and the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, and only a dentist, who is a medical practitioner, may engage in such medical practice. However, even if a dental sanitarian conducts such a medical practice under the direction or supervision of a dentist, it shall be deemed that such practice constitutes non-licensed medical practice.

A. The title and the instant crowdfunding practice performed in the course of impulse treatment may cause physical and chemical changes by directly contact not only the crypian crypology but also the crypology. As such, if it is performed by a person other than a medical person, it constitutes a medical practice that is likely to cause harm to the health and hygiene of the patient.

B. Meanwhile, a name and intermediary procedure conducted in the course of the practical process also constitute a medical practice. However, for the purpose of preventing dental diseases and for hygiene, the procedure is conducted in the part of the franchisium’s law that is regularly exposed to pollutants drafted without deletion. Thus, Article 2(1)6 of the Enforcement Decree of the Medical Technicians Act can be deemed as constituting “the removal of flusium, flusium, temporary charging, temporary charging, temporary charging, installation of fixtures, removal of flusiums, removal of flusiums, temporary attachment, installation and removal of flusiums, and other duties related to the prevention and hygiene of dental and oral diseases” under Article 2(1)6 of the Enforcement Decree of the Medical Technicians Act.

C. Unlike this, since the title and the instant crowdfunding practice conducted in the process of impulse treatment falls under the essential and important part of the entire process, it should be viewed as “the act of treating diseases,” and it cannot be deemed as falling under any of the duties provided by Article 2(1)6 of the Enforcement Decree of the Medical Technicians Act as the scope and limitation of the duties of dental technicians under the interpretation of the text.

D. Furthermore, the degree of concerns about health and hygiene risks that may arise in the course of the crypt treatment by a dental sanitarian may not be deemed to be merely the same level as the case where a dental sanitarian performs the crypt treatment in the course of the crypt treatment. In comparison with the crypt and this cryp treatment performed in the course of the crypt treatment, there is a substantial difference in the purpose of the cryp treatment, the specific situation where the cryp treatment is conducted in the course of the cryp treatment, medical expertise required, etc. In addition, compared to the cryp treatment in the course of the cryp treatment, there is a difference in the purpose of the cryp treatment, the specific situation where the cryp treatment is conducted in the course of the cryp treatment, where the cryp treatment is delayed or appropriate, and continuous observation is suspended after the cryp and the cryp treatment may increase the risk caused by contamination. This is likewise applicable to the so-called cryprying treatment.

E. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court en banc Decision 2013Do850 Decided July 21, 2016, which rendered a final appeal, is inappropriate to invoke the matter different from the instant case.

4. In the same purport, the lower court’s conclusion that found the Defendants guilty of violating the Medical Service Act is justifiable. In so doing, contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the interpretation of the licensed medical practice to dental sanitarians.

5. Therefore, all appeals are dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Ki-taik (Presiding Justice)