Whether the entries in the old land cadastre or documents related to the distribution of farmland can be used as data for fact-finding as to the alteration of rights in full together with other circumstances (affirmative)

Even if the name is indicated in the owner column of the land cadastre restored before the amendment of the Cadastral Act on December 31, 1975, it cannot be recognized that the statement has no presumption of right. Since the distribution farmland repayment register or the distribution farmland register is a document prepared to state matters necessary for repayment after the completion of the distribution farmland confirmation procedure, it cannot be recognized as a presumption of the alteration of right. However, there is no limitation that the entries in the former land cadastre or farmland distribution-related documents should be considered as evidence for the fact-finding of the alteration of right, taking into account other circumstances and circumstances. In addition, the farmland repayment register prepared as part of the farmland distribution procedure under the former Farmland Reform Act (amended by Act No. 31 of Jun. 21, 1949 and repealed by Act No. 4817 of Dec. 22, 1994) is prepared to state matters necessary for repayment after the completion of the distribution farmland confirmation procedure, it cannot be rejected because it is an important evidence as to farmland distribution.

Article 186 of the Civil Act, Article 202 of the Civil Procedure Act, Article 12 of the Cadastral Act, Article 11 of the former Farmland Reform Act (repealed by Article 2 of the Addenda to the Farmland Act, Act No. 4817, Dec. 22, 1994), Article 38 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Farmland Reform Act (repealed by Article 2 of the Addenda to the Enforcement Decree of the Farmland Act, Presidential Decree No. 14835, Dec. 22, 1995), Article 45 of the former Enforcement Rule of the Farmland Reform Act (repealed by Article 2 of the Addenda to the Farmland Act, Ordinance No. 1217, Dec. 29, 1995)

Supreme Court Decision 2003Da59815 Decided February 27, 2004, Supreme Court Decision 2006Da8825 Decided May 25, 2006, Supreme Court Decision 2008Da35128 Decided October 9, 2008 (Gong2008Ha, 1540)

Plaintiff 1 et al. (Law Firm Maok, Attorneys Go Chang-jo et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Korea

Suwon District Court Decision 2009Na4931 Decided September 24, 2009

The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the District Court Panel Division.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

1. Even if the name is indicated in the previous landowner's column of land cadastre restored before the amendment of the Cadastral Act on December 31, 1975, the presumption of right cannot be recognized. Since the distribution farmland repayment ledger or the distribution farmland ledger is a document prepared to state matters necessary for repayment after the completion of the distribution farmland confirmation procedure, the presumption of the alteration of right cannot be acknowledged. However, there is no limitation that the contents of the former land cadastre or documents related to distribution of farmland should be considered as materials for fact-finding regarding the alteration of right, taking into account all other circumstances and circumstances (see Supreme Court Decisions 2006Da8825, May 25, 2006; 2008Da35128, Oct. 9, 2008, etc.). Moreover, since the former Farmland Reform Act (amended by Act No. 3150, Jun. 21, 194; 2007Da4728, Dec. 27, 1994) was prepared for distribution of farmland, it cannot be rejected as evidence.

2. A. The lower court acknowledged the facts as indicated in its reasoning based on the evidence of employment, and determined that it is insufficient to recognize that Nonparty 1 succeeded to the land of this case from Nonparty 2, the title holder of the farmland of this case prior to the enforcement of the former Farmland Reform Act, in light of the following: (a) although ○○○ is deemed to be the same person as Nonparty 1, the father of the Plaintiffs; (b) there is no presumption of right in distribution farmland register, repayment register, cadastral record restoration report, and old land cadastre such as land cadastre, etc.; and (c) there is no submission of compensation-related documents such as an application for compensation; and (d) the written statement of land cadastre and farmland distribution-related documents, etc.

B. However, we cannot accept the above judgment of the court below.

(1) The reasoning of the lower judgment and the record reveal the following facts.

① As part of the procedure for distributing farmland under the former Farmland Reform Act, the repayment register of distributed farmland (No. 4) prepared by the Gyeonggi-do Yancheon-gun in 1950, in which the area of Gyeonggi-do Yancheon-gun in 1950 (hereinafter “instant land”) was registered as the distribution farmland at 45 (hereinafter “non-instant land”) and at 90 (hereinafter “non-party 3”) at 45 (hereinafter “non-party 3”) at Yancheon-do Yan-do 94 (hereinafter “the instant land”) and at 90 (hereinafter “non-party 4”), respectively, are written in the distribution column, and written in the remarks column in the remarks column as to the instant land and as to the non-party 1, respectively, as to the instant land.

② The previous landowner’s column for the land of this case is indicated as Nonparty 1, who resides in the 100-dong, Seoul, as the title holder, Nonparty 2’s next owner, who is the title holder. Nonparty 1, 2, 4 (Urrily 125), and Nonparty 5’s column for the previous landowner’s land cadastre as to the land of this case is indicated in sequence.

③ In the land cadastre and the registry comparison ledger, the owners of each land other than this case and the case are Nonparty 1 (Seoul) and the consignee is indicated as Nonparty 3 (U.S.). As to the land of this case, only the “Preservation” is indicated as the “Preservation,” but as to the land other than this case, the registration system and the preservation is indicated as

④ In addition, the distribution farmland division also states that Nonparty 3 (Ulim) and the person liable for duty payment of the instant land is Nonparty 1 (Seoul) in the distribution column of the instant land, and the public cadastral record recovery report also states that the instant case and the person liable for duty payment of the instant land, other than Seoul, is indicated as Nonparty 1 (Seoul) in the distribution column of the instant land.

⑤ On December 14, 1957, each of the lands other than the instant case and the instant case, the registration of ownership preservation was completed under the name of the Defendant on December 14, 1957, as the receipt of the Macheon Registry No. 2558. However, on December 30, 1965, the registration of ownership transfer was completed in sequence in the name of Nonparty 4 (the Macheon-gun, Sucheon-gun, Sucheon-gun, 125) and the name of Nonparty 5 on September 30, 1969.

(2) In light of the above circumstances in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, Nonparty 2, who is the circumstance title, disposed of each land other than the instant case and the instant case to Nonparty 1, the father of the Plaintiffs before the enforcement of the former Farmland Reform Act, and thereafter, the farmland distribution procedure was followed, and each of the instant land was distributed to Nonparty 3. As to the instant land, the ownership transfer registration was completed in the name of Nonparty 4, who appears to have been acquired by transfer or resale after the repayment was completed, but it is reasonable to deem that the ownership was returned to Nonparty 1, the original owner by waiver of the reimbursement regarding

C. Nevertheless, the lower court rejected the Plaintiff’s assertion that Nonparty 2, who is a real name, has already lost the ownership of the instant land solely on the ground that the Plaintiff’s assertion had already been rejected. In so doing, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the former Farmland Reform Act or by misunderstanding facts contrary to the rules of evidence, thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment.

3. Therefore, without examining the remaining grounds of appeal, the judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Hong-hoon (Presiding Justice)