Main Issues
In case that the reference land price is publicly announced at the time of the adjudication of expropriation and the reference land price is thereafter publicly announced before the adjudication of expropriation, the standard land price shall be calculated.
Summary of Judgment
If the standard land price is a public notice only at the time of the adjudication of expropriation, but the standard land price is not publicly notified, then the public notice of the standard land price under Article 29 (3) of the Act on the Utilization and Management of the National Territory was made before the adjudication of an objection, but this public notice does not take effect retroactively to the public notice of the target land price. Thus, damage caused by land expropriation shall be calculated at the time of the adjudication of expropriation regardless of the above standard land price.
[Reference Provisions]
Article 46 of the Land Expropriation Act, Article 29 of the Act on the Utilization and Management of the National Territory
Reference Cases
Supreme Court Decision 81Nu103 Decided March 23, 1982, 81Nu158 Decided May 24, 1983
Plaintiff-Appellee-Appellant
Hyundai Motor Corporation (Attorney Gyeong-young, Counsel for defendant-appellant)
Defendant-Appellant-Appellee
Central Land Tribunal (Attorney Kim Jong-chul, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)
Judgment of the lower court
Seoul High Court Decision 80Gu279 delivered on July 28, 1981
Text
The part of the judgment below against the plaintiff is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court.
The defendant's appeal is dismissed.
The costs of the appeal by the defendant shall be borne by the defendant.
Reasons
1. The plaintiff's attorney's grounds of appeal are examined.
According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below held that, on the premise that the land of this case, which was incorporated into the industrial site development project zone executed by the plaintiff, the local land expropriation committee of Gyeongbuk-do decided Sep. 29, 1979 and the defendant made a decision to change compensation among the above expropriation ruling of Feb. 29, 1980, the above local land expropriation committee did not dispute between the parties that the land of this case was subject to the public notice of the standard land price under the Act on the Utilization and Management of the National Territory at the time when the above local land expropriation committee made a decision to expropriate the land of this case, the compensation amount due to the expropriation of this case shall be determined pursuant to Article 29 (5) of the Land Expropriation Act and excluded from the application of Article 46 of the Land Expropriation Act based on macro evidence on the basis that the standard land price under Article 29 (5) of the Act on the Utilization and Management of the National Land of this case as of Aug. 21, 1978 is the most appropriate compensation amount.
However, according to the records, the above local land expropriation committee can recognize the fact that the standard price for the land was only the area subject to the public announcement at the time of the adjudication of expropriation, and the standard price was publicly announced as August 21, 1978 by Construction Part No. 493 of the Ministry of Construction and Transportation (No. 3139 of Dec. 5, 1978). According to the provisions of Article 29 (3) of the Act on the Utilization and Management of the National Territory (No. 3139 of Dec. 5, 1978), in assessing the standard price, it is necessary to investigate the arm's length price as of the date of the public announcement of the target area, but it cannot be said that the standard price becomes retroactively effective on the date of the public announcement of the target area, and the calculation of losses caused by the expropriation of land should be based on the time of the adjudication of expropriation. Thus, even if the standard price did not have been determined based on the legal principles as to the amount of losses before the adjudication of expropriation.
2. The defendant's attorney's grounds of appeal are examined.
Since the cooking of evidence alleged as a question belongs to the exclusive authority of the fact-finding court, it is not reasonable to discuss it.
3. Therefore, the part of the judgment of the court below against the plaintiff is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court which is the court below. The defendant's appeal is dismissed, and the costs of the appeal are assessed against the defendant. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges.
Justices Kim Young-ju (Presiding Justice)