(a) The meaning of the “person operating an automobile for his own sake” as provided in Article 3 of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act, and the status of the operator of the automobile;

(b) The case holding that the owner's operation under the above provision of the Act is recognized as one of the persons who stored and operated the Oral Ba for the heart of the owner of the Oral Ba in order to maintain the Oral Ba;

A. The term “person who operates an automobile for his own sake” under Article 3 of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act means a person who is in the position of a responsible subject to the control of the operation of the automobile and to enjoy the benefit therefrom, and the owner or the holder of the automobile shall be bound by the owner of the automobile unless there are special circumstances to deem that the specific operation causing an accident is entirely lost the control of the operation and the profit therefrom.

(b) The case holding that the owner's operation under the above provision of the Act is recognized with respect to the unauthorized operation of the person who has stored and driven the Oral Ba for the heart of the flat owner; and

Article 3 of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act

A. Supreme Court Decision 86Meu556 decided Dec. 23, 1986 (Gong1987, 228) (Gong198), 88Meu2134 decided Mar. 28, 1989 (Gong1989, 670) (Gong145) decided Apr. 25, 1990

Dongyang Fire and Marine Insurance Co., Ltd., Counsel for defendant-appellee

Defendant-Appellee et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellee

Busan High Court Decision 90Na7555 delivered on January 24, 1991

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

The judgment of the court below shall be deleted from July 5, 198, with respect to the amount of KRW 7,194,400 in the disposition of the court below.

As to the Defendant’s Attorney’s Grounds of Appeal

1. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below determined as follows: (a) as a whole of the evidence adopted by the court below, that the owner of the instant Orala owned by the defendant, was driving the livestock shed, Nonparty 1, or Nonparty 2 living in the above farm located outside of Pyeongtaek-gun ( Address omitted) operated by the defendant; (b) so, the above non-party 1 or the above non-party 2 was able to drive Oralba; and (c) on the day of the accident, the above non-party 2: (a) displayed an Oralacacacacacacacaca in order to allow the above non-party 1 or the above non-party 2 to drive Oralacaca; (b) placed oil with the gasoline value of Oralacaca, after taking into consideration the defendant's argument, and (c) allowed the above non-party 1 to write off the Defendant's Yacacaca and 2, which caused the above non-party 1 and the above non-party 2.

The term "person who operates an automobile for his own sake" in Article 3 of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act refers to a person in a position as a responsible subject to the control of the operation of an automobile and to enjoy the benefit therefrom, and the owner or the holder of an automobile shall be confirmed to be in a normal position. Thus, unless there are special circumstances to deem that the specific operation, which caused the accident, has completely lost the control of the operation and the profit from the operation of the owner, the holder shall be held liable for the accident (see Supreme Court Decision 80Da2813, Jul. 7, 1981; Supreme Court Decision 86Meu556, Dec. 23, 1986; 8Da2134, Mar. 28, 1989).

In light of the above principle, the court below's determination that the above facts did not lose the operation control and operation profit of Obaba to the defendant who is the owner of Obaba, is just and there is no error of law such as the theory of lawsuit.

2. As seen earlier, the lower court recognized the Defendant’s operation of the Defendant’s vehicle accident compensation guarantee as one of the cited evidence under Article 3 of the Automobile Accident Compensation Guarantee Act, and recognized the Defendant’s operation of the Defendant’s Obane as one of the quoted evidence, and determined contents are in violation of the Defendant’s operation of Masan District Court 88Gahap76 case, which is the related case, and, thus, it should be criticized for the lower court’s finding of facts without any explanation as to the part contrary to the Defendant’s evidence No. 3, which is identical with the aforementioned evidence No. 3. However, the lower court’s explanation of the reasoning is without merit, considering the special circumstances that were not considered in the above final judgment, the management status of Ebane, regardless of the Defendant’s will, and the circumstances leading Nonparty 1, the victim, took advantage of the above Obane, and rejected the Defendant’s establishment of the aforementioned part of Obane as one of the aforementioned facts and the purport of the lower judgment that it did not constitute an unlawful judgment.

3. The reasoning or the text of the lower judgment ordering the Plaintiff to pay the amount of KRW 15,504,80 and damages for delay thereof. However, the lower court erred by misunderstanding the part ordering the Plaintiff to pay the amount of KRW 7,194,400 and the damages for delay thereof under paragraph (2) of the same Article. However, since it is apparent that this is due to clerical error, it does not constitute grounds for reversal. However, the part is to be corrected ex officio.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed and all costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Kim Sang-won (Presiding Justice)