(a) Meaning of “a person who operates an automobile for his own sake” as stipulated in Article 3 of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act; or whether a company has lost control and interest in the operation of the automobile in case where an accident occurred while the driver employed by the company has retired from his office after completing his personal duties and returned to the company; and

A. Article 3 of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act intends to bear the burden of controlling the operation of an automobile and the loss incurred by the operation of an automobile to a person who has the profit from the operation, based on the principle of risk liability and compensation liability. Thus, the term "person who operates an automobile for himself" refers to a person who is in the position of a responsible subject to the control of the operation of an automobile and to enjoy the benefit therefrom.

나. 건설회사가 시공하는 댐건설공구 소속 찝차 운전사가 위 공구장의 지시에 따라 위 자동차로 위 회사직원들을 퇴근시킨 후 음주 등 개인적 용무를 마치고 다시 위 차를 운전하여 차고가 있는 위 공사현장으로 돌아가던 중 위 차에 편승하려던 위 회사직원을 들이 받아 사고가 발생하였다면, 위 차량운행의 경위, 운전사의 회사에서의 직책, 운행목적, 사고경위 등에 비추어 사회통념상 위 차량의 소유자인 위 회사가 위 차량에 대한 운행지배와 운행이익을 상실하였다고 볼 수는 없다.

Article 3 of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act

A. Supreme Court Decision 86Meu556 Decided December 23, 1986

1.5 U.S.C. 1

Dong Asia Construction Industry Corporation (Attorney Lee Young-gu, Counsel for defendant-appellant)

Seoul High Court Decision 86Na707 delivered on November 24, 1986

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

According to the facts duly established by the court below, the non-party 1, who was the driver at the 5Ma2373 of the defendant company's construction site at the time of the construction site of the dam construction site of the defendant company, was the non-party 1, who was the driver at the 5Ma2373 of the defendant company's 9, Seoul, on May 3, 1985, the day before the accident of this case, at around 21:30, the above construction site of the non-party 1, who was the employee of the defendant company and the supervisor belonging to the industrial development corporation, left the above 1:00 malle-gun, the non-party 1, who was working at night on the day of the accident of this case, did not immediately return to the above construction site of the construction site and carried out the above 3rd malle-gun mar 1,000,000 mar mar 1:5,000 mar mar mar.

Article 3 of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act intends to bear loss from the operation control of a motor vehicle and operation interest to a person who has the operation control over the motor vehicle and the operation interest based on the risk liability and the principle of compensation liability. Thus, the term "person who operates the motor vehicle for his own sake" refers to a person who is in the position of a responsible subject to the control over the operation of the motor vehicle and enjoying the benefit therefrom (see Supreme Court Decision 86Meu556, Dec. 23, 1986). The accident in this case occurred after the non-party 1, who is the driver of the motor vehicle, retired his employees and returned to the construction site of the defendant company. Thus, in light of the situation of the operation of the motor vehicle in this case, the defendant company, as the owner of the motor vehicle, cannot be deemed to have lost the operation control and the operation interest of the motor vehicle in this case.

In this view, the decision of the court below that recognized the defendant liable for damages arising from the accident under the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act is just and there is no error of law such as the theory of lawsuit.

The Supreme Court precedents are different from those of the instant case, and are not appropriate for the instant case.

In addition, in light of the records, the court below determined that the degree of negligence of the deceased was 30 percent by comparing the non-party 1's driver's negligence which caused the accident of this case with the degree of negligence of the deceased. In light of the records, the court below's measure is just and acceptable, and there is no error of law by misunderstanding the legal principles of comparative negligence, such as theory of lawsuit.

All arguments are groundless.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of the appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Yoon Yoon-hee (Presiding Justice)