[1] Where a suspect submits a letter of waiver of ownership to an investigator during the investigation process, whether the investigative agency’s duty to return seized articles is exempted (negative), and whether the suspect’s right to claim the return of seized articles is also extinguished (negative)

[2] In a case where a disposition of suspending prosecution was rendered because it is unclear as to whether the seized article was a breach of duty, whether the disposition of reverting the seized article to the National Treasury is not permissible and whether it is necessary to continue the seizure (negative)

[1] [Majority Opinion] Even if a person subject to return, such as a person subject to seizure, loses his/her right under the substantive law due to the waiver of ownership after the seizure, such failure to exercise any influence on the duty of the investigative agency to return the seized articles, and even if an investigative agency expresses its intent to waive the right to return under the Criminal Procedure Act, it cannot be deemed that the investigative agency’s duty to return is not effective and thus, it cannot be deemed that the said person’s duty is exempted. Thus, the right to return the seized articles that correspond to the above duty of return

The return of seized objects is not a granting the right to the returned object or a right under the substantive law to the person subject to the return, but merely returning it to the state prior to the seizure by cancelling the seizure, regardless of the right under substantive law. Thus, it cannot be said that the existence or alteration of the right under the Civil Act as an entity affects the status of the person subject to the return of seized objects under the Criminal Procedure Act as the procedural law. In addition, in the quasi-appeal procedure regarding the disposition of seized objects, which is a criminal justice procedure, it is inappropriate to determine the existence or absence of the intention to waive the ownership, the validity of the declaration of intention, and the existence or absence of defects, and ultimately, it is a matter to be resolved by civil procedure. Thus, even if the person subject to the return, such as the person subject to the seizure, loses the right under substantive law by waiver of ownership after the seizure, it cannot be said that there is any influence on the duty of the investigation agency to return the seized objects, which therefore is not necessary to continue the seizure.

In full view of the purport of Articles 133(1), 219, and 486 of the Criminal Procedure Act, when a continued seizure of seized articles is no longer necessary, an investigation agency shall return the seized articles to the National Treasury, except in cases where such seizure is impossible to return them, and may not be exempted from its obligation to return the seized articles by allowing a person to return the seized articles to waive the right to return the seized articles. The Act strictly provides for the procedures and methods to revert the seized articles to the National Treasury, as well as prepares for the need to keep the seized articles from return to the criminal. In addition, other methods than those prescribed by the Act, allowing the person subject to seizure, etc. to return the seized articles to the National Treasury by having the person subject to seizure, etc. waive their obligation to return the seized articles by having the person subject to seizure, etc., lose their right to return the seized articles by going against the constitutional spirit of guarantee of human rights and guarantee of property rights pursuant to due process, and Article 133 of the Criminal Procedure Act, which provides that the restitution of the seized articles may be necessary and set up a system for confiscation.

Therefore, even in cases where a person who is subject to the return of seized articles, such as the person subject to the seizure, expresses his/her intention to waive the right to return to the investigation agency under the Criminal Procedure Act, it cannot be deemed as being exempted from the requisite return obligation of the investigation agency. Thus, the right under the procedural law that can claim the return of seized articles corresponding to the duty

[Dissenting Opinion] The purport of the main sentence of Article 133(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act is that the original seizure is conducted on articles used as evidence or deemed to be confiscated (Article 106 of the Criminal Procedure Act). Thus, in a case where the continued seizure is no longer necessary, the seizure should be returned even before the completion of the case, and there is no mention as to whether the duty to return the seized articles is exempted in a case where the person subject to seizure waives the right to return the seized articles, and Article 486 of the Criminal Procedure Act provides the method of disposal in a case where it is impossible to return the seized articles due to the unknown whereabouts of the person subject to return in the course of execution of the trial after the court's decision to return the seized articles became final and conclusive, and where this provision applies mutatis mutandis to the investigation procedure, the prosecutor already decided to return the seized articles but decided to return them to the National Treasury through the public announcement procedure where it is difficult to keep them, and it cannot be deemed an exception provision that recognizes exemption from the duty to return the seized articles

In general, if a right holder renounces his/her right, it is natural that the obligation to respond to the seizure ceases to exist if it is valid, and in light of the general theory on whether the right holder renounces his/her right, first, although Article 133 of the Criminal Procedure Act is an individual public right, the main purpose of the right holder's right to return the seized article is to protect the economic interest of the seized article rather than the public interest element. Furthermore, when the right to return the seized article is not established in a non-prosecution disposition against the suspected facts, it is most cases where returning the seized article to the person subject to seizure is against social justice or unreasonable result to return the seized article even though there is a risk that the seized article will be again offered for the crime. Second, even if the person subject to seizure waives his/her right to return the seized article, it is not necessary to deny that the right of the person subject to seizure does not affect the owner's right if he/she belongs to a third party, the majority opinion considers that there is no possibility that the right holder's right to return the seized article would affect the specific third party's right.

If the ownership of the seized article is renounced, the State shall be deemed to have acquired ownership (the ownership of the seized article is occupied by the State, so it shall be interpreted by the owner's refusal of ownership or by the declaration of intention of transfer of ownership to the State as of February 27, 1968, and thus the State can acquire ownership.) Even if the seized article is returned upon the request for return, the State may demand the return based on ownership so that it can be demanded again, and thus the right to demand the return would no longer be available. Therefore, the majority opinion argues that the procedure for dance would be repeated or unnecessary disputes concerning the seized article will be caused. The majority opinion is understood to the purport that a dispute arising from the waiver of ownership will be treated again as a civil case after the return of the seized article, but this is contrary to the fundamental spirit of the Korean Civil Procedure Act, which seeks to promptly resolve legal disputes, such as a remedy order under Article 25 of the Act on Special Cases concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings, etc., in a criminal trial.

As such, in a case where a person subject to seizure submits a written renunciation of ownership to an investigation agency, barring any special circumstance, the right to return the seized article shall be deemed to have been waived. As such, the investigation agency is not obligated to return the seized article to the person subject to seizure unless there is a special circumstance to the contrary. However, in a case where the waiver of ownership by the person subject to seizure was made by a defective declaration of intent due to coercion, deception, etc. of the investigation agency, the waiver of ownership

[2] Even if foreign goods were seized on the grounds that they were suspected of being subject to customs duties, in the event that a disposition of suspending prosecution was taken on the grounds that it is difficult to determine who was removed from customs duties by anyone, such seized goods cannot be readily deemed as goods subject to customs duties, and thus, they cannot be deemed as belonging to the National Treasury, and the seizure is no longer necessary.

[1] Articles 133, 219, and 486 of the Criminal Procedure Act; Articles 215 and 229 of the Customs Act; Article 15 (2) of the National Security Act / [2] Articles 133 and 219 of the Criminal Procedure Act

[1] Supreme Court Decision 62Da211 delivered on July 12, 1962, Supreme Court Order 670Mo70 delivered on February 27, 1968, Supreme Court Order 68Da824 delivered on May 27, 1969 (defluence), Supreme Court Order 68Mo824 delivered on February 27, 1968 (defluence) / [2] Supreme Court Order 84Mo61 delivered on December 21, 1984 (Gong1985, 447), Supreme Court Order 88Mo55 delivered on December 14, 198 (Gong1989, 321), Supreme Court Order 10Mo10 delivered on April 22, 1991 (defluence)

Re-appellant

Attorney Lee E-soo

Seoul Criminal District Court Order 94Nu3 dated July 8, 1994

The order of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Seoul District Court Panel Division.

The grounds of reappeal are examined.

1. The court below rejected the quasi-appeal of this case seeking the cancellation of the custody order on the ground that the re-appellant did not have to continue to seize the above multimond on the ground that it was found to sell the same multimond and was discovered to the police and was investigated under suspicion of violation of the Customs Duties Act, and that the above multimond was confiscated. The prosecutor's investigation conducted the investigation that the above multimond's location of Non-party 1, the client for mediation of the first sale and purchase of the multimond was unknown and it was not known that the above multimond's location was a non-party 1, the client for mediation of the above multimond's first sale and purchase, and decided to keep the same multimond as to the above multimond. The court below rejected the quasi-appeal of this case seeking the cancellation of the above multimond's custody order on the ground that the above multimond's continued possession and other rights were not asserted during the investigation process, and thus, the re-appellant cannot seek the cancellation of the above disposition or other legal interests.

2. A. However, even if a person subject to the return, such as the person subject to the seizure, loses his/her right under substantive law after the seizure, such failure to exercise any influence on the duty of the investigation agency to return the seized articles, and even if the investigation agency expresses its intent to waive the right to return in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Act, it cannot be deemed that the investigation agency’s duty to return cannot be deemed as exempted by the lack of validity. Thus, the right to return the seized articles that correspond to the above duty of return cannot be extinguished due to the declaration of intent to waive the ownership of the seized articles

In other words, (1) The return of seized articles does not confer ownership or other rights under substantive law on the returned articles to the person who is subject to the return, but merely restores them before the seizure by cancelling the seizure (see Supreme Court Decisions 62Da211 delivered on July 12, 1962, 68Da824 delivered on May 27, 1969, etc.). This is to be done against the holder at the time of seizure regardless of the rights under substantive law. Thus, it cannot be said that the existence or change of rights under the Civil Act as a substantive law (judicial) affects the status of the person subject to the return under the Criminal Procedure Act (public law). It is inappropriate to determine the existence or absence of the intention to waive ownership or the validity of the declaration of intention, which is a civil dispute, or the existence of defects in the disposal of seized articles, which is a criminal justice procedure, and it is a matter to be resolved through a civil procedure. Thus, even if a person subject to the return, such as the person subject to the seizure, loses the rights under the Criminal Act, it does not need to continue the seizure.

Therefore, Supreme Court Order 67Mo70 dated February 27, 1968, which held that if the person to whom the seizure was made, expresses his/her intention to waive the ownership of the seized article in the course of the investigation, the right to claim the return of the seized article shall be extinguished.

(2) Furthermore, Article 133 (1) (main sentence) of the Criminal Procedure Act, which applies mutatis mutandis to the return of seized articles by an investigative agency pursuant to Article 219 of the same Act, provides that "the seizure shall be returned by ruling even before the completion of the case," and Article 486 of the same Act, which applies mutatis mutandis to the disposition of seized articles by an investigative agency pursuant to Article 219 of the same Act, provides that where the whereabouts of a person to whom the seizure is to be returned is unknown or it is impossible to return seized articles for other reasons, such seized articles shall revert to the National Treasury through a certain procedure. In light of the purport of each of the above provisions, if the continued seizure is no longer necessary, the investigative agency shall return seized articles without fail to return them unless it is impossible to return them, and it shall be deemed that the person to be returned may not be exempted from the duty of return of the seized articles by means of having the person to be returned waive the right

In addition, the right to return the seized articles, such as the person subject to seizure, to an investigative agency, is a right under the Criminal Procedure Act corresponding to the requisite return obligation of the investigative agency. In addition, the right under public law (public right) which an individual has against the State, especially a waiver of the right under the procedural law, and allowing the State to be exempted from the obligation under the procedural law, cannot be permitted as a matter of principle, except as otherwise provided in the law. The Act provides that the deprivation of ownership of the seized articles can be limited to the judgment of forfeiture in principle. Meanwhile, Article 486 of the Criminal Procedure Act, Article 215 and Article 229 of the Customs Act, and Article 15 (2) of the National Security Act provide that the seizure articles shall revert to the National Treasury without the judgment of forfeiture, and Article 15 (2) of the National Security Act provides that the Act strictly provides for the procedure and method of devolving the seized articles to the National Treasury, and provides for a system that allows the National Treasury to return the seized articles to the National Treasury by holding it necessary to guarantee property rights due process.

Therefore, even in cases where a person subject to a return of seized articles, such as a person subject to seizure, expresses his/her intention to waive a right to return to an investigation agency under the Criminal Procedure Act, it cannot be deemed that the investigation agency's duty to return is exempted due to its lack of validity. Thus, the right under the procedural law to request the return of seized articles corresponding to the duty to return shall

B. According to the records, the re-appellant was investigated about the sales process and source of the above Dmond immediately after the arrest of the re-appellant, and was later transferred to the Seoul Customs office. On September 15, 1993 and September 16 of the same year, 1993, five days after he was investigated, and the investigator was asked the prosecutor of the Seoul District Public Prosecutor's Office to conduct an investigation into the Re-Appellant, etc., and the above prosecutor instructed the re-appellant to "after receiving a notice of refusal of ownership from the suspect, it is clear that the above investigator, etc. received an order from the re-appellant that the market price of the above Dmond was 65,00,000 won or more at the time of the arrest of the re-appellant, and it is evident that the prosecutor again received an order from the prosecutor that the above Dmond did not claim any right or ownership of the above Dmond, and that the above Dmond was not subject to prosecution.

However, even if foreign goods were seized in the light of the suspicion of customs duties, if the disposition of the suspension of indictment was taken on the grounds that it is difficult to determine who was removed from customs duties by the re-appellant, the seized goods cannot be deemed to be goods as customs stolen, and it cannot be deemed to have accrued to the National Treasury as well as it is no longer necessary to continue seizure (see Supreme Court Order 84Mo61, Dec. 21, 1984; Order 88Mo5, Dec. 14, 198; Order 91Mo10, Apr. 22, 1991; Order 91Mo10, Apr. 22, 1991; Order Damond’s seizure cannot be deemed to have been carried out on the above multimond’s goods, and thus, once the re-appellant disposed of the aforementioned multimond goods as customs stolen goods, it cannot be deemed to have been exempted from the prosecutor’s duty to return the above goods as well as the prosecutor’s declaration of intent to return them under the former Montreal Act.

Therefore, the order of the court below contrary to this is erroneous in the misunderstanding of legal principles as to the return of seized articles, which affected the decision. Therefore, the ground of reappeal assigning this error is with merit.

3. Therefore, the order of the court below shall be reversed and the case shall be remanded to the court below. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices Park Jong-sung, Lee Yong-chul, Lee Chang-chul, and Lee Jae-soo,

4. Dissenting Opinion

When the requirements for seizure prescribed in the Criminal Procedure Act (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”) are extinguished, the Majority Opinion states that even if the person subject to seizure waives all the rights to the seized property, the said person cannot be exempt from the obligation to return the seized property, and that the seized property must be returned to the person subject to seizure, except as otherwise provided by the Act

A. First, the Majority Opinion argues that the investigative agency cannot be exempted from the duty to return seized articles even if the person subject to seizure waives all the rights to the seized articles, based on the positive legal basis of Article 219 of the Act, Articles 133(1) main text and 486 of the Act, which apply mutatis mutandis to the return of seized articles by the investigative agency

However, the purport of the main sentence of Article 133(1) of the Act is that the original seizure is conducted with respect to articles used as evidence or deemed to be confiscated (Article 106 of the Act). Thus, in cases where the continued seizure is no longer necessary, it is merely stipulated that the seized articles should be returned even before the completion of the case, and there is no mention as to whether the person subject to seizure has been exempted from the obligation to return the seized articles in cases where he/she renounced his/her right to return the seized articles, and Article 486 of the Act stipulates the method of disposal of the seized articles in cases where it is impossible to return the seized articles due to such reasons as the whereabouts of the person to be returned in the course of execution of the judgment after the court became final and conclusive, and in cases where it is applied mutatis mutandis to the investigation procedure, the prosecutor has already decided to return the seized articles but decided to return them, and it cannot be deemed an exception provision that recognizes the exception that the person subject to seizure is exempt from the obligation to return the seized articles.

Therefore, it is not reasonable to interpret that the Majority Opinion does not exempt the person subject to seizure from the duty to return to the investigative agency, even if the person subject to seizure renounces his/her right to the seized article on the grounds of the main sentence of Article 133(1) and Article

B. The majority opinion argues that even if the person subject to seizure waives his/her right to claim the return of seized articles, the duty of return by the person subject to seizure is not exempted or the person subject to seizure's right to claim the return of seized articles is not extinguished. However, in general, if the person subject to seizure waives his/her right, it would be natural that the person subject to seizure's duty to respond would be extinguished if it is valid, and in light of the general theory as to whether the person subject to seizure waives his/her right to claim the return of seized articles, first, although Article 133 of the Act has his/her right to claim the return of seized articles, the main legislative intent of Article 133 of the Act protects the person's economic interest rather than the public interest. Furthermore, the issue of waiver of the right to claim the return of seized articles is that the person subject to seizure is not established in a non-prosecution case where the person subject to seizure would not have any influence on the person subject to seizure's right to claim the return of seized articles.

Therefore, the person subject to seizure, who is the right holder, may waive the right to return the seized article according to his free will, and if it is valid, the investigation agency as a result shall be deemed exempted from the duty to return the seized article.

C. In addition, the majority opinion argues that, in cases where each Act, such as Articles 215 and 229 of the Customs Act, and Article 15(2) of the National Security Act, etc., provides for the preparation for the crime subject to seizure so that the ownership of the seized articles may not be restored to a criminal offender by trial, if allowing the person subject to seizure to waive the ownership, etc. of the seized articles in addition to the procedures for reversion to the National Treasury as specifically provided for in each Act, the abuse of the right to investigate, thereby infringing the people's property rights and infringing the property rights, and Article 133 of the Act stipulating that the return of seized articles is necessary and mandatory.

However, it can not be said that the current law is prepared for all necessary preparations in preparation for the case where the ownership cannot be deprived of the stolen property by trial, and rather, it should be said that the preparation of perfect legal regulations in preparation for this case is close to the reality.

The current Criminal Procedure Act does not provide a special procedure that enables confiscation, etc. in cases where there is no prosecution against the accused. For example, the case itself should be suspended from prosecution, but in cases where customs stolens or tools used for the crime have been seized, it cannot be punished because it is an insane or a criminal minor at the time of the crime, but in cases where the tools used in the crime or articles acquired through the crime and not belonging to a third party are confiscated, or in cases where the suspect himself/herself is a customs stolen, but in cases where he/she decides to suspend prosecution without prosecution without prosecution due to lack of proof as to the process or date, etc. of acquiring stolens or stolens even though they are subject to necessary confiscation but omitted in the judgment even though there is an expression of intent to waive ownership or right to return such articles, etc. from the suspect when they are confiscated to the National Treasury, or in cases where the confiscated articles are not returned to the person against judicial justice, unless there is any express provision that the seizure articles should not be returned to the person subject to confiscation.

In particular, if the waiver of the right to demand restitution is not permitted, a public prosecution is bound to be instituted for the purpose of being confiscated, which is expected to be used, and this will result in unreasonable results that not only reflects the suspect's own will who voluntarily renounced the right to the seized article, but also restricts the prosecutor's specific exercise of the right to demand a prosecution.

Therefore, in such cases, it would contribute to the realization of specific justice to allow the suspect to exercise the same effect as the confiscation by expressing that the suspect voluntarily renounces the ownership of the seized article and does not exercise the right to return to the investigation agency.

In addition, recognizing the waiver of the right to claim the return through the waiver of ownership on the seized articles is intended not to recognize the validity of the waiver of ownership made by deception or coercion by the investigative agency, but to recognize the validity of the waiver of ownership only when the waiver of ownership based on the genuine intent of the holder is made (Article 47 of the Rules on the Affairs of Seized Articles by the Prosecutors' Office provides that a prosecutor shall receive a written waiver of ownership if the owner expresses his/her intent to waive ownership). It cannot be said that the abuse of the right to claim the waiver of ownership does not always lead to the abuse of ownership, and that it does not violate the constitutional provisions on the guarantee of property rights by recognizing the waiver of ownership by the owner’s genuine will of the right holder. As such, it is not reasonable to argue that Article 133 of the Act is a dead culture because the right holder who only recognizes the validity of the waiver of ownership based on the genuine will of the right holder has waived ownership only in exceptional cases where he/she is able to do so in order

D. Next, the majority opinion argues that the existence or alteration of the right under the substantive law, such as the loss of ownership after the seizure, does not affect the status of the person to whom the seized article is to be returned, and the purport thereof is that even if the person to whom the seized article has already been seized expresses his/her intention to waive ownership to the investigation agency after the seizure, it does not affect the right to return the seized article, and therefore, the investigation agency should return the seized article to the person to whom the seized article has been seized.

In general, there is no theory that the waiver of ownership as a sole act may be effective. The majority opinion recognizes the waiver of ownership, but its effect is only limited to the reversion under private law, and it does not affect the validity of the claim for return, which is a public right, so even if the person subject to seizure waives ownership, it shall be deemed that the state acquires ownership. However, since there is a waiver of ownership on the seized property, it shall be deemed that the state acquires ownership (such as the possession of the state, it shall be interpreted as the non-owner's refusal of ownership and the declaration of transfer of ownership to the State can be acquired by the State as the owner's refusal of ownership or the declaration of intention of transfer of ownership to the State on February 27, 1968.) As such, even if the property is returned upon a request for return, it shall be deemed that the State is able to file a request for return based on ownership, and thus, the majority opinion does not have any legal interest in the seizure of the seized property. Thus, the court below's decision that there is no legal interest in the claim for cancellation of the right.

The majority opinion is understood to the effect that a dispute arising from the waiver of ownership is once dealt with as a civil case after the return of seized property, but this is contrary to the fundamental spirit of our country's litigation law to promptly resolve the legal dispute by hearing civil damages, such as a compensation order under Article 25 of the Act on Special Cases Concerning Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings.

Therefore, the reason why the person subject to seizure submits the seized articles for seizure in the course of investigation or renounces ownership is that the suspect suspected of being subject to seizure, who voluntarily renounces the economic interest in the subject matter of seizure in the event that it is proved guilty or that he/she provided it to the investigation agency and cooperates with the investigation agency in order to form a favorable condition for him/her. Therefore, the substantial meaning of the expression of intent to waive ownership means that the person subject to seizure waives all rights in respect of the subject matter of seizure (or seizure) and thus, it is realistic to interpret that the investigative agency is exempted from its duty to return. Therefore, deeming that the person subject to seizure’s right to return should have the same as it is, but only waivers the ownership in private law is extremely unrealistic and formal logic, and that the conclusion that the duty to return the seized articles by the investigation agency cannot be exempted in any case cannot be avoided.

The theory that the return of seized articles shall be conducted to the holder at the time of seizure regardless of the rights under substantive law is a system that restores the seized articles to the state before seizure by cancelling the seizure. Therefore, the theory that the return should not be returned to a person other than the person to whom the seized articles are seized, considering the legal relationship under substantive law, is not the theory that the return should be denied in cases where the person to whom the seized articles are seized waives the right to return or wishes

As such, if a person subject to seizure submits a written waiver of ownership to an investigation agency, the person subject to seizure shall be deemed to waive his/her right to return the seized article, unless there are special circumstances to the contrary, so the investigation agency shall not be obligated to return the seized article to the person subject to seizure. However, if the waiver of ownership is made by a defective declaration of intention due to coercion, deception, etc. of the investigation agency, it is reasonable to view that the person subject to seizure may claim the return of the seized article as a

E. In addition, Article 37(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that a fact may be investigated if necessary for a decision or order. As such, the existence or absence of an intention to waive ownership or a defect in the declaration of intention in the quasi-appeal procedure against the disposition of seizure or return of seized articles by a prosecutor or a judicial police officer may be examined. As such, it is not appropriate to conduct such a review in the quasi-appeal procedure, and there is no cadastral basis with the Majority Opinion that the right under the procedural law is not extinguished even if the person subject to seizure waives ownership

F. The problem is that, as the majority opinion concerns, it is difficult to prove the defect in the declaration of intention to waive ownership made by the person to whom the seizure was made, the investigative agency is easy to leave the suspicion that the person to whom the seizure was made would be subject to the waiver of ownership by an unreasonable means of suppression, and if so, the right to property of the person to whom the seizure was made would be infringed. However, in principle, the burden of proof is that the person who has expressed his/her intention to waive ownership by claiming the defect in the declaration of intention. However, in consideration of the value of the seized object, the fact that the seizure is true, acquittal, and seriousness of the crime, the burden of proof is considered as a person who has expressed his/her intent to prove the defect in the declaration of intention, and the reasonable operation of the procedure for the examination of evidence is determined in consideration of specific cases, and on the other hand, the investigation agency would prevent the omission of the right to claim ownership by unreasonably suppressing means, and on the other hand, it would be a fundamental and appropriate solution to this problem.

Therefore, it is not clear that the fundamental solution of the above problem is to be newly established, such as allowing the presumption in a certain case or allowing the withdrawal of the intention to waive the right to claim the return of seized property within the scope that does not undermine the stability of the litigation procedures. However, the Majority Opinion’s view that the waiver of ownership is not possible at all as the waiver of the right to claim the return and the exemption of the obligation to return are not appropriate as the approach to the resolution.

The majority opinion seems to have invoked the theory that a lawsuit of possessory right under Article 208 of the Civil Act cannot be tried on the ground of the principal right as it is for the claim for return of seized property, but this is for the purpose of removing the illegal infringement of possession. Therefore, it cannot be invoked from seizure, which is due process of law.

G. In conclusion, in cases where a person subject to seizure voluntarily submits a written waiver of ownership to an investigation agency based on the genuine intent, barring any special circumstance, the claim for return shall be deemed to have been waived, and thus, the obligation of the investigation agency to return seized objects shall be interpreted to be exempted. Therefore, we cannot agree with the Majority Opinion. Although Supreme Court Order 670Mo70 Decided February 27, 1968 differs from its explanation, it is reasonable to maintain the same purport as above, it is fundamentally,

H. In the instant case, if there is no evidence to acknowledge that the re-appellant had been forced by an investigation agency as asserted in the grounds of re-appeal when he expresses his intention to waive ownership against Dmond, which is the seized object of this case, the re-appellant waived the right to claim return to the investigation agency by submitting a written waiver of ownership to the investigation agency as to Dmond, which is the seized object of this case, and therefore, the investigation agency should be deemed exempted from the duty to return.

Therefore, the order of the court below that dismissed the claim for return since the re-appellant did not have the right to claim return against the Dmond of this case, is justified, and the re-appeal shall be without merit.

Chief Justice Yoon-young (Presiding Justice) (Presiding Justice), Kim Jong-soo, Justice Kim Jong-ho, Justice Kim Jong-ho, Justice Park Jong-ho, and Justice Lee Jae-ho, Justice Lee Jong-hee, Justice Lee Jong-hee, Justice Lee Jong-hee, Justice Lee Jong-hee, Justice Lee