[1] Whether the ownership in the forest register restored for administrative convenience by the competent administrative agency at the time of enforcing the former Cadastral Act exists (negative), and whether there is a presumption of changes in the rights in the survey of classification for the use of private forest (negative)

[2] Whether the entry of the owner in the forest survey report under the Shipbuilding Forest Survey Order is presumed (affirmative) and the verification of the successor to the land from the title holder

[1] At the time of the enforcement of the former Cadastral Act (amended by Act No. 2801 of Dec. 31, 1975), there was no procedure for restoring the destroyed forest register. Therefore, the forest register restored for administrative convenience by the administrative agency having jurisdiction over the forest register cannot be deemed to have been legally restored. Therefore, the owner’s entry in the forest register cannot be the evidence proving the ownership attribution. A survey on the classification of use of public forests is a document prepared for the administrative purpose that Gyeonggi-do intends to investigate the actual state of use of public forests and use it as the material for the public forest creation project, and it is not the register indicating the ownership change, and thus, the burden of proving the alteration of rights cannot be acknowledged.

[2] A person who is registered as an owner in a forest survey report under the Act on the Investigation of Forest Land and its Enforcement Decree shall be presumed to have received the assessment as a landowner and to have become final and conclusive unless there is any counter-proof such as a change in the content of the assessment by an adjudication. Therefore, a person who asserts succession from a person who claims

[1] Article 13 of the former Cadastral Act (Amended by Act No. 2801, Dec. 31, 1975); Article 186 of the Civil Act / [2] Article 3 of the former Decree on the Investigation of Forest Land in Shipbuilding (Ordinance No. 5, May 1, 1918)

[1] [2] Supreme Court Decision 95Da1613, 1620 decided Nov. 28, 1995 (Gong1996Sang, 158) / [1] Supreme Court Decision 92Da12216 decided Jun. 26, 1992 (Gong1992, 2275), Supreme Court Decision 93Da2322 decided May 25, 1993 (Gong193Sang, 1855), Supreme Court Decision 95Da3510 decided Feb. 13, 1996 (Gong196Sang, 93Da6091 decided Oct. 28, 1994)

Plaintiff (Attorney next full-time, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Korea

Seoul District Court Decision 95Na2233, 2240 delivered on February 16, 1996

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

Since there was no procedure for restoring the destroyed forest register at the time of the enforcement of the former Cadastral Act, the forest register restored for administrative convenience cannot be deemed to be legally restored, and therefore, the owner's column shall not be a document prepared for the administrative purpose of Gyeonggi-do to investigate the actual conditions of the use of the public forest and use it as the material for the development project of the public forest, and it shall not be recognized as the presumption of the alteration of rights in the entries. Meanwhile, unless there is any counter-proof such as the change of the contents by the ruling, a person registered as the owner of the forest survey report under the Shipbuilding Forest Investigation Ordinance shall be presumed to have become final and conclusive. Thus, a person who asserts the acquisition by succession from a person under the circumstance shall be responsible for proving the specific succession of ownership (see Supreme Court Decisions 95Da3510, Feb. 13, 1996; 200Da35196, Jun. 16, 192; 2000Da31969, Jun. 16, 1992).

According to the records, the court below's decision that the forest land of this case cannot be seen as being under the circumstances of Nonparty 1, who is the decedent of the plaintiffs, and it is difficult to consider only the classification of the use of public forest with the possession of ownership. The evidence of this decision alone is just and there is no violation of law such as misunderstanding of legal principles, incomplete hearing, and violation of the rules of evidence, etc., as pointed out in the judgment below. Nonparty 2, who is the title of circumstance, was already dead prior to the enforcement of the Forest Investigation Ordinance. However, according to the evidence No. 19, the above non-party 2 was born in 1890, and his child was born in 1919 (former year), and it is difficult to accept the presumption of the forest land of this case before Non-party 2's death.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed and all costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Jeong Jong-ho (Presiding Justice)