All appeals are dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the Plaintiff.

The grounds of appeal are examined (to the extent of supplement in case of supplemental appellate briefs not timely filed).

At the time of the enforcement of the former Cadastral Act (amended by Act No. 2801 of Dec. 31, 1975, hereinafter the same), there was no procedure for restoring the destroyed forest register, so the forest register restored by the competent administrative authority in the forest register for administrative convenience cannot be deemed legally restored. Therefore, the entry of the owner cannot be the evidence proving the ownership of the land.

(See Supreme Court Decision 92Da12216 delivered on June 26, 1992). In addition, in order for the Plaintiff to seek the cancellation of the registration of preservation of ownership completed in the name of the Defendant, the Plaintiff must actively assert that the Plaintiff had the title to file a claim for the cancellation thereof, and if it is not recognized that the Plaintiff had such title, the Plaintiff’s claim cannot be accepted even if the registration of the invalidation for which the registration of preservation of ownership in the name of the Defendant of the snow company should be cancelled.

(See Supreme Court Decision 98Da17831 delivered on February 26, 199). The court below acknowledged that K was under the circumstances of the real estate No. 1 in the forest register of this case (hereinafter “the forest register of this case”) on December 6, 1920, and it is reasonable to view that the forest register of this case was prepared around November 30, 1972, prior to the enforcement of the amended Cadastral Act as the restoration of the original register, it is difficult to recognize the burden of presumption of rights as to the owner’s item’s item’s item’s item’s item’s item’s item’s title, and even if K was recognized as having the capacity of presumption of rights as to the forest register of this case’s land before the division of this case on around 1920, the court below dismissed the claim of this case on the ground that the circumstances asserted by the plaintiff alone alone are insufficient to recognize the fact that K and the Plaintiff’s Magkk is the same person.