Seoul Administrative Court 2010Gudan14926 ( October 11, 2011)

Cho High Court Decision 2010Du0675 (Law No. 19, 2010)

Even if he resides at the same domicile, he is recognized as an independent household with independent living capabilities.

Even if the mother was residing in the same domicile, it is reasonable to view that the mother has formed an independent household with independent living capabilities due to the economic income that is derived from the lease income that the mother would engage in a substantial economic activity in his own name after receiving the earned income of a certain amount of each month from the age of 30 or more at the time of transferring real estate.

Article 154 of the Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act: Scope of One House for One Household

2011Nu1017 Revocation of Disposition of Imposing capital gains tax

AAA

Head of Sungbuk Tax Office

Seoul Administrative Court Decision 2010Gudan14926 decided February 11, 2011

November 1, 2011

January 13, 2012

1. The defendant's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Defendant.

1. Purport of claim

The imposition of capital gains tax of 233,466, and 330 won which the defendant notified to the plaintiff on December 1, 2009 shall be revoked.

2. Purport of appeal

The judgment of the first instance is revoked. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

1. Quotation of judgment of the first instance;

The reasons for this Court to be stated in this decision shall be as follows, and shall be determined by the first instance court as provided in subsection (2) or (3).

Except for the supplement of judgment, this is the same as the judgment of the first instance, and this is cited.

2. Parts in height:

Section 2-b. Paragraph b. (No. 4, No. 15 to No. 6)

( Sector) be dismissed as follows, and the annex of this Judgment shall be attached thereto:

1. As shown in the Attachment of the relevant Acts and subordinate statutes.

3. Parts supplementing the judgment of the court of first instance;

While the defendant reached the trial, the plaintiff and the BB resided at the same domicile for the most time after August 1995 until the time of the transfer of the real estate of this case. Considering the income confirmed by the plaintiff and the BB's taxation, the amount of credit bad debt of this BB, and the circumstances that this B borrowed most of the purchase price for the association apartment purchased in the name of this principal from CC, the plaintiff and the BB can not be viewed as constituting one household independently where they live together with her mother and live together with her mother. However, in addition to the evidence in the judgment of the first instance court, the plaintiff and the B have the independent ability of each independent household at the time of the transfer of the real estate of this case, and the following circumstances recognized by considering the results of the fact-finding on the evidence Nos. 16 and No. 21 (including the provisional number) submitted by the plaintiff in the trial of the first instance, it is insufficient to view that the plaintiff and the B had the independent ability of each independent household at the time of the transfer of the real estate of this case.

A. Article 154(2)1 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 21301, Feb. 4, 2009) provides that where the pertinent resident’s age is not less than 30 years, it shall be deemed as one household even if the said resident’s age is not less than 30 years old. In the case of the Plaintiff and the PlaintiffB, the pertinent real estate transfer age was not less than 30 years old. Of course, this is premised on the relevant resident’s independent living ability (see Supreme Court Decision 98Du1319, Oct. 23, 198), and as seen thereafter, this requirement is satisfied in the case of the Plaintiff or BB.

(b) As stated in the judgment of the first instance court, this BB has been working in a printing office operated by thisCC or in a placement office operated by thisCC for a considerable period of time and has received a certain amount of wages every month, and is found to have been engaged in considerable economic activities in its own name by purchasing automobiles in its own name, purchasing cancer treatment insurance, or using credit cards in its own name.

C. In the case of the Plaintiff, as recognized in the judgment of the first instance court, there is an economic income that can lead an independent life due to the lease income of the instant real estate, the lease income of the inherited property, the sales income, etc. In particular, in the case of the instant real estate, the Plaintiff is fully supported by the practical drawings (Evidence A No. 21) additionally submitted at the trial and the details of the report on the transfer of the lot number of the said real estate (the result of the inquiry of

D. The Defendant asserted to the effect that, in selling GG New Town Co., Ltd., as stated in the judgment of the court of first instance, it was insufficient to support the fact that the witnessCC of the court of first instance, who was its holder, had lent a considerable amount of money to this BB, had insufficient independent living capacity of this BB. However, through such circumstance, whether thisCC acquired the above apartment under the name of BB or thisCC donated the apartment purchase fund to thisB is insufficient to support the fact that the above apartment purchase fund was not proven to be the Plaintiff’s money, as long as it was not proved that the said apartment purchase fund was the Plaintiff’s money.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the judgment of the first instance court is justifiable, and the defendant's appeal is dismissed, and it is so ordered as per Disposition.

partnership.