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(영문) 대법원 1989. 11. 14. 선고 88도1251 판결
[현주건조물방화,집회및시위에관한법률위반,폭력행위등처벌에관한법률위반,병역법위반 등][공1990.1.1(863),65]
Main Issues

A. Amendment to and reversal of the applicable law after the judgment of the appellate court

B. Probative value of the suspect interrogation protocol against the defendant prepared by the prosecutor

Summary of Judgment

A. If Article 14(4), Article 3(1)4 of the former Assembly and Demonstration Act (amended by Act No. 4095, Mar. 29, 1989; Act No. 4095, Mar. 29, 199; Act No. 4095, Apr. 4, 198; Act No. 4099, Feb. 29, 199; Act No. 3090, Feb. 19

B. The protocol of interrogation of the defendant prepared by the public prosecutor is admissible unless there is any reason to suspect that the defendant's statement recorded in the protocol is not voluntary, in case where the defendant's statement in the protocol is acknowledged to have been made in the court room, and in case where the existence of voluntariness is disputed, the court shall make a judgment with free conviction by taking into account all the circumstances, such as the form and contents of the protocol, the academic background, career, intelligence

[Reference Provisions]

Articles 14(4) and 3(1)4 of the former Assembly and Demonstration Act (wholly amended by Act No. 4095, Mar. 29, 1989); Articles 19(4) and 5(1) of the Assembly and Demonstration Act; Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act

Reference Cases

B. Supreme Court Decision 87Do2048 Delivered on November 24, 1987

Escopics

1. Defendant (A, B, C, D) 2. Defendant (A, B)

upper and high-ranking persons

Defendants

Defense Counsel

Attorney Cho Jong-sik et al. (Defendant 1, 2)

Judgment of the lower court

Seoul High Court Decision 88No259 delivered on June 3, 1988

Text

The judgment below is reversed and the case is remanded to Seoul High Court.

Reasons

1. We examine ex officio the Defendants’ violation of the Assembly and Demonstration Act.

Articles 14(4) and 3(1)4 of the former Assembly and Demonstration Act, which were enforced at the time of the instant act, are completely amended to Articles 19(4) and 5(1) of the same Act, which were subsequent to the pronouncement of the judgment of the court below, pursuant to Article 4(4) and 4(1) of the same Act, which were subsequent to the pronouncement of the judgment of the court below. As such, the judgment of the court below is erroneous in the application of the Act

2. We examine the Defendants’ grounds of appeal on the remaining criminal facts.

The protocol of interrogation of the accused prepared by the public prosecutor is admissible unless there is any reason to suspect that the statement of the accused recorded in the protocol is not made voluntarily, and the admissibility of the protocol is disputed, and the court, depending on the specific case, can judge the whole circumstances such as the form and contents of the protocol, the academic background, career, intelligence, etc. of the person who made the statement free will (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 87Do2048, Nov. 24, 1987). According to the records, the accused submitted a written statement about the facts charged and a written statement to the effect that the accused's mistake is divided into two times from the public prosecutor. In addition, if the accused's statement is examined four times, the examination place, the method and contents of the interrogation, the academic background, career, intelligence, etc. of the accused, the public prosecutor's statement before the public prosecutor is acknowledged to be voluntary.

In addition, each protocol of suspect examination against the Defendants, each protocol of suspect examination on the Defendants, each protocol of suspect examination on Nonindicted 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 regarding the preparation of handling of affairs by prosecutors and judicial police officers, and each protocol of prosecutor's interrogation on Nonindicted 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 regarding the preparation of handling of affairs by the prosecutor and judicial police officers, and each protocol of prosecutor's examination on the high leap, Kim Young-ho, Kim Jong-ho, Kim Jong-ho, Kim Jong-ho, and anti-scop were not considered as evidence of guilt in the instant case. It is clear that the Defendants consented to the second protocol of prosecutor's examination on the yellow scopon as to the yellow scopon of prosecutor's preparation

3. However, since the crime of violation of the Assembly and Demonstration Act against the Defendants is both the concurrent crimes under the former part of Article 37 of the Criminal Act, the judgment of the court below against the Defendants cannot be reversed even if the appeal against other crimes are groundless as above.

Therefore, the judgment of the court below is reversed and the case is remanded to the court below. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Ansan-man (Presiding Justice)

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심급 사건
-서울고등법원 1988.6.3.선고 88노259