A. The scope and limitation of the guarantor's liability with respect to the so-called continuous guarantee

(b) The case holding that even if the credit sales amount in an agency contract concluded between Gap and Eul agreed that Gap may terminate the contract if it exceeds 150% of the transaction deposit, it cannot be deemed that Eul's obligation is anticipated and guaranteed within 150% of the transaction deposit, as the guarantor who has guaranteed an uncertain obligation arising in the continuous transaction relationship between Eul and Eul, even though Eul agreed that the contract may be terminated;

C. Whether it constitutes a ground for limitation of liability of a guarantor to conduct a guarantee without an economic cost, without promoting friendship with the principal debtor in the so-called continuous guarantee (negative)

A. Even in the so-called continuing guarantee of an uncertain obligation arising from a continuous transaction relationship between the obligee and the obligor, the surety is liable to perform the entire principal obligation during the due period. However, in a case where the surety anticipated or could have anticipated the scope of the principal obligation at the time of guaranteeing the obligor, the principal obligation was incurred in excess of an objective reasonableness exceeding the expected scope, and as such, the obligee was aware of the circumstances where the principal obligor’s assets significantly aggravated, and where the obligee was unable to know of such circumstances without any notice or intention, and thus, the obligee’s claim for the entire performance of the principal obligation against the surety is limited within the reasonable scope of the surety’s liability, unless there are special circumstances that are acknowledged as contrary to the good faith.

B. The case holding that even if the agency contract entered into between A and B entered into between B and B, if the credit sales of B with respect to B exceed 150% of the transaction deposit paid by B to B, it is nothing more than the provision of one of the reasons for termination of the contract, and it cannot be deemed that the scope of credit sales is limited within the limit of 150% of the transaction deposit paid by B with respect to the above agency transaction, since it is merely nothing more than the provision of one of the reasons for termination of the contract, it cannot be viewed as limiting the scope of credit sales within the limit of 150% of the transaction deposit paid by B.

C. In so-called continuous guarantee, even though the guarantor has not promoted friendship with the principal debtor and has given a guarantee without economic cost, such reason does not constitute a reason to limit the liability of the guarantor.

A. B. Article 428 of the Civil Code. Article 2 of the Civil Code

A. Supreme Court Decision 91Da14147 decided Oct. 8, 1991 (Gong1991, 2683), Supreme Court Decision 91Da9091 decided Dec. 24, 1991 (Gong1992, 65)

[Defendant-Appellant] Han-Gyeong, Inc., Counsel for defendant-appellant-appellant]

Defendant 1 and one other

Defendant 3 and one other, Defendants limited to Attorney Lee Jin-jin

Seoul High Court Decision 90Na33013 delivered on June 27, 1991

Each appeal shall be dismissed.

The costs of appeal shall be assessed against each appellant.

1. We examine the Plaintiff’s attorney’s grounds of appeal.

According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court below, the court below rejected the plaintiff's above assertion on the ground that the plaintiff asserted that the defendant 3 and the defendant 4 had jointly and severally guaranteed all of the present and future debts owed by the non-party 1 to the plaintiff in connection with the agency transaction with the plaintiff, it is not sufficient to recognize the plaintiff's above assertion, and that the non-party 2 and non-party 3's testimony is not sufficient to recognize the plaintiff's above assertion, and that the plaintiff's evidence Nos. 6 cannot be evidence to prove the above assertion in light of the macrosive evidence. Upon examining the evidence relation prepared by the court below, the court below's above determination of evidence is just and there is no error of law by misunderstanding facts contrary to the rules of evidence or the rules of experience, or by misunderstanding the legal principles of joint and several sureties contract, which affected the conclusion of the judgment, as argued in the lawsuit.

2. We examine the grounds of appeal No. 1 by Defendant 1 and Defendant 2’s attorney.

Upon examining the evidence established by the court below in accordance with the records, the court below's finding that Defendant 1 and Defendant 2 concluded a joint and several surety contract with the plaintiff on February 1986 between the plaintiff and the non-party 1 to pay all the present and future debts to the plaintiff in connection with the agency transaction with the plaintiff. There is no error of finding facts in violation of the rules of evidence, such as the theory of the lawsuit, and there is no error of finding facts against the rules of evidence, and the theory that the above defendants' guarantee contract was unilaterally prepared without the intent of the above defendants under the non-party 4, which is the wife of the above non-party 1, is merely an error of the legitimate confirmation of facts belonging to the whole authority of the court of fact-finding.

In addition, at the time of the conclusion of the above guarantee contract, the Plaintiff, the obligee, did not notify the above Defendants, the principal obligor, of the existence and scope of Nonparty 1’s existing obligation, or discontinued several months without any transaction with Nonparty 1 after the conclusion of the guarantee contract, the above guarantee contract, like the theory, is an expression of intent by fraud for the purpose of securing the guarantee obligation only, or cannot be deemed null and void as an unfair juristic act contrary to the good faith principle.

The judgment of the court below to the same purport is just, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as the theory of lawsuit.

3. We examine the second ground for appeal.

(1) In light of the records, even if the guarantee period began on March 1, 1986 as alleged by the above Defendants and there is no liability to guarantee the existing outstanding amount, in the settlement of the price of goods with the plaintiff and the above non-party 1, as long as the above non-party 1 had taken the so-called prior payment method, which appropriated the amount deposited by the above non-party 1 to the plaintiff after March 1, 1986, for the payment of the price of goods at the time of payment, which occurred first and was appropriated for the repayment of the obligation that became due first, the above non-party 1 appropriated the amount deposited by the plaintiff after March 1, 1986 for the previous existing obligation, and then it is clear that the remaining amount would be more than the amount claimed by the plaintiff if appropriated for the payment of goods after March 1, 1986.

Since the above agency contract of Nonparty 1 has been renewed every year and the guarantor's joint and several surety contract for the agency contract has been renewed every year, the above defendants are not liable for the existing debt existing at the time of concluding the guarantee contract of this case. However, as the court below duly established, the above defendants agreed that the above non-party 1 bears the guarantee liability for the present debt incurred by the plaintiff in relation to commercial transaction with the plaintiff. Thus, the above reasons such as the theory of lawsuit alone do not bear the guarantee liability for the principal debt incurred after the expiration of the guarantee contract of the above non-party 1, the above non-party 1 cannot be exempted from the guarantee liability for the existing principal debt existing at the time of concluding the guarantee contract of the plaintiff of the above non-party 1. Thus, since the scope of the principal debt against the plaintiff is calculated by the so-called prior payment method, or the scope of the principal debt is different by the so-called prior payment method, the judgment of the court below is without merit and there is no error in the conclusion of the judgment in this case.

(2) As seen in the instant case, even in a case where the so-called continuing guarantee is guaranteed by an obligee and an obligor with uncertain obligation arising from a continuous transaction, the surety is obligated to perform the entire obligation during the due period. However, in a case where the surety was expected or could have anticipated the scope of the principal obligation at the time of guaranteeing the obligor, the primary obligation was incurred in excess of the objective reasonableness beyond the expected scope, and as such, the obligee, even though he was aware of the significant aggravation of the status of the principal obligor’s assets, may limit the obligee’s liability to the reasonable extent, only if there are special circumstances deemed to be contrary to the good faith, such as where the obligee’s claim against the surety for the entire obligation is deemed to have been contrary to the good faith, by intentionally expanding the scale of transaction without any notice or intention of the obligee, even though he was aware of the considerable aggravation of the status of the principal obligor’s assets, and there is no evidence supporting the lower court’s assertion that the above obligation had been significantly aggravated after the above guarantee or that there was no increase in the size of assets.

According to the instant agency contract concluded between the Plaintiff and the above non-party 1, if the credit sales amount of the above non-party 1 against the above non-party 1 exceeds 150% of the transaction deposit paid by the above non-party 1, the Plaintiff may terminate the said contract, but the Plaintiff did not notify the above non-party 1 of the transaction amount by expanding the transaction amount exceeding 150% in violation of the management guidelines for the management of the outstanding amount, and thus, the above Defendants' liability for guarantee should be limited. However, even if the Plaintiff agreed that the transaction amount exceeds 150% of the transaction deposit, the above contract can be terminated, and it cannot be deemed that the above contract is limited within the limit of 150% of the transaction deposit paid by the above non-party 1 to the Plaintiff, and it cannot be deemed that the above defendants' debt would occur within the limit of 150% of the transaction deposit and joint and several surety cannot be viewed as violating the above management guidelines for the non-party 1 without any economic reasons. Furthermore, even if the above non-party 1's counter-party 1.

The court below's decision to the above purport is just and there is no violation of law like the theory of lawsuit.

In addition, the plaintiff's theory argues that since the plaintiff unfairly reversed the agency contract of this case with the above non-party 1 before the expiration of the contract period, the above defendants' liability of guarantee should be limited. However, as the theory of lawsuit, if the credit sales of the above non-party 1 exceed 150% of the transaction deposit, as long as the plaintiff can terminate the contract, the above termination of the contract cannot be justified and it cannot be justified. All arguments are without merit.

4. Therefore, each appeal by the Plaintiff, Defendant 1 and Defendant 2 is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Song Man-man (Presiding Justice)